IMT Nuremberg Archives

H – 1166

International Court of Justice

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# INDEX TO
# RAEDER DOCUMENT BOOK 10A

| Doc.No. | Exhibit No. | English Transcript Page | Doc. Book Page | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| C.17 | US 42 | 435 | 1 | Table of contents of "History of the German Navy 1919-39". |
| C.21 | GB 194 | 2660 | 6 | Extracts from file on intensification of U-boat warfare. |
| C.32 | US 50 | 448 | 8 | Survey list compiled after the conference with the Chief of "A" Section on September 9, 1933. |
| C.35 | US 132 | 1171 | 16 | Extract from War Diary re "Barbarossa". |
| C.41 | GB 96 | 1097 | 18 | Memorandum on "Questions of territorial expansion and bases" dated 3.6.40 signed Fricke. |
| C.50 | US 554 | 2191 | 20 | Order of the Fuehrer 13 May 1941 signed Keitel concerning application of military jurisdiction in area of "Barbarossa". |
| C.51 | GB 162 | 2407 | 25 | Order signed by Keitel dated 27 July 1941 concerning destruction of C.50. |
| C.59 | GB 121 | 1138 | 26 | Order for the execution of the Operation "Marita" dated Feb 19 1941, signed Warlimont. |
| C.62 | GB 106 | 1115 | 27 | Directive No. 6 for the conduct of the war dated Oct 9, 1939, signed Hitler, and order re "Fall Gelb" dated Oct. 15, 1939, signed Keitel. |
| C.63 | GB 87 | 1079 | 30 | Order signed Keitel dated 27 Jan 1940 re Study "N". Preparation for Weseruebung. |
| C.64 | GB 86 | 1076 | 31 | Report by Raeder of meeting of Naval Staff with the Fuehrer on Dec 12, 1939, subject Norwegian question. |
| C.65 | GB 85 | 1073 | 33 | Memorandum signed Rosenberg re visit of Quisling. |
| C.66 | GB 81 | 1065<br>1073<br>1076 | 35 | Memorandum from Raeder to Assmann dated 10 Jan 1944 re "Barbarossa". |
| C.72 | GB 109 | 1117 | 40 | Series of orders from Nov. 1939 to May 1940 postponing "A" Day in the West. |
| C.75 | US 151 | 1227<br>1248 | 58 | Directive No. 24 regarding collaboration with Japan dated 5 Mar 1941 signed Keitel. |

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|---|---|---|---|---|
| C.102 | US 74 | 560 | 59 | Instructions from Hitler re Operation "Otto" 11.3.38. |
| C.103 | US 75 | 561 | 61 | Directive dated 11.3.38 signed Jodl. |
| C.115 | GB 90 | 1090 | 62 | Extracts from file of Naval Operation Orders for Operation "Weseruebung". |
| C.118 | GB 195 | 2662 | 64 | Note re authorisation of attacks on US Merchantmen dated 18 July 1941. |
| C.120 | GB 41 | 997 | 65 | Directives from Hitler and Keitel preparing for war in the invasion of Poland. |
| C.122 | GB 82 | 1067 | 91 | "Gaining of bases in Norway". Extract from War Diary. |
| C.126 | GB 45 | 1005 | 92 | Preliminary orders for "Fall Weiss" and directions for secret mobilisation. |
| C.127 | GB 125 | 1145 | 95 | Directive No. 25 March 27, 1941, signed Hitler. |
| C.134 | GB 119 | 1137 | 96 | Letter from Jodl enclosing memo. on conferences between German and Italian Generals on 19 Jan 1941 and Hitler's speech of 20 Jan 1941. |
| C.136 | US 104 | 807 | 101 | Order of 21 Oct 1938 signed Hitler re 1) the securing of the frontiers of Germany and protection against surprise air attacks; and 2) the liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia. |
| C.137 | GB 33 | 988 | 102 | Supplement dated 24 Nov 1938, to Hitler's order C.136 and signed by Keitel. |
| C.139 | US 53 | 458 | 103 | Memo from Blomberg to Chief of the Army High Command and others dated 2 May 1935 re Operation "Schulung" |
| C.140 | US 51 | 451 | 104 | Memo from Blomberg to Chief of Army High Command and others and directive for the Armed Forces in case of sanctions. |
| C.151 | GB 91 | 1091 | 106 | Extracts from Operation Order "Hartmut", occupation of Denmark and Norway signed Doenitz dated 30 March 1940. |
| C.153 | US 43 | 440 | 107 | Armament plan for the third armament phase dated 12 May 1934 signed Raeder. |
| C.159 | US 54 | 460 | 110 | Instructions from Blomberg to C-in-C the Army and others dated 2.3.36 re decision to regard as obsolete certain obligations accepted in the Locarno Treaty. |

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|---|---|---|---|---|
| C.167 | GB 122 | 1139 | 112 | Report by Raeder of interview with the Fuehrer on 18 March 1941. |
| C.174 | GB 89 | 1082 | 113 | Directive for "Fall Weseruebung" dated 1 March 1940 signed Hitler. |
| C.175 | US 69 | 547<br>738<br>971 | 117 | Directive for the unified preparation for war of the Armed Forces. dated 24 June 1937 and letter of transmittal signed Blomberg. |
| C.182 | US 77 | 576 | 127 | Directive No. 2 re "Operation Otto" signed Hitler 11 March 1938. |
| C.191 | GB 193 | 2660 | 128 | Memorandum on "Demands of Flag Officer U-Boats" dated 22 Sept. 1939. |
| 004 PS | GB 140 | 2356 | 129 | Rosenberg report to the Fuehrer dated 17 June 1940 regarding "The Political Preparations of the Norway action". |
| 007 PS | GB 84 | 1069 | 135 | Report on activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau from 1933-43 signed Rosenberg. |
| | | 735, 741-8, 760-5, 769-76, | 147 | |
| 388 PS | US 26 | 793, 798-807, etc. | | File on "Fall Grun" |
| 440 PS | GB 107 | 1115 | 240 | Directive No. 8 for the conduct of the war dated 20 Nov 1939 signed Keitel. |
| 444 PS | GB 116 | 7133, 1166 | 243 | Directive No. 18 dated 12 Nov 1940 signed Hitler. |
| 446 PS | US 31 | 382, 1170 | 247 | Directive No. 21 for "Barbarossa" dated 18 Dec 1940 signed Hitler. |
| 447 PS | US 135 | 1175, 1189 | 252 | Supplement to Directive No. 21 dated 13 March 1941 signed Keitel. |
| 448 PS | GB 118 | 1135 | 255 | Directive No. 22 "Participation of German Forces in the fighting in the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, dated 11 Jan 1941, signed Hitler. |
| 503 PS | US 542 | 2175 | 258 | Hitler order regarding destruction of sabotage troops enclosed with Hitler memo dated 19 Oct.1942 |
| 789 PS | | | 261 | Conference 23 Nov. 1939. |
| 798 PS | US 29 | 280, 371 | 266 | Fuehrer's speech to the C's-in-C on 22 August 1939. |
| 1014 PS | US 30 | 371 | 269 | Speech by the Fuehrer on 22 Aug. 1939. |
| 1541 PS | GB 117 | 1134 | 270 | Directive No. 20 "Operation Marita" dated 13 Dec. 1940 signed Hitler. |

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|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1760 PS | US 57 | 468,490 | 272 | Affidavit George S. Messersmith dated 28 August 1945. |
| 1807 PS | GB 227 | 2738 | 288 | Extract from Jodl's diary. |
| 1809 PS | GB 88 | 1080 | 289 | Excerpts from Jodl's diary. |
| 1877 PS | US 152 | 1231,1251 | 320 | x |
| 2261 PS | US 24 | 334 | 323 | Memo from Blomberg dated 24 June 1935 to the Supreme Commander of the Army, Navy and Air Force and the Reich Defence Law of 21 May 1935. |
| EC 194 | US 214 | 1343-4 | 328 | Memo signed Keitel dated 31 Oct. 1941, subject: use of prisoners of war in war industry. |
| TC 31 | GB 79 | 1063 | 330 | Assurance to Norway 2nd Sept. 1939. |

x Memorandum of a conversation between the Reichs Foreign Minister and the Japanese Foreign Minister in Berlin on 29th March 1941.

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TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT OF DOCUMENT C-17
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

# HISTORY OF THE GERMAN NAVY 1919 - 1939

Part A (1919 - THE YEAR OF TRANSITION), Chapter VII. First efforts to circumvent the Versailles Treaty and to limit its effects. Page 70

(a) Demilitarisation of the Administration, incorporation of Naval offices in Civil Ministries, etc.

(e.g. Incorporation of greater sections of the German maritime observation station and the sea-mark system in Heligoland and Kiel, of the Ems - Jade - Canal, etc into the Reich Transport Ministry up to 1934; Noskes' proposal of 11.8.1919 to incorporate the Naval Construction Department in the Technical High School, Berlin; formation of the "Naval Arsenal Kiel".) Page 75.

(b) The saving from destruction of coastal fortifications and guns.

1. North Sea (strengthening of fortifications with new batteries and modern guns between the signing and the taking effect of the Versailles Treaty; dealings with the Control Commission - information, drawings, visits of inspection, result of efforts. Page 85.

2. Baltic. (Taking over by the Navy of fortresses Pilau and Swinemünde; salvage for the Army of 185 movable guns and mortars there.) Page 90.

3. The beginnings of coastal air defence. Page 95.

Part B (1920- 1924, - THE ORGANISATIONAL NEW ORDER) Chapter V.

The Navy
Fulfilment and avoidance of the Versailles Treaty Page 140.

Foreign Countries
(a) The inter-allied Control Commissions Page 145.
(b) Defense measures against the fulfilment of the Versailles Treaty and independent arming behind the back of the Reich Government and the legislative bodies. Page 150.

1. Dispersal of artillery gear and munitions, of hand and automatic weapons. Page 155.

2. Limitation of demolition work in HELIGOLAND. Page 160.

3. Attempt to strengthen personnel of the Navy, from 1923. Page 165.

4. The activities of Captain Lohmann (founding of numerous associations at home and abroad, participations, formation of "sports" unions and clubs, interesting the film industry in naval recruitment) Page 170.

5. Preparation for re-establishing the German U-boat arm since 1920
(Projects and deliveries for Japan, Holland, Turkey, Argentine and Finland. Torpedo testing) Page 175

6. Participation in the preparation for building of the Luftwaffe (preservation of aerodromes, aircraft construction, teaching of courses, instruction of midshipment in anti-air raid defence, training of pilots). Page 180.

7. Attempt to strengthen the mining branch. Page 185.

Part C (1925 - 1932. REPLACEMENT OF TONNAGE) Chapter IV.

The Navy, The Versailles Treaty,
Foreign Countries.

(a) The activities of the Inter-allied Control Commissiones (up to 31.1.27; discontinuance of the activity of the Naval Peace Commission)
Page 110.

Independent armament measures behind the back of the Reich Government and legislative bodies up to the LOHMANN case.
Page 120.

1. The activities of Captain LOHMANN (continuation) their significance as a foundation for the rapid reconstruction work from 1935.
Page 125.

2. Preparation for the re-strengthening of the German U-boat arm from 1925 (continuation), the merit of LOHMANN in connection with the preparation for rapid construction in 1925, relationship to SPAIN, ARGENTINE, TURKEY; the first post war U-boat construction of the German Navy in SPAIN since 1927; 250 ton specimen in FINLAND, preparation for rapid assembly; electric torpedo; training of U-boat personnel abroad in SPAIN and FINLAND. Formation of U-boat school in 1932 disguised as an anti U-boat school.
Page 130

3. Participation in the preparation for the reconstructic of the Luftwaffe (continuation). Preparations for a Naval Air Arm, Finance Aircraft Company Sevra, later Luftdienst GMBH; Naval Flying School Warnemünde; Air Station List, training of sea cadet candidates, Military tactical questions "Air Defence Journeys", technical development, experimental station planning, trials, flying boat development DoX etc., catapult aircraft, arming, engines ground organisation, aircraft torpedoes, the Deutchsland Flight 1925 and the Seaplane Race 1926
Page 135

4. Economic re-armament (The Tebeg" - Technical Advice and Supply Company as a disguised Naval Office abroad for investigating the position of raw materials for industrial capacity and other War economic questions.)
Page 140

5. Various measures. (The NV Aerogeodetic Company - secret investigations.)
Page 145

(c) Planned Armament Work with the tacit approval of the Reich Government, but behind the backs of the legislative bodies (1928 to the taking over of power)
Page 150.

1. The effect of the Lohmann case on the secret preparations; winding up of works which could not be advocated; resumption and carrying on of other work.
Page 155

2. Finance question. ("Black Funds" and the Special Budget).
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3. The Labour Committee and its objectives Page 165

(d) The Question of Marine Attaches
(The continuation under disguise; open re-appointment 1932-1933).
Page 170.

(e) The question of Disarmament of the Fleet abroad and in Germany
(The Geneva Disarmament Conference 1927; the London Naval Treaty of 1930; the Anglo-French-Italian Agreement 1931. The League of Nations Disarmament Conference 1932).



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(Autumn 1933. November 1935) Page 30.

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(7.11.35) Page 35.

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III The Re-armament of the Navy under the Direction of the Reich Government in a disguised way.
(1933 up to the achieving of military freedom in 1935) Page 45

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(The legal framework of the Navy; change of names and new formations from 1935) Page 90

(c) German-English Fleet Relationship from 1933 Page 95

1. The attitude of the Führer to the question of competitive re-armament and a new fleet rivalry threatening peace Page 100

2. The German-Anglo Naval Agreement dated 18.6.35. Contents: example of voluntary limitation of armament; chief points: the nullification of all naval conditions of the Versailles Treaty, for example the prohibition of U-boats, aircraft, coastal fortifications. (Concerning this, 15.11.1936, the declaration of the German Government over the suspension of the limiting conditions of the Versailles Treaty.) Reich Soverneignty of waterways, for example territorial rights in the North Sea - Baltic Canal. The extensive discussions of 22.6.35 over the future qualitative limitations of construction programme. The German renunciation of the unrestricted U-boat warfare of 25.6.1935. The fulfilment of the Naval Agreement in the year 1937 and the discussions of December 1938. The abrogation of the Treaty on 28.4.1939 Page 105

(d) Naval Activity in new construction after the conclusion of the Anglo-German Agreement Page 115

1. New plans for expansion and measures for the construction programme; launchings and commissionings, coastal fortifications. (The effects of the preparations of the period 1919-1920 - with the U-boat arm.) Comparisons with foreign countries. Page 120

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(e) The Personnel side of re-armament. Page 130

1. The increase in numbers Page 135

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF EXCERPT OF DOCUMENT C-17

I, Gerard Schaefer, 2d Lt, Inf, 0-1332102, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document No. C-17.

GERARD SCHAEFER
2d Lt, Inf.
0-1332102

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U.K.53.

(SEC-24.3/C-21

# INTENSIFICATION OF U-BOAT WARFARE

(Extracts from a File)

(N.B. In extracts 4 and 5 the words in brackets are explanations and NOT part of the translated text)

1. Page 1. Conference with Head of Naval War Staff: 1.1.40.
Special Points

1) Report by I a (Translator's Note: Chief of Staff) on Directive of Armed Forces High Command of 30.12. According to this, the Führer, on report of C.in C. Navy, has decided:

(a) "Greek merchant vessels are to be treated as enemy vessels in the zone blockaded by U.S.A. and Britain.

(Pencil Note: "For the conduct of the air war too? See page 5 above")

(b) In the Bristol Channel, all ships may be attacked without warning. For external consumption these attacks should be given out as hits by mines.

Both measures may be taken with immediate effect".

2. Page 5. Conference with Head of Naval War Staff 2.1.40.

Special Points:

1) Report by Ia on Directive of Armed Forces High Command, dated 30.12., referring to intensified measures in naval and air warfare in connection with "Fall Gelb" ✗

In consequence of this Directive, the Navy will authorise, simultaneously with the general intensification of the war, the sinking by U-boats, without any warning, of all ships in those waters near the enemy coasts in which mines can be employed. In this case, for external consumption, pretence should be made that mines are being used. The behaviour of, and use of weapons by, U-boats should be adapted to this purpose.

✗ Translator's Note: "Fall Gelb" is the German Code word for the invasion of Holland and Belgium.

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(SEC-24.3/C.21.)

3. Page 37. U-boats Warfare against Merchantmen
6.1.40.

..... the Führer has in principle agreed (see minutes of report of C.in C. Navy of 30.12.) to authorise firing without warning whilst maintaining the pretence of mine hits in certain parts of the American blockaded zone. In accordance with this, the following order is herewith given to the Flag Officer Submarines, Group East and Group West:

"All U Boats in the North Sea, position between 61° and 56° North and 4° W and 0°, are authorised to make immediately unrestricted use of weapons against all ships. Attacks should be unobserved so that the pretence of mine hits can be maintained".

4. Page 139.
18.1.40.

Special Points:

1) The High Command of the Armed Forces has issued the following Directive dated 17.1. cancelling the previous order concerning intensified measures of warfare against merchantmen:

"The Navy will authorise, with immediate effect, the sinking without warning by U Boats of all ships in those waters near the enemy coasts in which the use of mines can be pretended.

U-Boats must adapt their behaviour and employment of weapons to the pretence, which is to be maintained in these cases, that the hits were caused by mines. Ships of the U.S.A., Italy, Japan and Russia are exempted from these attacks".

("Spain" has been added underneath in green pencil)

.....(The Naval High Command, commenting on this order, says:) The pretence of mine hits must be maintained, i.e. the boats must avoid being seen by the use of electric torpedoes; and they may fire without warning only in areas in which the use of mines can be pretended.

5. Page 221.
26.1.40.

Extract from minutes of report of C.in C.Navy to Führer

.....(After mentioning the Führer's decisions on, and agreement with, measures for intensifying U-Boat warfare against merchant shipping the minutes end with the words:) Attacks should be unobserved in order to preserve as far as possible the pretence of hits by mines.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-32
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

3 copies SURVEY LIST COMPILED AFTER THE CONFERENCE WITH THE CHIEF OF "A"
1st copy (Illegible notes) SECTION ON 9 SEPTEMBER 1933

MOST SECRET
I Material Measures

Neu A II v 4212/33 Most Secret

| Ser No. | Measure | Details | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Exceeding the permitted number of mines | Number permitted: 1665<br>Actual number: 3675<br>x) should occasion arise, this number could possibly be increased by the addition of newly delivered mines. | Further mines are in part ordered, in part being delivered. |
| 2 | Continuous storing of guns from the North Sea area for Baltic artillery batteries. | The following guns, which according to the Versailles Treaty may be removed temporarily from their positions for maintenance reasons only, are permanently stored up in the Baltic area:<br>3 - 30.5 cm<br>3 - 28 cm<br>68 - 15 cm<br>14 - 10.5 cm<br>8 - 8.8 cm<br>96 guns | Justification: Necessity for over-hauling. Cheaper repairs. |
| 3 | Non-destruction of guns which could be used for new ships and other new guns by the preparations for new armament. | Since 1919, the following guns have been newly constructed:<br>6 - 28 cm (for Deutschland)<br>48 - 15 cm (for Deutschland, cruiser)<br>22 - 10.5 cm<br>4 - 8.8 cm<br>80 guns | Since then, the following guns have been handed over to the Army for scrapping:<br>10 -28 cm (actually scrapped)<br>8 -21 cm A receipt was sent<br>7 -21 cm from the Army<br>25 -15 cm to the Naval<br>8 -10.5cm Staff (B.W.) saying<br>30 - 8.8cm that the 99<br>2 - 7.02cm guns had been<br>9 - 3.7 cm scrapped. We know however that the guns were not scrapped. As this is so, the question is settled as far as the Navy is concerned. |



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| Ser. No. | Measure | Details | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4 | Deviation from the places settled by the Entente for the disposition of coastal batteries. | When the change in armament took place, the following batteries were not set up in exactly the places laid down by the Entente.<br>Coronal, Borkum (4-28cm)<br>Grosser Kurfurst, Pillau (3-28cm)<br>Graf Dohna, Pillau (3-17cm)<br>v. Hermann, Pillau (2-8.8cm) | A transfer conditioned by modernisation, to avoid firing damage and to gain a clear field of fire. Coronel has been set up within the battery area, the other 3 batteries outside it. A small point, Coastal fortifications are purely defence measures. When the equality of rights has been recognised, discussion on this question is unnecessary. |
| 5 | Laying gun-platforms for artillery batteries and storing Flak ammunition in Borkum, Sylt, Norderney, where no Flak batteries have been allowed. | Gun-platforms for the following artillery Flak batteries have been layed or are being constructed in positions not allowed by the Entente:<br>8 in Pillau<br>7 in Swinemuende<br>2 in Bug<br>2 in Nest<br>1 in Borkum | Flak defence is purely a defence measure. |
| 6 | Laying gun-platforms in the Kiel area. | The following gun-platforms have been laid or are being constructed in the Kiel area for artillery Flak batteries:<br>2 completed<br>4 in construction | The offence over and above that in Serial number 3 lies in the fact that all fortifications are forbidden in the Kiel area. This justification will make it less severe: pure defence measures. |
| 7 | Exceeding the calibre permitted for coastal batteries | v.d.Groeben 3-17cm in place of 6-15cm<br>Graf Dohna 3-17cm in place of 6-15cm | Possible justification is that, though the calibre is larger, the number of guns is less. |
| 8 | Arming of Mine-Sweepers. | The arming of the mine-sweepers of the 1st and 2nd mine-sweeping half flotillas. The armament consists of:<br>1 - 10.5<br>1 - MG C/30 | The reply to any remonstrance against this breach: the guns are taken from the Fleet reserve stores, have been temporarily installed only for training purposes. All nations arm their mine-sweeping forces (equality of rights). |



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H1166 - 0015



| Ser No. | Measure | Details | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|
| 9 | Arming of 6 E-boats and 8 Motor mine-sweepers. | The boats have MG C/30. E-boats are also equipped with torpedoes. | Reply to the question: arming: Only temporary for training and experimental purposes. |
| 10 | Setting up practice Flak batteries. | Several practice Flak batteries have been set up for training purposes in positions where, according to the Versailles Treaty, they are not allowed. | The practice Flak batteries stand on provisional gun-platforms so that the character of the temporary measure may be retained. Training of personnel purely as a defence measure. |
| 11 | Salute battery Friedrichsort. | The battery should be equipped only with 7.7 cm field guns rendered unserviceable it has however, 4 8.8 cm A/A guns quite ready for use. | Purely a defence measure. |
| 12 | Exceeding the amount of allowed ammunition. | The permitted total amt. of ammunition has been exceeded to the following extent:<br>Actual Amt. / Amount permitted<br>17 cm 16 700 / 14 600<br>15 cm 90 000 / 85 600<br>10.5cm 87 000 / 134000<br>88cm 166 000 / 164 000<br>6 cm 3 600 / 8 600<br>3.7cm 63 500 / 118 000<br>426 800 / 524 800<br>The numbers are given in round figures. The ammunition for heavy artillery has not been included as in this case the actual amount is less than the amount permitted. | At the present moment; large quantities of ammunition are in part being produced, in part being delivered so that the total amount of ammunition permitted will also soon be exceeded. To the question: Ammunition for heavy artillery is not so much as allowed. The contingents of material stocks were not fixed in any of the agreements and suggestions for Naval disarmament already made. Equality of rights. |
| 13 | Exceeding the number of machine guns etc. permitted. | Amount permitted / Actual Amount<br>1) m/g's 656 / 954<br>2) rifles 10233 / 18133<br>3) pistols 3483 / 5553<br>4) gas-masks<br>22500 / 43000<br>The actual amount of ammunition, side-arms, hand-grenades, search-lights, smoke-apparti, etc. likewise exceed the amount permitted but not to any considerable extent. | Can be made light of. |

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| Ser. No. | Measure | Details | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|
| 14 | Obtaining 337 m/g C/30 without scrapping equally serviceable weapons. | 112 m/g C/30 have already been delivered. They are counted as machine guns. The corresponding number of m/g's has not, however, been destroyed. The existance of 2 cm ammunition with detonators is in itself already a breach of the Hague Treaty. | It devolves into a question of detonators. Otherwise it is a small matter. Weapons for a purely defensive measure (air defence). |
| 15<br>16 | Intended:<br>Arming of U-boat depot-ships.)<br>Arming of E-boat depot-ships.) | As the term "exempt ships" has not yet been applied to Germany, this arming is a breach of the Versailles Treaty. | For the present, the armament should not be mounted. |
| 17 | Intended construction of reserve destroyers of 1850 tons. | The question of reserve ships has not yet been settled in our favour. Under the Macdonald plan, the construction and tonnage would be justifieble. | Not to be settled until further notice. If necessary, it could be declared that, according to the Macdonald plan, it would be possible and that we had agreed to this plan. |
| 18 | Construction of U-boat parts. | | Difficult to detect. If necessary can be denied. |
| 19 | Intended construction of a large armoured ship. | | Not to be settled until further notice. On the other hand, it must be established that the possibilities of the Versailles Treaty have not yet been fully exploited. |
| 20 | Arming of fishing vessels. | | For warning shots. Make little of it. |
| 21 | Arrangement for Gebr. Thiel G.m.b.H. -Ruhla to undertake the further manufacture of mechanised detonators. Holding ready separate parts, mechanism, tools for the work, so that the time required for starting work is shortened. | Together with the Army. | These firms are permissable. The list has been superseded in any case by the exclusion of firms etc. To be made light of. |

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| Ser. No. | Measure | Details | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|
| 22 | Arranging for the Westfälisch-Anhaltische Sprengstoffabrik A.G. (Wasag). Reinsdorf to undertake the further manufacture of explosives. | Together with the Army. | These firms are permissable. The list has been superseded in any case by the exclusion of firms etc. To be made light of. |
| 23 | Arranging for Julius Pintsch A.G., Fürstenwalde (Spree) to undertake the production of mine-shells. | Together with the Army. | This firm is permitted only for torpedo tubes and air compressors. The list has been superseded in any case by the exclusion of firms etc. To be made light of. |
| 24 | Incorporation of the firm Kuhlmann, Wilhelmshaven in the work of manufacturing discharge opening cases. | According to the list of firms, K. is not permissible. | The list has been superseded in any case by the exclusion of firms etc. To be made light of. |
| 25 | Arranging for Fried. Krupp Grusonwerk A.G. Magdeburg to undertake the manufacture of Flak shells, Flak gun barrels, 2 cm to 10.5 cm. Holding ready part-materials, mechanisms, tools for the work so that the time required for starting work may be shortened. | Also not permissible. | |
| 26 | Arranging for the Mitteldeutsche Stahlwerke A.G., Lauchhammerwerk Grüditz to undertake the manufacture of Flak shells. Holding ready part-material, mechanisms, tools for the work so that the time required for starting work may be shortened. | Also not permissible. | |
| 27 | Arranging for A.G. Lignose, Sprengstoffabrik Schönebeck/ Elbe to undertake the manufacture of explosives. | Also not permissible. | |
| 28 | Arranging for Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnberg A.G., Augsburg Works to undertake the mass production of engine types, essential for war purposes. Holding ready part-material, mechanisms, tools for the work so that the time required for starting work may be shortened | The measure can be opposed as a whole as a preparation for mobilization. | Together with the Army. |

12

H1166 - 0018



| Ser. No. | Measure | Details | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|
| 29 | Preparations in the sphere of motor experimental boats. | | |
| 30 | Probably in the near future (up to and including 1934) the following serious breaches will be necessary:<br>1) Continuation of the work in A I, 1-3.<br>2) Continuation of the work in No. 21,22.<br>3) Continuation of the work in 24,25,26, 27, further work of 25 by Fried. Krupp Grusonwerk A.G. in the production of complete guns.<br>4) Expansion of the Work in 24-28 to include further armament spheres. | | |

H1166 - 0019



APPENDIX TO AII v 4212/33 MOST SECRET
MOST SECRET

II Measures of organization

(illegible notations)

| Ser. No. | Measure | Details | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Methodical preparatory work in preparation for mobilization. | Relevant correspondence and appropriate allotting of personnel (G.A.F. employees) The same applies to the Army | Can be regarded as a natural measure to take, with reference to the equality of rights. |
| 2 | Creating a camouflage system of economy. | The same with the Army. | |
| 3 | Negotiations with the civil authorities and the responsible part to be taken by them in the preparations for mobilization. | The same with the Army. The Army is taking the lead. | |
| 4 | Creating groups and departments of the military authorities, which are concerned solely with the preparations for reinforcement. | The same with the Army. | |
| 5. | Exceeding the permitted number of active personnel by the measures of reconstruction. | from 1 June 33 approx. 1500 persons from 1 Jan. 34 approx. 2300 persons The army accordingly. | In the navy, however, the number of officers is at the moment far <u>below</u> the officer quota given in the Versailles Treaty. |
| 6 | Inclusion of units of the Armed Forces in planned preparations for the defense of the Reich, by the appropriate measures of organization and training. | The same with the Army. | |
| 7 | Training outside the Armed Forces for the purpose of creating a reserve of leaders and sub-leaders, also the corresponding young replacements and a specialist reserve. | Training establishments in<br>Pillau — Wangerooge<br>Swinemünde — Schillig<br>Neustadt — Wilhelmshaven<br>Kiel — Borkum<br>in the large towns of the Reich outside the demilitarized zones. | with arms<br>without arms |

H1166 - 0020



| Ser. No. | Measure. | Details | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|
| 8 | Creating a replacement organization | imminent (Army) (started on 1 Oct. 33) | |
| 9 | Creating an L-officers corps | in camouflaged form the same with the Army | |
| 10 | Nominal and statistical roll of reserve personnel. | | |
| 11 | Professorships of military science | In connection with the Reich Ministry of Military Science. Same with the Army. | Lectures by active officers. |
| 12 | Determining the production capacity of the war-essential industries. | In cooperation with the Army. | |
| 13 | Preparations on paper for making full use of the war-essential industries in case of war. | In cooperation with the Army. | |
| 14 | Preparations for the supply organisation of the Armed Forces in War. | In cooperation with the Army. | |

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-32

12 November 1945.

I, ERNST M. COHN, PFC, 33925738, AUS, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German Languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. C-32.

ERNST M. COHN
PFC - AUS
33,925,738

15

(PARTIAL)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-35
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel

30 January 1941 Page 401(of diary)

7) Talk by Ia about the plans and preparations for the "BARBAROSSA" case to be submitted to the High Command of Armed Forces.

I) Objectives of war against Britain

a) Main purpose of the navy consists in continued actions against Britain. Possibility of intensifying U-boat war be necessary discontinuance of submarine training in the Baltic and thereby release of part of the training ships for combat duty.

b) Importance of securing of sea lanes on the West Coast of Norway by the temporarily suspended traffic in the Baltic. Since some battle-worthy security forces are not sufficient, additional combat-units from the Western theater of operation are indispensable.

II) Objectives of war against Russia.

Solution of the problem in spite of Russian superiority possibly by the sacrifice of a temporary discontinuance of our sea traffic(ore transports) in the Baltic.

a)Protection of our coast secured by presently existing or about-to-be reorganized coast artillery. Defense against enemy submarine attack by using units of submarines, pursuit ships and mine/sweepers.

b)Prevention of escape of enemy combat vessels from the Baltic secured by the defense power of our coastal batteries, by creating new mined waters, with suitable barrage and the existing big air threat.

Additional safety measures:

To get ready loaded minelayers for immediate tactical blockade and the installation of the "SCHLESIEN" and "SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN" ships as floating batteries.

Since it is not possible for the Navy to prevent the escape of smaller Russian combat vessels through the WEISSMEER canal, immediate commitment of air force is required to destroy locks of this canal.

c) To declare mineswept waters and to effect blockades to fortify present defensive powers and to discourage operations of Russian waterborn combat units against the Western Baltic at the start of war:

1)Danger zone "OLAND" between MEMEL and south end of "OLAND".
2)Danger zone "BORNHOLM" between KOLBERG-BORNHOLM and BORNHOLMYSTADT.
3)Danger zone at the south outlet of the Sund(renewed and enlarged)
4)Danger zone "GJEDSER ENGE"
5)Danger zone at the Western outlet of the Finnish Bay(offensive blockade)

Demands to the Swedish navy to blockade Swedish waters including the SOUTHKVARKEN-STREET(AALAND SEA)

D

16

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H1166 - 0022



d) To harass the Russian fleet by surprise blows as:
1) Lightning-like commitments at the outbreak of the war of air force units against strong points and combat vessels in the Baltic, Black Sea, and Ice Sea,
2) Actions with mines (e.g. with E-boats) against the Baltic strong points, attack of submarines against traffic center points, attack of camouflaged mine-layers from the cliffs. If opportunity arises, premature laying of delayed action mines.
3) To make use of the fighting power of the Finnish fleet is desirable. Important support of German objectives by a surprise laying of a blockade with Finnish ships inside the Gulf of Finland. (If the opportunity arises, material support is required).

e) Protection of the sea lanes in the Ice sea is possible, however, not so the elimination of the Russian main stronghold of POLARNOJE-MURMANSK. Here, a lightning-like attack of the air force is necessary (bombers and air mines)

f) In the Black sea, on account of Russian superiority, limitation to coastal defense and securing the Danube and its estuaries.

For early regulation of the Rumanian and Bulgarian objectives, timely appointment of liaison officers is asked, Besides support by furnishing mines and coastal guns, the transfer of river flotillas from the Netherlands to the lower Danube is intended.

Possibilities of preparing a minelayer for offensive purposes and air mine action are being examined.

g) In case Russia respects Swedish rights in her waters, German sea traffic in Swedish waters under convoy of Swedish war ships is aspired from North Sweden to the KATTEGAT.

h) Even after the elimination of the Russian Baltic Fleet, long lasting effects from the mine war, to be expected of Russia, are to be reckoned with, Since our minesweeper units are not at disposal, it is attempted to use also Finnish and Swedish combat vessels and to commit captured Russian booty ships, if the opportunity arises, with a Russian crew. The head of the naval war staff agrees with these proposals. They are submitted to the Armed Forces High Command per naval war staff I op 94/41. Top Military Secret, matter for Chief.

---

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-35.

13 Nov. 1945.

I, Ernst M. Cohn, PFC. 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. C-35.

17

Ernst M. Cohn
Pfc. 33925738.

(SEC24-4/C-41)

C 41.

COPY.

## QUESTIONS OF TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND BASES.

I. These problems are pre-eminently of a political character and comprise an abundance of questions of a political type, which it is not the Navy's province to answer, but they also materially affect thestrategic possibilities open, - according to the way in which this question is answered - for the subsequent use and operation of the Navy.

It is too well known to need further mention that Germany's present position in the narrows of the Helegoland Bight, and in the Baltic - bordered as it is by a whole series of states, and under their influence, - is an impossible one for the future of Greater Germany. If, over and above this, one extends these strategic possibilities to the point that Germany shall not continue to be cut off for all time from overseas by natural geographical facts, the demand is raised that somehow or other an end shall be put to this state of affairs at the end of the war.

The solution could perhaps be found among the following possibilities:

1) The territories of Denmark, Norway, and Northern France acquired during the course of the war continue to be so occupied and organised that they can in future be considered as German possessions.

This solution will recommend itself for areas where the severity of the decision tells, and should tell, on the enemy, and where a gradual "Germanising" of the territory appears practicable.

2) The taking over and holding of areas which have no direct connection with Germany's main body, and which, like the Russian solution in Hango, remain permanently as an enclave in the hostile state. Such areas might be considered possibly around Brest and Trondjem.

(Pencil Note) But this isn't at all the case with Trandjem.

This type of solution can only be discouraged. It is fraught with every conceivable weakness to which a bridgehead in a hostile country and national body, difficult of access, far removed from the home-land and thrown back on its own resources is subject. On the face of it the thought of having made provision for the outbreak of a fresh war is a right one. As, however, it has in mind the possibility of a war breaking out in the near or distant future, it is basically wrong and ineffectual.

(pencil Note) What does this mean in Norway's case?

3) The power of Greater Germany in the strategic areas acquired in this war should result in the existing population of these areas feeling themselves politically, economically, and militarily, to be completely dependent on Germany. If the following results are achieved:- that expansion is undertaken (on a scale I shall describe later) by means of the military measures for occupation taken during the war - that French powers of resistance (popular unity, mineral resources, industry, Armed Forces) are so broken that a revival must be considered out of the question - that the smaller states, such as the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway are forced into a dependence on us which will enable us in any circumstances and at any time easily to occupy these countries again - then in practice the same, but psychologically much more, will be achieved.

Pencil Note) No,I can't agree there as far as Trondjem is concerned. If we clear right out of Trondjem the British could make difficulties again one fine day.

18

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H1166 - 0024



SEC24-4/C-41) The solution given in 3). therefore, appears to be the proper one, that is, to crush France, to occupy Belgium, part of North (Pencil Note) and East France, to allow the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway cont'd. to exist on the basis indicated above. To straighten out We must relations with Switzerland.
have
Trondjem.

The possession of Iceland would mean material strategic expansion for Germany.

11. I would advise against the creation of bases in the North and South America, Asia or Australia. On the other hand (Pencil Note) contigeous possession in Central Africa are considered extremely desirable - possessions which are made up of the YES area between Senegal and the Congo and stretch east as far as German East Africa - that is, they comprise: the French possessions say, South of the line of Latitude running through the mouth of the Senegal, the former German Colonies of Central Africa and the Belgian Congo. For the purpose of rounding off this area. German South West Africa could be considered as exchange territory for British or Portuguese possessions.

(Pencil Note) The acquisition of one or more bases on the groups of islands off Africa would be of the greatest importance, and YES besides this the possession of Madagascar and the French groups of Islands in the Indian Ocean.

Time will show how far the outcome of the war with England will make an extension of these demands possible.

1. Skl.

signed Fricke 3. 6. 40.

(6972)

19

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-50
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Naval War Staff

Berlin 17 June 1941

Reg. No. 1 SKL. Ia 00149/41 MOST SECRET S.O. Only

(illegible markings)

MOST SECRET
By hand of officer only

ORDER

1. Address to:-

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Group North | | Copy 1 - 2 |
| Admiral Norway | | Copy 3 - 4 |
| Baltic Station | | Copy 5 - 6 |
| F.O. Cruisers | | Copy 7 - 8 |
| Liaison Staff Finland) | for | Copy 9 -10 |
| Naval Command "C" ) | inform- | Copy 11 -12 |
| Naval Command "D" ) | ation | Copy 13 -14 |

1. Enclosed is an Order by the Führer concerning the application of Martial law in the area "Barbarossa" and special military measures.

2. Make copies of the Führer Order of 13th May and attach 2 copies of each to the document mentioned in 1.

3. I Op.

Naval War Staff

Ii
after departure

iA Ia
initials

(illegible notations)

20

H1166 - 0026



Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
WFSt/Section L (IV qu)
No. 44718/41 Most Secret S.O.

Führer's Hq. 14 May 1941

Most Secret

Only by Officer

(illegible markings)

23 Copies
7th Copy

Subject: Application of military jurisdiction and procedure in area "Barbarossa" and special military measures.

Enclosed is an order by the Führer concerning application of military jurisdiction and procedure in the area "Barbarossa" and special military measures. If possible further distribution will not be made until 1st June 1941.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

By order

(Signature) (Undecipherable)

(illegible notation)

DISTRIBUTION:

| | |
|---|---|
| C-in-C of the Army (Ops-Abt) | 1st copy |
| C-in-C of the Army (Gen Qu) | 2nd-3rd copies |
| Supreme Command of the Army (Chief H. Rüst.u.Bd.E) | 4th copy |
| C-in-C of the Air Force (Lw. Führungsstab) | 5th copy |
| C-in-C of the Air Force (Gen Qu) | 6th copy |
| C-in-C of the Navy (Naval War Staff) | 7th copy |
| Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/WFSt | 8th copy |
| Dept L - Chief | 9th copy |
| Dept L - IH | 10th copy |
| IL | 11th copy |
| IK | 12th copy |
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| Ktb | 15th copy |
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| Armed Forces Propaganda | 17th copy |
| Foreign/Abw | 18th copy |
| Abw III | 19th copy |
| Reserve | 20th-23rd copies |

H1166 - 0027



The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

Fuhrer's Headquarters, 13 May 1941

(Pencil Note-)
One copy for Group South
sent 15.12.1941. V.W.

Order

Concerning the exercise of martial jurisdiction and procedure in the area "Barbarossa" and special military measures.

The application of martial law aims in the first place at maintaining discipline.

The fact that the operational areas in the East are so far-flung, the battle strategy which this necessitates, and the peculiar qualities of the enemy, confront the courts-martial with problems which, being short-staffed, they cannot solve while hostilities are in progress, and until some degree of pacification has been achieved in the conquered areas, unless jurisdiction is confined, in the first instance, to its main task.

This is possible only if the troops take ruthless action themselves against any threat from the enemy population.

For these reasons I herewith issue the following order effective for the area "Barbarossa" (Area of operations, army rear area, and area of political administration):

I. Treatment of offences committed by Enemy Civilians.

1. Until further notice the military courts and the courts martial will not be competent for crimes committed by enemy civilians.

2. Guerillas should be disposed of ruthlessly by the military, whether they are fighting or in flight.

3. Likewise all other attacks by enemy civilians on the Armed Forces, its members and employees, are to be suppressed at once by the military, using the most extreme methods, until the assailants are destroyed.

4. Where such measures have been neglected or were not at first possible; persons suspected of criminal action will be brought at once before an officer. This officer will decide whether they are to be shot.

On the orders of an officer with the powers of at least a Battalion Commander, collective despotic measures will be taken without delay against localities from which cunning or malicious attacks are made on the Armed Forces, if circumstances do not permit of a quick identification of individual offenders.

5. It is expressly forbidden to keep suspects in custody in order to hand them over to the courts after the reinstatement of civil courts.

6. The C-in-Cs of the Army Groups may by agreement with the competent Naval and Air Force Commanders reintroduce military jurisdiction for civilians, in areas which are sufficiently settled.

For the area of the "Political Administration" this order will be given by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

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II. Treatment of offences committed against inhabitants by members of the Armed Forces and its employees.

1. With regard to offences committed against enemy civilians by members of the Wehrmacht and its employees prosecution is not obligatory even where the deed is at the same time a military crime or offence.

2. When judging such offences, it must be borne in mind, whatever the circumstances, that the collapse of Germany in 1918, the subsequent sufferings of the German people and the fight against National Socialism which cost the blood of innumerable supporters of the movement, were caused primarily by Bolshevik influence and that no German has forgotten this fact.

3. Therefore the judicial authority will decide in such cases whether a diciplinary penalty is indicated, or whether legal measures are necessary. In the case of offences against inhabitants it will order a court martial only if maintenance of discipline or security of the Forces call for such a measure. This applies for instance to serious offences originating in lack of self control in sexual matters, or in a criminal disposition, and to those which indicate that the troops are threatening to get out of hand. Offences which have resulted in senseless destruction of billets or stores of other captured material to the disadvantage of our Forces should as a rule be judged no less severely.

The order to institute proceedings requires in every single case the signature of the Judicial Authority.

4. Extreme caution is indicated in assessing the credibility of statements made by enemy civilians.

III. Within their sphere of competence Military Commanders are personally responsible for seeing that:-

1. Every commissioned officer of the units under their command is instructed promptly and in the most emphatic manner on principles set out under I above.

2. Their legal advisers are notified promptly of these instructions and of verbal information in which the political intentions of the High Command were explained to C-in-Cs.

3. Only those court sentences are confirmed which are in accordance with the political intentions of the High Command.

IV. Security

Once the camouflage is lifted this decree will be treated as "Most Secret".

By order

Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

(signed) Keitel

Checked

Dressel (?)
Major d.G.

23

H1166 - 0029



CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-50

16 November 1945.

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C-50.

ERNST M. COHN,
Pfc, 33925738.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-51
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

High Command of the Armed Forces
WFSt/Dep.L(IV/Qu)
Nr.001590/41 Top Secret.

Fuehrer's H.Q. 27 July 1941
(illegible notations)

TOP SECRET

24 Copies
20th Copy

Reference: OKW/TsT/Dep. L(IV Qu)
N r. 44718/41 Top Secret S.O. 14 May 1941,

Re: Military Courts

In accordance with the regulation concerning classified material, the following offices will destroy all copies of the Fuehrer's decree of 13 May 1941 issued in the communication mentioned above.:

a) all offices upwards to(the ranks of) General Commands inclusive

b) Group Commands of the armoured troops

c) Army Commands and offices of equal rank, if thereiis an inevitable danger that they might fall into the hands of unauthorized persons(Rules concerning classified materials No. 58)

The validity of the decree is not affected by the destruction of the copies. In accordance with Paragraph III it remains the personal responsibility of the Commanding Officers to see to it that the officers and legal advisers are instructed in time and that only those sentences are confirmed which correspond to the political intentions of the High Command.

This order will be destroyed together with the copies of the Fuehrer's decree.

The Chief of the High Command

(signed) Keitel

Distribution:
the same as referred to in
the communication above.

and Gen. on special mission
with High command Army.

(rubber stamp with hand markings:) Encl to /SKl 17245/init top secret.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-51

16 Nov, 1945.

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc. 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. C-51.

ERNST M. COHN, Pfc.
33925738

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H1166-0031

SEC 24-G/C-59

Most Secret

Führer's HQ
19 February 1941

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 44 187/41, Most Secret, "WFSt/Section L (I Op)

10 copies
2nd Copy.

S.O. Only
By Officer only.

On 18 February the Führer made the following decision regarding the carrying out of operation "Marita":

1. The following dates are envisaged:

Commencement of building pontoon: 28 February
Crossing of Danube: 2 March

The final order for carrying out the operation will be given on 26 February at the latest.

It will be decided on 26 February at the latest whether the XIVth Army Corps will march into Bulgaria when bridge-building operations are begun or whether only AA Forces will be moved in.

2. It is for the Bulgarians alone to decide if and when to lay mines off Varna and Burgas.

3. If air attacks are carried out against Bulgaria and Rumania from Greek territory, the Xth Air Corps has freedom of action in operations against Greek territory.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces
By Order
signed Warlimont

DISTRIBUTION:

| | |
|---|---|
| C-in-C Command of the Army (Op Abt.) | 1st Copy |
| C-in-C Command of the Navy (SKL) | 2nd Copy |
| C-in-C Command of the Air Force (LwFSt.) | 3rd Copy |

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

| | |
|---|---|
| Armed Forces Operational Staff | 4th Copy |
| Abt. L | 5th-9th Copies. |
| Foreign/Abwehr | 10th Copy |

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SE[illegible]4-G/C-62

C62

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
OKW No. 172/39 SO only. Most Secret WFA/L

Berlin 9.10.1939.

8 Copies
2nd Copy

S. O. Only
Access only through
and Officer (Stamp).

## Directive No.6.

## For the Conduct of the War

(1) If it becomes evident in the near future that England, and France, acting under her leadership, are not disposed to put an end to the war, I am determined to take action and offensive action without letting much time elapse.

(2) A long waiting period results not only in the ending, to the advantage of the Western Powers, or Belgian, and perhaps also of Dutch neutrality, but also strengthens the military power of our enemies to an increasing degree, causes confidence of the neutrals in German final victory to wane, and does not help to bring Italy to our aid as a brother-in-arms

(3) I therefore issue the following orders for the further conduct of military operations:

a) Preparations should be made for offensive action on the northern flank of the western front crossing the area of Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland. This attack must be carried as soon as forcefully as possible.

b) The object of this attack is to defeat as strong sections of the French Fighting Army as possible, and her ally and partner in the fighting, and at the same time to acquire as great an area of Holland, Belgium and Northern France as possible, to use as a base offering good prospects for waging aerial and sea warfare against England and to provide ample coverage for the vital district of the Ruhr.

c) The time of the attack is dependent on the operational readiness of the armoured and motorized units, which should be expedited with the utmost effort, and on the state of the weather at the time and the weather forecast.

(4) The Luftwaffe prevents the combined French and British Air Force from interfering with the Army, and, where necessary, gives direct support to its activities. In this connection, it will be very important to prevent the combined French and British Air Force gaining a hold, and also British troops from landing in Holland.

(Note in pencil) - The cutting of the routes supplying the English troops once they have landed will be the task of the Luftwaffe, for U-boats will soon have to cease operating in the Channel on account of great losses.

(5) The conduct of the war at sea must concentrate entirely on being able to give direct or indirect support to the Army and Air Force operations throughout this attack.

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(6) In addition to making these preparations for the start of the offensive in the West according to plan, the Army and the Luftwaffe must be ready at any time and in increasing strength, to be able to make an immediate stand against a combined French, and British entry into Belgium, and this in as advanced a postion as possible on Belgian territory - also to be able to occupy Holland as extensively as possible while pushing towards the West Coast.

(Margin note) - Something like this would be more worth while striving for in every respect.

(7) The disguising of preparations must take the line that nothing more than precautionary measures against the threatening concentration of French and British Forces on the Franco-Luxembourg and Belgian frontier are being taken.

(8) I request the C-in-Cs, acting on this order, to submit reports on their intentions to me individually as soon as possible, and to keep me informed through the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the state of their preparations.

A. Hitler.

DISTRIBUTION:

| | |
|---|---|
| Supreme Command of the Army | 1st Copy. |
| Supreme Command of the Navy | 2nd Copy. |
| Air Minister and C-in-C of the Air Force | 3rd Copy. |
| **Supreme Command of the Armed Forces** | |
| Chief of Armed Forces Ops Division | 4th Copy. |
| Chief I | 5th Copy. |
| Ia | 6th Copy. |
| Ib | 7th Copy. |
| Ic | 8th Copy. |

SEC-24 - C/C-62

MOST SECRET

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

BERLIN.
15th October 1939.

W.F.A.No. 20/39 Op Most Secret S.O. only.

Re: "Fall Gelb"

7 copies
copy No.2.

S.O. Only.
Access only through officer.

The enquiries of the Supreme Command of the Army with reference to the carrying out of the directive OKW/WFA/L No.213/39 Most Secret, S.O. only of 14 November 1939, were discussed with the Fuehrer today.

The Result was as follows:

The protection of the Ruhr areas, by moving the A/C Reporting Service and the Air defense as far forward as possible in the area of Holland, is of not inconsiderable significance to the whole conduct of the war.

The more Dutch territory we occupy, the more effective can the defense of the Ruhr area be made. This viewpoint must determine the choice of objectives by the Army, even if Army and Navy are not directly interested in such a territorial gain. It must be the object of the Army's preparations, therefore, to occupy. - on receipt of a special order - the territory of



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H1166 – 0034



Holland, in the first instance as far as the Grebbe-Maas line. It will depend on the political and military attitude of the Dutch, as well as on the effectiveness of their flooding, whether the objective must and can be still further extended.

Preparations will likewise be made to take possession, with the support of the Navy, of the West Frisian islands, at first with the exception of Texel, as soon as the Northern coast of Groningen is in our hands; These too are of great importance as bases for the A/C Reporting Service and England must be deprived of the possibilities of seizing them for similar purposes.

Keitel

Distribution:

| | |
|---|---|
| Supreme Command of the Army (Gen. Staff of the Army) | Copy No. 1. |
| Supreme Command of the Navy | " " 2 |
| Minister of Air and C-in-C of the Air Force | " " 3 |
| Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/L | " " 4 |
| | 5 & 6 |
| Draft | 7 |

708

C 63.

H1166 - 0035

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

Berlin, 27.1.40

No. 22045/40 MOST SECRET WFA/Section L.

5 copies
2nd Copy.

Re. Study "N"

S.O. Only.
Access only through an Officer.

Ref. 22039/40 Most Secret WFA/Section L (1) of 23.1.40.

C-in-C of the Navy has a report on this.
Ia/29/i (Ink Note)

Noted by 1 SKL.
(Ink Note).

Note: Noted by M K A, who takes over the nominating of Officers (Probably Kapitän-Leutnant z.S. Krulte?)
Ia/1
(Ink note)

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed forces wishes that Study "N" should be further worked on under my direct and personal guidance, and in the closest conjunction with the general war policy. For these reasons the Führer has commissioned me to take over the direction of further preparations.

A working staff has been formed at the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces H.Q. for this purpose, and this represents at the same time the nucleus of a future Operational Staff.

I request the Supreme Commands of the Navy, Army and Air Force to nominate one officer each for this staff, suitable for Ia, and if possible possessing a knowledge of organisation and supply matters. The Bureau of Foreign Defence has the placing of the officer for Ic, WFA ≠ , that of the officer concerned with transport matters, Senior Officer for communications and Senior Officer for general questions concerning the administration of the country.

The time of meeting will be announced later.

All further plans will be made under the cover name "Weserübung".

KEITEL.

+The invasion of Norway
≠Armed Forces Operations Dept.

Distribution:

| | |
|---|---|
| C-in-C of the Army | 1st Copy |
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2258.

30

H1166 - 0036

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-64
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

Meeting of Naval Staff with Fuehrer on 12. 12. 39. 1200.
(Keitel, Jodl, Ruttkammer)

Norwegian question.

C. in C. Navy has received Quisling and Hagelin. Quisling creates the impression of being reliable and states that :

As a result of the Russo-Finnish conflict, anti-German feeling in Norway is even stronger than hitherto. England's influence is very great especially through Storthing-President Hambro (Jew, a friend of Hore-Belisha), all-powerful in Norway just now. Quisling is convinced that there is an agreement between England and Norway for the possible occupation of Norway. In which case Sweden would also stand against Germany. Danger of Norway's occupation by England is very great - possibly very shortly. From 11. 1. 40 onwards the Norwegian Parliament and therefore the Norwegian Government is unconstitutional as Parliament in defiance of the constitution, prolonged its term by a year. This would give an opportunity for a political re-shuffle. Quisling has good connections with officers of the Norwegian Army and has supporters in important positions, (e.g. Railways) In such an event Quisling is ready to take over the Government and to call upon Germany for help. He is also ready to discuss preparations of a military character with the German Armed Forces.

C. in C. Navy points out that with such offers one never knows how far the people concerned are wishing to further the ends of their own party or how much they have German interests at heart. Therefore caution is indicated - Norway must be prevented at all costs from falling into England's hands. That might have a decisive effect on the war; for Sweden would be completely under England's influence and it would bring the war into the Baltic, thus preventing completely the activities of the German Navy in the Ocean and the North Sea. The Fuehrer too said that a British occupation of Norway would be unbearable. C. in C. Navy pointed out that occupation by Germany of positions on the coast of Norway would naturally produce strong British countermeasures to stop the export of ore from Narvik, and that this would bring about surface warfare off the Norwegian coast, to which the German Navy was not equal for any length of time. This was one weak spot of the occupation.

The Fuehrer thought of speaking to Quisling personally so that he might form an impression of him. He wanted to see Rosenberg once more beforehand, as the latter has known Quisling for a long while. C. in C. Navy suggests that if the Fuehrer forms a favourable impression, the OKW should obtain permission to make plans with Quisling for the preparation and carrying out of the occupation.

a) By peaceful means, i.e. German forces summoned by Norway , or

b) To agree to do so by force Fuehrer agrees (ink note)

2269.

31

H1166 - 0037

2) C. in C. Navy advocates that a very clear policy in the Russo-Finnish conflict be maintained. No help to Finland by the supply of arms (which would mean passing through unreliable Sweden).

The C. in C. Armed Forces states that the Swedish Foreign Office has been informed that arms would only be sent to Sweden, on guarantee in writing by the government that they were only for the use of the Swedish Armed Forces.

The C. in C. Navy on the other hand is in favour of concessions to Russia, for example the supply of oil to U-boats, as Russia would also offer us practical help, (Vorteile), for example, the holding of foreign steamers in Murmansk until three days after the "Bremen" has sailed.

The Fuehrer has agreed to both points.

RAEDER.

- - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-64

13 November 1945.

I, BETTY D. RICHARDSON, P.O. 66370, W.R.N.S. hereby certify that I am thoruoughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No.C-64.

BETTY D. RICHARDSON
P.O. 66370
W.R.N.S.

H1166 - 0038

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-65
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

PAGE 1.

(Enclosure in a letter of Reichsleiter Rosenberg to the C-in-C. of the Navy) (illegible notations)

Re - Visit of Privy Councillor Quisling - Norway.

Rounding out previous information, I inform you that Quisling is considered as one of the best known Scandinavian Officers of the General Staff, that he was military attache in Finland, and that he represented British interests in Moscow from 1927 to 1930 before the breaking off of diplomatic relations between the Soviet-Union and Great Britain. He was Norwegian Minister of War from 1931 - 33, being a representative of the Norwegian peasant party, then resigned and founded a National Radical Socialist party under the name of "National Party". This party held and still holds anti-Semitic views and stand for the closest collaboration with Germany, has 15000 registered members, and Quisling estimates the number of his immediate supporters as between 2 and 300,000, that is, that 10 per cent which, even amidst the manifest anti-German feeling in Norway and Sweden today, are in favour of collaboration with Germany. His party has also not taken any part in the elections for the Great Assembly (Storthing).

The reasons for a coup, which Quisling made a report, would be provided by the fact that the Storthing had, in defence of the constitution, passed a resolution prolonging its own life which is to become operative on January 12th. Quisling still retains in his capacity as a long-standing officer and a former Minister of War, the closest relations with the Norwegian Army. He showed me the original of a letter which he had received only a short time previously from the Commanding Officer in Narvik, Colonel Sunlo. In this letter Colonel Sunlo frankly lays emphasis on the fact that; if things went on as they were going at present, Norway was finished. He only hoped that there would still be sufficient of the nation left to be able to create a people out of the remains, which could then build up Norway again well and truly. It was right that the race of today should be relegated to obscurity, and one had to admit it didn't deserve any better fate; for as he saw it, the Norwegians had committed an offence against the unalterable law of the universe. This law demanded work and idealism, and stupidity had never been regarded as a plausible excuse. "I shall not do anything for the old boozer Madsen (Minister of Trade), the enemy of Defence Monsen (Minister of War), and the blockhead Nygolswold (Prime Minister). It may on the contrary be a good idea and a useful one, to spend one's time in risking one's neck for the national revival". signed Konrad Sunlo.

Amtsleiter Scheidt, who had been to Norway several times, and has a number of acquaintances there, says that the Commanding Officer of the largest drilling-ground, Hroslev, had expressed similar opinions, as had also the head of the Military Academy at Halden, Captain Fritzner.

The King knows Quisling very well from the time when he held office and he believes that the king also had a high opinion of him, even though he is, by and large, pro-British in his views. The Jew Hambro is cited as Germany's greatest enemy, and as possibly the most powerful personality in politics, who practically controls the policy of Scandinavia at the moment. He is President of the Storthing, who at the same time holds the office of President of the Foreign Committee. He is also leader of the League of Nations Delegation and Leader of the strongest political party, the so-called "Conservatives" with whom the fate of the present minority Government rests. Hambro also controls the communication system in Norway, and so there is reason to fear - and

H1166 - 0039



TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-65 (Cont'd)

indeed shortly to fear - that as far as the anti-Russian feeling is concerned, which has increased by reason of the Russo-Finnish conflict, this will gain in strength in favour of England and against Germany in an increasing degree.

A plan has been put forward which deals with the possibility of a coup, and which provides for a number of selected Norwegians to be trained in Germany with all possible speed for such a purpose, being allotted their exact tasks, and provided with experienced and die-hard National Socialists, who are practised in such operations. These trained men should the proceed with all speed to Norway where details would then require to be further discussed. Some important centres in Oslo would have to be taken over immediately, and at the same time the German Fleet together with suitable contingents of the German Army would go into operation when summoned specially by the new Norwegian Government in a specified bay at the approaches to Oslo. Quisling has no doubts that such a coup, having been carried out with instantaneous success - would immediately bring him the approval of those sections of the Army with which he at present has connections, and thus it goes without saying that he has never discussed a political fight with them. As far as the king is concerned, he delieves that he would respect it as an accomplished fact.

Quisling gives figures of the number of German troops required which accord with German calculations.

Signed.

A. Rosenberg.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-65.

15 November 1945.

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C-65.

ERNST M. COHN.
Pfc. 33925738.

2246.

H1166 - 0040

(Memorandum for Admiral Assmann for his own use; not for publication. With the signature "Raeder" and date 10 January 1944).

1. S. O. Only

a) Barbarossa.

1) At this time the Fuehrer had made known his "unalterable decision" to conduct the Eastern campaign in spite of all remonstrances. After that, further warnings, if no new situations had arisen, were found to be completely useless. As Chief of Naval War Staff I was never convinced of the "Compelling necessity" for Barbarossa.

2) During the campaign in France and also during the beginning of preparation for Seelöwe* - while the Fuehrer still had hopes of gaining control of the air, (which he too recognised as being an essential pre-requisite of Seelowe), it was doubtless his intention after France's fall to concentrate on the Navy and Air Force. The Fuehrer described the moving of troops to the Eastern front in August to me as a large scale camouflage measure for Seelöwe. (A statement from the Supreme Command of the Army would have to be obtained on this point).

The Fuehrer very early had the idea of one day settling accounts with Russia, doubtless his general ideological attitude played an essential part in this. In 1937-38 he once stated that he intended to eliminate the Russians as a Baltic power; they would then have to be diverted in the direction of the Persian Gulf. The advance of the Russians against Finland and the Baltic States in 1939-40 probably further strengthened him in this idea.

The fear that control of the air over the Channel in the autumn of 1940 could no longer be attained - a realisation which the Fuehrer, no doubt, gained earlier than the Naval War Staff, who were not so fully informed of the true results of air raids on England (our own losses) - surely caused the Fuehrer, as far back as August and September, to consider whether - even prior to victory in the West - an Eastern campaign would be feasible with the object of first eliminating our last serious opponent on the Continent. The Fuehrer did not openly express this fear, however, until well into September.

The Fuehrer's remark of 21st July 1940 is an indication of reflections of this kind (Section 68) ("It is of course our duty to give careful consideration to the question of America and Russia!"); furthermore, comments such as Section 76, dated 12.8, dealing with the fortification of the North Norwegian fjords, and occasional statements regarding the meeting of Russia demands for the delivery of ships and heavy artillery, which show the Fuehrer's mistrust of the Russian attitude and his hope of evading certain comittments altogether.



* Invasion of England.

H1166-0041

Doubtless during September 1940 the possibility of a Eastern campaign was mentioned rather often by the Fuehrer, for I was worried lest the war should take a wrong turn (being diverted from the main danger "England"), and this caused me to have an interview with the Fuehrer, tête à tête, "even outside my own department" on 26th June 1940, concerning the significance of the Mediterranean and North Africa, after I had first made a thorough report on these questions, on September 6th, 1940. In this interview of 26 September 1940 my statement - "It is questionable whether an attack on Russia from the North is necessary", removed all doubt that there had been talk during the previous weeks of the Eastern operation. It is in keeping with the Fuehrer's usual mode of procedure for him to exercise personal reserve in the first instance in this matter vis-a-vis the Chief of Naval War Staff, whose concept would necessarily be a different one. In this connection the Supreme Command of the Army will be able to give fuller details, since it was primarily concerned in the preparations, and will have been addressed by the Fuehrer on the matter. I would particularly point out here - quite apart from the Eastern operation - how I have attempted to impress on the Fuehrer the decisive importance for the war of the question of the Mediterranean and North Africa (when I reported to the Fuehrer on 6.9. and 26.9.40). After the discussion on 26.9. the Fuehrer told Kapitan zur See von Puttkamer that this report had been especially valuable to him, and that he could, in the light of it, review his own opinions, and see whether he was "in the right perspective."

3) At that time, (see a 1)✓, the Fuehrer was firmly resolved on a surprise attack on Russia, regardless of what was the Russian attitude to Germany, - this, according to reports coming in, was frequently changing. The communication to Matsuoka was designed entirely as a camouflage measure and to ensure surprise. Concern lest a note to Matsuoka which stated his true purpose might prejudice surprise, restrained the Fuehrer from telling Matsuoka the whole truth. He told me so at the time at a party!

4) The expression "greatly abbreviated" describes the representations I have always made while at 1 SKL, - memorandums, which were not so much German essays, or very exhaustive, as notes, and thus easier to put into report form. By means of the notes I could the more briefly and forcefully present this report, which without doubt gave a particularly clear and significant picture of the situation. It formed a very good supplement to and continuation of my reports made on the 6.6. and 29.6.40. The Fuehrer, whose primary interest was in the setting in motion of Barbarossa, (thus, for instance, he wanted to employ the German Air Forces principally on the Eastern Front) - naturally took a special interest in those points in connection with which fuller aid could be secured from the Italians. It would be a mistake to conclude, from the expression "greatly abbreviated", that there was "reserve" on my part on this subject, to which I have always given the greatest publicity.

✓ Ink Note.

H1166-0042

5) In view of previous statements by the Fuehrer (see Section 2), and the contrasts in ideology, I personally have always doubted that the Fuehrer believed from the very beginning that the Russo-German pact would last. I think that the pact arose solely out of the need of the moment and that the Fuehrer (-in spite of his speech in the Reichstag on 1.9.39.) in no wise intended it to be a permanent solution of the Russian problem. After the campaign against Poland he had contented himself in the first instance with a frontier line which would, with the help of an Eastern wall, afford an effective defence against Russia. In my opinion it was only later - when, on the one hand, the first successes in Russia had been gained, and on the other, when the prospects of turning North Africa to good account were fading - that it became his aim to make the feeding of Europe dependent on the Ukraine, this plan bringing with it permanent opposition to Russia. Though nothing was actually said, this would involve giving up all thought of targets for which a certain measure of sea power was required, that is, it would mean striving for a pure continental policy.

6) As under section 3). A statement such as this to the Duce should be considered merely as camouflage. The Fuehrer kept his plans most carefully secret from the Italians. I believe that Stalin is our greatest enemy - a statesman at home and abroad, a soldier and an organiser on a prodigious scale, a Titanic genius seeing far into the future. I consider it extremely probable that in 1937 and 38 Stalin came to recognise, through the efforts of the United States ambassador, as described by Davies in "Mission to Moscow", that Russia could play an important part in a subsequent conflict between the Anglo-Saxon races and Germany, and that he thereupon began to speed up his armaments. The pact with Germany was of a kind which would help him towards the realisation of the first part of his scheme - Eastern Poland, the Baltic countries, Bessarabia and perhaps the Balkans and the Dardanelles. The gains of 1939/40 were indeed great. In 1940/41 Stalin had no reason to march against Germany. Germany's surprisingly great successes against France and the Balkans impressively demonstrated her strength to him and perhaps even awakened fear of her. Stalin cannot therefore have intended, to take the initiative in attacking this strong Germany in 1941, but while continuing to arm, he must have wanted to wait and see whether the subsequent course of the war between Germany and the Anglo-Saxon powers would offer him a favourable opportunity- he knew from Davies that the USA would join in sooner or later. Whether in this connection he favoured a push towards the Rhine, passing through the Scandanavian countries, or to the North Atlantic, or in the direction of the Mediterranean to the Dardanelles, or through Persia to the Indian Ocean, or finally towards India, must have depended entirely on the course of the struggle between Germany and the Anglo-Saxon powers. As I see it, it does not do justice to the importance of Stalin to assume that he intended "to start the war against Germany in the autumn of 1941". It is true that an essential part of his armament was

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made ready for this dead-line. I have sometimes been in doubt whether, for Stalin, the ideological had not taken second place long ago in favour of a tremendous effort to use to the full the opportunity he was offered of realising the schemes of Peter the Great. Was the announcement of the dissolution of the Commintern perhaps a hint to Germany that an understanding between Germany and Russia would have been possible even then, and that, after the Russian territories had been regained, a peaceful relationship would have been possible between the two States, who, taking the long view, are both threatened by the USA?

7) As no other course is possible, I have submitted to compulsion. If, in doing so, a difference of opinion arises between 1 SKL and myself, it is perhaps because the arguments the Fuehrer used on such occasions (Dinner speech in the middle of July to the Officers in Command, to justify a step he had planned, usually had a greater effect on people not belonging to the "inner circle", than on those who often heard this type of reasoning.

Many remarks and plans indicate that the Fuehrer calculated on the final ending of the Eastern campaign in the autumn of 1941, whereas the Supreme Command of the Army (General Staff) was very sceptical. OKH

H1166 - 0044

1 Chefsache

Gross Admiral Assmann, for your own personal information.

Not for distribution. Raeder. 10. 1. 44.

a) .....

b) Weser-Ubung.

The memo is wholly insufficient and does not correspond to the contents of the report. During the weeks preceding the report on 10. 10. 39. I was in correspondence with Admiral Carls, who, in a detailed letter to me, first pointed out the importance of an occupation of the Norwegian coasts by Germany. I passed this letter on to C/SKl for their information and prepared some notes+ based on this letter for my report to the Fuehrer which I made on 10. 10. 39, since my opinion was identical to that of Admiral Carls, while, at that time, SKl was more dubious about the matter. In these notes, I set out the disadvantages which an occupation of Norway by the British would have for us - control of the approaches to the Baltic, flanking of our naval operations and of our air attacks on Britain, pressure on Sweden. I also mentioned the advantages for us of the occupation of the Norwegian coast - outlet to the North Atlantic, no possibility of British minefields as in the year 1917-18. Naturally at the time, only the coast and bases were considered; I included Narvik, though Admiral Carls, in the course of our correspondence, hoped that Narvik might be excluded. (At that time, we were able to use Murmansk and/or a special Russian base.) The Fuehrer saw at once the significance of the Norwegian problem; he asked me to leave the notes and stated that he wished to consider the question himself.

In the further developments, I was supported by Korv.Kapitän Schreiber Naval Attache in Oslo and the M-chief personally - in conjunction with the Rosenberg Organization. Thus, we got in touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came to Berlin in December and were taken to the Fuehrer by me - with the approval of Reichleiter Rosenberg.++ On the grounds of the Fuehrer's discussion with Quisling and Hagelin on the afternoon of 14.12.39. the Fuehrer gave the order that preparations for the Norwegian operation were to be made by Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

Until that moment, the Naval War Staff had taken no part in the development of the Norwegian question, and, even then, they were somewhat sceptical about it. The preparations, which were undertaken by Kpt.z.S. Kranke in the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, were founded, however, on a memorandum of the Naval War Staff.

---

+ With the help of K.Adm.v.Puttkamer, these may possibly still be obtainable; I had no duplicate as I did not think I should have to give the notes up.

++ At the crucial moment, R. hurt his foot, so that I visited him in his house on the morning of 14.12.

10th November 1945.

I, Kenneth Hugh Molesworth Duke, Major R.A., hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C-66.

'SGD' KENNETH HUGH MOLESWORTH DUKE
Major R.A.

39

H1166 - 0045

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-72
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Berlin, 7 November 1939

WFA/Dept. LI No. 207/39 Top Secret Important Matter

5 copies
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TOP SECRET

Important Matter

Only by hand of Officer

On 7 November the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, after hearing reports on the meteorological and the railway transport situation, has ordered:-

A-day is postponed for the time being by three days. The next decision will be made by 1800 hours on 9 November 39.

signed: KEITEL

Distribution:
OKH
OKM
R.d.L. u. Ob.d.L.
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(497)

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TRANSLATION OF DOC. C-72
(cont.)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces — Berlin, 10 November 1939

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Important Matter

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On 9 November the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, after hearing a report on the meteorological situation, has decided:-

The earliest date designated for A-day is 19 November. The next decision hereon will be made by 1800 hours on 13 November.

signed: KEITEL

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TRANSLATION OF DOC. C-72
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Supreme Command of the Armed Forces — Berlin, 13 November 1939

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Important matter

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On 13 November the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander, after receiving a report on the meteorological situation, has decided:

The next decision on A-day will be made on Thursday, 16 November. A-day therefore definitely not before Wednesday, 22nd November.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

signed: KEITEL

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TRANSLATION OF DOC. C-72
(cont.)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces — Berlin, 16 November 1939

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TOP SECRET

Only by hand of Officer

1) On 16 November the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander, after hearing a report on the meteorological situation, has decided:-

The next decision on A-day will be made on Monday, 20 November. A-day therefore definitely not before Sunday, 26 November.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

signed: KEITEL

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TRANSLATION OF DOC. C-72
(Cont.)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Berlin, 20 November 1939

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TOP SECRET

On 20 November the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander, after hearing a report on the meteorological situation, has decided:-

The next decision on A-day will be made on Monday, 27 November. A-day therefore definitely not before Sunday 3 December.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

Signed: KEITEL.

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TRANSLATION OF DOC C-72
(cont.)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Berlin, 27 November 1939

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TOP SECRET

Only by hand of Officer

On 27 November the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has decided:-

1) All mobile units are to be transported immediately to the transit quarters.

2) The next decision on A-day will be made at 1800 hours on 4 December.

3) Earliest date of next A-day 9 December.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

signed: KEITEL

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Supreme Command of the Armed Forces,
Department for National Defence.

Berlin. 29 Nov. 1939.

No 223/39 Top Secret Important Matter.

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Important.

TOP SECRET.

Only by hand of Officer.

Enclosed the time-table for the preparations of the attack in the West No 233/39 Top Secret Important Matter, 2nd Copy.

The time table sent on 8 November 1939 under No. 196/39 Top Secret Important Matter to be destroyed. (Marginal handwritten note:- destroyed).

for the Supreme Command of the
Armed forces.

Signed: JODL

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TRANSLATION OF DOC. C-72
(cont)

H1166 - 0052

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces - Important Matter - Berlin. 29. Nov. 1939.

Department for National Defence - Only by hand of Officer - 10 Copies.
2nd Copy.

No. 233/39 Top Secret Important Matter

TOP SECRET.

Time Table for the Preparation of the Attack in the West

A-Day = Day of Attack.

| No. | Time. | Army. | Navy. | Air Force. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A-Day minus 5 1800 hrs | Decision by Fuehrer as to A-Day. | | | 1. Next decision 4. Dec. at 1800 hrs. 2. Attack can be stopped til A-Day minus 1 at 2300 hrs if disadvantages will be accepted |
| 2. | A-day mins 1 during the day | | | Air Force units move to forward airfields. | |
| 3. | A-day minus 1 1200 hrs. | Last moment at which an order of the day by the Fuehrer has to reach the C-in-C of the Army, if it is to reach company commanders before the commencement of the attack (telephone transmission unavoidable) | | | |
| 4. | A-day minus 1 2300 hrs | Latest moment for stopping the attack | | | |

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TRANSLATION OF DOC. C - 72
(Cont.)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Berlin. 4 December 1939.

WFA/Dept L No 226/39 Top Secret Important Matter 8 Copies.
2nd Copy.

Important Matter

TOP SECRET. Only by hand of Officer.

On 4 December the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has decided:-

1) The next decision on A-day will be made at 1800 hrs on 6 December.

2). Earliest date of next A-day 11 December.

for the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Signed : JODL.

Distribution:

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|---|---|
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610.

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H1166 - 0054

 TRANSLATION OF DOC C - 72
(Cont.)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

WFA/Dept L No 22 230/39 Top Secret

Berlin, 6th December 1939.

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TOP SECRET.

Important Matter.

Only by hand of Officer.

On 6 December the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has decided:-

1). The next decision on A-day will be made at 1800 hours on 12 December.

2). Earliest dateof next A-day 17 December.

For the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

Signed: JODL.

Distribution:

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TRANSLATION OF DOC C – 72.
(Cont.)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Berlin, 12 December 1939

WFA/ No 22 /39 Top Secret Important Matter 8 copies.
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TOP SECRET. Important Matter

Only through hand of Officer.

On 12 December the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has ordered:-

1.) The next decision on A-day will be made by 1800 hrs on 27 December.

2.) Earliest date of next A-day therefore 1. January 1940.

3.) Christmas leave to be arranged accordingly by the branches of the armed forces.

for the Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

Signed: JODL.

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TRANSLATION OF DOC. C - 72.
(cpnt.)

TOP SECRET.

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Berlin 27. December 1939.

WFA/ Dept L No 22 244/39 Top Secret Important Matter 8 Copies.
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Important Matter

Only by hand of Officer.

On 27 December the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has made the following decision:-

In view of the general meteorological situation, the date of the atta id further postponed, as far as can be foreseen by at least a fortnight. The next decision will be made at the latest by 1800 hrs on 9 January.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Signed; JODL.

Distribution.

| | |
|---|---|
| Ob.d.H. | 1st Copy. |
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| Dept. L Ia - Ic | 6th - 8th Copies. |

(Handwritten note:)
Group W advised by teleprinter 1800 on 27 Dec.

(Handwritten) NOTE:-

According to informationI b (H), the above means that the earliest A-day is the 9 Jan, and the latest day for a decision is also the 9. Jan.
Rectification accordingly by Top Secret message No. 2821 on 28 Dec. to Group I

Initial

(handwritten)

| Date | Moon Phase. |
|---|---|
| 2 Jan. | last quarter |
| 9 Jan | new moon |
| 17 Jan | first quarter |
| 24 Jan | full moon |
| 31 Jan | last quarter |

616.

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H1166 – 0057



TRANSLATION OF DOC. C-72
(cont.)

TOP SECRET

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Berlin, 30 December 1939

WFA/Dept L (Ib) No 22247/39 Top Secret Important Matter

To
the High Command of the Navy

Important Matter
Only by hand of Officer

Subject: Skl B No 1 Skl Ia Op. 512/39 Top Secret Important Matter

Re: Clarification of date for A-day

Your interpretation that the earliest date for A-day is now the 9 January, but that the next decision will also be made at the latest by 1800 hours of the same day is confirmed as correct.

Should the attack take place in the period between the 9 January and 14 January 1940, Naval High Command will receive the necessary notification (warning-order) early, i.e. 9 days before the commencement of the attack.

For the Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

signed: JODL

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H1166 - 0058



Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Berlin, 9 January 1940

No 22007/40 Top Secret Important Matter OKW/WFA LI 8 copies
2.copy

TOP SECRET

Important Matter

Only by hand of Officer

A decision on the date of A-day will not be made before 10 January 1940.

For the Chief of the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces

signed: JODL

Distribution:-

| | | |
|---|---|---|
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| Chief L | 5th | " |
| Ia | 6th | " |
| Ib | 7th | " |
| Ic | 8th | " |

(handwritten) Note:-

Has been passed by telephone by I/Skl Io 0
9 Jan 40 to A I Group
West.
Initial

613

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H1166 – 0059



TRANSLATION OF DOC. C.72
(cont.)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Berlin, 11 January 1940

WFA No 22014/40 Top Secret Important Matter Dept L (I)

9 copies
2nd copy

Important Matter

Only by hand of Officer.

Re: Contingency "Yellow"

On 10 January 1940 the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, after receiving reports from the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, the Commander in Chief of the Navy and the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, has ordered the following:-

1) A-day and X-hour

A-day is Wednesday, 17 January 40. (Wednesday, 17 in ink)
X-hour 15 minutes before sunrise at Aix-la-Chapelle on A-day
0816 hours. (0816 in ink)

2) Employment of the 7th Air Div.

The operation is to be carried through according to the instructions so far given, with the following modifications:-

For the 7th Air Div., besides the "North" and the "South" drives, a third drive (code-name: "Einsatz fortress") is to be prepared for obtaining possession of the heart of the Dutch fortress. The Supreme Command of the Army makes preparations to enable it to break quickly into the Dutch fortress beyond the goal hitherto designated , i.e. the Maas-Grebbe line, should the"Einsatz fortress" be the order given to the 7th Air Div.

The decision on the "Einsatz fortress" will be made at the latest on the morning of A-day minus 1. The "North" and "South" drives can only be considered if by A-day, a sufficient depth of snow improves jumping and landing conditions near Chent and along the Maas, which at the moment are fraught with difficulties.

3) Air Force Attack on the Enemy Air Force.

If the weather is suitable, the air force will on 14 January 40 attack with all available forces the majority of the occupied enemy air-fields in northeastern and eastern France by surprise, with the principal aim of destroying the fighter and reconnaissance aircraft stationed there. For this attack, the air force is at liberty to fly across Luxemburg and, as far as necessary, also across Belgium and Dutch territory.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.

signed: KEITEL

Distribution:

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OKM 2nd copy
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(5265)

H1166 - 0060



TRANSLATION OF DOC.C-72
(cont.)

TOP SECRET

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Berlin, 13 January 39.+

WFA No 3/40 Top Secret Important Matter

5 copies
2nd copy

Re: Contingency "Yellow"

Important Matter

By hand of officer Only

On account of the metereological situation, the Fuehrer has decided to postpone A-day, probably to 20 January 40. Latest time for issue of orders re above is 1800 hours on A-day minus 5.

For the Chief of the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces

signed: JODL

Distribution:

| | |
|---|---|
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| OKM | 2nd " |
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| OKW/WFA | 4th " |
| L | 5th " |

6015

---

+Translator's Note: The date is a typing error; it is obvious from the context that the correct date is 13 January 40.

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H1166-0061



TRANSLATION OF DOC. C-72
(cont.)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces — Berlin, 7 May 1940

WFA/Dept L No 22 179/40 Top Secret Important Matter

5 copies
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Top Secret

Important Matter

Only by hand of Officer

1) The Orders:-

OKW/L No 22 176/40 Top Secret Important Matter, dated 6 May 40 and

OKW/L No 22 177/40 Top Secret Important Matter, dated 6 May 40

are cancelled.

2) The new A-day will be ordered, according to the weather situation, at 1200 hours on A-day minus 1 only. A new X-hour+ will be given accordingly.

Next decision at 1200 hours on 8 May.

For the Chief of the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces

signed: JODL

Distribution:

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| Dept L | 5th | " |

+ X-hour = zero hour

H1166 - 0062

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Berlin. 9 May 1940.

WFA/Dept L No 22 180/40 Top Secret Important Matter 5 Copies.
2nd Copy.

Important Matter

Only by hand of Officer. TOP SECRET.

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has decided:-

A-day ... 10 May
X-hour .. 0535 hours

The code words "Danzig" or "Augsburg" to reach the branches + of the armed forces by 2130 hours on the 9 May at the latest.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Signed: KEITEL.

Distribution.

| | |
|---|---|
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| Ob.d.L. | 3rd Copy. |
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| Chief WFA | 4th Copy. |
| Chief L. | 5th Copy. |

+ OKH, OKL, & OKM.

- - - - - - 0 0 0 - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION.
OF DOCUMENT C - 72

23 October 1945.

I, Fred NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf. 0-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Englsih and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document C - 72.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
0-1335567.

617.

57

H1166 - 0063

Translation

SEC24-G/C-75 Top Secret

High Command of the Armed Forces
"WFST"/Dep. L (I Op)
No. 44 282/41 gK.ChM

Fuehrer's H.Q. 5 March 1941

Top Secret
Only by Officer

14 Copies
2nd Copy

Instruction No. 24
concerning collaboration with Japan

Concerning the collaboration with Japan the Fuehrer has ordered the following:

1. The aim of our collaboration based upon the Tripartite Pact will be to induce Japan to intervene actively in the Far East as soon as possible. Strong English forces will thereby be tied down, the focus of U.S. interests will be shifted to the Pacific.

   Since the war potential of her adversaries is as yet in an undeveloped condition, Japan's prospects of success will be the better the earlier she intervenes. The Plan "Barbarossa" creates particularly favorable political and military conditions for this intervention. (Marginal note in handwriting - "slightly exaggerated")

2 - 4: (particulars as to German wishes for Japanese intervention)

5. No allusion to the Plan "Barbarossa" may be made to the Japanese.

The High Command of the Armed Forces

(signed in the draft) Keitel

A fair copy
(signed) Kunze
Lt. Com.

58

H1166 - 0064

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 102
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

SKC 24-5/C-102

Berlin, 11.3.38.

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
OKW L I a Nr. 420/38 g.Kdos.

Referring to: Operation OTTO

30 Copies
11th Copy

TOP SECRET

1) If other measures prove unsuccessful, I intend to invade Austria with armed forces to establish constitutional conditions and to prevent further outrages against the pro-German population.

2) The whole operation will be directed by myself.

According to my instructions:

The Ob.d.H. will direct the land operations with the 8th Army in the formation and strength suggested to me, and with the attachments of the Air Force, the SS and police (see appendix).

The Ob.d.L. will direct the air operations with the forces suggested to me.

3) Operational duties:

a) Army
The invasion of Austria must be carried out in the manner explained to me. The Army's first target is the occupation of upper Austria, Salzburg, Lower Austria, the Tyrol, the speedy occupation of Vienna and the securing of the Austro-Czech frontier.

b) Air Force
The Air Force must demonstrate and drop propaganda material, occupy Austrian aerodromes for the use of further possible reinforcements assist the Army upon demand as necessary, apart from that, hold bomber units in readiness for special tasks.

4) The forces of the Army and Air Force detailed for this operation must be ready for invasion and/or ready for action on the 12th March 1938 at the latest from 1200 hours.

I reserve the right to give permission for crossing and flying over the frontier, and to decide the actual moment for invasion.

5) The behaviour of the troops must give the impression that we do not want to wage war against our Austrian brothers. It is in our interest that the whole operation shall be carried out without any violence but in the form of a peaceful entry welcomed by the population. Therefore any provocation is to be avoided. If, however, resistance is offered it must be broken ruthlessly by force of arms

Austrian units who come over to us, immediately come under German Command.

6) On the remaining German frontiers no security measures are to be taken for the time being.

Signed A. HITLER

Translator's Note: This document bears the initials of Jodl, Keitel and one other which is undecipherable.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT C 102

13 November 1945

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, 2nd Lt., O-1332102, hereby certify that I am throughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document C 102.

GERARD SCHAEFER
2nd Lt.,
O-1332102

60

H1166 - 0065

H1166 - 0066

TRANSLATION OF DCOUMENT C 103
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

SEC 24-5/C-103

A T 16/38 "Oel"

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 428/38 Top Secret L. IA.

Berlin, 11 March 1938

40 Copies
6th Copy

Pencil note: -C-in-C Navy
is informed.

TOP SECRET

Special instructions No. 1
to "The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces No. 427/38
Top Secret L IA of 11.3.38."

Directive:

for policy towards Czechoslovakian and Italian troops or militia units on Austrian soil.

1. If Czechoslovakian troops or militia units are encountered in Austria, they are to be regarded as hostile.

2. The Italians are everywhere to be treated as friends especially as Mussolini has declared himself disinterested in the solution of the Austrain Question.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces
By order
JODL

DISTRIBUTION:
as Directive No. 1

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-103

13 November 1945

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, 2nd Lt., O-1332102, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document C 103.

GERARD SCHAEFER,
2nd Lt.,
O-1332102

H1166 - 0067

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C115
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

(SEC - 24.6/C-115)

## NAVAL DECEPTION AND CAMOUFLAGE IN THE INVASION OF NORWAY

The following extracts are taken from a file of naval operation orders for Operation "Weseruebung" (the invasion of Norway).

1. Page 6 . 4.4.40

....V. General Orders :

(a) The Sperrbrechers (Translators Note : barrage breaking vessels) will penetrate inconspicuously and with lights on into Oslo Fiord disguised as merchant steamers.

(b) Challenges from coastal signal stations and lookouts are to be answered by the deceptive use of the names of English steamers. I lay particular stress on the importance of not giving away the operation before zero-hour.

2. Page 84. 24.3.40. Orders for reconnaissance Forces.

....XI. Behaviour during entrance into the harbour

All ships darkened, lights to be put on onlu by order of the Flag Officer Reconnaissance Forces by V.H.F....

No personnel on deck except gun crews and other upper deck action stations. All Army troops below deck.

The disguise as British craft must be kept up as long as possible. All challenges in morse by Norwegian ships will be answered in English. In answer to questions a text with something like the following content will be chosen:

"Calling at Bergen for a short visit, no hostile intent."

....

Challenges to be answered with names of British Warships :

| | |
|---|---|
| "Koeln" = | H.M.S. "Cairo" |
| "Koenigsberg" = | H.M.S." Calcutta" |
| "Bremse" = | H.M.S. "Faulknor" |
| "Karl Peters" = | H.M.S. "Halcyon" |
| "Leopard" = | British Destroyer |
| "Wolf" = | " " |
| E-Boats = | British motor torpedo boats |

(SEC-24.6 /C-115)

Arrangements are to be made enabling British war flags to be illuminated. Continual readiness for making smoke.

3. Page 106. 24.3.40. Annex 3 to Flag Officer Reconnaissance Forces.
Most Secret 110/40 SO only.
Copy number 20.

Prepared Signals Group III for possible traffic with passing ships and with land during entry into Bergen harbour.



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Following is laid down as guiding principle should one of our own units find itself compelled to answer the challenge of passing craft.

To challenge : (in case of the "Koeln") H.M.S. "Cairo"
To order to stop : (1) Please repeat last signal.
(2) Impossible to understand your signal.
In case of a warning shot : Stop firing. British ship. Good friend.
In case of an inquiry as to destination and purpose Going Bergen. Chasing German steamers.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF EXCERPT FROM C-115

8 November 1945

I, D.E.SHERRIFF, 2nd Officer, Womens Royal Naval Service, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt of Document C-115.

D.E.SHERRIFF
2nd Officer,
Womens Royal Naval Service.





H1166 - 0068

H1166 – 0069

(SEC-24.6/C-118)

C.118

AUTHORISATION OF ATTACK ON

U.S. MERCHANTMEN.

(Extract from a file)

Page 276. 18.7.41.

Special Points

1. Supplementary to the order forbidding for the time being attacks on U.S. warships and merchant vessels in the operational area of the North Atlantic, the Fuehrer has ordered the following:

> 1. Attacks on U.S. merchant vessels sailing in British or U.S. convoys, or independently is authorised in the original operational area blockade zone and which does not include the sea-route U.S.A. - Iceland.

(3368)

H1166 - 0070

C120/A

Top Secret

(1 Skl I op 43/39)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Operational Staff Ref. Nr. 37/39.

Top Secret High Command matter L Ia

Subject: Directive for the Armed Forces 1939/40.

High Command matter.

Officer only.

Berlin, 3-4-1939.

5 copies
2nd copy.

The "Directive for the Uniform Preparation for War of the Armed Forces in 1939/40" is being re-issued.

Part I ("Frontier Protection") and Part III ("Danzig") will be issued in the middle of April. Their basic principles remain unchanged.

Original attached

Part II "Fall Weiss" is attached herewith. The signature of the Führer will be appended later.

The Führer has added the following directives to "Fall Weiss":

1) Preparations must be made in such a way that the operation can be carried out at any time from 1-9-39 onwards.

2) The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to draw up a precise time-table for "Fall Weiss" and to arrange by means of conferences the synchronisation of timing between the three branches of the Armed Forces.

3) The plans of the branches of the Armed Forces and details of the time-table must be submitted to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces by 1-5-39.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.

signed KEITEL.

Distribution:

| | |
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| High Command of the Army | 1 (Reg. No. 1) |
| " " of the Navy | 1 (Reg. No. 2) |
| Reichsmarshal and C-in-C of the Air Force | 1 (Reg. No. 3) |
| Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (L) | 2 (Regs. No. 4 and 5) |
| Total | 5 |

C120/B

Top Secret

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Ref. No. 37/39 Top Secret

High Command matter Operational Staff L.I

Berlin, 11-4-39.

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High Command Matter
Officer only

65

H1166 - 0071

## Directive for the Uniform Preparation of War by the Armed Forces, 1939/40.

I shall lay down in a later directive the future tasks of the Armed Forces and the preparations to be made in accordance with these for the conduct of the war.

Until that directive comes into force, the Armed Forces must be prepared for the following eventualities:

I) Protection of the frontiers of the German Reich and defence against surprise air attacks (see Appendix I)

II) "Fall Weiss" (see Appendix II)

III) The annexation of Danzig (see Appendix III)

Appendix IV contains regulations for the exercise of military authority in East Prussia in the event of a war-like entanglement.

signed A. HITLER.

Distribution:

| | |
|---|---|
| High Command of the Army | 1 (Reg. No. 1) |
| Navy High Command | 1 ( " " 2) |
| Reichsmarshal and C-in-C of the Air Force | 1 ( " " 3) |
| Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Operational Staff /L) | 2 (Regs. No. 4 and 5) |

To 1 Skl. I. op 43/39 Top Secret High Command Matter.

C/120/C

Top Secret

Appendix I to Supreme Command of the Armed Forces L Ia, Ref. No. 37/39

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Top Secret High Command Matter.

High Command matter
Officer only.

### I

### Protection of the frontiers of the German Reich and defence against surprise air attacks.

1. The Armed Forces must be ready at any time to protect at short notice the frontiers and the Living Space of the German Reich. Preparations for this purpose must be made in such a way that the frontier protection and air defence can be put into operation either for all the frontiers and the whole air-space or for a part only, according to the situation, even without general mobilisation.

The following short titles will be used:

Frontier Protection
Frontier Protection West (France, Luxemburg, Belgium)
Frontier Protection East (Poland, Lithuania)
Frontier Protection East or West ..... except .....
(e.g. Lithuania)

The focal point for the preparations for frontier protection and for air defence lies in the West.

2. For the branches of the Armed Forces there result the following tasks:



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H1166 - 0072

A. Army.

"Frontier Protection" is to be ensured by having units readily available near the frontiers. Apart from this, in the West preparations must be made for employment of strong forces in the defence of coastal fortifications.

Other units, particularly motorised units, are to be kept at disposal in such a manner that they can be employed according to the development of the situation.

For the "Frontier Protection East" only weak forces are to be provided. For the remaining frontiers the Reinforced Frontier Patrol Service will suffice. Further extension of the western fortifications to a permanent construction which could be defended even against an attacker 3 - 4 times stronger remains urgent. For this purpose the building of further strong defence works is imperative. As second priority the fortifications in the East are to be completed and pushed forward south of the Oder-Warthe bend towards the Polish frontier.

B. Navy.

The possibility of protecting and keeping watch over German coastal territories by means of active naval striking forces and the fleet air arim must be ensured at all times.

Regarding the extent and method of execution of these operations decisions will be made according to the political situation at any time.

C. Air-Force.

Defence against surprise air-attacks is to be ensured in the first place by the employment of air defence units near to their peace-time stations. When strong Army formations are deploying on the frontier, their protection, including protection against air-reconnaissance, must be ensured. The bulk of the Air-Force is to be kept ready at the peace-time stations and deployment is to be prepared according to the situation at any given time.

Enclosure to Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Ref. No. 37/39 Top Secret High Command matter Operational Staff 1 of 11-4-39.
(Appendix 1)

Top Secret

Special Orders for "Frontier Protection" ("Grenzsicherung")

High Command matter Officer only

1. Giving of orders.

The order for carrying out frontier protection measures will be given by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. The extent of the frontier protection measures depends on the situation. It is only in case of a sudden enemy attack that the responsible local commander has to order the necessary measures on the necessary scale on his own iniative.

2. Legal basis.

It is to be assumed that a state of defence or war, in the sense of the law for the Defence of the Reich of the 4-9-38, will not be declared. All actions and orders for mobilization are to be based on peace-time legislation.

3. Mobilization.

The Supreme Commander will decide, according to the situation, whether - apart from precautionary measures - total or partial mobilization will include only the armed forces, or whether the armament industry and the civil sphere will also be mobilized wholly or in part.



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2047

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4. Operational zone.

When measures for the protection of the frontiers are carried out, the operational zone - which will depend on the situation - will come into force according to plan.

In this operational zone, the Commander in Chief of the Army will be empowered, by a special order based on the Reich Defence Law of 4-9-38, to exercise executive authority. He can depute this fully or in part to the army commanders.

5. Reinforced Frontier Control Service (V.G.A.D.) and/or Reinforced Frontier Control Service (War) (V.G.A.D.(K)) and Frontier Guard.

Orders for setting up the Reinforced Frontier Control Service - V.G.A.D. or V.G.A.D.(K) - and the Frontier Guard will be given through the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces in case of need.

6. Powers of the Reichsmarshal and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force in questions of air defence.

The powers conferred on the Reichsmarshal and Command-in-Chief of the Air Force (see Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Ref. Operational Staff /L II of 27-9-38 Section 3) in the event of mobilization (X-), can be given to him also in a period of tension by an order of the Supreme Commander.

7. Clearing of the frontier zones.

All measures in this field are subject to the approval of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

In the west, the clearing of the red zone opposite the Luxemburg and French frontier takes first place.

In the east, evacuation and clearing are to be reckoned with less. Preparations for an organization to receive refugees takes first place.

8. Evacuation and transfer of the population as a protection against air-attacks

In as far as the evacuation and transfer of the population and other measures (evacuation of schools, clearing of public buildings, hospitals etc:) of protection against air raids in the event of mobilization (X-) comes under consideration, these measures are to be prepared and dates fixed by the Reichsmarshal and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, in cooperation with the competent military and civil authorities. The execution, at a time when only a state of tension exists, of the measures planned is subject to the approval of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

9. Subordination.

According to the situation, the following are wholly or partly subordinated:

a) to the Supreme Command of the Army:
the parts of the Air Force earmarked for individual eventualities,
the SS troops available for military employment (SS - Verfügungstruppe) (cf. Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Ref. No. 1730/38 Top Secret Operational Staff /L II of 28-8-38),
as a first instalment of the Police, those forces which are planned for in the event of mobilization,
of the Reich Labour Service (R.A.D.), the portions laid down in special Appendix 7 of the Mobilization Plan (Army),

b) to the Supreme Command of the Navy:
fleet air units,
the portions of the R.A.D. planned for in the event of mobilization.

c) to the Reichsmarshal and C-in-C of the Air Force:
the portions of the R.A.D. laid down in Special Appendix 3 to



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the Mobilization Plan (Air Force),
the units of the Army intended for use as airborne troops, as requested by the C-in-C of the Air Force.

10. Supervision and suspension of postal, telegraphic, etc. services on land, frontiers and coasts, and suspension of railway, air and sea communications.

The necessary measures will be prepared by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces in cooperation with the branches of the Armed Forces, in such a way that they can be applied on all frontiers (as well as the coast) or against individual foreign countries, according to the situation. Details on this subject follow.

11. Signals communications:

For the signals communications of the branches of the Armed Forces in the operational zone, the regulation laid down in Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Ref. 1050/39 Top Secret Operational Staff /L IIc of the 10-5-39 applies.

Permission must be obtained from the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces before the branches of the Armed Forces ban the transmission of messages on official and private telephonic and telegraphic installations - unless such bans are necessitated by battle operations or the clearing of the frontier area.

The time at which the Wireless regulations in war time come into force will be ordered by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces according to the situation.

For the enemy monitoring service, no change in the general body of wireless transmissions must at first be recognizable. The Armed Forces peacetime wireless communications are therefore to be maintained up to the beginning of operations. The branches of the Armed Forces will give orders for any further camouflage measures which may become necessary.

Measures for interfering with the enemy's non-military wireless communications will be ordered by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

Operational wireless reconnaissance remains in the hands of the branches of the Armed Forces and is to be carried out in good time and along war-time lines. No special action by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces is planned at first.

12. Supply.

Supply of the troops is to be carried out according to the Laws and instructions valid for the Reich territory in peace-time.

13. Allowances and rations.

The branches of the Armed Forces employed get travelling allowances, according to Appendix 4 of Army Order 159. The Service High Commands will lay down to which units in particular these apply.

14. Budgeting of additional expenses incurred.

Additional expenses incurred under Frontier Protection are to be ultimately debited to extraordinary vote VIII E 230 (budget of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces) which has been specially provided for this purpose.



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Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Appendix II to Ref. No. 37/39, Top Secret.
High Command Matter L I

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II

"Fall Weiss " (Case "White")

The present attitude of Poland requires that, over and above the present "Frontier Protection East", military preparations should be made in order, if necessary, to exclude for ever any threat from this quarter.

1) Preliminary Political Conditions and Designation of Aims.

German relations with Poland continue to be determined by the principle of avoiding disturbances. Should Poland alter her policy towards Germany, which until now has been based on the same principle, and adopt a threatening attitude to the Reich, then, notwithstanding the relevant treaty, a final settlement may become necessary.

The goal in this event is to destroy Polish armed power and to create a situation in the East corresponding to the requirements of the defence of our country. The Free City of Danzig will be declared German territory at the latest at the beginning of the conflict.

The political leaders consider it their duty in this event to isolate Poland so far as possible, i.e. to limit the war to Poland.

The development of a growing crisis in French domestic affairs and a consequently reserved attitude on the part of England might allow such a situation to arise in the not too distant future.

An attack by Russia, so far as she may be capable of it, will in all probability not help Poland at all since it would mean her destruction by Bolshevism.

The attitude of the border states will be determined solely by the military demands of Germany. (In the course of later development it may become necessary to occupy the neighbouring countries as far as the old Kurland frontier and to incorporate them into the Reich. (Translator's note: this sentence is scored through in the original and a pencil note in the margin gives reference number of a supplement to this document dated 13 April, 1939)

On the German side, it is not possible to reckon with certainty on Hungary as a comrade-in-arms. The attitude of Italy is determined by the Berlin-Rome Axis.

2) Military Conclusions.

Our great aims in building up the German Armed Forces continue to be determined by the opposition of the Western democracies. The "Fall Weiss" is only a prudent completion of preparations, and is in no way to be regarded as the pre-condition for a military clash with our Western opponents.



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The more we succeed in opening the war with powerful surprise strokes and in achieving quick successes, the earlier we shall be able to ensure the isolation of Poland, even after the outbreak of war.

However, the general situation will in any case require that precautionary measures should also be taken for the defence of the Western frontier and of the Reich North Sea coast, and of the air over them.

Protective measures are to be taken against the border states, and in particular against Lithuania, in case of a Polish violation of their territory.

3) Tasks of the Armed Forces.

It is the task of the Armed Forces to destroy the Polish Armed Forces. To this endevery effort is to be made to ensure a surprise attack and this will be prepared. The disguised or publicly announced general mobilisation will be ordered only on the day preceding the attack and at the latest possible moment.

As regards the forces provided for "Frontier Protection West (see Section I - "Frontier Protection"), no further action is to be taken at first.

The remaining frontiers are to be watched only, but protective measures are to be taken against Lithuania.

4) Tasks of the various branches of the Armed Forces.

a) Army.

The goal of the operation in the East is the destruction of the Polish Army.

To this end Slovakian territory may be entered on the southern flank. On the northern flank, communication between Pomerania and East Prussia is to be established quickly.

The preparations for the beginning of operations are to be made in such a way that a start can be made with the forces immediately available, without waiting for the concentration according to plan of mobilised units. It can be foreseen that these forces will be made ready under camouflage immediately before the day of the attack. I reserve the decision in this matter to myself.

Whether the forces providedfor "Frontier Protection West" will march there as a whole, or whether part will be free for other employment, will depend on the political situation.

b) Navy.

In the Baltic Sea, the following tasks fall to the Navy:
1) destruction or keeping at bay of the Polish naval fighting forces.
2) closing the sea - routes leading to Polish naval strongpoints, particularly Gdynia. Neutral shipping in Polish harbours and in Danzig is to be given a time-limit by which it must leave, time-limit to be made known at the beginning of the breakthrough into Poland. After it has left, the Navy will be at liberty to take blockading measures.
The disadvantages to naval war strategy arising from the time allowed for getting away must be borne in mind.
3) Cutting off Polish maritime trade.
4) Security of the sea-route Reich - East Prussia.
5) Protection of German sea-communications with Sweden and the Baltic States.



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6) Reconnaissance and precautionary measures, so far as possible in an inobtrusive manner, against an attack by Soviet Russian naval forces coming from the Gulf of Finland.

Appropriate naval forces are to be provided for the defence of the coasts and coastal areas of the Baltic.

To the south of the North Sea and in the Skagerrak those precautionary measures are to be taken which appear requisite for security in case of a surprise entry by the Western powers into the conflict. They are to be limited to the absolutely essential minimum. Their inobtrusiveness must be guaranteed. In this connection it is definitely a question of avoiding every action which could aggravate the political attitude of the Western powers.

c) Air Force.

Except for the necessary forces to be left in the west, the Air Force is to be employed in a surprise attack against Poland.

Besides the destruction of the Polish air arm in the shortest possible time, the following tasks have priority for the Air Force :

1) Interference with Polish mobilisation and prevention of the concentration of the Polish Army according to plan.

2) Direct support of the Army, above all of the troops leading the attack, from the crossing of the frontier onwards.

Any transfer of flying units to East Prussia before the beginning of operations must not be allowed to detract from the surprise nature of the attack.

The first flight across the frontier must be fixed to coincide with the operations of the Army.

Attacks against the harbour of Gdynia may begin only after the time allowed to neutral shipping to leave (see para 4) has elapsed.

Focal points of air defence are to be established over Stettin, Berlin and the Upper Silesian industrial area (including Mährisch, Ostram and Brno).



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Typed by an Officer.

Top Secret.

Berlin 24th June, 1939

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
Operational Staff Ref. No.: 67/39 Top Secret L(I)

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Copy No. 2

Subject: "Fall Weiss" (Case "White")

Navy High Command.

High Command matter.
Officers only.

Ref. Al op. 76/39
Received 26 June 1939.

The High Command is instructed to prepare all reserves aimed at taking over the bridges across the lower Vistual in undamaged condition. On completion of preparations the Command of the Army will render a short report to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

Apart from the above the High Command of the Army and Navy will re-examine the question whether the surprise element of a sudden attack against the bridge at Dirschau could be endangered through previous naval operations in the Gulf of Danzig. In view of the importance of the bridge it is to be ascertained whether the High Command of the Army still stands by its former agreement to the proposed naval operations (i.e. mining before "Y"-hour).

(Marginal pencil note:) Accordingly an announcement, which would give the alarm, may not take place before "Y"-hour. Even the operations near Gd (translators note: Gdynia?) may have an alarming effect and therefore require consent of Supreme Command of Armed Forces.

(Marginal pencil note:) Yes, but take up first with Supreme Army Command.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

(Sgd.) Keitel. 24 June.

Distribution:
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Enclosure to Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Ref. No. 37/39 Top Secret, High Command matter, Operational Staff/(1) dated 11th April, 1939.

Top Secret.

Special Instructions for "Fall Weiss"

Appendix II.

High Command Matter
Officer only.

1) Legal basis

It is to be assumed that a state of defence or a state of war within the meaning of the Reichs Defence Law of 4th September 1938 will not be declared. All measures and requirements must be based on peacetime legislation. The articles of the Hague convention are applicable. Further instructions will follow later.

2) Mobilization.

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces will issue insturctions on the extent of preliminary measures required in "Fall Weiss", in particular as far as they concern provision of reinforcements of personnel and equipment.

Should mobilization without public announcement (eventuality "X") be decreed for all or some of the Armed Forces, eventuality "X" does not become automatically applicable to the civil sphere, including the armaments industry. However the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces will decree the necessary measures for the mobilization of all or some of the Armed Forces and for the maintenance of working efficiency of authorities and industries to the extent required and within local limits.

Should general mobilization with public announcement (eventuality "Mobilization" be ordered for all the Armed Forces, this automatically and integrally implies total mobilization in the civil sphere including the armaments industry. However a public announcement of mobilization is not to be counted on if military operations are limited to "Fall Weiss".

3) Operation Zones and executive powers.

In "Fall Weiss" the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces will promulgate "operational Zone East" also "operational Zone West", as laid down for the purpose, if the necessity of safeguarding the Western frontier should arise.

Once the Reich frontiers have been crossed, the operational zones are enlarged in accordance with the gains of territory made by the troops.

The C.in C. of the Army is vested with executive powers in the operational zone by special decree and is authorized to delegate all or some of these powers to the Army Commanders.

4) Reinforced Frontier Control Service, and/or Reinforced Frontier Control (War) (V.G.A.D., V.G.A.D.(K), und Grenzwacht)

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces will order the formation of the Reinforced Frontier Control Service and/or Reinforced Frontier Control Service (War) (V.G.D.A., V.G.D.A.(K) and the Frontier Guard

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(Grenzwacht) as and when required.

5) Powers of the Reichsmarshal and C in C of the Air Force regarding Air Defence.

Powers vested in the Reichsmarshal and C in C of the Air Force in the event of mobilisation "X" according to part III of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Ref. No. 2230/38, Top Secret, Operational Staff/L II dated 27 September 1938, may also be granted to him in a period of tension by order of the Supreme Commander.

6) Clearing of the frontier zones.

No clearing or evacuation measures will be taken in the East. The High Command of the Army will prepare the reception organization for refugees of German origin from Poland.

7) Evacuation and billeting of the civil population as precaution against air attacks.

The Reichsmarshal and C in C of the Air Force in co-operation with the military and civil authorities concerned will prepare and define a timetable for any evacuation and billeting of the civil population and other measures (evacuation of schools, public institutions, hospitals etc.) required as precaution against air raids in the event of mobilisation "X". The taking of these measures in periods of tension must be authorized by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

8) Chain of command.

According to the situation the following will be totally or partly subordinated:

(a) Subordinate to the C in C of the Army. those units of the Air Force intended for "Fall Weiss"".
The S.S. troops available for military employment (S.S. Verfügungstruppe) of the Armed Forces Ref. No. 1730/38 Top Secret Operational Staff/L II dated 28 August 1938, as a first instalment of police, the units which are planned in the event of mobilisation.
Portions of the Reichs Labour Service (R.A.D.) as laid down in the Special Appendix No. 7 of the Army Mobilisation Plan.

(b) Subordinate to the C in C of the Navy.
The Fleet Air Arm,
portions of the Reich Labour Service (R.A.D) as provided in the Mobilisation Plan.

(c) Subordinate to the Reichsmarshal and C in C of the Air Force.
portions of the Reich Labour Service (R.A.D.) as laid down in Special Appendix No. 3 of the Air Force Mobilisation Plan.
Army units for employment as airborne troops as required by the C in C of the Air Force.

9) Supervision and suspension of postal, telegraphic communications etc at the frontiers and the coast, and suspension on rail, air and sea traffic.

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces in collaboration with the Services will prepare the necessary measures in such a way that they can take effect for "Fall Weiss" and also according to the situation, wholly or in part at the other frontiers (including the coast). Detailed instructions follow.

10) Signals communications

The directions laid down in Supreme Command of the Armed Forces ref.

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No. 1050/39 Top Secret Operational Staff/L IIc dated 10 May 1939 apply to the signals communications of the Services in the operational zone.

As military operations in the Corridor proceed, military, official and private telecommunication installations are to be taken over in accordance with the instruction of the High Command of the Army. After the Corridor has been occupied, they will be put to use again, where suitable, for the improvement of communications between the Reich and East Prussia and the Reich and Danzig.

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces will determine according to the situation when "Wireless Regulations, in wartime, Armed Forces " (F.i.K.) is to be commenced.

Any application by the Services for a ban on signalling at official or private installations, except where this is necessitated by military operations or evacuation of frontier zones, is to be addressed to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

The enemy's monitoring service must not be enabled to perceive immediately a change in the general wireless picture. The peacetime wireless traffic of the Services will therefore be maintained up to the beginning of military operations. The additional camouflage measures required will be laid down by the Services.

Measures for interference with the enemy's non-military wireless traffic will be ordered by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Operational wireless reconnaisance remains in the hands of the Services and is to be carried out in good time and along wartime lines.

11) Supply.

The C in C of the Army may order the provisioning of troops from the occupied territory. The reduced circumstances of the German minorities are to be taken into account in these cases.

By properly applying the Hague convention, requisitions can be carried out in occupied territory; where demands must be made local population of German extraction, payments are to be made in German currnecy.

The Supreme Co mand of the Armed Forces will fix the rate of exchange for all transactions as and when required.

12) Allowances and rations.

Units of the Armed Forces which are employed will be granted 25% command pay (1/4 Kammandogled) apart from free rations and accommodation. The Commanders in Chief of the Services will lay down the individual units to which this applies.

Translators note: The above para is crossed out and bears the manuscript remarks:) Para. 12 amended, Supreme Command Armed Forces instruction, Top Secret, High Command matter only, No 81/39. Operational Staff/L II date 4 July 1939. Chief of Staffs tel. O/L 83139 (Initial). Amended version of para 12 is as follows:).

12) Allowances. (Pay, rations, accommodation, clothing, medical care.)

Those units of the Armed Forces to which case "X" is applicable, receive allowances according to the draft of the Armed Forces Operational Allowances. Decree (EWGG) as from the first day of case "X".

Para. 3 (i) of the EWGG is amended in so far as officers and military officials of the reserve receive 50% of the training allowances: (Uebungsgeld) and N.C.O.s of the reserve (Cpls and above) continue to receive full training allowances. Training allowances for L/Cpls and Ptes. are included in their pay.

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Para. 3 sub-paras. 2 - 4, deduction of compensations. (Abzug des Ausaleichbetrages), para. 7, operational allowance, and para. 8. alterations in travelling allowances and staff pay, of the EWGG are NOT applicable.

13) Budgeting of additional expenses incurred.

Additional expenses incurred in "Fall Weiss" are to be ultimately debited for the extra-ordinary vote VIII E 230 of the Supreme Command Armed Forces budget, which has been specially provided for this purpose.

C120/G

Appendix III to Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces ref No. 37/39
Top Secret, High Command matter.
Operational Staff/LI.

High Command matter.
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III

Occupation of Danzig.

The occupation of the Free City of Danzig by a coup de main can be carried out independently of "Fall Weiss", by utilizing a politically favourable situation.

The preparation will be based on the following:

Para. 3 of the "Regulations of the Executive power in East Prussia in the event of a warlike development" (vide appendix IV) will be put into operation.

The Army will carry out the occupation from East Prussia.

The Navy will support Army operations by taking part from the sea in accordance with detailed instructions by the C in C of the Navy. Units concerned in these operations will be instructed to collaborate with the Army.

The Reichsmarshal and C in C of the Air Force will go into the question whether Air Force units can participate in the occupation.

The Services will settle directly amongst themselves details of their collaboration.



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Enclosure to Supreme Command of the Armed Forces ref No. 37/39. Top Secret. High Command matter. Operational Staff/LI dated 11 April 39.

(Appendix III)

Top Secret.

High Command matter
Officer only.

Special instructions for "Occupation of Danzig."

1) General.

It must be borne in mind that, by the occupation of the Free City of Danzig, pure German Territory will be brought back under the sovereignty of the German Reich after a long separation.

2) Legal Basis.

It is to be assumed that a state of defence or a state of war within the meaning of the Reichs Defence Law of 4 September 1938 will not be declared.

3) Mobilisation.

Since the occupation of Danzig will be carried out with units of the peacetime armed forces only and without mobilised reinforcements, no mobilisation measures need be expected in the civil sphere, including the armaments industry.

4) Operational zone and executive forces.

No operational zone will be formed on Reich territory, however once the Reich frontiers have been crossed, the C in C of the Army will be vested with executive powers and will be authorized to delegate the whole or some of these forces to the Corps Commander, 1st Army Corps.

5) Reinforced Frontier Control Service and/or Reinforced Frontier Control Service (War), and Frontier Guards (V.G.A.D., V.G.A.D.(K) und Greuziracht).

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces will order the formation of the Reinforced Frontier Control (V.G.D.A., V.G.D.A.(K)) and Frontier Guards (Greuzwacht) as and when required.

6) Chain of Command.

Appendix IV of the "Directions for the Uniform Preparation for War of the Armed Forces, 1939/40 (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces ref No. 37/39, Top Secret, High Command matter, Operational Staff/LI dated 11 April 1939)" applies concerning subordination of Air Force units to the Army.

Some fleet air-arm units will be subordinated to the Navy according to detailed agreement between the C in C of the Navy and the C in C of the Air Force.

S.S. military units and police units in so far as they participate in the occupation, will be subordinated to the High Command of the Army.

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7) Supervision and suspension of postal and telegraphic communications of the frontiers and the coast, and suspension of rail, air and sea traffic.

1st Army Corps, which has been entrusted with the occupation of Danzig, is empowered to take the necessary steps in East Prussia and/or Danzig on its own account.

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces reserves itself the right to introduce similar measures in the remaining Reich territory.

8) Signals communications.

1st Army Corps HQ is empowered to utilize official and private telecommunication installations. The requirements of the participating Air Force and naval units will be safeguarded by 1st Army Corps HQ.

The Armed Forces Signals HQ (Wehrmachtsnachrichtenkommandantur) Koenigsberg will come under No. 1 Military District (W.Kr.Kdo.)

The military, official and private telecommunication installations in the occupied territory are to be taken over at an early moment. After having been proofed against enemy interference, they are to be brought into use again.

Wireless procedure for the operation, as far as this can not be laid down by 1st Army Corps HQ, in particular for the necessary inter-Service communication, will be regulated by Supreme Army Command serarately.

9) Supplies.

The C in C of the Army can order the provisioning of troops from the occupied territory. In this case, German Law is applicable.

All services rendered by the population will be paid for in German currency; requisitions are to be avoided as far as possible.

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces will fix the rate of exchange for all transactions as and when required.

10) Allowances and rations.

Units of the Armed Forces which are employed will receive travelling allowance (Merschabfindung) according to Supplement 4 of Army Order (H. Dv.)159.

11) Budgeting of additional expenses incurred.

Additional expenses incurred through the occupation of the Free City of Danzig will be debited to the extra-ordinary vote VIII E 230 of the Supreme Command Armed Forces budget, which has been specially provided for this purpose.

C120/H

Top Secret.
High Command Matter.
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Appendix IV to Supreme
Command of the Armed
Forces. L Ia No. 37/39.
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IV

(Marginal note: for the navy nothing new)

Regulation of the power of issuing orders in East Prussia in the event of

H1166 - 0085



[illegible] the commander in military district I has, as commander of the 3rd Army, supreme command of the province of East Prussia. He alone is responsible for the defence of East Prussia, for the conduct of which he has to use all forces and means to the full in order to keep the province within the Reich. In this connection the Supreme Commander of the Air Force will provide the measures necessary for the Air defence of East Prussia, within the framework of the general prosecution of the air war.

Marginal note: new)
2) When code number "9434" (taking over command) of the preliminary measures for eventuality "X" come into force for East Prussia, executive power throughout the entire province will be vested in the Commander in Military District I. He is empowered to decree legal regulations, to institute special courts and to give instructions to all authorities and offices, these powers being effective for East Prussia. His right to issue decrees has priority over decrees by other superior offices.

(Marginal note: new.)
3) The Air Force Commander attached to HQ. 3rd Army is together with the units of the Air Force attached to the HQ strategically under the command of the Army Commander. The remaining parts of the Air Force used in East Prussia come under the C in C of the Air Force via Air Force command, East Prussia.

The decree Supreme Command of the Armed Forces No. 1922/38. Top Secret. Operational Staff/L of the 27 September 1938 is mutatis mutandis valid for defining the boundaries between the competences of HQ 3rd Army and Air Force in East Prussia. (Marginal note: see page 8 part "operational zones")

4) Regarding the placing of forces and departments of the navy in East Prussia under the command of HQ 3rd Army, the agreements made theron between the C in C of the Army and the C in C of the Navy remain fully valid (regulation on the authority to issue orders in East Prussia).

5) Prior to the receipt of my express sanction or prior to the establishment beyond the possibility of doubt of extensive violations of frontiers by a foreign power, violations of frontiers by Germany are to be strictly prohibited.

6) If a part of the province is unexpectedly threatened militarily and if special instructions for defence against such danger cannot be waited for, then the Commander in Army District I is entitled, on his own responsibility to give to all civil and military departments such instructions as are urgently necessary for the protection of the frontier districts. The execution of these instructions takes precedence over other duties and in this event, the Commander in Military District I may delegate his powers of issuing decrees to subordinate commanders, down to the senior member of a garrison.

Pencil note: re No. 4 see summary of A II data, re cooperation between Army, Navy and Air Force at I a.c.



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C 120 (Cont)
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Top Secret.
High Command matter.

Appendix V to Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. L Chief of Staff No. 37/39.

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High Command matter.

High Command of the Navy.
AI O/L 51/39
Received: 12.5.39.
Enclosures: 1 Map.

V.

Delimitation of the operational zones of the Army.

I approve the delimitation of the operational zones of the army as marked on the enclosed map.

Operational zone west applies to the protection and defence of the western frontier.

Operational zone East applies to the protection of the eastern frontier and "Fall Weiss".

With the advance of our troops beyond the Reich frontier on the further frontier of the Slovak protected zone, the operational zone will move forward accordingly.

(signed)

Adolf Hitler.

Distribution:

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H1166 - 0087



Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
No. 1050/39. Top Secret.
Operational Staff IIc.

Berlin. 10th May 1939.

Top Secret.

200 copies.
45th copy.

Subject: Exercise of military powers in the operational zones of the army.

1) In the entire war zone it is the primary task of the Army to combat the enemy forces on land, of the Navy to combat every enemy at sea, and of the Air Force to combat the enemy air force.

An exception to this is the battle which the Army and Navy will conduct against enemy aircraft - with their own weapons and those units of the Air Force that are permanently attached to them - in order to protect their troops, ships or fortified zones.

Any other exceptions (for example employment of units of the Air Force or of the Navy in the war on land) form part of the tasks of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces in its capacity as Supreme Command, as does any other direct cooperation between the branches of the armed forces, and will where necessary, be regulated by the Supreme Command.

The division of the war zone into separate zones (operational zone of the Army, naval fortified zone, and home front) must not prejudice the cooperation of the branches of the armed forces.

The exercise of military powers in the operational zone of the Army is laid down as follows:

I. Powers of the C. in C. of the Army.

2) The folllwing are subordinated to the C in C of the Army (or where relevant to the Army Commands or Corps Commands under him) when in the operational zone of the Army:

a.) Those offices and troops of the other branches of the armed forces that are under the command of the C in C of the Army for tactical purposes.
For details regarding the Air Force see Section III.

b.) Other offices and units of the Navy and Air Force in the operational zone. Inspectorates of war-economy reserve units, schools) as regards:

billeting (with the exception of permanent installations of the Air Force).

transport and traffic regulations (see paragraph 14) clearing of the combat zone,

defence,

medical services (except for army medical services,

pay, feeding,

supply of fuel for vehicles,

Army postal services.

The unified direction of the counter-intelligence service is the duty of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (A. Counter Intelligence (Foreign) according to specific instructions.

H1166 - 0088



3) Executive power in the operational area will be transferred to the C in C of the Army or to the Army commanders on the declaration of a state of defence or of a state of war, without any further orders in accordance with the Reich Defence Law.

If this executive power is to be transferred to them without the previous announcement that a state of defence or a state of war exists, then this will be ordered by the Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

In exercising their executive powers, the C in C of the Army or the Army Commanders are authorised to issue decrees for the operational zone of the army, to set up special Courts, and to issue instructions to the authorities and offices concerned with the operational area, with the exception of the Supreme Reich authorities, the supreme authorities of the Prussian State, and the Reich Executive of the N.S.D.A.P.

This right to give instructions takes precedence over the instructions of other superior offices.

4) A "Civilian Commissioner with the High Command of the Army" will be attached to the C in C of the Army, and a "Head of the Civil Administration" (ch. Ziv. Verw.) to the Army Commands.

Their tasks are laid down in Army Order 90, Paragrapphs 9,11,21,24,26, 27,29,36 and 120.

5) The Offices War and Economy, remain subordinated directly to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and to the branches of the armed forces, to supervise the production of the armament industry and its distribution as well as for general tasks in the field of the armament industry.

If the war-economy office lies within the operational zone, it comes under the command of the C in C of the Army territorially, if it does not lie in the operational zone, it comes under it for that part of its territory which belongs to the opertional zone.

If in exceptional cases an Army Command has to rely on firms working on war production (in as far as they are within the territory of the Army Command), for additional repair of equipment, then the Liaison Officer of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/Economic Staff or the Head of the Civil Administration (Special representative of the Plenipotentiary General) is to be consulted in this.

6) The Army Command is responsible for the protection of troops and installations of the army in the operational zone from air raids.
For exceptions see Section III.

## II. Delimitation of authority between the Field Army and the Navy in the operational zone of the Army.

7) If portions of the coastline in which there are units or installations of the Navy are included in the operatio al area of the Army, then they will come tactically under the command of the relevant Army Command as regards the conduct of the war on land.

For the tasks they have to carry out for the war at sea, they remain under the command of the C in C of the Navy.

## III. Delimitation of authority between the Field Army and the Air Force in the operational zone of the Army.

8) The defence of the air space above the operational area of the army by Air Force units is exclusively the task of the C in C of the Air Force. @

@ The same applies to the naval fortified zones.

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9) The C in C of the Air Force, or the district (Gau) air commands, are further responsible for the employment of an ti-aircraft artillery to protect:

a) those installations which are of importance to the war effort in the operational zone, but are not of immediate importance to the immediate operations of the Army. The Army Commands are to be informed of such air defence measures.

b) Units that are subordinated to the C in C of the Air Force and installations of the Air Force, in particular the Air Force ground organisation.

10) The C in C of the Army is responsible - with the Air force units subordinated to him under wartime arrangements (anti-aircraft artillery) - for

a) the air defence of the active battle area,
b) the air defence of installations and area in the rear part of the Army area where these are of particular importance for the immediate land operations.

Where further forces coming under the C in C of the Air Force are employed in this connection on the instructions of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces or after agreement between the Army and Air Force, these can only be withdrwn with the agreement of the Army. In cases of doubt the Supremen Command of the Armed Forces will decide.

11) If units or installations of the Air Force that are under the command of the C in C of the Air Force under wartime arrangements are located or are being employed in the operational zone of the army (flying units, anti-aircraft artillery, units of the Air Force Signals Corps on aircraft reporting service, Air Force ground organisation), then they remain basically under the command of the C in C of the Air Force. (For billeting arrangements, transport and movement control see under Paragraph 14).

12) If strong air defence forces are employed by the C in C of the Air Force in the operational zone of the Army because of the general situation in the air, then they remain under the unified command of the C in C of the Air Force. Should units of the Army's anti-aircraft artillery be located within such an air defence area, then the senior officer of this area is responsible for their being fitted into the common plan. Their subordination to the Army is not altered thereby.

In cases of doubt the Supremen Command of the Armed Forces will decide as to the strength of the air defence forces to be employed in the operational area.

13) The following are responsible in the operational area of the Army for the carrying out of the civil air defence according to the general instructions of the C in C of the Air Force:

a) the Army Commands in their battle areas

b) the air district (Gau) commands in the rear part of the Army area in agreement with the Army Commands concerned.

The battle areas will be delimited by the Army Commands.

If an air defence area is located wholly or partly within the operational zone of the Army, then for this part the same regulations apply as in the operational zone as regards air defence and civil air defence.

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14) Troop movements of any size (i.e. of units above the strength of a platoon), transports and the allocation of billets to units of the Air Force, in so far as they are under the command of the C in C of the Air Force will be harmonised with the requirements of the Army by the Army Command concerned in the operational zone of the Army. However the Army Command is responsible for seeing to it, that the units of the Air Force are brought into the transport and movement arrangements of the Army in such a way, that Air Force operations will not be delayed. This applies particularly to supply columns.

All requirements regarding any of the subject mentioned above are to be reported in good time via the local Air Force commander to the Army Command concerned by the higher authorities of the Air Force from whom they originate. The instructions issued by the Army Command in this connection will be made known to the Air Force authorities via the local Air Force commander and are binding for the Air Force.

15) "Air Force Signals Liaison officers" attached to the senior Army Signals officers will be the channel through which all the requirements which the Air Force signal communications service in the operational area of the Army has to obtain the Army Command will be put forward.

They are to keep in close contact with the Air Force commanders at the Army Commands.

The units of the Air Force Signals Corps that are under the command of the C in C of the Air Force in the operational zone, according to Paragraph 11, have been instructed to work in the closest collaboration with the Air Force Signals Liaison Officers at the Army Commands.

16) The Army is permitted to make use of the non-military long distance communication facilities in the operational zone in occupied enemy territory. On Reich territory this has to be done via the Wehrmacht Signals Commands concerned, who have been instructed to collaborate with the senior signals officers of the Armies.

In occupied enemy territory the area over which the Wehrmacht Signals Command have authority only extends as far as the nearest junction (telephone exchange, amplifier station etc.) on the other side of the national frontier or the demarkation line at the rear of the operational zone.

The requirements of the Air Force as regards non-military long distance telephone and telegraph etc, installations in the operational area of the Army can therefore only be applied for at the Wehrmacht Signals Commands on Reich territory and are to be secured within the meaning of the instructions issued by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. In enemy territory, on the other hand, the Air Force Signals Liaison Officers at the Army Commands will present all requirements of the Air Force for an allotment of the available non-military long distance telephone and telegraph etc. facilities directly to the Army Command.

These have to meet the requirements of the Air Force and the Army equally, as far as it is possible.

17). The Air Force has its own telephone lines for the use of its units in the operational area of the Army. The senior Signals officer of the Air Force Command concerned, or on his instructions the senior Signals officer of the Air District (Gau) concerned, are responsible for any additions to the telephone network. Their requirements from the Army Commands will be presented at the Army Commands by the Air Force Signals Liaison Officers, as laid down in paragraph 15.

During the installation of the telephone networks of the Army and the Air Force it is to be ensured through close collaboration, that the lines are laid in such a way that they do not interfere with each others telephone system. The installation of the necessary connections between the two

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networks will be ordered by the Army Command.

Units of the Air Force Signals Corps that are employed in the battle area will report as to their duties to the proper local Army officers and will request to be allotted a corresponding place of employment.

18) The W/T regulations of the Air Force apply to those groups and units of the Air Force in the operational area that are under the command of the C in C of the Air Force.

The W/T regulations of the Army apply to the units of the Air Force that are subordinated to the Army.

The Air Force will fulfill the demands of the Army regarding the carrying out of W/T traffic in the operational zone, so long as the accomplishment of the Air Force's tasks allow this.

Where W/T silence has been ordered, the following W/T services are exempted from it, unless the contrary has been ordered by the C in C of the Air Force:

a) the tactical W/T communications of flying units,

b) W/T services for the safeguarding of aircraft in emergencies.

c) W/T beams,

d) The transmission of orders by the Air Force Signal Companies and the aircraft reporting transmissions on the approach of enemy aircraft,

e) the meteorological W/T transmissions,

f) W/T communications within anti-aircraft gun and searchlight detachments of the C in C of the Air Force while targets are being observed and where other means of communication are not at their disposal.

However, where the situation requires it, W/T restrictions regarding time and volume of traffic can be improved on these W/T services by the C in C of the Air Force or by the competant Air Force Command, either acting on their own initiative, or after application by the Army Command.

The Army Commands are to be kept informed by the Air Force Signals Liaison Officers at army commands as to the carrying out of W/T traffic by the units of the Air Force located in the operational area.

19) The decree Supreme Command of the Armed Forces ref No. 1922/38. Top Secret. Operational staff/L of the 27the September 1938 is hereby cancelled and is to be destroyed.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces,

(signed)

KEITEL.

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(Sec-24. 6/C-120)/K.
11. Translation of a document signed by HITLER. Top Secret Officer Only.

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Berlin,10th Ma y 1939.
Nr. 48/39 Top Secret WFA/I(1) 7 Copies 2nd Copy.

Subject: Directive for the uniform preparation of War by the Armed Forces, 1939/40 (OKW.Nr.37/39 g.K.Chefs. WFA/L(I) of 11.4.39.)

(Stamp: Ob.d.M. AI Op.50/39 Received: 12.5.39 Enclosures: 1 attached in note on report).

Herewith, as Part VI of the "Directive", instructions for the economic war and the protection of our own economy.

The Commanders in Chief of the 3 branches of the Armed Forces will report to the Armed Forces High Command on the measure taken in consequence of these instructions by 1st August, 1939.

(Signed) Adolf Hitler.

Marginal note in copying pencil "Done 31.7. Not e in green pencil: Verbal report in time". Note in copying pencil: before leave: from 1.7. onwards) Verbal report has been made on 30.6. la (Initial) 29."

Note in red pencil:
"Submit report about 20/25. VI
Tra nslator's Note:
S (SCHNIEWIND) 16.5)

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Top Secret. High Command matter.
Officers only.

Annex VI to Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces
Ref: No. 37/39 Top Secret.
Operational Staff./L Ia High Command Matter.

VI.

Directives for the War against enemy economy (economic warfare) and protective measures for our own economy.

I. Preliminary remarks.

1). The most important prosecutors of the attack against enemy economy are the Navy and the Air Force. Their measures are supplemented by sabotage warfare. (Supr. Comm. of Armed Forces (Intell.)). The task of the Army can be to extend German living-space by taking possession of enemy territories, which are of special importance for our own economy.

The preparation of measures of economic warfare are a matter for the Plenipotentiary-General for Economy.

The Supreme Command of the Armed forces takes care of the unified orientation of all measures against enemy economy (The Operational Dept. WFA) in connection with Economic Staff), the same applies to protective measures for our own economy.

2) In sections II and III, of the present directive, instructions are issued for economic warfare and protective measures in the event of "Frontier Protection" (Grenzsicherung) and "Weiss" (White). From them follow the preparations to be made by the branches of the Armed Forces and the Plenipotentiary -General for Economy.

3) The prerequisite for a uniform conduct of the economic war is a uniform conception in judging ecemy economy.

For that the following instructions apply:

a) The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Economic Staff) is responsible for the overall judgement of the countries in question from the point of view of war economy, on the basis of our own data and those provided by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Foreign/Intell) and the three branches of the Armed Forces. For that a close collaboration with the three Branches, the Foreign Office, the Plenipotentiary-General for Economy and all other offices concerned is essential.

b) The three Branches, in collaboration with Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Econ.Staff and Foreign/Intell.), provide data for their employment a nd pass on to the Supreme Command Economic Staff all contributions to an overall judgment of enemy from the point of view of war economy of enemy countries.

II. Directive for the eventuality "Frontier Protection" (Grenzsicherung)

1. Attack against enemy economy.

a) General.

The eventuality "Frontier Protection", lays down only the security

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measures to be taken at the beginning of a war. Over and above this it is necessary that especially the Navy and the Air Force make preparations for the immediate opening of economic warfare. This is to be prepared with the main concentration against Britain and the secondary one against France. Britain and France will have to be considered as a closed economic block - in those spheres in which mutual economic support between the two countries seems to be possible. It is important to recognise not only the most important sources of production, but also above all the bottlenecks of enemy economy.

In all war measures, the sovereignity of neutral States must not be violated

b) Army.

Interference with or distruction of enemy economic and supply plants, which were within the range of arms employed on frontier protection, is to be prepared by the High Command of the Army in collaboration with the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Economic Staff).

If an advance into enemy territory comes under consideration, it is to be laid down by the higher commands tog ether with the attached liaison officers of the War Economy Staff (Wehrwirtschaftsstab), which economic and supply plants will have to be spared for our own subsequent use. It is of special importance to secure in time, stocks of all kinds in the occupied enemy territory. Their securing to be reported to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Econ. Staff).

c) Navy.

The Navy in its sphere prepares the economic war against Britain and France. According to the prevailing political situation in peacetime and with regard to the various possibilities in the composition of our enemies the intended form of conducting the economic war will have to be examined from a legal and military aspect in collaboration with the Foreign Office and adjusted to the expected developments.

The operational areas for the economic war will have to be established by the High Commands of the Navy and Air Force and continuously examined.

d) Air Force.

Measures are to be taken for attacking and paralysing the enemies' sources of food supply and raw materials and their production centres and armament industry. In this connection all attacks are to be concentrated in collaboration with the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Econ. Staff) and Naval High Command on those economic sources, the falling out of which would have the greatest effect on the war economy of the enemies.

In the battle against the enemy's maritime lines of communication the choice of targets particularly in closed cooperation with the Naval High Command with the aim of achieving combined concentrations by the two branches of the Armed Forces, is particularly important.

2) Protection of German economy.

a) In cases of "Frontier Protection" Reich territory (including the Protectorate and the Sbvak protected zone) is considered as being guaranteed to our economy, in as far as it does not lie within the range of fire of the French frontier fortifications.

b) On the home front (Heimatkriegsgebiet) the preliminary security measures (active and passive air raid protection, protection of factories' guards, defence

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against acts of sabotage, etc.) will come into force in the scope of the preparatory instructions or the mob. directives.

c) In the operational area of the Army the same rules are in force as on the home front, as far as Reich territory (including the Protectorate and the Slovak protected Zone) is concerned. In case of the occupation of enemy territory, the higher commands of the Army and Air Force, together with the attached liaison officers of the War Economy Staff (Wehrwirtschaftsstab) have to decide between themselves what is to be protected. Measures are to be taken to ensure that war industries continue to be supplied and to carry on production and that their products are transported away with as little disturbance as possible even in the operational zone.

1) The Naval High Command is responsible for the protection of commerce in the sea and coastal areas to the extent demanded by the directives for the unified conduct of the war. In the case of war with Britain, the continuation of our imports from and exports to places overseas cannot be expected, apart from isolated blockade runners so that in such a case the tasks of protecting our commerce can in the main only be expected in the Baltic and the territorial waters of the North Sea.

3. Special preparations in the field of war with Britain, Germany would be cut off from her imports from the Atlantic, the Plenipotentiary-General for Economy, in co-operation with the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and the other competent offices will first of all have to make the following preparations:

a) Increased exchange of goods with Italy,

b) Increased imports from the South-Eastern Area,

c) Economic safe-guarding of the ore deliveries from Scandinavia and the diversion of shipping to South Swedish ports.

d) The diversion of commerce and transport within Germany connected therewith.

III. Directive for the eventuality "Weiss" (White.)

1. It is essential to get hold of the Polish economic plants as far as possible undamaged. They will therefore only be attacked if an immediate military necessity should arise.

2. The quick seizure of the industrial areas of Polish Upper Silesia and Teschin is of importance for our war economy.

3. The Navy has to take measures to cut off all supplies entering Poland by sea. For this purpose the form of economic warfare to be waged against supplies going into Poland has to be decided on according to the political situation and in cooperation with the Foreign office. In this connection particular attention has to be paid to the treatment of ships sailing under neutral flags and of those goods that might perhaps be destined for Poland via neutral ports.

4. For the protection of German economy, the directives for the eventuality "Grenzsicherung" are valid mutatis mutandis.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF CERTIFICATE NO. C-122
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

SKC24/C/C-122

3 Oct.

5.) The Chief of the Naval War Staff considers it necessary that the Führer be informed as soon as possible of the opinions of the Naval War Staff on the possibilities of extending the operational base to the North. It must be ascertained whether it is possible to gain bases in Norway under the combined pressure of Russia and Germany, with the aim of improving fundamentally our strategic and operational position. The following questions must be given consideration:

a) What places in Norway can be considered as bases?

b) Can bases be gained by military force against Norway's will, if it is impossible to carry this out without fighting?

c) What are the possibilities of defense after the occupation?

d) Will the harbours have to be developed completely as bases, or have they possibly already decisive advantages as supply positions ?
(F.O.U-boats already considers such harbours extremely useful as equipment - and supply - bases for Atlantic U-boats to call at temporarily).

e) What decisive advantages would exist for the conduct of the War at sea in gaining a base in North Denmark e.g. Skagen.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-122

16 November 1945

I. ERNST M. COHN, Pfc, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document No. C-122.

ERNST M. COHN,
Pfc, 33925738

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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 126
OFFICE OF U.S.CHIEF OF COUNSEL

C 126

EXTRACT FROM LETTER TO THE FLEET F.O. (U/B) & B.d.P.

Berlin, August 2nd, 1939.

Attached are Operational Directions for the employment of U-Boats which are to be sent out to the Atlantic, by way of precaution, in the event of the intention to carry out "Fall Weiss" remaining unchanged. F.O. (U/B) is handing in his Operation Orders to Slk. by 12 August (Ink note - a decision on the sailings of U-Boats for the Atlantic will probably be made at the middle of August).

These directions must, if the Operations are not carried out, be destroyed by the 1 September 1939 at the latest.....

(Initialled) F.A.
Slk.
1/Slk.

---

Berlin 22.6.1939

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Re: Preparations for "Fall Weiss".
.....

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has submitted to the Führer and Supreme Commander a "preliminary time-table" for "Fall Weiss", based on the particulars so far available from the Navy, Army and Air Force. Details concerning the days preceding the attack and the start of the attack were not included in this time-table.

The Führer and the Supreme Commander is, in the main, in agreement with the intentions of the Navy, Army and Air Force and made the following comments on individual points:-

1. In order not to disquiet the population by calling up reserves on a larger scale than usual for the manoeuvres scheduled for 1939, as is intended, civilian establishments, employers or other private persons who make enquiries should be told that men are being called up for the autumn manoeuvres and for the exercise units it is intended to form for those manoeuvres.

It is requested that directions to this effect be issued to subordinate establishments.

2. For reasons of security the clearing of hospitals in the area of the frontier which the Supreme Command of the Army proposed should take place from the middle of July, must not be carried out.

3. It should be ascertained whether it appears to be expedient to transfer the S.S. Artillery Regiment to East Prussia and use it there for the purpose intended, in view of the fact that this regiment had only been formed a short time previously, or whether it seems more profitable to use an Army Artillery Regiment in place of an S.S. Artillery Regiment.

The result of the investigation should be communicated to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

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4. The Führer and Supreme Commander will decide at the beginning of August whether the training ships of the Navy will put out according to plan.

Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.

Keitel.

---

SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES
OKW/WFA No. 170/39 gk Chefs. L.I.

Berlin, 31 August 1939

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Direction No I for the conduct of the war.

1. Now that all the political possibilities of disposing by peaceful means of a situation on the Eastern Frontier which is intolerable for Germany are exhausted, I have determined on a solution by force.

2. The attack on Poland is to be carried out in accordance with the preparations made for "Fall Weiss", with the alterations which result, where the Army is concerned, from the fact that it has in the meantime almost completed its dispositions.

Allotment of tasks and the operational target remain unchanged.

Date of attack - 1 September 1939
Time of attack - 04:45 (Inserted in red pencil)

This time also applies to the operation at Gdynia, Bay of Danzig and the Dirschau Bridge.

3. In the West it is important that the responsibility for the opening of hostilities should rest unequivocally with England and France. At first purely local action should be taken against insignificant frontier violations.

and Denmark (red pencil note)

The neutrality assured by us to Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland should be scrupulously observed.

The German land frontier in the West is not to be crossed at any point without my express consent.

According to this Atlantic U-boats must remain in their waiting positions for

The same applies to warlike actions at sea or any which may be so interpreted.

Defensive measures on the part of the Luftwaffe should at first be confined exclusively to the warding off of enemy air attacks on the frontier of the Reich. In doing so the frontier of the neutral states should be observed as long as possible when dealing with single aircraft and smaller units.



1905

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Defensive operations should only be permitted over th[illegible] neutral territory when, where French and English attacking squadrons are operating over neutral states against German territory in considerable force, air defence in the West is no longer assured.

the time being. (pencil note)

It is of special importance that the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces should be informed with the least possible delay of any violation of the neutrality of their States on the part of our opponents in the West.

4. If England and France open hostilities against Germany, the task of those sections of the Armed Forces which are operating in the West is to uphold, while conserving their strength as far as possible, against those conditions necessary for the successful conclusion of the operations against Poland. Within the scope of this duty, damage should be done to enemy forces and their economic sources of supply as far as resources all. In any case I reserve to myself the order to commence attack operations.

Warfare against Merchant Shipping (Green pencil)

(See Directions to Groups, ships and U-Boats) (red pencil note)

The Army is holding the West wall and is making preparations to prevent its being turned. - The Western Powers violating Belgian or Dutch territory in doing so. If French forces move into Luxembourg, the frontier bridges may be blown up.

(Undecipherable note in green pencil)

In its warfare on merchant shipping the Navy is concentrating on England. To intensify the effect of this, a declaration of danger zones is to be expected.
The Supreme Command of the Navy announces in which areas of sea and within what limits danger zones are considered expedient. The wording of a public declaration should be prepared in conjunction with the Foreign Office and should be summitted to me for approval through the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

The Baltic should be secured against penetration by the enemy The C - C. of the Navy decides whether the approaches to the Baltic should be mined for this purposes.

Address to... (undecipherable) General Warning! (Red pencil note)

The primary task of the Luftwaffe is to prevent the French and English Air Force operating against the German Army and German "Lebensraum".

In waging war against England preparations should be made for the use of the Luftwaffe in causing damage to sea transport, the armament industry and troop transports to France. Full use should be made of favourable opportunities to make an effective attack on massed English Naval units, especially on battleships and aircraft carriers. The decisions regarding attacks on London rests with me.

Attacks on the English motherland should be prepared, bearing in mind that whatever happens, inadequate success with part forces is to be avoided.

(Sgd) A. Hitler

..... (undecipherable)

Warning ? (Note in red pencil)



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(SEC-24.7/C 127)

EXTRACT FROM "DIRECTION NO. 25."

Führer's Headquarters.

27. 3. 41.

(1) The military Putsch in Jugoslavia has altered the political situation in the Balkans. Jugoslavia must, in spite of her protestations of loyalty for the time being, be considered as an enemy and therefore be crushed as speedily as possible.

(2) It is my intention to force my way into Jugoslavia from the area comprising Fiume and Graz on the one hand and the area around Sofia on the other, moving in the general direction of Belgrade and South of this, and to contact and annihilate the Jugoslavia army, also to cut off the extreme Southern part of Jugoslavia from the rest of the country, and to take it over as a base for the continuance of the combined German and Italian offensive against Greece.

The approaching opening of the Danube to traffic, and the taking over of the copper mines at Bor are important for reasons of war economy.

An attempt will be made to persuade Hungary and Bulgaria to take part in the operations by holding out the prospect of regaining Banat and Macedonia.

The political internal crisis in Jugoslavia will be rendered more acute by the political assurances given to the Croatians."

.... A. HITLER.

681.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-134
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Top Secret

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

Fuhrer HQ, 21 January 1941

WFSt No. 8/41 Top Secret

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Enclosed please find a short resume of the speech made by the Fuhrer during the final conference with the Duce on 20 January 41, and a summary on the results of the conference held by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces with General Guzzoni on the 19 January 41.

for the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Jodl

- 2 enclosures -

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Result on the Conference of the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces with the Italian General Guzzoni on the 19 January 41

Important Items from the Appreciation of the Situation by General Guzzoni.

1.) Albania

The most important Italian theatre of war. Though front not sufficiently secure to make it certain that the present line can be held against Greek attacks in all circumstances, no danger of Valona or Berat being lost. 21 divs. now in Albania. Intention is to send another 3 divs. from Italy.

Intention to form a group for attack on the northern flank. Strength about 10 divs. (including 3 divs. still to be brought from Italy and 4 Alpine divs.) Will not be ready for attack

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before another 2½ months, since transport facilities do not make it possible to ship the 3 divs. or the personnel and equipment required for the reinforcement of the remaining divs. any faster. Intention to attack with this group in direction Korica, from there, some units to carry out a flanking movement to Pisoke in order to cause the collapse of the northern part of the Greek front, the main body to continue the attack in the direction of Florina as soon as supplies are safeguarded beyond Korica (only 1 road available). Abandoned intention of making an attack with a limited objective along the coast in the near future.

2.) Libya
Intention for continuation of campaign:
Holding of Tobruk as long as possible. Defence of the Derna - Eastern edge of the Djebel line, using the armoured unit stationed at Mekili for offensive action. Sending of reinforcements from Tripoli to Cyrenaica, in order to strengthen the defence planned there, in case the situation in Cyrenaica continues to develop favourably, thus making if possible to hold the western part of Cyrenaica.
If Cyrenaica cannot be held, defence of Tripoli.
Italians believe that Tobruk can hold out for some time and that the British will not advance upon Benghazi - Agedabia before the fall of Tobruk.
The following reinforcements are earmarked for Libya:-
Bringing the 3 divs. stationed in Tripoli up to full strength, transferring one armoured div. and one infantry div. (motorized) from Italy to Tripoli. Completion of these transports about 20 February 41.

3.) East Africa
Situation difficult in the case of British attack, which is expected in the near future. Defence to the utmost intended. It is desirable to divert British forces from Libya to East Africa, even though it may render the situation in East Africa more difficult.

4.) Dodekanese
Expected attack on Dodekanese has not hitherto taken place. Supplies in hand for about 3 months. Forces in Dodekanese weak (handwritten marginal note:- these ought to be considerably increased), nevertheless a certain offensive power in the case of a German attack upon Greece from Bulgarian territory (especially against British transports from Egypt into the Aegaean).

II. Views on the Italian appreciation of the situation

1.) Albania
Very unlikely that the Italians will be able to muster the forces requited for an attack within the time provided. A support of a German attack from Bulgaria against Greece must therefore be discounted. (Handwritten marginal note:- The German attack will however bring strong relief to the Albanian front)

2.) Libya
Whether or not Cyrenaica can be held cannot yet be determined. Unless the situation is basically changed, a loss also of Tripoli need not be feared, all the more since from May onwards large - scale operations will no more be possible, owing to the heat (handwritten marginal notes:- the loss of Morzuk (S) is evidently considered trifling. Conditio sine qua non:- no complications out of Tunis).

3.) East Africa
Duration of resistance in the case of a British attack cannot be estimated.

4.) Dodekanese
No resistance of any significance is to be expected in the case of attack. Offensive action of the Italian Forces stationed there against British transports to Greece cannot be counted on (handwritten marginal note:- ought to be built up in order to form an important complementary operation during the occupation of Greece.)

III. Employment of German units in Libya and Albania

1.) Libya
Italians very warmly welcome the dispatch of the 5th. light div. (motorized) composed as suggested. Shipment to Tripoli can begin approximately between 15 and 20 February; it will however be possible to carry out transports of equipment before that date.

H1166-0103



2.) Albania
Dispatch of a German unit is described by Italians as desirable, but not necessary. Dispatch of a corps impossible, as transport facilities inadequate. For reasons of transport, dispatch of only one mountain div. with light equipment could be considered. Decision not urgent at the moment. Italian attack - unless strong Greek forces are moved from the Albanian front to the Bulgarian frontier - impossible in any case before the beginning of April, therefore German unit need not be sent before March. Consequently new decision whether a unit is to be sent, at the beginning of March. Preparations for making a unit available will however continue.

- - - - - - - - -

Enclosure 2 to OKW/WFSt. No. 8/41 top secret
Top Secret

6 copies
2nd copy
Top Secret
Only thru officer

Speech by the Führer
on 20 January 1941

1.) On 20 January at 1100 hrs., a report is made to the Führer by the Chiefs of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and of the Armed Forces Operational Staff in the presence of General von Rintelen on the result of the military discussions with General Guzzoni and General Gandin.

II.) At 1200 hours, the Führer developed before a wider circle his thoughts and views on the situation.
Those present:-

| on the German side | on the Italian side |
|---|---|
| The Minister for Foreign Affairs | the Duce |
| Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces | Count Ciano |
| Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff | General Guzzoni |
| General von Rintelen | General Marras |
| Ambassador Schmidt | General Gandin |
| An interpreter from the Foreign Office | |
| Colonel Schmundt | |
| Freg. Kapt. von Puttkamer | |

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Contents of the Führer's Speech in Concise Form:-

Finland of great importance to us owing to the nickel findings unique in Europe. Russians promise to supply us with the quantity of nickel required, but only as long as they pleased. Therefore Finland must not be interfered with any more.

Demarche of the Russians on account of our massing of troops in Roumania has taken place and will be duly rejected. Russians always become insolent at a time when they cannot be harmed (winter).

The massing of troops in Roumania serves a threefold purpose:-

a) an operation against Greece
b) protection of Bulgaria against Russia and Turkey
c) safeguarding the guarantee to Roumania.

Each of these tasks requires its own group of forces, altogether therefore very strong forces whose deployment far from our base requires a long time.

Desirable that this deployment is completed without interference from the enemy. Therefore disclose the game as late as possible. The tendency will be to cross the Danube at the last possible moment and to line up for attack at the earliest possible moment.

H1166-0104



For this reason - as well as owing to the difficulties of transp which came to light during yesterday's military discussions - it is not advisable at present to dispatch a German unit to Albania. If it remains stationary behind the front, psychologically undesirable reactions would result: Italians in heavy fighting - Germans look on from behind the fron However if the German unit is employed, the war in the southeast, too will be prematurely started.

As far as can be foreseen, Turkey will remain neutral; it would be very unpleasant if she declared her solidarity with Britain and put her ai fields at Britain's disposal (handwritten marginal note:- Constantinopel Constanza: 350 km).

General situation in the East can be judged correctly only from the situation in the West. The attack against the British Isles is our ultimate aim.

In this respect, we are in the position of a man with only one round left in his rifle; if he misses, the situation is much worse than before. The landing cannot be repeated, since too much equipment would be lost in the case of a failure. Britain would then have no need to worry any more and could employ the bulk of her forces at the periphery wherever she pleases. As long as the attack has not taken place, the British must always reckon with the possibility.

A landing can only be made under certain conditions which, however, did not exist in Fall:- no three consecutive days of good weather.

Apart from that, the general task in the West is the protection of our base from Kirkenes to the Spanish frontier, at the same time always keeping a group of forces in Southern France ready to step in if Britain should gain a foothold in Portugal.

The blocking of the Sicily passage by the air force is only a poor substitute for the possession of Gibraltar. We had made such preparation as would have ensured success. Once in possession of Gibraltar, we would be in a position to gain a foothold with strong forces in North Africa and thus put an end to Weygand's blackmail. If therefore Italy were after all to succeed in getting France to enter the war, this would be a great success and would basically change the situation in the Mediterranean within a short space of time.

I don't see great danger coming from America even if she should enter the war. The much greater danger is the gigantic block of Russia. Though we have very favourable political and economic agreements with Russia, I prefer to rely on powerful means at my disposal. Very consider able parts of these are therefore tied down on the Russian frontier, thus preventing me from supplying the armament industry with sufficient manpower to bring the armament of the air force and navy to the highest possible pitch.

As long as Stalin lives, there is probably no danger; he is intelligent and careful. But should he cease to be there, the Jews, who at prese only occupy second and third-rank positions might move up again into the first rank.

It therefore behoves us to be careful. The Russians are continually trying to work out new demands which they read into the agreements. That is why they do not like explicit and precise formulas in these.

It is therefore necessary to keep a constant eye on the Russian factor and to keep on guard, by means of strength and clever diplomacy. Formerly Russia would have been no danger at all: for on land she cannot imperil us in the least, but now in the era of the air force; the Roumanian oilfields can be turned into an expanse of smoking debris from Russia and from the Mediterranean, and the life of the axis depends on those oilfields.

In any case we must not dispatch valuable units to places where they will remain inactive. Therefore we shall send to Libya not an armoured but an anti-tank unit, which can be transported more quickly and can still be employed before the hot period sets in. For employed it shall be:- we do not want to act like the British did in France. The tanks and the anti tank guns in this unit penetrate any British tank which is in action there.

The troops are experienced, have confidence in their weapons and are self-reliant that is very important in the fight against tanks. We have given the name "tank-hunters" to the anti-tank gunners also for psychological reasons. They are to seek out the enemy tank and battle it like the huntsman his quarry.

H1166-0105

Top Secret

General statements on the factors which are decisive for success in modern warfare. In the course of these, reference to the importance of training in up-to-date methods of warfare, which requires much time and effort and a highly efficient body of non-commissioned officers.

Importance of the air force and of the armored warfare. The training of an armoured unit is beset with difficulties; it is least possible to form an armoured unit by improvisation. Even the conversion of a fully trained armoured unit to other weapons takes months.

We have not achieved our great successes with armoured troops by working with heavy tanks. We prefer medium tanks. The French had very much heavier tanks than we had.

Our greatest asset were our par[illegible]enerals who have developed completely new tactics and have directed their units very cleverly and with an offensive spirit.

General reference to the importance of mines in land warfare.
Examples:- mining of our west wall.
Blockade by mines which were laid by the 16th army in the flank of our attack against France.
By means of mines, a field of attack can be completely messed up.

Question of the Führer about mines at Tobruk and whether further mines could not be brought in by U-boats.

Tanks lose all offensive spirit as soon as they encounter minefields. Great heroism by the engineer is required to remove or clear minefields.

Views on the war in the air and the comparison of German to British air raids.

It is necessary to have at one's disposal a mighty anti-aircraft weapon with a great ammunition supply; for a moment may come when the war will be conducted almost exclusively by the air force and the navy.

Against heavily armed ships, only the dive-bomber is successful.

Führer dwells on the excellent impression he has gained of General Antonescu. He really is a personality.

The Duce is of the opinion that his relations to the Legion are not good.

Führer goes into generalizations on the subject of revolutions, of which only the Fascist and the National Socialist ones have had an immediately constructive effect. In Roumania the predestined man was murdered before the outbreak and the first-rank leaders of the legion with him. Thus it came about that the leading may grew out of the Army, who started off the revolution and removed the king. He is inspired by glowing fanaticism, is ready for any battle for his country and will wage it with, without, or if necessary even against the Legion.

One man must be the Führer, a head of State and beside him a leader of a movement are not possible. It would be best if Antonescu became simultaneously the leader of the Legion.

---

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C134

10 Nov 45

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5, 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C 134

GOETZ MAYER
T/5 33812169

100

H1166-0106

(SEC-24.7/C-136)

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces.

Berlin, 21. 10. 1938.

The future tasks for the Armed Forces and the preparations for the conduct of war resulting from these tasks will be laid down by me in a later Directive.

Until this Directive comes into force the Armed Forces must be prepared at all times for the following eventualities:

1.) The securing of the frontiers of Germany and the protection against surprise air attacks.

2.) The liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia.

3.) The occupation of the Memelland.

. . . . . .

2.) LIQUIDATION OF THE REMAINDER OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

It must be possible to smash at any time the remainder of Czechoslovakia if her policy should become hostile towards Germany.

The preparations to be made by the Armed Forces for this contingency will be considerably smaller in extent than those for "Gruen"; + they must however, owing to the fact that planned mobilisation must be given up, guarantee a continuous and considerably higher state of preparedness.

The organisation, order of battle and state of readiness of the units earmarked for that purpose are in peace-time to be so arranged for an assault that Czechoslovakia herself will be deprived of all possibility of organised resistance. The object is the swift occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and the cutting off of Slovakia. The preparations should be such, that at the same time "Grenzsicherung West" ++ can be carried out

. . . . .

Signed Hitler

Checked Keitel

+ Operation "Gruen" (="Green") is the codename for the original German plan to invade Czechoslovakia if Hitler's demands were not conceded.

++ Codeword for measures of frontier defence in the West.

(6975)

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H1166-0107

C.137.

Translation

C.137.

Top Secret.

Typed by officer

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Berlin, 24/11/38.

No. 241/38 top secret important L Ia.

Re:- The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces OKW No. 236/38 top secret important matter L Ia of 21/10/38.

10 Copies
3rd Copy.

(Handwritten) to be placed before the C-in-C

Important Matter
By hand of Officer Only.

1st Supplement to Instruction dated 21/10/38.

The Führer has ordered:-

1) Apart from the 3 contingencies mentioned in the instructions of the 21/10/38, preparations are also to be made to enable the Free State of Danzig to be occupied by German troops by surprise ("4). Occupation of Danzig").

The preparations will be made on the following basis:-

Condition is a quasi-revolutionary occupation of Danzig, exploiting a politically favourable situation, not a war against Poland.

No.3 of the "instructions on the power to give orders in East Prussia in the case of becoming involved in war" (OKW No. 230/38 top secret important matter L Ia, dated 27/9/38) will come into operation.

Occupation by the army has to take place from East Prussia. The troops to be employed for this purpose must not simultaneously be earmarked for the occupation of the Memelland, so that both operations can, if necessary, take place simultaneously.

The Navy will support the army's operations by attack from the sea according to detailed orders from the C-in-C Navy. The forces participating are to be instructed to co-operate with the army. The details of the support to be given by the navy are to be agreed between the branches of the armed forces (Translator's Note:- i.e. OKH and OKM).

How far air force units can collaborate in the occupation is to be investigated by the Reich Marshal of the Air Force and the C-in-C Air Force and to be agreed in direct co-operation with the other two branches of the armed forces (Translator's Note:- i.e. OKH and OKM).

The plans of the branches of the armed forces (Translator's Note:- i.e. OKH, OKM and OKL) are to be submitted by the 10/1/1939.

2) No. 3 of the "instructions on the power to give orders in East Prussia in the case of becoming involved in war" (OKW No. 230/38 top secret important matter L Ia, dated 27/9/38) will also apply for the "occupation of the Memelland" (part 3 of the instructions dated 21/10/38).

Distribution:
OKH = 1 (Copy No.1)
RdL u.ObdL= 1 ( " " 2)
OKM = 1 (Copy No.3)
OKW = 7 ( "No.4-10)

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
K E I T E L.

3625.

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H1166-0108

SEC.24-7/C-139

Top Secret.
S.C.

The Reich Minister of Defence
Nr. 1400/35 g Kdos.L.Chef.

Berlin, 2nd May 1935

(Note in
2nd copy (Blue pencil "By hand only")

To: Chief of Army High Command
Chief of Navy High Command
Reich Minister for Air

For the operation, suggested in the last Staff Talks of the Armed Forces, I lay down the Code name "Schulung" ("Training").

The supreme direction of operation "Schulung" rests with the Reich Minister of Defence as this is a joint undertaking of the three Services.

Preparations for the operation will begin forthwith according to the following directions:

I. General.

1). The operation must, on ossie of the code word "Carry out Schulung", be executed by a surprise blow at lightning speed.

Strictest secrecy is necessary in the preparations and only the very smallest number of officers should be informed and employed in the drafting of reports, drawings etc., and these officers only in person.

2). There is no time for mobilisation of the Forces taking part. These will be employed in their peace-time strength and with their peace-time equipment.

3). The preparation for the operation will be made without regard to the present inadequate state of our armaments. Every improvement of the state of our armaments will make possible greater measure of preparedness and thus result in better prospects of success.

II. In particular, I request suggestions about the following points:

1). High Command of the Army:

a) How many divisions ready for action and what other suitable troops, including all mobile fighting-troops, can be made available for the operation ?

Basis of the calculations:
Restriction to pure defence - if necessary delaying resistance - in the West.
Reinforcement of the necessarily inadequate forces there by the East Prussian divisions which will be transported there immediately by rail or sea.

b) Concentration area or areas and time taken by concentration.

c) Plans for the carrying out of the operation.

2). High Command of the Navy.
Safe transport of the East-Prussian troops by sea if transport by land is not possible.

3). Air-Force.

a) Support for the attack carried out under "Schulung" by the army.
b) Examination of the possibilities of further assistance to the defence in the West.

(signed) v. Blomberg

(496)

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-140
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

(SEC-24.7/C-140)

To A I op 23/35. (in pencil)

Appendix to "The Reich-Minister for Defense No. 7/33 secret Reich Ministry of Defense.

Berlin, 25.10.193[illegible]
Secret 114.

H1166-0109

Directive
for the Armed Forces
in case of Sanctions.

Weisung
fur die Wehrmacht
im Falle von Sanktionen.

**1.)** The further development of the international situation created by Germany's giving notice of leaving the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference, can lead to the application of sanction measures against Germany.

It is not known which States will take steps towards sanctions. As long as the Council of the League of Nations does not decide upon joint action, France should first of all be considered. But France can induce Poland, Belgium and Czechoslovakia also to apply sanctions.

**2.)** The sanctions of the opponents can be of various natures.

The Armed Forces will be immediately and directly affected by such measures as entail a violation of German Territory, particularly therefore, if the enemy's forces break into, fly over or shell German land areas. The same applies to sea to the 3-miles zone (pencil margin note - mine-laying) also in case of enemy measures against German naval forces in case of the Capture or sinking of German merchant ships, in case of the blockade of the German coast as well as in case of attack on German coastal fortifications or places,

First of all an occupation of German territory is to be reckoned with.

**3.)** The Government of the Reich is determined to reply to all enemy actions as described under Figure 2, with a local armed resistance, without regard to the chances of military success, (for restrictions see figure 5a) to c) ). (Pencil margin note: Resistance).

This resistance will be made only by the Army, Navy and Air Force and the other forces, which have been expressly described as components of and which are under orders of the Armed Forces. These other forces must comply with the conditions of Article 1.) of the Appendix to the Treaty regarding the laws and usages of land warfare of 18.10.1907.

**4.)** In order to carry out armed resistance, the following emergency, and defensive measures of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, are visualized:

**a)** Systematic formation of the A-Army (A-Heeres). The whole Provincial and/or Emergency Police Force of the states (Laender) is, as a fighting body, at the disposal of the Chief of the Army High Command and under his orders. Defense-District-Command I (Wehrkr. Kdo.I) has at its disposal the East Prussian Provincial Police Force.

**b)** Systematic formation of the V-Navy (v-Marine) and its further reinforcement as material and personnel possibilities permit.

**c)** Systematic formation of the A-Air Force (A-Luftwaffe) including the passive air defense of the Reich.

The air-forces planned for co-operation with the Army and the Navy, as soon as ready, will be placed under the orders of the Commander in Chief of the Army or Navy.

The field passive air defense troops (Feldluftschutztruppen) planned for the Army will be available at first for the passive air defense of the Reich. I reserve for myself the time of placing them under the orders of the Chief of the Army Command.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-140
Continued

5.) The following tasks of the armed resistance to be offered are to be envisaged first.

a) on land:

The ensuring of the positioning of the A-Army against France-Belgium against Poland and Czechoslovakia together with the Frontier Guards (the reinforced Frontier Guard - Survey Service included) and the Provincial and/or Emergency Police Force. In the West the line Roer-Rhine and the Block Forest, in the East of the Reich the position Kotzenplotz-Oder-Nischlitz-Obra and Pomerania must be held as long as possible. In the struggle against Czechoslovakia ground may be given only yard by yard. As far as East Prussia is concerned the present regulations remain in force.

A concentration of forces of the Army in the demilitarised zone or their entry into the same requires my consent.

b) At sea:

Protection of commerce in the North and Baltic seas. Securing of communication with East Prussia.

Defense against enemy attacks lauched from the sea and from the air against the German Coast.

I reserve for myself the approval of all enterprises which have not the character of armed resistance (pencil note: see para 2) such as attacks against Gdingen, mining operations which exceed local or tactical purposes, as well as of counter-measures against an enemy blockade (marginal note in pencil: as long as the blockade has nothing to do with para. 2 or 2) and the opening of warfare against merchant and naval shipping.

c) in the Air:

Defense of the air over Berlin and over the industrial part of central Germany, with Berlin as the centre of gravity.

The employment of Bombers remains reserved.

I reserve for myself the approval of declaration of restricted areas for civil aviation.

signed Blomberg.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-140

2 January 1946

I, KENNETH DUKE, Major, R.A., 109907, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C-140

KENNETH DUKE
Major., R.A.
109907

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H1166-0110

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-151
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

(SEC24-8/C-151

EXTRACTS FROM THE OPERATION ORDER
FOR
OPERATION "HARTMUT"

Commander-in-Chief of U-Boats,
Operations Department,
B.Nr.Most Secret SO 120

30.3.40.
Copy No. 1.

Top Secret

S. C.

Officer only.

Operation order "HARTMUT" (initialled by Fricke, among others)

( II. EDITION)

Occupation of Denmark and Norway.

This order comes into force on the codeword "Hartmut". With its coming into force the orders hitherto valid for the boats taking part lose their validity.

The Day and Hour are designated as "Wesser-Day" and "Weser Hour" and the whole operation is known as "Weserübung".

Situation:

The operation ordered by the codeword has its objective the rapid surprise landing of troops in Norway, Simultaneously Denmark will be occupied from the Baltic and from the land side.

The primary requisite for success once the landing is accomplished is the hindering of enemy countermeasures, above all of troop landings, until an adequate number of troops has been put ashore. With this object orders have been given for the full commitment of all naval force.....

II (5) The naval force will as they enter the harbour fly the British flag until the troops have landed, except presumably at Narvick.....

(Signed in draft) Dönitz
(Certified) Godt.

*Translators' Note: "Toughness"

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-151

17.11.45.

I, ENID M. STANDRING, P.C. 52012, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. C-151.

ENID M. STANDRING,
P.C.
52012.

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H1166-0111

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-153
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Chief of the Naval Command Staff (Marineleitung)

Reg. No. A I st 1000/34 Gkdos — Berlin, 12 May 1934.

Top Secret — Copy No: 3

# Armament plan (A.P.) for the 3rd. Armament Phase

## I. General Preliminary Observations.

1.) The war tasks, within the framework of the defence of the Reich, indicated to the Navy by the Reich Minister of Defence, form the basis for all military considerations and decisions.

2.) The war and operational plans resultant from the war tasks provide the direction for a clearly defined armaments target.

3.) The planned organisation of armament measures is necessary for the realisation of the target; this again requires a co-ordinated and planned expenditure in peace time. This organisation of financial measures over a number of years according to the military viewpoint is found in the Armament Programme and provides

a) for the military leaders a sound basis for their operational considerations

and

b) for the political leaders a clear picture of what may be achieved with the military means available at a given time.

4.) The A-Plan should accordingly be the directing factor in the composition of the annual budget.

5.) Owing to the speed of military political development since Germany quitted Geneva and based on the progress of the army, the new A-Plan will only be drawn up for a period of 2 years. The 3rd A phase lasts accordingly from 1.4.34 to 31.3.36.

6.) The 3rd A-Phase emphasizes reorganization. The expenditure becoming necessary owing to increases in strength of the correspondingly increased training activity lessens the amount available for purely A objects. In the meantime discomforts of all kinds (smaller barrack space and the forgoing of some amenities for instance) will have to be accepted in order to enable the existing gaps in our armaments to be filled as far as possible. By the skilled appertioning and exploitation of arms and equipment available and under issue, expenditure on costly training equipment must be kept within limits commensurate with the progress of the armament programme.

7.) All theoretical and practical A-preparations are to be drawn up with a primary view to readiness for a war without any alert period. Measures which require for their execution and completion a longer period than is envisaged in the "A" plan + are temporarily withdrawn.

## II. Financial Basis.

1.) The following assumptions will form the basis for the preparations of the A.P.

Budget 34 amounting to 396.-
Budget 35 " " 434.- 830 Mill. R.M.

For current peacetime expenditure
including Personnel



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H1166-0112

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1934 | 171.- | | |
| 1935 | 190.- | 361 | Mill. R.M. |
| Blance available for armament purposes of which for ship replacement construction | | 469 | " " |
| 1934 | 148.- | | |
| 1935 | 175.- | 323 | " " |
| Balance for other Armaments | | 146 | " " |

(s. Table in Appendix D)

2.) The budget resources detailed in para II, 1 include all sources available for naval purposes (public budget, conversion budget, B budget, labour programme etc.)

III. Armaments - Target (A-Target) for the 3rd A-phase (until 1.4.36) ++

1.) General .....

2.) In Detail .....

IV. Organisation of the A.P.

1.) The material organisation in the new A.P. is arranged according to the following groups.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| I | = | New construction |
| II | = | Air Defence (without munitions) |
| III | = | Improvement on ships (Ship = incl. engine construction |
| IV | = | " " " (Armaments) |
| V | = | Artillery - Munitions and Stores |
| VI | = | Artillery measures |
| VII | = | Torpedo " |
| VIII | = | Barrage " |
| IX | = | Signals " |
| X | = | Bases incl. Dock and Arsenal |
| XI | = | 'J-' preparations (Supply) |
| XII | = | Training |
| XIII | = | Accomodation and Clothing |

---

+++ .....

---

V. Order of Priority.....

VI. Execution of the R.P.....

RAEDER

+ T's Note: 'A' in original not R (Ruestung) Plan, as elsewhere.
++ Translator's Note: From III headings only have been given.
+++ Translator's Note: Details of Appendices follow.



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H1166-0113

H1166-0114

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-153
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

**Distribution:**

| | |
|---|---|
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| B | 5 " |
| E | 1 copy |
| Fleet | 1 " |
| Stat. O. | 1 " |
| Stat. N. | 1 " |
| W.A.(L) | 1 " |
| T.A. | 1 " |
| Reserve | 4 copies |
| | 20 copies. |

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-153

11 November 1945.

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, 2nd Lt, 01332102, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C-153.

GERARD SCHAEFER
2nd Lt, 01332102

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H1166-0115



TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-159
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

SEC24-9/C-159

(Reader's initials in green pencil).

(Red pencil note- To be submitted to the C-in-C of the Navy)

The War Minister and C-in-C of the Armed Forces

Berlin W35, 2.3.36.
Tirpitzufer 72-76
Telephone: Bl Kurfuerst 8191

W A No. 380/36 Most Secret L I
S.O. only

Written by an officer

To:
The C-in-C of the Army
The C-in-C of the Navy
The Air Minister and C-in-C of the Air Force

Supreme Command of the Navy
Reg. No. AI Op 14/36

1. The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor has made the following decision:

By reason of the Franco-Russian alliance, the obligations accepted by Germany in the Locarno Treaty, as far as they apply to articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles wich refer to the demilitarised zone, are to be regarded as obsolete.

2. Sections of the Army and Air Force will therefore be transferred simultaneously in a surprise move to garrisons of the demilitarised zone. In this connection I issue the following orders:

3.

a) Re-forming his divisional staffs, the C-in-C of the Army is to move forward sections consisting mainly of the VI, IX and V Army Corps into the demilitarised zone in such a way that they will be transferred to permanent garrisons onthe Rhine and East of it. Apart from that, one Infantry Batallion shall be transferred to Aachen, one to Trier and one to Saarbruecken.

The Regional Police Inspectorates West, South West, and South will come entirely under the orders of the C-in-C of the Army for the purpose of incorporating them into the army.

b) The Reich Air Minister and C-in-C of the Air Force will transfer one fighter squadron each to the area around Cologne and Coblenz, and sections of the AA into or near such towns on the Lower and Middle Rhine where the most important Rhine bridges are.

4. The movements are to be prepared and synchronised in such a way by the C-in-C of the Army and the C-in-C of the Air Force that the first Staffel, including the batallions assigned to Aachen, Trier and Saarbruecken, and the AA guns arrive in the Rhine Valley at 1200 hours on Z-day and the first fighter squadrons

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land at the same time.

A second Staffel, comprising all the remaining sections of the Army assigned to the demilitarised zone will follow within 24 hours. Orders for Z-day will be given at the appropriate time.

5. Marching orders for the troops which are to be transferred, are to be given as late as possible. Every precaution must be taken to shorten the period between the commencement of practical preparations for the actual move and the entry into the demilitarised zone.

The C-in-C of the Army will see to it that the responsible departments of the general and interior administration, of the Police Force, of the municipalities, and of the Party are not informed before 0800 hours on Z-Day about the billetting of Army and Air Force men in their area.

6. To preserve the peaceful character of the operation, military security or advance measures are not to be taken without my express orders.

On Z-Day, from 0800 hours until further notice, however it must be ensured that the command posts of the three services can commence work day and night at short notice. Persons on leave are not to be recalled.

7. If the other powers who have signed the Locarno Treaty reply to the transfer of German troops into the demilitarised zone with military preparations, I reserve the right to decide on any military counter-measures.

In the event of enemy frontier violations with offensive intent, action must be taken in accordance with instructions for taking up position and battle orders.

8. I request:

a) timely information on instructions given in accordance with 3a and 3b.

b) to be informed continuously on the progress of the transfer of garrisons, starting on Z-Day at 1200 hours (T 1 Abteilung 1).

Counter espionage is being given special instructions.

c) That suggestions be made to me as soon as possible, as to what advance measures should be put into operation during the the first critical stages, in case military preparations by neighbouring states become evident.

signed Blomberg.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO C-159

I, Pfc Ernst M. Cohn 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document C-159.

ERNST M. COHN
Pfc.
33925738

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SEC-24.9/C-167.

C 167

Translated Extract

Report of the C in C of the Army delivered to the Fuehrer 18. 3. 1600 hours.

(Present. Chief OKW, Gen. Jodl, Commander v Puttkamer)

. . . . . .

9. Preparations for Marita.

. . . . . .

(p.6). B). Personnel Position.

f) The C in C of the Navy asks for confirmation that the whole of Greece will have to be occupied even in the event of a peaceful settlement. Fuehrer: The complete occupation is a prerequisite of any settlement.

. . . . . .

Raeder.

3673.

H1166-0118

SEC-24.10/C-174.

TRANSLATION

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces
WFA/Abt. L. Nr 22070/40 G. Kdos. Chefs.

Berlin, 1.3.1940.

9 Copies
3rd. Copy.

Most Secret

+

TOP SECRET
By Officer only

Directive for "Fall Weser uebung" ++

1.) The development of the situation in Scandinavia requires the making of all preparations for the occupation of Denmark and Norway by a part of the German Armed Forces ("Fall Weser uebung"). This operation should prevent British encroachment on Scandinavia and the Baltic, further it should guarantee our ore base in Sweden and give our Navy and Air Force a wider start line against Britain. The part which the Navy and the Air Force will have to play, within the limits of their capabilities, is to protect the operation against the interference of British naval and air striking forces.

In view of our military and political power in comparison with that of the Scandinavian States, the force to be employed in the " Fall Weser uebung" will be kept as small as possible. The numerical weakness will be balanced by daring actions and surprise execution. On principle we will do our utmost to make the operation appear as a peaceful occupation, the object of which is the military protection of the neutrality of the Scandinavian States. Corresponding demands will be transmitted to the Governments at the beginning of the occupation. If necessary, demonstrations by the Navy and the Air Force, will provide the necessary emphasis. If in spite of this resistance should be met with, all military means will be used to crush it.

Translator's Notes :

+ Initialled by Fricke

++ Code name for Invasion of Norway and Denmark.



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2.) I put in charge of the preparations and the conduct of the operation against Denmark and Norway the Commanding General of the XXI Army Corps, General d. I. + v. Falkenhorst (Commander of "Group XXI").

In questions of the conduct of operations the above named is directly under my orders. The Staff is to be completed from all the three branches of the Armed Forces.

The force which will be selected for the purpose of "Fall Weser uebung" will be under separate command. They will not be allocated for other operational theatres.

The part of the Air Force detailed for the purpose of the "Weseruebung" will be tactically under the orders of Group XXI. After the completion of their task they revert to the command of Ob.d.L. ++

The employment of the forces which are under direct Naval and Air Force command will take place in agreement with the Commander of Group XXI.

The administration and supply of the forces posted to Group XXI will be ensured by the branches of the Armed Forces themselves according to the demands of the Commander.

3.). The crossing of the Danish border and the landings in Norway must take place simultaneously. I emphasise that the operations must be prepared as quickly as possible. In case the enemy seizes the iniative against Norway, we must be able to apply immediately our own counter-measures.

It is most important that the Scandinavian States as well as the Western opponents should be taken by surprise by our measures. All preparations, particularly those of transport and of readiness, drafting and embarkation of the troops, must be made with this factor in mind.

In case the preparations for embarkation can no longer be kept secret, the leaders and the troops will be deceived with fictitious objectives. The troops may be acquainted with the actual objectives only after putting to sea.

Translator's Notes :

\+ der Infanterie= of the Infantry

++ Commander in Chief of the Air Force.



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SEC-24.10/C-174.

4.) Occupation of Denmark ("Weseruebung Süd").

The Task of Group XXI : Occupation by surprise of Jutland and of Fuenen immediately after occupation of Seeland.

Added to this, having secured the most important places, the Group will break through as quickly as possible from Fuenen to Skagen and to the east coast. In Seeland bases will be captured early on. These will serve as starting points for later occupation. The Navy will provide forces for the securing of the connection Nyborg - Korsor and for swift capture of the Kleine - Belt - Bridge as well as for landing of troops should the necessity arise. She will also prepare the defence of the coast.

The Air-Force will provide squadrons of which the primary object will be demonstrations and dropping of leaflets. Full use of the existing Danish ground defences and air defence must be ensured.

5.) Occupation of Norway ("Weseruebung Nord")

The Task of the Group XXI : Capture by surprise of the most important places on the coast by sea and airborne operations.

The Navy will take over the preparation and carrying out of the transport by sea of the landing troops as well as the transport of the forces which will have to be brought to Oslo in a later stage of the operation. She will escort supplies and reserves on the way over by sea.

Preparations must be made for speedy completion of coastal defence in Norway.

The Air Force, after the occupation has been completed, will ensure air defence and will make use of Norwegian bases for air warfare against Britain.

6.) Group XXI will make regular reports to the OKW concerning the state of preparations and will submit a chronological summary of the progress of preparations. The shortest necessary space of time between the issue of the order for "Weseruebung" and its execution must be reported.

Intended Battle Headquarters will be reported.

Code names: Wesertag = the day of the operation.

Weserzeit = "H" hour.

(signed) A. Hitler.



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SEC-24.10/C-174.

Distribution:

| | |
|---|---|
| O.C. Group XXI | Copy No. 1. |
| C.in C. Army | " " 2. |
| C.in C. Navy | " " 3. |
| C.in C. Air Force | " " 4. |
| Supreme Command Armed Forces | |
| Head W.F.A. @ | " " 5. |
| L. Section | " Nos. 6 - 9 |

@ Wehrmachtsführungsamt = operational H.Q. Armed Forces.



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TRANSLATOR'S NOTE:
Words or sentences in square brackets in the translation appear in similar pencilled brackets in the original, and are sometimes scored through in pencil as well.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

SEC-24.10/C-175. C. 175.

S.O. Top Secret.

Berlin, 24.6.1937.
S.O. only
(Stamp) Access only by an officer)

The Reich Minister for War
and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.

Nr. 55/37 g. K. S.O. only L Ia. 4 copies
2nd Copy.

Subject : "Directive 1937/38"

Reference : W.A. 36/36 S.O. only LIa of 26.6.36.

(Remark in ink)
AI op. 34/37. Gkdos Chefs.
Received 25.6.

Written by an officer.

Outgoing documents in connection with this matter, and dealing with it in principle, are to be written by an officer.

inal Enclosed "Directive for Unified Preparation for War of the
rk in Armed Forces" comes into force on 1. 7. 1937. At the same time the
: "Directives for the unified preparation of a possible war by W.A.,+
.24/36. Army, Navy and Air Force" (W.A. 36/36 S.O. only LIa of 26.6.36) will be cancelled and is to be returned to W.A. (L.Ia) with covering letter by 10. 7. 37.

I request the forwarding to me of the results of the considerations to be made, according to part 3. of the Directive by 1. 9. 37.

(Signed) v Blomberg

Ob.d.H. (C,in C. Army) 1 Covering letter (Copy 1), 1 Directive (Copy 1)
Ob.d.M. (C. in C.Navy) 1 " " (Copy 2), 1 " (Copy 2)
R.d.L. and Ob.d.L. (Reich Minister for Air and C. in C Air Force)
1 Covering letter (Copy 3), 1 Directive (Copy 3)
W.A. (L) 1 Covering letter (Copy 4), 2 Directives (Copies 4&5)

+ W.A. = Branches of the Armed Forces.

(Remark in ink) MI op. 34/37 Gkdos Chefs.

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The Commander in Chief of the Armed [illegible] Berlin 2a June 37.
55/37 g K. Chefsache L 1a

5 Copies
Copy No.2.
Top Secret
Only through an officer

Written by an officer.

AI op 34/37 Gkds Chefs

H1166-0123

# Directive

## For the unified preparation for war of the Armed Forces
## (Valid from 1. 7. 37 until presumably 30.9.1938)

Contents


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| Part 2. | Likely Warlike Eventualities (Concentrations) | 9 to 17 |
| Part 3. | Special Preparations | 18 to 22 |


## Part 1.

### General Guiding Principles

1) The general political position justifies the supposition that Germany need not consider an attack from any side. Chief grounds for this are, in addition to the lack of desire for war in almost all nations, particularly the Western Powers, the deficiencies in the preparedness for war of a number of States and of Russia in particular.

The intention to unleash a European War is held just as little by Germany. Nevertheless the politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands a continuous preparedness for war of the German Armed Forces.

a). to counter attacks at any time.

b). To enable the military exploitation of politically favourable opportunities should they occur.

Preparations of the Armed Forces for a possible war in the Mobilisation Period 1937/38 must be made with this in mind. They must therefore cover various possibilities and will be divided up in the following directive according to :

a). General Preparations (vide Para 2)

b). Work on warlike eventualities which, owing to their probability, top the list, in the shape of concentration plans with the co-operation of subordinate departments (vide Para 3).

c). Special preparations in the shape of studies and considerations, generally however only within the High Command (Special preparations vide Para 4).

2) To the general preparations, belong :

a). The permanent preparedness for mobilisation of the German Armed Forces, even before the completion of rearmament and full preparedness for war.

b). The further working on "Mobilisation without public announcement" in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to begin a war suddenly and by surprise both as regards strength and time.

c). The working on the transport of the bulk of the regular army from East Prussia to the Reich.

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d). Preparatory measures in case German territory is violated suddenly by a foreign power with hostile intention.

In that event armed resistance will be offered without special orders.

The services will therefore empower the competant frontier or coastal territory commanders to take, in such cases, all necessary for countermeasures against hostile attacks, irrespective of whether a legal basis exists for any individual measure or not (Executive decree to the Reich's Defence law).

Under no circumstance however may the German frontier be crossed or flown over or foreign territory be violated without my approval.

German territory is not deemed to be violated (see first sentence, para 2d above) in the case of individual sentries or patrols crossing our frontiers accidentally or not deliberately or as a result of the excessive zeal of a junior commander; nor is territory deemed to be violated if flown over owing to faulty navigation or if German territorial waters are entered by warships with obviously non-hostile intentions.

3). Among the probable warlike eventualities for which concentration plans will be drafted are:

I) War on two fronts with the focal point in the West (Concentration "Red")

II) War on two fronts with the focal point in the South East (Concentration "Green")

for details see part 2 /of the Directive/.

4). Special preparations are to be made for the following eventualities:

I) Armed intervention against Austria (Special case Otto) (pencil note: settled).

II) Warlike entanglements with Red Spain (Special case Richard)

III) England, Poland, Lithuania take part in a war against us. (Special case "Enlargement Red/Green")

For details see part 3 /of the Directive/

While working out in detail or planning these special preparations the following will have to be considered:

Though we can in all probability reckon as things lie at present on one or more allies in particular individual circumstances, all elaborations and plans are to be based on the fundamental assumption that we stand alone for the time being.

5). /The present+ directive refers only to the unified preparations for war and to the general strategical points, which have to be observed in case of the opening of hostilities/.

In virtue of this directive The branches of the Armed forces must complete their deployment etc., plans or make new ones, and must communicate with evil other while doing this, in order to eliminate all discrepancies before the issue of the directives, asking if necessary for a decision by me.

(+ crossed out in pencil in original)

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5)

/The Directive for the conduct of the war itself and the definition of the objects of the war, depend on the general political as well as military and economic situation at the beginning of a war will be given /through us/ by the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander/.

(signed v. Blomberg.

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## Part 2.

## Probable warlike eventualities.
(Concentrations)

The following suppositions, aims and tasks will be made the basis for the treatment of the probable warlike eventualities (concentrations).

### I) War on two fronts with focal point in the West.
(Concentration "Red")

#### 1.) Suppositions.

In the West, France is the opponent. Belgium may side with France either at once, or later, or not at all. It is also possible that France may violate Belgium's neutrality if the latter is neutral; she will certainly violate that of Luxemburg.

In the East we shall in all probability have to reckon with the hostile attitude of Russia /and Czechoslovakia/. One can assume that Poland and Lithuania will remain neutral for the time being.

From /Austria/, Italy, Hungary and Yugoslavia at least benevolent neutrality is expected. England's attitude will be uncertain /see Part 3 of the directive/.

The outbreak of war will presumably take the form of a surprise attack by the French army and air force against Germany, with the participation of the French fleet. /In the east, Czechoslovakia can be counted upon to stay out for the time being, as long as political pressure by Russia does not force her to act prematurely - mainly with her air force reinforced by Russia-/ Operations by Russian naval forces are probable.

2.) It is the task of the German armed forces to make their preparations in such a manner that the bulk of the armed forces can be employed against France, and that our action in the east is at first limited to defence - and that with the employment of the smallest possible forces.

3.) Within this general intention the branches of the armed forces will havethe following tasks allotted to them:

#### a.) Army.

The focal point of the war on land lies in the west.

It will be the first task of the army, by commencing the battle as near as possible to the frontier, to prevent the enemy advancing towards and across the Rhine and the Black Forest, and to defend the area to the west of the Rhine and the north of the Moselle for as long as possible.

If Belgium is neutral it is particularly important to hold the Eifel as a position in the flank of and a base for questions against the northern French wing.

Every favourable opportunity for effective minor blows against the French army is to be made use of.

The defence of the eastern and southern frontiers of the Reich can be left to the frontier-guards and reserve divisions for the time being.

East Prussia is to be defended. But according to the political situation, the transport of a part or of all the active forces to the Reich by sea must be allowed for.

#### b. Navy.

The focal point of the war at sea is to be expected either in the Baltic or in the North Sea, according to the naval situation. The strategic task of the navy is to secure our sea communications in the Baltic, the North sea and the oceans of the world; in particular the communications with East Prussia are to be safeguarded. The operational execution of this task



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1836.

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depends on the ratio of strength at sea and it is to be striven for through eliminating the enemy's naval forces.

At the same time as defending and guiding our own sea communications, enemy traffic in the North Sea and Baltic is to be made impossible and that in the Atlantic, Mediterranean and, as the occasion arises, in other seas, is to be interfered with by suitable naval forces. Prevention and delay of French troop transports from Africa can considerably ease our own war on land.

In all these preparations the political necessity is to be taken into account that at the beginning of a war we ensure for ourselves the neutrality of non-belligerent countries by a painstaking consideration of their rights.

c. Air Force.

The focal point of the war in the air is also in the West.

The first tasks of the air force here will in all probability be:

The battle against the air force of the western enemies and their ground orgainisation, as well as against the main armament centres of the enemies' aircraft industry.

Participation in the battles on land, and at a later date possibly also the delaying of the enemy's deployment, if that is the only way to prevent largish initial successes by the enemy army, which it might not, under certain circumstances, be possible to catch up with later.

Protection of the German sources of production, and in particular of Berlin, the Ruhr area and the Central German industrial area.

The attacking of targets of mainly political importance (such as Paris) needs my special consent in every case.

- - - - - - - - - - - -

H1166-0128

## II "War on two fronts with focal point, South East. (Concentration "Green")

1.) Suppositions.

To parry the imminent attack of a superior enemy coalition, the war in the East can begin with a German surprise operation against Czechoslavakia. The conditions for such a stroke in the field of politics and international law must be created beforehand.

It is to be expected, that Poland and Lithuania will probably take a neutral or at least a temporising attitude, while Austria, Italy and Yugoslavia will be at least benevolent neutrals. Hungary will sooner or later perhaps join Germany in her action against Czechoslovakia, France and Russia will most probably open hostilities against Germany, Russia at first with her naval and air forces only. The leaders of German policy will endeavour with all possible means to assure the neutrality of England, which is to be regarded as an absolutely essential pre-condition for the case "Green", and also of all the other Countries not so far mentioned, but capable of conducting military operations against Germany.

2.) The task of the German Armed Forces is to prepare in such a way that the main body of all forces can break into Czechoslovakia quickly, by surprise and with the greatest possible weight, while in the West the smallest possible force is provided to cover the rear of this attack.

The aim and object of thissurprise attack by the German Armed Forces should beto destroy the hostile Armed Forces and to occupy Bohemia and Moravia and thus to eliminate completely, for the duration of the war, the threat by Czechoslovakia to the rear of the operations in the West, and to take from the Russian Air Force the most substantial portion of its operational base in Czechoslovakia.

H1166-0129

3) Within the framework of this proposition, the Services will have the following tasks:

a). The Army.

The largest part of the Army will be used for an attack on Czechoslovakia.

The short-term planning of this operation will depend on the strength and operational readiness of the German Army at the time on the state of preparations, and also on the attitude of Poland. The possibility that German troops will be able to be deployed on Austrian territory should be taken into consideration in the long-term preparations, since it can be supposed that the necessary conditions for this will be created by the political leaders.

The beginning of military operations must be fully synchronized with Air Force operations and I therefore reserve to myself the right to determine the exact time for the attack. (see under "Air Force" sub-para b) below).

The aim is a strategic pounce on Czechoslovakia, systematically planned in peace time, which, will overrun her fortifications by a surprise attack pin down and destroy her Armed Forces whilst still being mobilized and conquer Czechoslovakia in a short time by making use of her racial disintegration. The military pre-condition for this surprise attack can only be attained if the tank formations are fully equipped and completely ready for employment.

The troops covering the rear in the West must be reduced both in number and in quality to the utmost degree having regard to the state of fortifications existing at that time. The limit of this reduction is to be determined only by the necessity to hold the industrial areas in the Rhineland and Westphalia and to maintain communications between Northern and Southern Germany.

East Prussia will be defended but according to the political situation, the transport away of some or all of the operational forces by the sea route to the Reich must be reckoned with.

b). The Airforce.

Practically the whole Airforce is to be employed against Czechoslovakia only the minimum strength to be provided for the West.

The first tasks of the airforce will be:

The paralysation of the Czech mobilisation, especially the combatting of the Czech air force and its ground organisations, also of the mobilisation centres and the most important communication centres. The intention is effectively to disintegrate the Czech State and thus to facilitate the army's task of taking possession. With regard to the assignment of battles tasks, all industries and plants to be used by us later on should nevertheless be preserved in our own future interest as far as military considerations permit.

Protection of the sources if German production, with special reference to Berlin, the Central-German industrial area and the Ruhr area.

The beginning of operations of the Air force against Czechoslovakia must be completely harmonized with the beginning of operations by the Army. I therefore reserve to myself the fixing of the zero hour. (compare army chapt.a)

c). The Navy.

The Navy's tasks remain the same as in concentration "Red".

The shifting of the focal point to the Baltic will have to be provided for.

(Translators note: All the above part 2,I, is scored through and bears a pencil note "Superseded by the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces letter 94/37 dated 7 Dec 37)

H1166-0130

## Part. 3.

## Special Preparations.

The following special cases are to be considered inside the High Commands, in general without participation by outside authorities.

I). Special Case "Otto".

"Armed intervention in Austria in the event of her restoring the Monarchy".

The object of this operation will be to compel Austria by armed force to renounce a restoration.

Making use of the domestic political divisions of the Austrian people the march in will be made in the general direction of Vienna and all resistance will be broken.

Parts of the German Air Force are to be employed in direct support of the Army. Any further employment of Air Force units will be decided on by me.

The question, whether formations of the National-Socialist Party will be employed over and above the Armed Forces, rests with the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

Special case "OTTO" will be planned:

a). As an isolated action without simultaneous concentration on other fronts.

b). As part of concentration "Red".

Special case "Otto" will not be planned as simultaneous operation with concentration "Green". Should the political pre-conditions for both cases arise simultaneously, special case "Otto" will be deferred until conclusion of concentration "Green".

The possibility of concentratration "Green" developing out of special case "Otto" must be taken into account, this possibility must be included in the planning.

(Translators note: All the above part 3I is scored through and bears a pencil note "Superseded")

II) Special Case "Richard".

"Warlike entanglements with Red Spain".

The Spanish Civil War contains the danger that, through accidental or provoked incidents, conflict may arise between Germany and Red Spain which can lead to a state of war between the two governments.

For this case preparatory plans are to be made only by the Navy. For the Army and Air Force it will remain a matter of assistance to White Spain with material and personnel, as has been the previous procedure. Subordination of parts of the Air Force under command of the Navy may come into question.

III) Special Case "Extension Red/Green".

The military-political starting point used as a basis for concentrations plans "Red and Green" can be aggravated if either England, Poland or Lithuania, or all three of these countries, join the side of our opponents from the beginning of the war.

H1166-0131

Thereupon our military position would be worsened to an unbearable, even hopeless, extent. The political leaders will therefore do everything to keep these countries neutral, above all England and Poland.

Nevertheless supplements are to be considered to concentration plans "Red and Green" for the eventuality of the failure of this aim of the political leadership.

The following conditions are to be the basis for the discussions: -

a) England.

England will employ all her available economic and military means against us. She will at first support France with Naval and Air Forces and for the latter she will try to win Belgium and eventually Holland as bases.

b) Poland.

That Poland should take part in an opening of hostilities against us, where possible at the side of Russia, is, in the present political situation, more than improbable. Should it nevertheless come to this, then Poland's concentration on land against Germany would take place in a form which is, in its essence, known to us, in order to gain first East Prussia and then, in co-operation with Czechoslovakia, Silesia.
With her Air Force, apart from using parts against East Prussia, she will take part in a Czech-Russian attack against the Reich, and at sea she will co-operate with the Russian Fleet to interrupt the connection between East Prussia and the Reich.

c) Lithuania.

Lithuania will, above all, serve the Russian Air Force as an advanced base. An attack on land need only be reckoned with in combination with Poland or after the arrival of Russian Army forces in Lithuania.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION. 27 November 1945.

We, Joyce Leonard, Junior Commander A.T.S., and Leslie A. Hill M.C. Major, Northumberland Hussars, hereby certify that we are thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C.175.

Joyce Leonard,
J/Cmdr. A.T.S.

Leslie A. Hill,
Major.
Northumberland Hussars.

1941

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-182
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

SEC 24-10/C-182

TOP SECRET

Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
OKW L 1 a No. 427/38 Top Secret

Berlin, 11th March 1938
2045 hours.

C-in-C Navy
(pencil note) has been informed

35 Copies
6th Copy

Re: Operation Otto

Directive No. 2

1) The demands of the German ultimatum to the Austrian government have not been fulfilled.

2) The Austrian Armed Forces have been ordered to withdraw in front of the entry of German troops and to avoid fighting.

The Austrian Government has ceased to function of its own accord.

3) To avoid further bloodshed in Austrian towns, the entry of the German Armed Forces into Austria will commence, according to directive No. 1, at daybreak on 12.3.

I expect the set objectives to be reached, by exerting all forces to the full, as quickly as possible.

signed Adolf HITLER

initialled by JODL
and possibly WARLIMONT

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-182

13 November 1945

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, 2nd Lt., O-1332102, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 269 PS

GERARD SCHAEFER
2nd Lt.,
O-1332102

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H1166-0132

SEC 24-10/C - 191.

Extract from document entitled:

Demands of F.O. U-boats and military possibilities of carrying them out.

Berlin 22 Sept, 1939.

1 Copy.

1 ). F.O. U-boats intends to give permission to U-boats to sink without warning any vessels sailing without lights.

Previous instructions, permitting attacks on French war- and merchant ships only as a defensive measure, purely French or Anglo-French convoys only North of the latitude of Brest, and forbidding attack on all passenger ships, give rise to great difficulties for U-boats, especially at night. In practice there is no opportunity for attacking at night, as the U-boats cannot identify a target which is a shadow in a way that entirely obviates mistakes being made. If the political situation is such that even possible mistakes must be ruled out, U-boats must be forbidden to make any attacks at night in waters where French and English Naval forces or merchant ships may be situated. On the other hand, in sea areas where only English units are to be expected, the measures desired by F.O. U-boats can be carried out : permission to take this step is not to be given in writing, but need merely be based on the unspoken approval of the Naval War Staff. U-boat commanders would be informed by word of mouth and the sinking of a merchant ship must be justified in the War Diary as due to possible confusion with a warship or an auxiliary cruiser.

In the meanwhile, U-boats in the English Channel have received instructions to attack all vessels sailing without lights. This instruction was approved on 21.9. by C-in-c Navy

Translator's Note:

The rest of the document is considered irrelevant. No signature is appended.

( 6974 )

H1166-0134

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 004-PS

Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel

C O P Y

# The Political Preparation of the Norway Action

(The enclosures mentioned in the report have been omitted from this paper since they are only relative to specifice matters. The complete report including appendices has been submitted to the Deputy of the Führer by Reichsleiter Rosenberg on 17 June 1940)

The Office of Foreign Relations (Aussenpolitisches Amt) of the National-Socialist Party (NSDAP) has had contact with VIDKUN QUISLING, leader of the NASJONAL SAMLING in Norway, for years. The director of the "Office North" (Amt Norden) of the office of Foreign Relations - later victim of a fatal accident - paid him (Quisling) a personal visit on one of his trips to Scandinavia.

When in 1939 the general political situation was beginning to grow critical Quisling gave the Office of Foreign Relations an estimate of the situation and his opinion about the possible intentions of Great Britain with relation to Scandinavia in case of conflict (Great Britain's) with the German Reich. Prior to the convention of the NORDIC ASSOCIATION (Nordische Gesellschaft) in Luebeck, Quisling was received by REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG in Berlin. He (Quisling) pointed out the decisive geopolitical importance of Norway in the Scandinavian region and the advantages gained by the Power in control of the Norwegian coast in case of conflict between the German Reich and Great Britain. He further explained the extraordinarily clever, democratic and particularly anglo-saxon propaganda which had been accepted favourably by almost the entire nation, also because of Norway's economic dependence on the seas and therefore on England. Since he did not believe that the small nations would remain neutral in case of conflict - as had been the case in the World War of 1914 - but was convinced that they would become involved in one way or the other he requested support for his party and press in Norway, basing his request on the "pangermanic" ideology. REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG also requested Director (Amtsleiter) Scheidt to arrange a meeting between QUISLING and his Deputy HAGELIN with State Secretary (Staatssekretaer) KOERNER, bearing in mind that this matter might be of particular interest to GENERAL FIELD MARSHALL GOERING with regard to air strategy. This meeting with the State Secretary KOERNER did take place. At the same time Staff Director (Stabsleiter) SCHICKEDANZ, directed by REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG, submitted the attached memorandum to Reich Minister and Chief of the Chancellery (Reichsminister und Chef der Reichskanzlei) LAMMERS for the information of the Führer by the end of June 1939 (Enclosure No 1).

After the Luebeck convention Director (Amtsleiter) SCHEIDT took a vocation trip to Norway to further pursue this matter. His observations are found in the attached report (Enclosure No. 2). Even during his presence in Germany Quisling had requested a short, pertinent training programme for reliable party functionaries especially selected by him. This request was granted by REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG.



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In August 1939 a 14 day course was held at the School of the Of. for Foreign Relations of the NSDAP (Aussenpolitisches Schulungsha NSDAP) in Berlin for 25 followers of the NASJONAL SAMLING who had been selected by QUISLING.

In September Burgermeister Dr. WINKLER revealed that he h been charged with the financial aspects of QUISLING'S request by GENERAL FIELD MARSHAL GOERING through State Secretary KOERNER. The outbreak of war and the beginning of the Polish campaign delayed the decisions (Enclosure No 3). A further reminder of REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG to GENERAL FIELD MARSHAL GOERING in the course of a talk about the importance of Norway in connection with the matters set forth originally by QUISLING had no practical results.

At the same time political tension increased in Norway as Russian activity made itself felt in the Baltic regions. Of this QUISLING kept the office (APA) informed through his deputies in Germany. The outbreak of the Russo-Finnish war at the end of November helped to further increase the anti-German currents in all Scandinavia and played into the hands of the anglo-saxon propaganda which was now building up to full strength. Greater Germany was represented as a secret ally of Soviet Russia and as the real culprit in Finland's misfortune. At the same time the Western Powers promised Finland military support which could only be supplied via Norway and Sweden. The possibility of a plan by Great Britain to occupy Norway and possibly Sweden to effectively close the blockade against Greater Germany and further to gain convenient air bases against Germany began to take shape under the pretence of altruistic help to Finland. Its aim was to involve also the Nordic Nations in a conflict against Greater Germany. QUISLING informed the office(APA) about these new possibilities shaping on the political scene, acting through his deputy in Germany.

As the activities of the Allies became more and more noticeable in Norway QUISLING again came to Germany to voice his fears. He was received by REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG in the early part of December and he again presented his ideas. Firmly convinced that in the long run a genuinely neutral position in the great conflict would become impossible for the small nations and and in his firm faith in the victory of Greater Germany in this conflict which also an ideological one, QUISLING considered it his duty - supported as he was by a small but determined minority - to tie Norway's fate to that of Greater Germany as the new centre of strength of a nordic-germanic life community. We knew that his courageous group was the only pro-German Party. His deputy in Germany, HAGELIN, had also arranged for a talk between QUISLING and GRAND ADMIRAL RAEDER which took place about this time. During a report to the Führer REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG again mentioned Norway. He particularly pointed out her importance in the case of England deciding to occupy Norway with the tacit consent of the Norwegian Government, for the purpose of strengthening the blockade and under the pretence of help for Finland. GRAND ADMIRAL RAEDER, too, upon his request, was called to the Führer in connection with his talks with QUISLING. As a result of these steps QUISLING was received by the Führer for personal instructions on the 16th. of December and again on the 18th. of December. During this interview the Führer emphasised repeatedly that the most preferable attitude of Norway as well as all of Scandinavia would be one of complete neutrality. He had no intentions to enlarge the theatres of war to draw other nations into the conflict. If, however, the enemy were preparing an enlargement of the zones of war with the aim to further throttle and threaten the Greater German Reich then, of course, he would be obliged to arm against such steps. Then the Führer promised QUISLING financial support for his movement based on the pan-germanic ideology and for the prupose of combatting the increasing enemy propaganda. The military matters of the questions were now transferred to a special military staff which assigned special missions to QUISLING and heard his opinions (Encl. No 29).





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The political treatment was to be handled by REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG, exponses were to be carried by the Foreign Office (Auswaertiges Amt) and Reichminister for Foreign Affairs (Reichsminister vom Aussen-politischen Amt) was to be kept informed at all times. Maintenace of liaison with QUISLING was assigned to Director (Amtsleiter) SCHEIDT who, as matters developed further, was attached to the Naval Attache in Oslo, Commander (Korvettenkapitaen) SCHREIBER. Strictest secrecy was ordered for the entire matter.

Then, in January, during a conference between REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG and Foreign Minister von RIBBENTROP it was decided to appropriate to QUISLING an initial sum of 200,000 Goldmark. This money was to be taken to Oslo, in two installments, by the liaison agent SCHEIDT where it was to be handed to QUISLING. In the Foreign Office (Auswaertiges Amt) Privy Councillor (Geheimrat) VON GRUNDHERR was the only one to be told of this arrangement. (Encl. No 3).

As shown in the attached documentary memoranda QUISLING'S reports transmitted by his deputy in Germany HAGENLIN concerning the possibility of active intervention of the Western Powers in Norway with consent of the Norwegian Government became more and more alarming. These reports continuously supplemented with more and more accurate confirmations by Quisling's confidants were in certain contrast with the opinions of the German Legation in Oslo. The Legation believed in the neutral intentions of the Norwegian Government of that time, the NYGARDSVOLD . and was further convinced that the Government would take arms in defense of its neutrality policy. The Foreign Office (Auswaertiges Amt) held the same opinion as is shown in the attached documentary memorandum dated January 8 which is the result of a talk between Director (Amtsleiter) SCHEIDT and Privy Councillor (Geheimrat) VON GRUNDHERR (Encl. 8). It is of special interest that HAGELIN, Quisling's Deputy in Germany, whose intimate connection with QUISLING was not known in Norway succeeded in getting a foothold in the circles of the NYGARDSVOLD Government. Thus he heard the uncoloured opinions of the members of the Government who conducted themselves like a secret Norwegian-Anglophile society.

In the documentary memorandum of January 13 he relates the opinions expressed to him by two Norwegian Ministers. The gist of the opinions was that Germany had already lost the war and that Norway - if only because of its large Merchant Marine - could not do other than favour England in her politics, in war even more so than in peace. And further that the entire nations agreed with this policy (Encl. 9). During the night of February 16 to 17 the English raided the "Altmark" in the Joessingsfjord. The reaction of the Norwegian Government to the Altmark-affair seemed to indicate that certain secret arrangements had been made between the Norwegian Government and the Allies. This was further emphasised in Director SCHEIDT's consolidated report covering January 20th to February 20th (Encl No 11) after he had received HAGELIN's report. HAGELIN had overheard the conversation between two members of the Storting during which one member said to the other that the actions of the two commanders of the Norwegian torpedo boats had been a "prearranged affair". The same report also refers to the English demands for air bases in Norway and for freedom of trade in the Norwegian waters. It goes on to say that although the Norwegian Government refused those demands it was agreed that violations by the English would be answered with paper protests only. Such reports, and confirmations thereto were time and again supplied through QUISLING. In complete contrast to those opinions the German Legation, even after the Altmark Affair, relied fully upon the good will of the Norwegians. The Ambassador cited the signing of the Norwegian-German trade agreement as weighing heavily in favour of his point of view.

He already considered the Norwegian Government NYGARDSVOLD somewhat dependent on the Greater German Reich (Encl. Nos 11 and 12). All these reports were currently submitted to the Führer by REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG. QUISLING always emphasised that more than 90% of the country was behind England and that he only represented a minority which, however, was chosen by virtue of its intuition to take charge later on as representatives of a NEW Norwegian nation.

Apart from financial support which was forthcoming from the Reich in currency, QUISLING had also been promised a shipment of material for immediate use in Norway such as coal and sugar. Additional help was promised. The shipments were to be conducted under cover of a new Trade Company to be established in Germany or through especially selected existing firms while HAGELIN was to act as consignee in Norway. HAGELIN had already conferred with the respective Ministers of the Nygardsvold Government as for instance the Minister of Supply and Commerce (Versorgungs-und Handelsminister) and had been assured permission for the import of coal. At the same time the coal transports were to serve possibly to supply the technical means necessary to launch QUISLING's political action in Oslo with German help. It was QUISLING's plan to send a number of selected, particularly reliable men to Germany for a brief military training course in a completely isolated camp. They were then to be detailed as area and language specialists to German Special Troops who were to be taken to Oslo on the coal barges to accomplish a political action. Thus QUISLING planned to get hold of his leading opponents in Norway including the King, to prevent all military resistance from the very beginning. Immediately following this political action and upon an official request of QUISLING to the Government of the German Reich the military occupation of Norway was to take place. All military preparations were to be completed previously. Though this plan contained the great advantage of surprise it also contained a great number of dangers which could possibly cause its failure. For this reason it received a quite dilatory treatment while, at the same time, it was not disapproved as far as the Norwegian were concerned.

In February, after a conference with GENERAL FIELD MARSHAL GOERING, REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG informed the Secretary in the Office of the Four Year Plan (Ministerialdirektor im Vierjahresplan) WOHLTHAT only of the intention to prepare coal shipments to Norway to the named confidant HAGELIN. Further details were discussed in a conference between Secretary WOHLTHAT, Staff Director SCHICKEDANZ and HAGELIN. Since WOHLTHAT received no further instructions from the GENERAL FIELD MARSHAL, Foreign Minister von RIBBENTROP - after a consultation with REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG - consented to expedite these shipments through his office. Based on a report of REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG to the Führer it was also arranged to pay QUISLING ten thousand English pounds per month for three months commencing on the 15th of March, to support his work. This money was to be paid through the liaison agent SCHEIDT.

Meanwhile HAGELIN, through his connection in Norway as trusted agent of the Norwegian Navy, had been commissioned with the purchase of German AA guns (Flaks) through the German Navy Ministry. Through this connection he gained more and more insight into the actual ideas and intentions of the Norwegian Nygardsvold Government and into the Allied preparations which had already started in Norway. While in Germany on the 20th. of March to attend conferences regarding the delivery of the German AA guns, he made a detailed report about the increasing activities of the Allies in Norway, tolerated by the Nygardsvold Government. According to this reports the Allies were already checking the Norwegian coastal towns for landing and transport possibilities. He also stated that the French Commandant KERMARREC who was charged with this reconnaissance had a confidential talk with Colonel SUNDLO, Commandant of Narvik, who is a follower of QUISLING; during the course of the talk he told him of the Allied intentions to land motorised troops in Stavanger, Dronthcim and possibly also at Kirkenes and to occupy the airport at Sola (Encl. no 14)



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At the same time HAGELIN increased his oral and written warnings regarding the confidential agreements between the Allied and the Norwegian Governments stipulating that in case of an Allied occupation of coastal towns the Norwegian Government would not go beyond paper protest, as was the case in the Altmark Affair. And again, in his report of March 26 (Encl. Nos. 15 and 16) he pointed out that the speech of the Norwegian Foreign Minister KOHT dealing with Norwegian neutrality and containing some protests was not being taken seriously either in London by the English nor in Norway by the Norwegians. It was well known that the Government had no intentions to take a stand against England. However, to keep up appearances towards Germany up to the last minute the Norwegian Government intended to issue an order to fire. This was to demonstrate that everything within their power had been done. There was a continuous series of conferences between the King, the Commanding Admiral, the Crown Prince and the newly appointed Minister of War LJUNDBERG who had been placed in office at the special request of England as early as January. A person close to the King as well as the commanding Admiral explained to HAGELIN that the above mentioned actions by England were quite unavoidable since she knew that she could only win the war if she were in control of the Norwegian ports. Furthermore England feared a German counterblow which was not to be allowed to materialize. The Norwegian Government was also notified by London that Germany intended to mine the waters between Jutland and the Norwegian coast. Based on a message from England this plan was revealed on or about March 15 during a secret session of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Storting by Foreign Minister KOHT. As a matter of fact, during the course of the military preparations for the occupation of Norway this plan had been adopted by the German military authorities and to this day it is a mystery how this plan got to London. In view of all this news QUISLING could no longer back his earlier advice to continue watching the development of the situation in Norway. He now had to point out that any further delay would mean a grave risk. The above was probably the most decisive report ever to be summitted here by HAGELIN. REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG immediately transmitted it to the Führer (Encl No 15).

While still in Berlin HAGELIN was requested by Colonel SCHMUNDT to make speedy arrangements for a conference between QUISLING and a Colonel of the General Staff, at some neutral location. This conference was held in Copenhagen in the beginning of April.

In confirmation of all this information coming from QUISLING and his confidants and in contrast to the opinion held up to the end by German Legation in Oslo and by the Foreign Office, the Allies, on April 8th. initiated their first major blow as an introduction to their intended occupation of Norway. During the night from the 7th to the 8th. of Aprilthey mined the Norwegian coast and made public announcement of this act. Norway's reaction, consistant with the reports always received by the Office of Foreign Relations (Aussenpolitisches Amt) of the NSDAP, was nothing more than protests on paper growing weaker by the hour. Then, after proper preparations and by command of the Führer Greater Germany undertook the counterblow in the morning of April 9th. and occupied the most important Norwegian airfields and seaports.

Reports about the further political developments in Norway proper are found in the appended documentary memorandum (Encl. Nos 18 to 30)

After the success of the occupational operations in Norway seemed assured the Führer called for REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG for a short talk before lunch, on April 25th. He oriented him (Rosenberg) about the developments of the military action in Norway where the English Auxiliary Corps had just suffered a decisive defeat combined with the capture of important documents and plans.

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He further revealed to REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG that he had based this most daring decision which was now approaching successful completion on the continuous warnings of QUISLING as reported to him by REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG. And that it actually happened in the DRONTHEIM-FJORD that behind the stern of the last German Troop Transport there appeared the bow of the first English destroyer which convoyed the Allied Troop Transport fleet. This destroyer was wiped out by the German Navy.

Berlin, June 15th. 1940



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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 007-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

# BRIEF REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUREAU OF THE PARTY (AUSSENPOLITISCHES AMT DER NSDAP.) FROM 1933 TO 1943

When the foreign Affairs Bureau (AUSSENPOLITISCHES AMT) was established 1 April 1933 the Fuehrerdirected that it should not be expanded to a large bureaucratic agency, but should rather develop itseffectiveness through initiative and suggestions

Corresponding to the extra ordinarily hostile attitude adopted by the Soviet Government in Moscow from the beginnir the newly-established bureau devoted particular attention to internal conditions in the Soviet Union, as well as to the effects of World Bolchevism primarily in other European countries. It entered into contact with the most variagated groups inclining towards National Socialism and combatting Bolchevism, focussing its main Attention on Nations and States bordering on the Soviet Union. On the one end these nations and states constituted an Insulating Ring encircling the Bolchevist neighbor; on the other handthey were the lateral of German living space (Fluegelstellung zum deutschen Lebensraum) and took up a flanking position towards the Western Powers (FLANKIERUNG GEGENUEBER DEN WESTMAECHTEN) especially Great Britain. In order to wield the desired influence by one means or another, the Bureau was compelled to use the most varying methods, taking into consideration the completely different living conditions, the ties of blood, intellect and history of the movements observed by the Bureau in these countries

In Scandinavia an outspokenly pro-Anglo-Saxon attitude, based on economic considerations, had become progressively more dominant after the World War of 1914/18. There the Bureau put entire emphasis on influencing general cultural relations with the Nordic peoples. For this pupose it took the Nordic Society (NORDISCHE GESELLSCHAFT) in LUEBECK under its protection. The Reich conventions of this society were attended by many outstanding personalities, especially from Finnland. While there were no openings for purely political cooperation in Swoden and Denmark, an association based on Greater Germanic ideology was found in Norway. Very close relations were established with its founder, which led to further consequences. (See annex I for more detailed exposition).

South-Eastern Europe was dominated by the French post-war system of alliances. The countries united in the Little Entente were aiming at a more favorable defence of the booty accumulated during the war. In addition each one of these countri sought to gain through this mutual-assistance pact safety against a superior opponent : Czechoslovakia against Germany; Yugoslavia against Italy; Romania against the Soviet Union.
In Czechoslovakia a common hatred against everything German united the still remaining, partly pan-Slavic, Masonic and pro-Jewish tendencies. In Romania the feeling of insecurity and fear of the superior neighbor, from whom she had taken Bessarabia, was growing. In Romania a primitive anti-Semitic group still existed. Its academically doctrinaire attitude precluded large scale political effectiveness, but nevertheless offered points of mutual interest. The Foreign Affairs Bureau picked these up, developed them, instigated the formation of a new party and



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thereby forced a decisive change in the whole political sitation in Rumania, which is still having its effect to-day. (See Annex II for more detailed exposition).

Hungary and Bulgaria alone, Allied nations of the World War which had formerly been completely deprived of their rights, were attracted by the newly-formed center of gravity in the north. This attraction was nourished by the hope of obtaining an expansion of their own power through the increasing strength of Germany. However, National-Socialism met a certain reserve or antipathy in Bulgaria because of widespread contagion of the Communistic blight. In Hungary it met similar reserve due to the still-fashionable feudal leading circles, who are bolstered by Jewish capital. At any rate it may be mentioned here that the first foreign state visit after the seizure of power took place through the mediation of the Foreign Affairs Bureau. Julius Gombos, who in former years had himself pursued anti-Semitic and racial tendencies, had reached the Hungarian Premier's chair. The Bureau maintained a personal connection with him. In September 1936 he paid a visit to Germany and was received by the Fuehrer in Erfurt. With this visit the official cordon of isolation surrounding National-Socialism was pierced for the first time. This visit had been preceded by the Fuehrer's reception of the Romanian poet and former minister Octavian Goga through the Bureau's mediation. Goga later became the decisive exponent of a political reproachment with Germany.

In Yugoslavia other German Reich agencies had become active in the same direction, so that the Foreign Affairs Bureau remained in the background and shifted its efforts to the purely commercial sphere. It initiated the first contracts with Croatian and Serbian co-operatives.

Motivated by reasons of War Economy, the Bureau advocated the transfer of raw material purchases from overseas to the areas accessible by overland traffic routes, i.e. primarily in the Balkans, naturally insofar as practicable. At first little heed was paid to the Bureau in these endeavors, but it later secured the active support especially of the Food Estate (NAEHRSTAND) through its cooperation, e.g., on the subject of fruit and vegetable imports, a very substantial shift in the source of imports was attained, particularly through the currently initiated cooperation with Croatian and Hungarian cooperatives as well as with commercial associations all over the Balkans.

From the beginning work in Italy was out of the question because ever since the days of our struggle for power ties of a personal nature have existed, which were taken over by official institutions or cultivated by individual personalities. Work in Austria was also excluded, since a special "Provincial Directorate for Austria" existed within the Nazi Party (NSDAP).

The Bureau declined to concern itself with questions of Racial Germans (VOLKSDEUTSCHE) abroad. For this phase of the problem the "Racial Germans" Central Agency (VOLKSDEUTSCHE MITTELSTELLE) was later created.

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Towards Eastern European states the Bureau limited its activities to simple observation of existing conditions, or to the establishment of relations, especially of a commercial nature, primarily in Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg.

In accordance with the attitude on foreign police laid down by the Fuehrer, the Bureau endeavored to establish far-reaching connections with England through continuous personal contacts with influential personalities of English political life. Eminent Englishmen were invited to the annual Party Rallies.

Pursuant to its self-chosen task the Bureau devoted its attention to the Near East. Turkey, newly consolidated by Mustapha Kemal, adopted a hesitat attitude of watchful waiting. This position was probably due to military impotence against Soviet Russia, clearly recognized, on the one hand, and also to hostility to Fascist Italy, already previously manifested, on the other hand. In Iran, however, the Bureau's initiative in the economic field to stimulate the mutual exchange of goods encountered greatest understanding and the greatest readiness in carrying it through. The Bureau's initiative in developing with the help of commercial circles, entirely new methods for the economic penetration of Iran found expression, in an extraordinarily favorable way, in reciprocal trade relations. Naturally in Germany, too, this initiative at first encountered a completely negative attitude and resistance on the part of the competent state authorities, an attitude that had first to be overcome. In the course of a few years the volume of trade with Iran was multiplied five-fold, and in 1938 Iran's trade turnover with Germany had attained first place. Even Soviet Russia, the competitor who had the biggest and most dreaded previously, had been eliminated from the running. Concurrently with the activation of commercial relations the Bureau had also intensified cultural relations and had, in conjunction with growing commercial influence and in closest collaboration with the Iranian Government, created a series of cultural institutions headed and directed by Germans. In consequence the dominat French cultural influence in Iran has already been broken since the year 1936

The Bureau simultaneously attempted to also draw Afghanistan into its orbit. Relations established with leading individual personalities led to the willing opening of this country, which had formerly been rather neglected by Germany. All the leading personalities of Afghanistan were guests of the Bureau. The Bureau favored the taking part of German economy in the industrial upbuilding of the country; German experts in all fields were called to Afghanistan in increasing numbers through the Bureau's mediation. The German Colony became the dominant one in Afghanistan. The preparation for expansion of the Afghan army was in German hands; carrying it through was prevented by the outbreak of war. Even though the German Colony had to leave Afghanistan later on, Afghanistan's neutral position to-day is largely due to the Bureau's activity.

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The Arab question, too, became part of the work of the Bureau. In spite of England's tutelage of Iraq the Bureau established a series of connections to a number of leading personalities of the Arab world, smoothing the way for strong bonds to Germany. In this connection, the growing influence of the Reich in Iran and Afghanistan did not fail to have repercussions in Arabia. All these relations took place on a purely economic ba sis a nd fostered the systematically directed advancement of German influence and prestige in the domains reserved by the Western Powers for themselves. In this connection it may be mentioned in general that the internal peril to England's preponderance in those a reas would ha ve been considerably more pronounced, if the Bureau's foresighted initiative, which took Oriental conditions very well into account, had not been forever ignored by official authorities.

The Bureau foresaw the necessity of technical improvement of the Danube water route to facilitate traffic, because of the shift in the increase of the exchange if goods, especially in the Balkans and in the Orient. On its own initiative it attempted to influence competent authorities (especia lly of th Ba varian Government), together with particularly interested private commercial circles, to enlarge our Danube shipping facilities (primarily the port of Regensburg). Although the Bureau throughout the years, asserted this necessity, which was becoming more and more urgent, and although the Bureau relentlessly maintained its initiative, its endeavors in this matter were unfortunately not crowned by any success. Presumalby all responsible authorities regret it bitterly to-day.

Among other projects due to the Foreign Affairs Bureau's initiative, endesvors to grow the rubber-fibered KOK SAGYS plant in Germany deserve to be emphasized. This plant is being cultivated in the Soviet Union. In spite of efforts during many years, no success was attained in planting sizeable experimental crops, because of latent disunity among competent a uthorit: The Bureau was compelled to resort to experimental fields in Greec through its own connections in the Balkans.

Somewhat off the beaten path was the Bureau's undertaking in Brazil, which grew out of personl connections, large quantities of cotton (60000 tons) were successfully brought to Germany under a clearing agreement at a time when imports of this raw material ha d become very critically short, already necessitating work outs. A Bureau representative was twice the Brayilian Government's guest. Brazil and Iran were the only nations from whom Germany could purchase this indispensable raw material for REICHSMARK. The Brazilian Minister expressed his thanks for this initial step to the Head of the Bureau in an address delivered at the occasion of an exposition.

About 40 lecture evenings for diplomats and the foreign press should also be listed. They dealt with the construction of the new Germany, and speakers included many leading personalities of the Reich.

The Bureau has carried out the initiating of all

politica lly feasible projects. With the outbreak of war it was entitled to consider its task as terminated. The exploitation of the many personal connections in many lands can be resumed under a different guise.

(Signed) ROSENBERG

2 Inclosures
I Norway
II Romania



H1166-0144

ANNEX I to Brief Report on Activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Nazi Party (AUSSENPOLITISCHES AMT DER NSDAP) From 1933 to 1943.

The Political Preparation Of the Military Occupation of Norway During The War Years 1939/1940.

As previously mentioned, of all political groupings in Scandinavia only "Nasjonal Samling", led in Norway by the Former Minister of War and Major of the Reserve Vidkun Quisling, deserved serious political attention. This was a fighting political group, possessed by the idea of a Greater Germanic Community. Naturally all ruling powers were hostile and attempted to prevent, by any means, its success among the population. The Bureau maintained constant liaison with Quisling and attentively observed the attacks he conducted with tenacious energy on the middle class which had been taken in tow by the English. From the beginning it appeared probable that without revolutionary events, which would stir the population from their former attitude no successful progress of Nasjonal samling was to be expected. During the winter 1938/1939, Quisling was privately visited by a member of the Bureau. When the political situation in Europe came to a head in 1939, Quisling made an appearance at the convention of the Nordic Society (NORDISCHE GESELLSCHAFT) in Luebeck in June. He expounded his conception of the situation, and his apprehensions concerning Norway. He emphatically drew attention to the geopolitically decisive importance of Norway in the Scandnavian area, and to the advantages that would accrue to the power dominating the Norwegian coast in case of a conflict between the Greater German Reich and Great Britain. Assuming that his statements would be of special interest to the Marshal of the Reich Goering for aero-strategical reasons, Quisling was referred to State Secretary (STAATSSEKRETAER) Koerner by the Bureau. The Staff Director (STABSLEITER) of the Bureau handed the Chief of the Reich Chancellery a memorandum for transmission to the Fuehrer. It dealt with the same subject, still taking into account the then doubtful attitude of Soviet Russia. After the outbreak of German-Polish hostilities and of the Soviet-Finnish war, tensions in Scandinavia became more strained and facilitated the work of Anglo-Saxon propaganda. It began to appear possible that, under the pretext of altruistic aid to Finland, Great Britain might intend to occupy Norway, and perhaps Sweden, to complete the anti-German blockade in the North Sea for all practical purposes, and to gain comfortable airplane bases against Germany. The aim would have been to drag the Northern countries, too, into a military conflict with Germany. Apprehensive about this development, Quisling again appeared in Berlin in December 1939. He visited REICHSLEITER Rosenberg and Grand Admiral Raeder. In the course of a report to the Fuehrer, REICHSLEITER Rosenberg turned the conversation once more to Norway. He especially pointed to Norway's importance should England, to tighten her blockade and under the pretext of aid to Finland, take steps to occupy the country, with the Norwegians; tacit consent. On the basis of his conversation with Quisling and at his own request, Grand Admiral Raeder, too, had been asked to see the Fuehrer. In consequence of these steps, Quisling was granted a personal audience with the Fuehrer on 16 December, and once more on 18 December. In the course of this audience the Fuehrer emphasized repeatedly that he personally would prefer a completely neutral attitude of Norway as well as of the whole of Scandinavia.



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He did not intend to enlarge the theaters of war and to draw still other nations into the conflict. Should the enemy attempt to spend the war, however, with the aim of achieving further throttling and intimidation of the Greater German Reich, he would be compelled to gird himself against such an undertaking. In order to counterbalance increasing enemy propaganda activity, the promised Quisling financial support of his movement, which is based on Greater Germa nic ideology. Military exploitation of the question now raised was assigned to the Special Military Staff, which transmitted special missions to Quisling. REICHSLEITER Rosenberg was to take over political exploitation. Financial expenses were to be defrayed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (AUSWAERTIGES AMT), the Minister for Foreign Affairs being kept continuously by the Foreign Affairs Bureau.

Chief of Section (AMTSLEITER) Scheidt was charged with maintaining liaison with Quisling. In the course of further developments he was assigned to the Naval Attache in Oslo, Lt. Commander (KORVETTENKAPITAEN) Schreiber. Orders were given that the whole matter be handled with strictest secrecy.

Quisling's reports, transmitted through his representative in Germany, Hagelin, and dealing with the possibility of intervention by the Western Powers in Norway with tacit consent of the Norwegia n government, became more urgent by January already These increasingly better substantisted communications were in sharpest contrast to the view of the German Legation in Oslo, which relied on the desire for neutrality of the then Norwegian Nygardsvold ca binet and was convinced of that government's intention and readiness to defend Norway's neutrality. No one in Norway knew that Quisling's representa tive for Germany maintained closest relations to him; he therefore succeeded in gaining a foothold within governmental circles of the Nygardsvold cabinet, and in listening to cabinet member's true views. Hagelin transmitted what he had heard to the Bureau, which conveyed the news to the Fuehrer through REICHSLEITER Rosenberg. During the night of 16 to 17 February English destroyers attacked the German steamer "Altmark" in Jossing fjord. The Norwegian government's reaction to this question permitted the conclusion that certain agreements had been covertly arrived at between the Norwegian government and the Allies. Such assumption was confirmed by reports of Section (AMTSLEITER) Scheidt who in turn derived his information from Hagelin and Quisling. But even after this incident the German Legation in Oslo championed the opposite view, and went on record as believing in the good intentions of the Norwegians.

Thanks to his connections in Norway as agent of the Norwegin Navy, Hagelin had succeeded, in the meantime, in being entrusted with the purchase of German AA guns through the German Navy Ministry. Through these connections he gained more and more insight into the real views and intentions of the Norwegian Nygardsvold cabinet, and into the preparations already initisted by the Allies in Norway. At the occasion of his presence in Berlin on 20 March to negotiate about delivery of German AA guns he mentioned that the Allies were now even examining Norwegian ports for loading and transportation facilities. The French KOMMANDANT entrusted with this mission was said to have revealed Allied intentions in confidential conversations with the commander of Narwik, and adherent of Quisling.

these intentions were to land motorized troops at Stavanger, Drontheim and perhaps Kirkenes, and to occupy Sola airdrome near Stavanger. Hagelin also re-emphasized his warnings about agreements secretly concluded between the Allies and the Norwegian government according to which the Norwegian government would content itself solely with paper protests in case of a possible occupation of port cities by the Allies. He pointed out that the Norwegian government had never intended to seriously oppose England, and that it was playing a two-faced game with Germany solely to gain time for faits accomplis. He also mentioned that the Norwegian government had been informed by England that Germany intended to lay a minefield from Jutland to the Norwegian coast. In view of all the information that had reached him, Quisling could no longer stand by his advice to await developments in Norway for a little while longer; he was compelled to point out that any delay of the German counter-thrust would entail extraordinary risks These reports were immediately transmitted to the Fuehrer by REICHSLEITER Rosenberg. On 8 April the Allies struck the first blow in preparation for their intended occupation of Norway, thus confirming these reports made by Quisling and his agents, and in contrast to the views held to the end by the German Legation in Oslo and by the expert of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (AUSWAERTIGES AMT). During the night from 7 to 8 April minefields were laid alongside the Norwegian coast by the Allied fleet, and th Allied governments informed the world of the steps they had taken. In accordance with indications given by the Bureau, only progressively more tepid protests were made by Norway. By order of the Fuehr Greater Germany counter-attacked, after corresponding preparation, in the morning of 9 April and occupied the most impotant Norwegian sea ports and airdromes.



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ANNEX II: Romania (From the overthrow of Titolescu to Marshal Antonescu)

In spite of almost complete occupation by the Central Powers in the last World War, Romania was indebted to Versailles for her re-creation, which was effected partially even at the expense of her one-time Eastern ally. A basically sound anti-Semitic tendency existed in this post-war country, which was torn asunder by dynastic squabbles and innumerable party fights. But in spite of repeated efforts this tendency had never risen above the limitations of a club, because of solely scientific doctrinaire leadership. What was lacking was the guiding leadership of a political personality. After manifold grouping trials the Bureau believed to have found such a personality - the former Minister, and poet, Octavian Goga. It was not difficult to convince this poet, pervaded by instinctive inspiration, that a Greater Romania, though it had to be created in opposition to Vienna, could be maintained only together with Berlin. Nor was it difficult to create in him the desire to link the fate of Romania with the future of the National-Socialist German Reich in good time. By bringing continuing influence to bear, the Bureau succeeded in inducing Octavian Goga as well as Professor Cuza to amalgamate the parties under their leadership on an Anti-Semitic basis. Thus they could carry on with united strength the struggle for Romania's renascence internally, and her affiliation (ANSCHLUSS) with Germany externally. Through the Bureau's initiative both parties, which had heretofore been known by distinct names, were merged as the National-Christian Party, under Goga's leadership and with Cuza as Honorary President. The attempts concurrently undertaken by the Bureau to amalgamate this Party with the much more youthful, but energetic Iron Guard movement were initially frustrated by the apparently insurmountable personal incompatibility of Cuza and Codreanu. At any rate these attempts led to the secret establishment of good personal relations between Goga and the mystic-fanciful Codreanu.

In the course of the years after his return, the king had succeeded in becoming the country's decisive factor through crafty tactics in dealing with the dominant political parties. Had the Bureau also succeeded in merging the National-Christian Party with Codreanu, Romania would have obtained sharply anti-Semitic leadership based on strong mass support. Such leadership could have attained its aims even against the will of the king. However, surviving rivalries between the country's anti-Semitic trends later enabled the king to use them separately for his plans, in order to destroy them as far as possible.

The struggle for re-orientation of Romania's foreign policy was taken up by Goga with bold elan. He had earlier succeeded in upsetting the position of Foreign Minister Titulescu, the agent of France, of the Geneva League of Nations and of the Little Entente. Titulescu was later overthrown. Among the numerous, not very significant splinter parties, the "Young Liberals", founded by George Bratianu, supported Goga's campaign, without joining the anti-Semitic trend. The Romanian front of Vaida Voevod, wobbling to and fro among all camps, adopted a similar position for some time.

Through intermediaries, the Bureau maintained constant contact with both tendencies, just like it constantly cibsulted with Goga, through Staff Director (STABSLEITER) Schickedanz, about ta ctics to be followed. The whold struggle was accelerated by Soviet Russia's increasing pressure in the Bessarabian question, and by the process of politica l rapproachement with Moscow, which was supported by Paris and Prague. Following a long period of recurring political trials involving scandal and graft Romania's internal struggle for the future make-up of the country, had been aggra va ted by the coming to the front of the Christian-Nationa l-list Party a nd of the Iron Guard. This struggle wa s being fought with increasing bitterness. The king's attitude towards the nationa l movement was procrastinating and underhanded. The movement wa s agreeable to him for eliminating the two parties which, by tradition, took turns in the government. But he intended to prevent the unequivocal victory of anti-Semitic and racial (VOELKISCH) principles, influenced by growing Nationalism, in the country. That is why the Nationalists' foreign policy, secretly projected by Germany, did not fit into his plans. Because he was in possession of the police and of the army, he remained the decisive factor in the country. After repeated postponement of the elections, which were legally due, the king decided to hold an election. The decision was based on a very reliable report of his then Prime Minister Tatarescu. Tatarescu was convinced that the Liberal Party would aga in receive 40 % of all votes, through the machina tions customary in Romia. However, after a bitter election campaign the Liberal Party suffered painful defeat. The opposition National Movement had achieved indisputable victory in spite of all chicanery and machinations by their opponents. The Iron Guard received about 16 % of the total vote, the National-Christian Party Goga-Cuza about 11 %, the government party about 35 %. The rest of the votes were scattered. After some vacillation and hesitancy, the king appointed Goga Prime Minister on 27 December 1937 with a binding promise that Parliament would be desmissed and new elections held within the legally prescribed time limit. In spite of warnings by the Bureau Goga believed the promise given by the king. But the king was only attempting to gain time.

Thus a second government on racial (VOELKISCH) and anti-Semitic foundations had appeared in Europe, in a country in which such an event ha d been considered completely impossible. The government immediat ly made known its intention to proceed aga inst Jewish predominance in the country and declared repeatedly that it would have to subject Romania's previous foreign policy to re-examination and reform. In the meantime the Judaic-Masonic and liberal opposition did not lose time. Passions were inflamed and became increasingly more envenomed. It looked like a hot and bloody election campaign. The prospects of Goga's Christian-National list Party pointed to a big victory with sure certainty, especially since, with the Bureau's cooperation he had on thesly made a secret agreement with Codreanu. To be sure, Goga did not act on the Bureau's advice to immediately develop his party cadres, to expand his party machine all over the country and to permeate the police and gendarmerie. Goga postponed the execution of organizational reform, which he also intended, until after the election. He considered himself to be under obligation to the king not to undertake anything until the electoral decisions had been rendered, but to take steps all the more incisively after legally attaining the majority.

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In innumerable interviews the opposition must have succeeded in convincing the king that an electoral victory of Goga would react most acutely against the king himself. In that case he would no longer be able to get rid of the ghosts he had called in; if Goga attained a two-thirds majority, he, the king, would beGoga's captive. These expostulations, and the uncontrollable Judaic influences of the Jewish clique at the Romanian court, plus the pressure of the French and British Ministers led to a change in the king's attitude, assuming that this change had not already been anticipated by him at the time of Goga's appointment. The king decided to prevent the elections. Goga resisted. Thereupon the king offered Goga the formation of an authoritarian government, i.e., a government created solely by virtue of raoyal sovereignty. That meant a coup d'etat. Goga declined. Thereupon the king informed Goga that he would accept the cabinet's resignation, which, however, had not even been offered to him. Goga realized too late that the strength at his disposal was entirely inadequate to thwart the king's plans. He resigned.

But the course once embarked upon forced even the king to pay heed to the mood that had been created in the country. Also, a return to the disrupted foreign-policy ties was no longer possible. Although an authoritarian system had been built up, Romania found herself without her former backing. The French security system had been ruptured and could not be re-established, if only in view of Yugoslavia's attitude in the South-East, where relations established by other German agencies had simultaneously loosened the cohesiveness of the Little Entente. That, at any rate, was the Goga government's success.

In his last great speech to the Romanian Academy, shortly before his death, Goga welcomed Austria's affiliation with Germany, and affirmed for the last time his belief in adherence to new Greater German Reich and to Fascist Italy, a belief he had struggled for.

Now the king's war of extermination against the Iron Guard began. Codreanu was arrested with his closest xollaborators, to face a specially convoked court-martial. Sole basis for the prosecution was an alleged communication from Codreanu to the Fuehrer, which was proved to be a forgery, and a telegram addressed to the Fuehrer. On the basis of these "records" he was sentenced to tenyears' hard labor. In vain did the Bureau attempt to bring about an intervention of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (AUSWAERTIGES AMT) in this episode, which diminished the whole prestige of the German Reich. It did not prevail aga inst the official agencies, which condemned the entire project of the Bureau in Romania, because the official German delegation expected their sole salvation from the attitude of the king and his creatures. Logically, the acceptance without dissent of this challenge was interpreted in Bucharest as granting carte bla nche and Codreanu was shot with his closest collaborators establishment of the first personal contact between the King and the Fuehrer.

This appeared to doom the Iron Guard, too, Goga's party, deprived of his leadership, was submerged into insignificance. But Goga left behind a personal heir, who is now Marshal Antonescu. Against the king's wish, Goga had appointed this politically insignificant provincial general, with whom the king was on bad terms, as his Minister of War. At first completely pro French in outlook, Antonescu gradually adopted a different vie
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pro-French in outlook, Antonescu gradually adopted a different view under Goga's influence. After Goga's resignation, Antonescu still remained in the King's cabinet at Goga's wish. He also maintained continued relations with the Iron Guard. Thereby the possibility of eliminating the King was at hand - and was exploited. Antonescu's to-day appears in practice as executor of the heritage bequeathed to him by Goga, who had led him from political insignificance into the political arena. Thereby a change to Germany's liking had become possible in Romania.

(Signed) ROSENBERG.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 007-PS

I/ FRED MITTERGALL/ 2nd Lt Inf, 0-1735537/ hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 007-PS

FRED MITTERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
0-1735537

H1166-0152

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

APPERTAINING TO WAR HISTORY

(pencil note)

S.O. Only

"FALL GRUN"

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

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ITEM 1

- - - ? of the Fuehrer: (semi-illegible)

1). Does MUSSOLINI regard his work as completed or not.

a). if so, close future boundary of Czechoslovakia West then wait and see. "Return with the bag empty."

b). if not, then the "Empire" of Africa. Impossible without German help. Czechoslovakia is a preliminary condition. "Return with Czechoslovakia in the bag."

2). MUSSOLINI, who is no illusionist, can definitely assess Germany's military potentialities. Therefore he will suit timing of his aims with that.

3). Against France and England, problem of Czechoslovakia can be settled only if still allied with Italy. France and England will not intervene. (Only to overcome the four-week re-grouping period.)

4). Living under a common fate. (Example, 1805 and 1806)

5). State of Armament: comparisons relative but in our favor;

a). Deliveries of ores: France -- 600,000 tons
Germany - 2 million tons.

b). Britain has been arming for 9 months. Launching not for 2 years.

c). Out of date air force equipment.

6). No general staff conferences of the various branches of the Armed Forces. Would have to retract permission to the Army. Only through Supreme Command. Very important that actual intentions be kept secret.

7). Arming progressing too slowly: Guns not only for constituted units, but also in reserve for replacement. Fortifications. Range of guns.

8). Replacement of officers doubtful.

* * *

Schm

(M. Schmundt's writing
and initialled by him)



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H1166-0154



ITEM 2

S.O. Only

Berlin, 22 April 1938

## BASES OF THE DISSERTATION ON "GRUEN"

Summary of discussion between Fuehrer and General KEITEL of 21 April:

### A. Political Aspect

1). Strategic surprise attack out of a clear sky without any cause or possibility of justification has been turned down. As result would be: hostile world opinion which can lead to a critical situation. Such a measure is justified only for the elimination of the last opponent on the mainland.

2). Action after a time of diplomatic clashes, which gradually come to a crisis and lead to war.

3). Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (e.g. assassination of German ambassador in connection with an anti-German demonstration).

### B. Military Conclusions

1). The preparations are to be made for the political possibilities 2) and 3). Case 2). is the undesired one since "Gruen" will have taken security measures.

2). The loss of time caused by transporting the bulk of the divisions by rail - which is unavoidable but should be cut down as far as possible - must not impede a lightning-swift blow at the time of the action.

3). "Separate thrusts" are to be carried out immediately with a view to penetrating the enemy fortification lines at numerous points and in a strategically favorable direction. The thrusts are to be worked out to the smallest detail (knowledge of roads, of targets, composition of the columns according to their individual tasks). Simultaneous attacks by the Army and Air Force.

The Air Force is to support the individual columns. (e.g. divebombers: sealing off installations at penetration points, hampering the bringing up of reserves, destroying signal communications traffic, thereby isolating the garrisons.)

4). Politically, the first 4 days of military action are the decisive ones. If there are no effective military successes, a European crisis will certainly arise. Accomplished Facts must prove the senselessness of foreign military intervention, draw Allies into the scheme (division of spoils!) and demoralize "Gruen".

Therefore: bridging the time gap between first penetration and employment of the forces to be brought up, by a determined and ruthless thrust by a motorized army.(e.g. via Pi past Pr) (Pilsen, Prague).

5). If possible, separation of transport movement "Rot" from "Gruen". A simultaneous strategic concentration "Rot" can lead "Rot" to undesired measures. On the other hand it must be possible to put "Fall Rot" into operation at any time.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388-PS
(cont.)

C. Propaganda

1). Leaflets on the conduct of Germans in Czechoslovakia (Gruenland).

2). Leaflets with threats for intimidation of the Czechs (Gruenen).

Schm

Written by an officer

(initialled by Schmundt)



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ITEM 2

22 April

A). POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES

1). Sudden surprise attack out of clear sky not possible. World opinion can produce critical situation. Would be thinkable only for ultimate conflict without the threat of other opponents.

2). Action after a period of tension and constant aggravation of the situation.

3). Action as the result of an incident. (example)

B). MILITARY NECESSITIES

Cases 2 and 3 can be considered. In case 2 "security measures" will be taken. Duration of transporting by rail to be looked into.

1). Invasion by columns ready to march at points which lie in/a direction, strategically important. (Permanent fortifications must be known, columns assembled to suit particular situations, roads reconnoitred.) Simultaneous attack by luftwaffe, cooperation with luftwaffe, isolation of garrisons of the fortifications, cutting of communications.)

2). "Dead Space" in first 4 days prior to actual operation must be avoided under all circumstance. Must be bridged through motorized army. Penetrating via ALLSEN. Hamper mobilization.

3). Separation of transport movement "Rot" and "Gruen",

a). in order not to aggravate "Rot",

b). but also so as not to arrive late, if necessary.

Basic Principle : Create Accomplished Facts so that

a). help comes too late - other powers do not intervene

b). Allies take part (like wolves also want something out of it)

c). State collapses from within.

Propaganda: Directions to Germans
Threats to others

Submit: 1). Fortifications (strength in detail)

2). Distribution of nationalities within Wehrmacht.

H1166-0157



ITEM 3

MOS 1 16/5 0925 -
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

ZEITZLER

Most Secret - 1) Which divisions on the "Gruen" frontiers ready to march within 12 hours, in the case of mobilization?

2) What is the final day of mobilization?

SCHMUNDT

MOS 1 1930 MELDAU MBZ

(the same also in Schmundt's handwriting)

- - - - - - - - -

MOS No. 2 1115 -

MBZ 02 16/5 1114 -

Major Schmundt, Armed Forces Adjutant to the Fuehrer -

Most Secret to Question 1

12 of them - in garrisons

to Question 2

Third day - Please state time of receipt. Teleprint left my room at 1110 - NN

ZEITZLER Oberstleutnant on the General Staff

- - - - - - - - -

MOS 03 16/5 1155

OKW for Oberstleutnant Zeitzler - Most Secret

1). Teleprint received 1115

2). Please send the numbers of the divisions.

Schmundt

(the same also in Schmundt's handwriting) 1159 MOS 03 Wagner?

- - - - - - - - -

MBZ 04 16/5 1302 -

Major Schmundt Armed Forces Adjutant to the Fuehrer -

Most Secret to message 1155 7, 17, 10, 24, 4, 14, 3, 18, 38, 8, armored and mountain.

Zeitzler Oberstleutnant on the General Staff.



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ITEM 4

MBZ 05 17/5 1505

TO MAJOR SCHMUNDT ARMED FORCES ADJUTANT TO THE FUEHRER - MOST SECRET

IN ANSWER TO OBERST LEUTNANT ZEITZLER AND WITH REGARD TO MAP OF FORTIFICATIONS:

FORTIFIED CONSTRUCTION CONSISTS OF FAIRLY LARGE NUMBER OF STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS AS WELL AS LIGHT, MEDIUM AND HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENTS TO CLOSE GAPS BETWEEN FORTIFICATIONS. NUMBER OF STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS VARIES FROM ONE TO NINE PER KILOMETER. POSITIONS CONSTRUCTED CONSIST OF LIGHT, MEDIUM AND HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENTS AND AN OCCASIONAL STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATION IN BETWEEN. NUMBER OF MG EMPLACEMENTS VARIES FROM TWO TO NINE PER KILOMETER. BLOCK CONSTRUCTION CONSISTS OF LIGHT, SOMETIMES MEDIUM AND HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENTS AT MAIN ROADS AND THOROUGHFARES. DEFENSIVE POTENTIALITIES: STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS BULLET PROOF AGAINST ALL KNOWN CALIBRES. LIGHT MG EMPLACEMENTS BULLET PROOF AGAINST ALL CALIBRES UP TO 10.5 CM., MEDIUM MG EMPLACEMENTS BULLET PROOF AGAINST CALIBRES UP TO 10.5 CM., HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENT BULLET PROOF AGAINST CALIBRES UP TO 21.00 CM., SOMETIMES AGAINST THE LARGEST CALIBRES.

ZEITZLER OBERSTLEUTNANT ON THE GENERAL STAFF



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ITEM 5

MOST SECRET

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
L Ia No. 38/38 S.O. Only

Berlin, 20 May 1938
Tirpitzufer 72.76

S.O. Only
access only through Officer

Schm (initialled by Schmundt)

My Fuehrer!

Effective 1 October 1938 (beginning of the new mobilization year for the army) new strategic directives must be issued, whose political bases and stipulations you, my Fuehrer, yourself intend to make.

For the meantime, however, it is necessary that the "Gruen" section of the strategic directives be replaced by a new version that takes into account the situation which has arisen as a result of the incorporation of Austria into the Reich and the newly-suspected intentions of the Czech General Staff.

A draft of this kind is attached. It has not yet been discussed with the Commanders in Chief. I intend to do this only after this draft in its fundamental ideas has been approved by you my Fuehrer, so that it can then be resubmitted to be signed.

Heil, my Fuehrer

(signed) Keitel

ITEM 5

written by an officer

L Ia to No. 38/38 S.O. Only

Berlin, 20 May 1938.

MOST SECRET
S. O. Only
access only through officer

DRAFT

for

3 Copies
1st Copy

THE NEW DIRECTIVE "GRUEN"

(Provisional) - pencil note

1). Political Prerequisites:

It is not my intention to smash Czechoslovakia without provocation, in the near future through military action. Therefore inevitable political developments within Czechoslovakia must force the issue, or political events in Europe create an especially favorable opportunity and one which may never come again.

2). Political Possibilities for the Commencement of the Action:

An invasion without suitable obvious cause and without sufficient political justification cannot be considered with reference to the possible consequences of such an action in the present situation.

Rather will the action be initiated either:

a). after a period of increasing diplomatic clashes and tension, which is coupled with military preparations and is made use of to push the war-guilt onto the enemy. Even such a period of tension preceding the war however will terminate in sudden military action on our part, which must come with all possible surprise as to time and extent, or

b). by lightning-swift action as a result of a serious incident, through which Germany is provoked in an unbearable way and for which at least part of the world opinion will grant the moral justification of military action.

b). is militarily and politically the more favorable.

3). Conclusions for the Preparations of "Fall Gruen"; which must take into account the possibilities mentioned in 2 a). and 2 b).

a) For Armed War it is essential to create -- already in the first days -- a military situation which plainly proves to hostile nations eager to intervene, the hopelessness of the Czechoslovakian military situation, and gives the nations with territorial claims on Czechoslovakia an incentive to immediate intervention against Czechoslovakia. In such a case the intervention of Poland and Hungary against Czechoslovakia can be expected, especially if France, due to Italy's clearly pro-German attitude fears, or at least hesitates, to unleash a European war by her intervention against Germany.

It is very probable that attempts by Russia to give military support to Czechoslovakia are to be expected. If concrete successes are not achieved as a result of the ground operations during the first few days, a European crisis will certainly arise.

b) The Propaganda War must, on one hand, intimidate Czechoslovakia by threats and reduce her power of resistance, on the other hand,



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give instructions to the national minorities for supporting the Armed War and influence the neutrals into our way of thinking.

c). The Economic War has the task of employing all means at the disposal of economy to hasten the final collapse of Czechoslovakia.

The opening of the Economic and Propaganda war can precede the Armed War. I myself will determine the date.

Z (initialled at end by Zeitzler)

For paragraphs 4)., 5)., and 6). see under ITEM 11



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ITEM 6

Questions on "Gruen"

1). Peace-time strength of divisions prepared for march readiness.

2). Strength of mobile divisions.

3). Composition of 2nd Armored Division in the case of mobilization.

4). Strength, possibilities and composition of a motorized unit (motorized divisions) to be used for independent thrust.

5). When can the field units be equipped with 15 cm. mortars?

6). What calibres andhow large a number of artillery pieces are available for combatting fortifications suchas fortressgs?

H1166-0163



ITEM 6

L Ia

Berlin, 23 May
MOST SECRET

Questionnaire of 23 May

1). Peace-time strength of divisions prepared for march readiness.

Strength of a peacetime division : 14,000 men
Strength of a division made ready to march: 14,000 men
(but composition is different from that of a peacetime division, i.e. some men are left out and others included).

2). Strength of mobile divisions.

Strength of a mobile division : 17,000 men

3). Composition of the 2nd Armored Division in the case of Mobilization.

In the case of mobilization the 2nd Armored Division is composed of 1 rifle brigade, one tank brigade and divisional troops.

The rifle brigade has one Infantry regiment motorized of 2 battalions and one motorcycle rifle Battalion.

The tank brigade has two tank regiments of two battalions.

The Divisional Troops will include 1 Artillery Regiment motorized of 2 light Battalions, 1 Reconnaissance Battalion motorized, 1 Anti-Tank Battalion, 1 Engineer Battalion motorized, and 1 Signal Battalion motorized.

Altogether the 2nd Armored Division (mobile) has 807 light Machine guns, 250 heavy Machine guns, 18 light mortars, 12 heavy mortars, 8 light Infantry howitzers, 48 Anti-Tank guns, 122 2 cm. guns. 16 37 cm. guns, 16 7.5 cm. guns and 24 light field howitzers.

4). Strength, possibilities and composition of a motorized unit (motorized divisions) for independent thrust.

In the case of mobilization, C-in-C Army is in command of the motorized units. C-in-C Army must therefore be questioned as regards any new employment.

Altogether the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions (rapid march readiness is intended) 4 motorized divisions and the light division (for the moment not yet intended for rapid march readiness; presumably from 1 October).

5). When can the field units be equipped with 15 cm. mortars?

Mobilization of the infantry guns (= 15 cm. mortars) planned only for the fall, as ammunition for them will only then be available. For training purposes nearly all corps except the 3 corps have the heavy infantry guns at the moment without live ammunition, however.

6). What calibres and how large a number of artillery pieces are available for combatting fortifications such as fortresses?

Only 21 cm. howitzers. Altogether 23 (of which 8 are in East Prussia)

H1166-0164



with 16,000 rounds (of which 4,000 in East Prussia).

(In Schmundt writing): In general, single experimental artillery piece (guns).

Z (initialled by Zeitzler)

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On next page the questions are put again plus, the following additional questions):

7). What do the individual types of Czechoslovakian permanent frontier fortifications look like? Profile?

8). Is cooperation between infantry and bombers assured for attacks against enemy strongpoints etc.?

9). Can the construction of fortifications in the West, in the form of MG strong points and road blocks, be hastened by the employment of work columns of the Inspector of Road Construction?

10). What progress has been made in the howitzer (Moerser) programme? What progress has been made in the coversion of heavy naval guns?

* * *

(Next three pages contain the first 6 questions above and answers to them in a teleprint message, beginning: "I am answering several questions which the Fuehrer put to me during conferences. I request that you report the answers to the Fuehrer."

H1166-0165



ITEM 8

1). INFORM GENERAL KEITEL: THE FUEHRER IS GOING INTO "GRUEN" IN DETAIL. BASIC IDEAS NOT CHANGED. SURPRISE-ELEMENT TO BE EMPHASIZED MORE. CONFERENCE WITH PARTICIPANTS WILL TAKE PLACE AFTER RETURN, AT THE LATEST. CONFERENCE HERE NOT OUT OF THE QUESTION. RETURN PROBABLY BEGINNING NEXT WEEK.

2). INFORM COLONEL GENERAL VON BRAUCHITSCH AND GENERAL KEITEL:

A). THE FUEHRER, IN CONNECTION WITH HIS CONSIDERATIONS ON 1), HIMSELF SUGGESTED THE HOLDING OF MANOEUVERS TO PRACTISE TAKING FORTIFICATIONS BY SURPRISE ATTACK. I THEN REPORTED THAT C-IN-C ARMY WAS PLANNING A CORRESPONDING TRAINING EXERCISE FOR SEPTEMBER. THE FUEHRER THINKS THAT MOMENT TOO LATE. HE HIMSELF WILL DISCUSS THIS WITH C-IN-C ARMY.

B). THE FUEHRER REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THE NECESSITY OF PRESSING FORWARD GREATLY THE FORTIFICATION WORK IN THE WEST

(NOTE FOR K KPT V PUTTKAMER: PLEASE DESTROY TEXT OF 1). AND 2). AFTER USE)

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H1166-0166



ITEM -

REICH WAR MINISTRY/ NAVAL SIGNAL SERVICE

MOST SECRET

CANARIS REPORTS ON EVENTS OF THE NIGHT: NO SPECIAL OCCURRENCES. THE MOBILIZATION MEASURES ORDERED IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA CONTINUE. THE FOLLOWING HAVE BEEN DRAFTED: CLASSES 1913 AND 1914 COMPLETE AND SPECIALISTS ONLY FROM CLASSES 1894 TO 1911 LEAVING OUT CLASSES 04, 06, 09. I SHALL KEEP YOU FURTHER CONTINUALLY INFORMED. I CONSIDER IT NECESSARY THAT THE FUEHRER INFORM HIS C'S-IN-C OF HIS INTENTIONS SOON. HAVE YOU ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS?

ITEM 10

ILLEGIBLE



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H1166-0168



ITEM 11

Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
OKW No. 42/38 Most Secret S.O. Only L I

Berlin, 30 May 1938
Copy of the 4th Copy

S.O. Only

3 Copies
1st Copy

Access only through Officer

Written by an Officer

By order of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Part 2, Section II of the directive on the unified preparations for war of the Armed Forces dated 24 June 1937 (Ob.d.W. No. 55/37 g.kdos Chefsache L Ia) ("Two-Front-War with main effort in the South-East - strategic concentration 'Gruen'") is to be replaced by the attached version. Its execution must be assured as from 1 October 38 at the latest.

Alterations in the other parts of the directivesmust be expected during the next few weeks.

by order

Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

1 Appendix

sgd. Keitel

To: C-in-C Army — Copy 1
C-in-C Navy — Copy 2
C-in-C Air Force — Copy 3
OKW Section L — Copy 4 - 5

Certified a true copy

Zeitzler

Oberstleutnant on the General Staff



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ITEM 11

MOST SECRET

Appendix to: Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
OKW No. 42/38 Most Secret S. O. Only L Ia
dated 30.5.38.

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Written by an Officer

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Access only through Officer

## II. Two front war with main effort in the South East (strategic concentration "Gruen")

1). Political Prerequisites.

It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future. It is the job of the political leaders to await or bring about the politically and militarily suitable moment.

An inevitable development/ of conditions inside Czechoslovakia or other political events in Europe creating a surprisingly favorable opportunity and one which may never come again/may cause me to take early action.

The proper choice and determined and full utilization of a favorable moment is the surest guarantee of success. Accordingly the preparations are to be made at once.

2). Political Possibilites for the Commencement of the Action.

The following are necessary prerequisites for the intended invasion:

a). suitable obvious cause and, with it
b). sufficient political justification,
c). action unexpected by the enemy, which will find him prepared to the least possible degree.

From a military as well as a political standpoint the most favorable course is a lightning-swift action as the result of an incident through which Germany is provoked in an unbearable way for which at least part of world opinion will grant the moral justification of military action.

But even a period of tension, more or less preceeding a war, must terminate in sudden action on our part - which must have the elements of surprise as regards time and extent - before the enemy is so advanced in military preparedness that he cannot be surpassed.

3). Conclusions for the Preparation of "Fall Gruen".

a). For the Armed War it is essential that the surprise element as the most important factor contributing to success be made full use of by appropriate preparatory measures, already in peacetime and by an unexpectedly rapid course of the action. Thus it is essential to create a situation within the first four days which plainly demonstrates, to hostile nations eager to intervene, the hopelessness of the Czechoslovakian military situation and which at the same time will give nations with territorial claims on Czechoslovakia an incentive to intervene immediately against Czechoslovakia. In such a case, intervention by Poland



H1166-0169

H1166-0170



ITEM 11

and Hungary against Czechoslovakia may be expected, especially if France - due to the obvious pro-German attitude of Italy - fears, or at least hesitates, to unleash a European war by intervening against Germany. Attempts by Russia to give military support to Czechoslovakia mainly by the Air Force are to be expected. If concrete successes are not achieved by the land operations within the first few days, a European crisis will certainly result. This knowledge must give commanders of all ranks the impetus to decided and bold action.

b). The Propaganda War must on the one hand intimidate Czechoslovakia by threats and soften her power of resistance, on the other hand issue directions to national groups for support in the Armed War and influence the neutrals into our way of thinking. I reserve further directions and determination of the date.

4). Tasks of the Armed Forces.

Armed Forces Preparations are to be made on the following basis:

a). The mass of all forces must be employed against Czechoslovakia.

b). For the West, a minimum of forces are to be provided as rear cover which may be required, the other frontiers in the East against Poland and Lithuania are merely to be protected, the Southern frontiers to be watched.

c). The sections of the army which can be rapidly employed must force the frontier fortifications with speed and decision and must break into Czechoslovakia with the greatest daring in the certainty that the bulk of the mobile army will follow them with the utmost speed. Preparations for this are to be made and timed in such a way that the sections of the army which can be rapidly employed cross the frontier at the appointed time at the same time as the penetration by the Air Force before the enemy can become aware of our mobilization.*

*For this, a timetable between Army and Air Force is to be worked out in conjunction with OKW and submitted to me for approval.*

5). Missions for the branches of the Armed Forces

a). Army: The basic principle of the surprise attack against Czechoslovakia must not be endangered by the inevitable time required for transporting the bulk of the field forces by rail nor the initiative of the Air Force be wasted. Therefore it is first of all essential to the army that as many assault columns as possible be employed at the same time as the surprise attack by the Air Force. These assault columns - the composition of each, according to their tasks at that time - must be formed with troops which can be employed rapidly owing to their proximity to the frontier or to motorization and to special measures of readiness. It must be the purpose of these thrusts to break into the Czechoslovakian fortification lines at numerous points and in a strategically favorable direction, to achieve a breakthrough or to break them down from the rear. For the success of this operation, cooperation with the Sudeten German frontier population, with deserters from the Czechoslovakian army, with parachutists or

(* - * passages between asterisks occur only in this version not in Item 5)

ITEM 11 (cont.)

airborne troops and with units of the sabotage service will be of importance. The bulk of the army has the task of *frustrating the Czechoslovakian plan of defense, of preventing the Czechoslovakian army from escaping into Slovakia, of forcing a battle,* of beating the Czechoslovakian army and of occupying Bohemia and Moravia speedily. To this end a thrust into the heart of Czechoslovakia must be made with the strongest possible motorized and armored units using to the full the first successes of the Assault columns and the effects of the Air Force operations. The rear cover provided for the West must be limited in numbers and quality to the extent which suits the present state of fortifications. Whether the units assigned this will be transported to the Western frontier immediately or held back for the time being will be decided in my special order. Preparations must however, be made to enable security detachments to be brought up to the Western frontier even during the strategic concentration "Gruen". *Independent of this, a first security garison must be improvized from the engineers at present employed in constructing fortifications and from formations of the Labor Corps. The remaining frontiers as well as East Prussia, are to be Reichly weakly protected. But, alway depending on the political situation, the transfers by sea, of a part or even the bulk of the active forces of East Prussia, into the Reich must be taken into account.

b). Air Force. While leaving a minimum of defensive forces in the West, the Air Force is to be employed in bulk in a surprise attack against Czechoslovakia. The frontier is to be flown over at the same time as it is crossed by the first section of the army. (s e 5a) The most important task of the Air Force is the destruction of the Czechoslovakian Air Force and their supply bases within the shortest possible time, in order to eliminate the possibility of its employment as well as that of Russian and French air forces, should the occasion arise, against the strategic concentration and penetration of the German army and agains the German "Lebensraum." Next to this the crippling of enemy mobilization, of the direction of the government and Armed Forces, as well as the delaying of the strategic concentration of the Czech Army by attacks on communication installations, mobilization and government centers can be of considerable importance to the initial successes of the army. At points in the frontier area where stronger sections of the Czechoslovakian Army *or the depth of the defensive system* might make the success of the sudden breakthrough of the German Land-attack questionable, the employment of adequate bomber forces must be assured. Czechoslovakian industrial installations are to be spared as far as the course of operations permits. Retaliatory attacks against the population will be carried out only with my permission. Centers of air defense are to be created throughout BERLIN, the central German industrial area and the RUHR area,* and gradually prepared even now in an inconspicuous fashion.*

c). Navy. The Navy will assist the army operations by employing the DANUBE-flotilla. For this purpose the flotilla will be under the orders of C-in-C Army. As regards the conduct of naval warfare at first only those measures are to be taken which appear to be necessary for the careful protection of the North Sea and the Baltic against a sudden intervention in the conflict by other states. These measures must be confined to the absolutely necessary extent. Their inconspicuousness must be guaranteed. It

(* - * Passages between asterisks represent additions to the version in ITEM 5)



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ITEM 11 (cont.)

is of decisive importance that all actions, which might influence the political attitude of the European Great Powers unfavorably, be avoided.

6). Tasks of the War Economy:

In war economy it is essential that in the field of the armament industry a maximum-deployment of forces is made possible through increased supples. In the course of operations, it is of value to contribute to the reinforcement of the total war- economic strength - by rapidly reconnoitring and restarting important factories. For this reason the sparing of Czechoslovakian industrial and works instalations - insofar as military operations permit - can be of decisive importance to us.

7). *All preparations for sabotage and insurrection will be made by OKW. They will be made, in agreement with and according to the requirement of the branches of the Armed Forces, so that their effects accord with the operations of the Army and Air Force.*

signed ADOLF HITLER

Certified copy

signed Zeitzler

Oberstleutnant on the General Staff

(* - * Passages between asterisks represent additions to the version in ITEM 5)



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H1166-0173



ITEM 12

L I a H

Berlin, 9 June 1938.

SHORT SURVEY OF ARMAMENT OF THE CZECH ARMY

1. SMALL ARMS

Armed uniformly with Mauser Rifle, Model 24, calibre 7.92 mm (similar to German Rifle 98). Also grenade launcher for rifle grenades is attached to the rifle.

2. MACHINE GUNS

Light MG Z.B. 26, wieht 9 Kg, 20 round magazine.

Heavy MG, temporarily the MG "Schwarzlose" which has been improved in range. Super-heavy MG, 20 mm MG, Oerlikon system has been introduced (especially for active air defence), other models are being tested.

3. MORTARS

5.1cm Stokes-Brandt, range 3000 m.

9cm light Skoda mortar, model 17, range 1200 m.

14cm medium mortar, model 18, range 2500 m.

26cm heavy mortar, model 17, range 2700 m.

4. INFANTRY GUNS FOR ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND ANTI-TANK DEFENSE

Several models are being tested, some of them twin barrel guns. Calibre 37 - 40 mm and/or 66 - 70 mm.

5. ARTILLERY PIECES

a. Light and Mountain Artillery:

8cm field gun, model 17, range 10 km

8cm field gun, model 30, range 13.5 km (can also be used as an AA gun)

10cm light field howitzer, model 14/19, range 10 km.

7.5 Mountain gun, model 15, range 7 km.

10cm Mountain howitzer, model 16/19, range 10 km.

b. Heavy Artillery:

10.5cm gun, model 35, range 18 km.

15cm howitzer, model 14/16, range 8 km.



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ITEM 12

15cm howitzer, model 25, range 12 km.

15cm gun, model 15/16, range 20 km.

24cm gun, model 16, range 36 km.

21cm howitzer (Mörser) gun, model 18, range 10 km.

30.5cm howitzer (Mörser) gun, model 16, range 12.4 km.

Also in use are French 15.5cm howitzers.

c. A A Artillery

9cm AA-gun, model 12/20 (stationary), range 12 km.

8.35 cm AA-gun, model 22/24 horizontal range 18 km, vertical range 12 km.

7.65cm AA-gun, model 35, horizontal range 16 km, vertical range 11 km.

6.6cm AA-gun, model is being tested.

Z (Initialled by Zeitzler)

H1166-0175



ITEM 13

L I a

Berlin, 9 June 1938

MOST SECRET

FUEHRER'S QUESTIONS ON 9 JUNE 1938

H1166-0176

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388-PS
(Cont'd)

ITEM 13

Berlin. 9 June 1938

MOST SECRET

2 copies

1st copy

Question 1: Armament of the Czech Army?

Answer:

Arming and equipping of the Army with new means of war is progressing, thanks to the excellent production capacity of the Czech armament industry.

The armament was built up from the weapons of the old Austrian Army. It is slowly and steadily being modernized.

In Detail:

Artillery: Light field artillery. At present the old armament from the Austrian Army predominates.

Mountain Artillery: the same.

Medium artillery. New armament predominates.

Heavy artillery. old armament predominates.

Infantry Weapons: The following are available:

a uniform new infantry rifle; a uniform new light MG; a uniform old improved heavy MG.

Equipment of heavy infantry weapons (AT-guns, Infantry Howitzers, Mortars) and tanks is modern, but still incomplete.

A new modern AA-gun has been introduced, but is not yet available in sufficient numbers.

Reserves of weapons and ammunition seem to be guaranteed.

SUMMARY: The Czech Army must be considered up to date as far as armament and equipment are concerned.

Z (Initialled by Zeitzler)



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H1166-0177



ITEM 13

L I a

Berlin 9 June 1938

MOST SECRET

2 copies
1st copy

Question 2: How many battalions, etc. are employed in the West for the construction of emplacements?

Answer:

Up to now the following have been employed on fortifications:

The 36th Infantry Battalion

The 10th Infantry Howitzer Company

The 12th Anti-Tank Company

The 10th Battery

The 30th 1/3 Engineer Battalions

In addition:

The 78th German Labor Service Battalion, and later the 190th German Labour Corps battalion.

In addition, the Commander of Army Group 2 (General Adam) has the authority to draw still further troops from his 4th Corps for the construction of emplacements if he deems it necessary.

Z (Initialled by Zeitzler)

(Pencilled noted by Schmundt):

Number of troops

Production possibilities



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ITEM 13

L I a

Berlin, 9 June 1938

MOST SECRET

2 copies
1st copy

Question 3: Are the fortifications of Czecho Slovakia still occupied in unreduced strength?

Answer:

The troops have been withdrawn to some extent from the fortifications and are housed in local billets. The fortifications themselves are guarded. The barriers at the frontiers are opened.

Z (Initialled by Zeitzler)



H1166-0178

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IT[redacted] 13

L I a

Berlin, 9 June 1938

MOST SECRET

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Question 4: Frontier protection in the West?

Answer:

In the West as at the other frontiers, the first frontier protection is undertaken by the VGaD, then the Frontier Guard. This protection by the Frontier Guard is directly at the frontier. At the same time as the Frontier Guard at the frontier, the fortification installations, which lie further back, receive security garrisons (reserve personnel).

Strength of the Frontier Guard on the Western Frontier:

15,200 men with 1,250 light MG's.

For further details on the frontier guard see appendix.

Z (Initialled by Zeitzler)



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H1166-0179

ITEM 14

L I a

Berlin, 18 June 1938

S. O. Only

Access only through Officer

1. DRAFT FOR THE NEW DIRECTIVE

(1st copy)

In three parts.



H1166-0180

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ITEM 14 MOST SECRET 4 copies
1st copy

Written by an officer.

S. O. Only

Access only through Officer

Part 1

GENERAL GUIDING PRINCIPLES

1. There is no danger of a preventive war by foreign states against Germany.

Germany has not committed herself to any military alliances which would automatically force Germany into a warlike conflict of foreign powers.

The immediate aim is a solution of the Czech problem by my own, free decision; this stands in the foreground of my political intentions. I am determined to use to the full every favorable political opportunity to realize this aim.

Thereby, friends, interested parties and enemies can be called upon to take part in this scheme and other powers can remain indifferent even though they could not be previously placed with absolute certainty in one of these categories.

However, I will decide to take action against Czechoslovakia only if I am firmly convinced as in the case of the occupation of the demilitarized zone and the entry into Austria that France will not march and therefore England will not intervene.

2. The preparations of the Armed Forces must cover:

a) thorough preparation of the action against Czechoslovakia ("Fall Gruen"). See Part 2.

b) Maintenance of the previous "Fall Rot" (strategic concentration with the main effort against the West.) See Part 2.

c) Special preparations, mainly in the form of studies and deliberations within the Supreme Commands. See part 3.

d) Preparatory measures, in case German territory is suddenly and abruptly violated with hostile intent by a foreign power. See number 3.

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IT[redacted] 14

3. If in the midst of peace, German territory is suddenly and abruptly violated with hostile intent by a foreign power, armed resistance will be offered without any special order.

Therefore, the branches of the Armed Forces must empower their competent Commanders on the frontier or on the coast to take on their own authority, all measures necessary to repulse the enemy attack should such a case occur. (See Reich Defense Law (RVG) para. 2).

In no event, however, may the German Reich frontier be crossed by troops or aircraft, nor any foreign territory violated, without my order.

It will not be considered a violation of German territory (see 1st sentence of this number) if single sentries or patrols cross the frontier unintentionally and accidentally or through the overeagerness of a subordinate commander, or if aircraft fly over the frontier due to faulty navigation, or warships sail in our German territorial waters with obviously no hostile intentions.

4. This directive concerns the uniform preparation for war and the general strategic considerations applying to the outbreak of the war. It will be augmented as necessitated by the various strategic concentrations by regulations dealing with matters of Special Administration and War Economy.

The directives necessary for the prosecution of the war itself will be issued by me from time to time.

K (Initialled by Keitel)

Z (Initialled by Zeitzler)



H1166-0182

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ITEM 14

Written by an officer MOST SECRET 4 copies
1st copy

S. O. only

Access only through officer

Part 2

STRATEGIC CONCENTRATIONS

1. Action against Czecho-Slovakia ("Fall Gruen")

The directive, issued as OKW Nr 42/38 Most Secret S. O. only L I dated 30 May 1938, remains in force. Regulations dealing with special matters, administration and War Economy relative to "Fall Gruen" are still to be issued.

2. Two Front War with the main effort in the West ("Fall Rot")

Since even a war against us started by the Western Nations must, in view of the situation today, begin with the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia, the preparation of strategic concentration for a war with the main effort by the Army and Air Force against the West, is no longer of primary importance.

The preparations made to date for the event ("Rot"), however, remain in effect. They contribute, as far as the Army is concerned, towards camouflaging and screening the other strategic concentration and serve, in the case of the Luftwaffe, as a preparation for the shifting of the main effort from the East to the West, which may, under certain circumstances, suddenly become necessary. They also serve as preliminary work for future possibilities of war in the West.

It is left to C in C Army to decide how far the Army strategic concentration "Rot", prepared by OKH for the beginning of the new mobilization year 38/39, will be issued to subordinates.

The tasks which arise for the Navy in "Fall Rot" will be the same as those should "Fall Gruen" be extended to include the Western European nations. The naval preparations are therefore to be continued with the previous objective.

J
K (Initialled by Keitel and Jodl)



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H1166-0184

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388-PS
(Cont'd.)

ITEM 14

Written by an officer

2. DRAFT

MOST SECRET Berlin, 7 July 3?

2 copies
1st copy

S. O. only

access only through officer

Part 3

CONSIDERATIONS

I. In connection with "Gruen".

How the political situation will develop during the execution or after the conclusion of "Gruen" cannot be predicted. Therefore the Armed Forces will confine themselves to the preparation of the measures given in Part I, Number 3, to "Fall Gruen" and "Fall Rot". However, it seems expedient to make at least theoretical considerations and calculations for several possible eventualities, to avoid being mentally unprepared. These considerations would have to cover:

a) What would have to be done if other nations intervened against us during the execution of "Gruen" - contrary to our expectations.

b) What should be done after the conclusion of "Gruen".

To a)

If, during the execution of "Gruen", France intervenes against us, the measures provided in "Fall Gruen" come into force. The primary essential in this connection is to hold the Western fortifications, until the execution of the action "Gruen" permits forces to be freed. Should France be supported by England, in this it will have small effect at first on the land-war. It is the duty of the Air Force, the Navy, and the OKW (War Economy Staff, Defense, Armed Forces Communications), however, to carry out farsighted deliberations in their sphere.

Among the Eastern powers, Russia is the most likely to intervene. This, in the beginning at any rate, will probably consist of reinforcement of the Czech Air Force and Armament. However, the decision must not be neglected concerning what measures are to be taken if Russia were to come to the point of starting a Naval and Air war against us or even wish to penetrate into East Prussia, through the border states.

In the case of a penetration by Poland, we must hold the Eastern fortifications and East Prussia, using the Frontier Guard and other formations, until the conclusion of the action "Gruen" once more gives us freedom of movement.



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To b) If the action "Gruen" takes place still during this Mobilization year, we must be in the position after the conclusion of "Gruen" to put a provisional strategic concentration quickly into force.

In connection with the latter, further to what was said in part 1, number 3, it is primary importance to safeguard the German frontiers, including the new addition by the Armed Force, and still have the bulk of the Field Forces and the Air Force at our disposal. It would have to be possible to put such a future strategic concentration, "Frontier Protection," into force separately for the various frontiers.

II. Independent of "Fall Gruen"

Germany will not refrain from occupying the Memal-territory by a lightning blow in the case of a Polish-Lithuanian conflict occurring. The deliberations on this eventuality must cancel the directive issued 18 March 1938 (OKW Nr 472/38 g. Kdos L Ia).

III. General

The branches of the Armed Forces are still allowed to deliberate further on the matter contained in Section I) and II). These however, may be carried out only as theoretical studies within the Supreme Commands without the participation of subordinate authorities.

Z

K (Initialled by Keitel and Zeitzler)

H1166-0186

[redacted] 16

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 1233/38 Most Secret L Ia

Berlin, 22 July 1938

MOST SECRET

2 Copies
1st Copy

To:

Major Schmundt or deputy

I enclose a conference report. Your attention is requested.(e.g. the remark of Chief OKW).

Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

by order

signed Zeitzler

Submitted to the Fuehrer on 1.8.

Schm (pencil note by Schmundt)

Stamp:
Adjutants' Office of the
Armed Forces to the Fuehrer
and Reich Chancellor
Recd. 26? July 1938 App. 1
No. 82/38 Most Secret



/87

H1166-0187

ITEM 16 pencil note: Maj. Schmundt
1 copy 3rd
report to
Fuehrer

L Ia
to L No. 1233/38 Most Secret

Berlin, 12 July 1938

2 Copies
1st Copy

Conference Notes

K (initialled
by Keitel)

MOST SECRET

CKH issues new manoeuvre intentions for 1938. Reason for alteration: development of the Western fortifications and spreading of the foot-and-mouth-disease.

Details:

1). Of the previously intended training manoeuvres, the following remain:

Fall exercise for the I Army Corps
Training exercise for the XI Army Corps
Fortress warfare exercise for the 1st Army Group Command

2). New training manoeuvres:

a). Fighting for fortifications

b). Coordination with the Air Force

c). Cooperation between ground attack, airplanes and field units commencing 1 August in the exercise area

d). Mobilization exercises for the Staffs

e). Supply and communications control

f). Chemical defense and cleansing of contaminated areas

3). Training Manoeuvres for armored divisions:

1st Armored Division up to 24 October at GRAFENWOHR, Corps HQ of the XVI Army Corps will also be there

2nd Armored Division remains in Austria

3rd Armored Division up to 24 September in KOENIGSBRUECK, from 25 September near BRESLAU West of the ODER

4). Training Manoeuvres for motorized divisions ready to march:
exercise
2nd motorized Division in/area A, from 28 September, in NEUHAMMER

29th motorized Division in exercise area B

20th motorized Division in exercise area C

13th motorized Division in exercise area D

1st light Division in exercise area E



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ITEM 16 (cont'd)

Commencement of the exercises not before 12 September, the end 24 November.

5). Terrain exercises for units ready to march:

These take place in the following Wehrkreise:

II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XIII, XVII,

commencement of Terrain exercises: 20 September

6). Training manoeuvres for the mountain divisions composed as on mobilization:

2nd Mountain Division in area STEYR - PICHL - WEGER
3rd Mountain Division in area SEMMERING - BRUCK
commencement of exercises: 26 September, End: 24 November

7). Training Manoeuvres for Training Divisions (Reserve Divisions):

a). 15 August to 13 September:
Training Division VII Army Corps (69th Division) Field units
Exercise Area NEUHAMMER,
Training Division IX Army Corps (52nd Division) Field units
Exercise Area GROSSBORN,
Training Division III Army Corps (68th Division) Field units
Exercise Area JUETERBOG.

b). 9 September to 24 November:
Training Division IV Army Corps (56th Division) Field units
Exercise Area OHRDRUF
Training Division VIII Army Corps (62nd Division) Field units
Exercise Area SENNE
Training Division XIII Army Corps (73rd Division) Field units
Exercise Area MUENDINGEN
Training Division XII Army Corps (79th Division) Field units
Exercise Area WAHN
From about 24 September these 4 divisions will train West of the RHINE.

8). New dispositions:

a). Truck Regiment 616, 20 September to 24 October disposition by III Army Corps.

b). Army Artillery:

6 battalions: 15 August to 3 September disposition and training
11 battalions: 9 September to 24 October disposition and training.

Of these, beginning 24 September:

5 battalions to Reserve divisions West of the RHINE
6 battalions to Terrain exercises of troops "ready to march"

c). Engineer Battalions:

3 Engineer Battalions, 9 September to 24 October, disposition and training.



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H1166-0189

ITEM 16 (cont'd)

of these 2 battalions, 20 September, to terrain training of troops "ready to march"
1 battalion, from 20 September to Reserve Division West of the Rhine.

d). Artillery Intelligence Regiments:

4 battalions and 2 Telephone communications companies (motorized)
9 September to 24 November.

Disposition and training; from 28 September, the battalions will be situated in the neighborhood of BRESLAU, GRAFENWOEHR, NEUHAMMER, INGOLSTADT.

9). Employment of Engineer Battalions on the Western fortifications:

Employment of Engineer Battalions extended for no longer than 3 weeks, also 7 Engineer Battalions will be added.

10) Reich Party Rally and Harvest Festival:

Participation remains as intended.

11) Foreign Military Delegations:

The foreign Military Delegations as well as foreign military attaches will be invited to attend the fall exercises of the I Army Corps.

Z (initialled by ZEITZLER)



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H1166-0190



ITEM 17

Chief Section L — Written by General Staff Officer

MOST SECRET

S.O. Only — Berlin, 24 August 1938

access only through Officer

1 Copy

TIMING OF THE X- ORDER AND THE QUESTION OF ADVANCE MEASURES

The Luftwaffe's endeavor to take the enemy air forces by surprise at their peace-time airports justifiably leads them to oppose measures taken in advance of the X-order and to the demand that the X-order itself be given sufficiently late on X minus 1 to prevent the fact of Germany's mobilization becoming known to Czechoslovakia on that day.

The army's efforts are tending in the opposite direction. It intends to let OKW initiate all advance measures between X minus 3 and X minus 1, which will contribute to the smooth and rapid working of the mobilization. With this in mind OKH also demands that the X order be given not later than 1400 on X minus 1.

To this the following must be said:

Operation (aktion) Gruen will be set in motion by means of an "incident" in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany provcation for military intervention. The fixing of the exact time for this incident is of the utmost importance.

It must come at a time when weather conditions are favorable for our superior air forces to go into action and at an hour which will enable authentic news of it to reach us on the afternoon of X minus 1.

It can then be spontaneously answered by the giving of the X order at 1400 on X minus 1.

On X minus 2 the Navy, Army and Air Force will merely receive an advance warning.

If the Fuehrer intends to follow this plan of action, all further discussion is superfluous.

For then no advance measures may be taken before X minus 1 for which there is not an innocent explanation as we shall otherwise appear to have manufactured the incident. Orders for absolutely essential advance measures must be given in good time and camouflaged with the help of the numerous manoeuvres and exercises.

Also, the question raised by the Foreign Office as to whether all Germans should be called back in time from prospective enemy territories must in no way lead to the conspicuous departure from Czechoslovakia of any German subjects before the incident.

Even a warning of the diplomatic representatives in PRAGUE is impossible before the first air attack, although the consequences could be very grave in the event of their becoming victims of such an attack (e.g. death of representatives of friendly or confirmed neutral powers.)

H1166-0191



ITEM 17 (cont'd)

If, for technical reasons, the evening hours should be considered desirable for the incident, then the following day cannot be X day, but it must be the day after that.

In any case we must act on the principle that nothing must be done before the incident which might point to mobilization, and that the swiftest possible action must be taken after the incident. (X-Fall)

It is the purpose of these notes to point out what a great interest the Wehrmacht has in the incident and that it must be informed of the Fuehrer's intentions in good time - insofar as the Abwehr Section is not also charged with the organization of the incident.

I request that the Fuehrer's decision be obtained on these points.

J 20/8

Notes:

Submitted on 30.8

The Fuehrer will act on these lines.

On 31.8 Col. v. S. Jodl notified. Schm 31.8 Col. Jodl

(initialled by Jodl)



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H1166-0192



ITEM 18

CONFERENCE

on 3 September 38
at the BERGHOF

Present: The Fuhrer
Generaloberet v. Brauchitsch
General of Artillery Keitel
Major Schmundt

I.

Gen. Ob. v. Brauchitsch — Reports on the exact time of the transfer of the troops to "exercise areas" for "Gruen". Field units to be transferred on 28 Sept. From here will then be ready for action. When X Day becomes known, field units carry out exercises in opposite directions.

Fuhrer — Has objection. Troops assemble field units a 2-day march away. Carry out camoflage exercises everywhere.

? — OKH must know when X-day is by 1200 noon, 27 September.

II.

The Fuhrer — Expresses different opinion on employment of troops for "Gruen". Aspects for the 2nd Army (OS) are smallest. Strongest Cz. fortifications there. Waste of troops; thrust in the 10th Army area, however, is promising. Roadblocks prepared everywhere in addition also in 2nd army area. No reason for hinderance. The Czechs will stop opposite 2nd army and keep assault army ready east of PRAGUE. A thrust against it into the heart of Cz. is to be made. Thrust in the 14th army area will fail because of means of transport. Therefore assemble all mot. and arm'd divisions with 10th army and employ in the thrust. Once we are through there, the South front, which is built up opposite our 12th army in 3 defense lines, will collapse. An army in the heart of BOHEMIA will bring about the decision. Possible repetition of VERDUN in case of 2nd army. An attack there would mean bleeding to death for a task which cannot be accomplished.

v. Brauchitsch — Has objections because of the state of the mot. divisions, supply and untrained leaders.



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H1166-0193



ITEM 18

The Fuhrer: The course now planned corresponds to Cz. expectations. Opposite the 10th Army the enemy is not always in concrete emplacements. Possibility here of drawing in the Henlein people (uniforms). The line here is very far back. Cooperation between 10th and 12th armies. We must add motorized units to army. As formerly the "Prussian Cavalry." How else can we gather experiences? Decisive is the coordination of equal speeds. Breakthrough in sector of 2nd army not so rapid, so that a tactical success can be turned into a strategic one. The Fuhrer gives orders for the development of the Western fortifications; improvement of advance positions around AACHEN and SAARBRUCKEN. Construction of 300 to 400 battery positions (1600 artillery pieces). He emphasizes flanking action.

Certified.

SCHMUNDT, Major on the General Staff
BERGHOF, 4 Sept 1938

* * *

(In Schmundt's writing)



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H1166-0194



ITEM 189

S. O. Only

MOST SECRET

DISCUSSION
Nuremberg, 9 Sept. to 10 Sept., 2200 to 0330

Present: Fuhrer
General oberst v. Brauchitsch
General Halder
General Keitel
Major Schmundt
Hauptmann Engel
Hauptmann v. Below (?)

General Halder states reasons for operational plan "Gruen."
Mission: to prevent retreat of Cz. Army from Moravia - Bohemia area. To beat army. To bring about rapid decision. Mission can be accomplished by pincer attack in the direction of OLUMUTZ and BRUUN to be undertaken by 2nd and 14th Armies. Difficult transport situation in Austria. Therefore main effort in 2nd Army area. Cz. frontier can only be lightly held. Withdrawal certain on part of Cz forces. Several defensive lines favorable by terrain will delay second thrusts and allow time to be gained for a Cz retreat, and so retain a rear position. This is to be avoided. The Bohemian Moravian heights which will confront the attacker in the last phase will favor probable Cz line of action. The pincer attack makes a "rear attack" from behind these heights possible. This operation will definitely succeed. Reserves at first mainly local. Further reserves near and south of Prague. Opponent won't have time to form further reserves. Opponent does not possess closed armoured forces. They are distributed and consist of light units.

2nd Army. Weaknesses opposite its sector recognized. Installations only partly completed. Mostly lack armed cupolas. There are great gaps. Olumutz will be reached on the second day. OPPA is no obstacle, can be crossed by tanks as well as Inf. No armed forces opposing. FREUDENTAL only 35 men garrison? So-called light motorized forces on right flank are no danger. Consist party of Mounted units and will be engaged by adjoining Army. Were the attack, against expectations, to fail, then under no circumstances "bleed to death" before the position. Strategic concentration to be flexible. Rear sections will then be brought up to the points where success has been achieved. Cz fears the GLAZ mountain area. Only demonstrations to be staged in this area; there will be a tie up of Cz forces. To provide cover eastwards tanks will be valuable.

On the rest of the mountain front; 4th (9?) Corps, and in the frontier sector demonstrations must be staged to tie up forces.

12th and 14th Armies will work together. Their columns must necessarily support one another during the thrust and cause the front to collapse. Bohemia only weakly occupied at frontier; 1 Division to 120 kms. Operation therefore promising. After the thrust in a northerly direction 12 Army forces east and "races" for Brunn. The enemy will not be able to employ reserves according to plan.

10 th Army faces PILSEN RIEGEL which is strongly fortified. Bad roads. Tanks must break through here and establish bridgeheads for following up forces. Forces of the next wave will be brought up by truck units. After the 3rd and 4th Mobilization day 6 further divisions will be brought up to the 2nd and 3rd line and can be employed where success is in the balance.



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H1166-0195



ITEM 19

The Fuhrer: We should not plan the action on the operations as we desire them, but take into consideration the probable course of action pursued by the enemy. With regard to his course of action two factors are decisive:
1. At the time of our rearmament between 1934 and 1938 our opponent must have endeavoured to secure himself against a tearing of the East-West Communication, in his case probably between TRAPPAU and NIKOLSBURG. Against us this would imply the building of fortifications on the Upper Silesian frontier. In the South an agreement with Austria would achieve a defense north of the Danube, or an advance to the DANUBE to protect the Southern flank.
2. The latter is no longer possible. Therefore, as a result of the situation created in March 1938, it is all the more probable that they have increased their fortifications opposite our 2nd army. The enemy must hold there - otherwise there is no sense in holding the remaining front. Hence here the best regiments and fortifications are to be expected. Holding of the front facing the 2nd Army will decide the "To be or Not to be" of Cz. There is no doubt that the planned pincer movement is the most desirable solution and should take place. But its success is nevertheless too uncertain for it to be depended on. Especially as a rapid success is necessary from a political point of view. The first 8 days are politically decisive, within that week a far-reaching territorial gain must be achieved. Our artillery (21cm Howitzers) not adequate against fortifications. Where an attack is expected the element of surprise is ruled out. Besides from experience difficult to refrain from an action that achieves only part-success. More and more units are thrown into breaks and bleeding-to-death which one wanted to avoid, sets in (VERDUN!) Tanks are used up and are not available for the subsequent territory-gaining operation. The consequence is that motorized divisions have to advance without tanks. ("Tables Turned")
Also the objectives of the motorized units are not too far-removed and can be gained without fighting, so that they could be equally well gained by infantry troops. The motorized divisions will not be able to influence a decision to any extent. It is the task of motorized forces to bridge areas free of the enemy. Where an attack opens up a large, free space the commitment of motorized forces is justified. Compare with the use of army cavalry at the beginning of the 1914 war. It is catastrophic for tanks to have to stop and wait for infantry. This contradicts all laws of logic. In the 14th army sector fortifications can only have been begun since March. Hence, thrust toward BRUNN will be easier. 2nd Pz Div can therefore be left there. However, this division should operate with the 29th motorized division. Therefore the 29th must not arrive on the evening of the 2nd day. The 2nd Pz must constitute the advance column of the 29th Div (Mot.). Are the road conditions suitable for the 29th? The 13th Division, which has no prospects of success as a Mot. division with the 12th Army, is to be transferred to the REICHENAU Army together with 2nd Motorized Div. Thus 2 chances for victory will be created.
If pincer movement has no success, 10th Army will open way for 12th Army, bringing strong forces into the heart of the country. If both operations are successful, this means the end of Cz. In place of the two motorized divisions it is preferable to mobilize two further divisions which are to be brought up in trains and buses. For the 10th Army the turn Northeast toward PRAGUE may become necessary.

General Oberst v. BRAUCHITSCH: Employment of motorized divisions was based on the difficult rail situation in Austria and the difficulties in getting other divs. (ready to march) into the area at the right time. In the West vehicles will have to leave on the 20th of Sept., if X-Day remains as planned. Workers leave on the 23rd, by relays. Specialist workers remain according to decision by Army Command 2.



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H1166-0196



ITEM 19.

The Fuhrer: Doesn't see why workers have to return home as early as X-11. Other workers and people are also on the way on mobilization day. Also the RR cars, they will stand around unnecessarily later on.

General Keitel: Workers are not under the jurisdiction of district commands (Bezirks Kdos.) in the West. Trains must be assembled.

V. Brauchitsch: 235,000 men RAD (Labour Service) will be drafted. 96 Construction Bns will be distributed (also in the east). 40,000 trained laborers stay in the West.

Fuhrer: Trained men should be distributed among newly formed divisions on 2nd line.

BRAUCHITSCH: Will be investigated. Implies change of mobilization orders if war orders already in the hands of the people.

General Construction Inspector Dr. Todt(late brought into the conference): Delays in unloading of material through slow changeover in timetable of RRs only from 15 September. Transports must be in their appointed positions by X minus 11. Air zone to take 2nd place to the Infantry zone. Build battery positions.

Certified

/s/ SCHMUNDT

Major on Gen. Staff



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H1166-0197



ITEM 20

Schm (initialled by Schmundt)

Nuremberg, 10 September 1938

Stamp
Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer Reich Chancellor
Received 19 September 1938

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

TOP SECRET

1). The whole RAD organization comes under the command of the Supreme Command of the Army effective 15 September.

2). The Chief of OKW decides on the First commitments of this organization in conjunction with the Reichs Labor Leader (Reichsarbeitsfuehrer) and on assignments from time to time to the Supreme Commands of the Navy, Army and Air Force. Where questions arise with regard to competency he will make a final decision in accordance with my instructions.

3). For the time being this order is to be made known only to the departments and personnel immediately concerned.

(signed) ADOLF HITLER

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2038/38 Most Secret WFA/L IIc

T 9.9

Distribution:

C-in-C of the Army
Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C of the Air Force
C-in-C of the Navy
Reichsminister of the Interior
for the attention of Ministerial Director Dr. Danchwerts
Head of Reich Labor Service through Adwin Office (VOA)

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H1166-0198



ITEM 21

Berlin, 14 September 1938

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2044/38 Most Secret WFA/L IIc

12 Copies

Stamp
Office of the Adjutant of the Armed Forces attached to the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor
Received 19 Sept. 1938
Reg. No. 198/35
Despatched Schm
Clerk (initialled by Schmundt)

SUBJECT: Employment of Reich Labor Service for Manoeuvres with Wehrmacht.

I. Effective 15 September the following units will be under command of the C-in-C of the Army

1). The R.D forces of the light road construction battalions.

2). Those parent units of construction troops which are to be formed from personnel from 2 Gau Commands, 21 R.D Group Commands, and 91 R.D Battalions of Wehrkreis. H.Qs VII, IX and XIII, and set up at Army Group H.Q. 2 (Heeresgruppenkommando) for the purpose of carrying out exercises within the areas of Wehrkreis H.Qs V and XII.

3). a). The staff of Labor Gau W (Arbeitsgaustab) and the section and group staffs of the R.D employed on the construction of the Western fortifications and also R.D Battalions with the exception of those branches of the R.D attached to the Reich Minister for Air and the C-in-C of the Air Force (compare Section 8).

b). Labor Gaus XXI, XXIV, XXV, XXVI, XXVII, and XXXII come under the Supreme Command of the Army only in matters affecting the defence of the country. Those R.D units from these Labor Gaus employed at the moment for purposes of the Country's Kultur etc. will retain these tasks for the time being. Labor Service for Girls (AMJ) is excepted from coming under the control of the Supreme Command of the Army.

c). It must be borne in mind, when allotting military tasks to those sections of the R.D named in a). and b). above, that in accordance with Appendix 7 to the Army Mobilization Plan for Deputy Gau Commands, Deputy Group Commands and Guard Units will remain with the RAD if and when mobilization takes place.

4). The C-in-C of the Army and Reichs Labor Leader are requested to discuss all details under 1. and 3 direct.

II). 5). Light road construction battalions are training-units of the Army. Their members are regarded as having been drafted into the Armed Forces for manoeuvre purposes and are soldiers.

6). The members of remaining formations as per 2 and 3 who have been taken exclusively from the R.D will remain R.D leaders or men until mobilization.

But it is possible that they will have to be attached to the Army for administration or that the army must furnish money if difficulties are encountered in prompt payment of the men.

The C-in-C of the Army and the Reich Labor Leader are requested to settle details by direct agreement.

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H1166-0199



ITEM 21 (cont'd)

7). In case of mobilization the regulations laid down in Appendix 7 of the plan for the mobilization of the army come into effect automatically and apply also to those exercise formations for which there have up to now been restrictive regulations with regard to their coming fully under the command of the Army.

III). 8). These R.D staffs and Battalions made over to the Luftwaffe, in the Lines area will be under command of the Reich Minister for Air and the C-in-C of the Air Force beginning September 15. The same regulations apply in essence to them.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

By Order

Signed Keitel

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H1166-0200



ITEM 22

MOST SECRET

Berlin, 16 September 1938

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
WFA No. 194/38 Most Secret S.O. Only L Ia

7 Copies
5th Copy

19.9.38
Schm

S.O. Only

Access only through Officer

Subject: Preparations on part of Reichsbahn etc.

The Reichsbahn must provide trains of empty trucks in great numbers by September 28 for the carrying out of mobilization exercises. This task now takes precedence over all others.

Therefore the train-loads for the LIMES-job will have to be cut down after September 17 and those goods loaded previous to this date unloaded by September 20.

The Supreme Command of the Army (5th Division of the Army General Staff) must issue further orders after consultation with the authorities concerned.

However, in accordance with the Fuehrer's directive, every effort should be made to continue to supply the materials in as large quantities as feasible even after 20th September 1938, and this for reasons of camouflage as well as in order to continue the important work on the Limes.

Reports should be submitted on what can be done in this direction.

Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

signed Keitel

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Major Schmundt

5



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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388-PS
(cont'd)

H1166-0201

ITEM 24

Berlin, September 16, 1939

MOST SECRET

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T 9.9

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2120/38 Most Secret WFA/ L IIc

Stamp
Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
Rec. 19th Sept. 1938,
Enclosures
Reg. No. 199138
Despatched
Clerk

Schm
(initialled by Schmundt)

Subject: Employment of the Reich Labor Service (RAD)

1). The following RAD forces will receive military training; in accordance with the instructions of the C-in-C of the Army:

| | |
|---|---|
| From the area of the IInd Army Korps (AKs) | 7 Battalions |
| IIIrd | 2 Battalions |
| IVth | 31 Battalions |
| Vth | 1 Battalion |
| VIth | 78 Battalions |
| VIIth | 1 Battalion |
| IXth | 65 Battalions |
| Xth | 84 Battalions |
| XIth | 33 Battalions |

For the time being these battalions are still part of the RAD in matters regarding personnel, administration, and discipline.

2). The C-in-C of the Army and Reich Labor Leader are requested to settle all details by direct agreement.

For the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

By Order

Jodl

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H1166-0202



ITEM 25

(Handwritten note) MOST SECRET S. O. ONLY

LAST NIGHT CONFERENCE TOOK PLACE BETWEEN FUHRER AND OBERSTLEUTNANT KOECHLING. DURATION OF CONFERENCE 7 MINUTES. LT. COL KOECHLING REMAINS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE TO OKW. HE WILL BE ASSIGNED TO KONRAD HEITLEIN IN AN ADVISORY CAPACITY. HE RECEIVED FAR-REACHING MILITARY PLENARY POWERS FROM THE FUHRER. THE SUDETEN GERMAN FREE CORPS REMAINS RESPONSIBLE TO KONRAD HEINLEIN ALONE. PURPOSE: PROTECTION OF THE SUDETEN GERMANS AND MAINTENANCE OF DISTURBANCES AND CLASHES. THE FREE CORPS WILL BE ESTABLISHED IN GERMANY. ARMAMENT ONLY WITH AUSTRIAN WEAPONS. ACTIVITIES OF FREE CORPS TO BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

(Pencil Note) 1045, 18 Sept 38
radioed to Capt.
Engel, Berlin.



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H1166-0203



ITEM 26

(Handwritten note) MOST SECRET S. O. ONLY

(In ink)
18.9
38
1030
vb

GERMAN 2nd ARMY -- COSEL - 7 Inf. Div's, 1 Armd Div, 1 Inf Div on trucks, 1 Light Div, of these the following arrive on 1st X day: Two-thirds of one Inf Div, 1 Armd Div, and 1 Inf Div on trucks.

On 2nd X Day: one-third of one Inf Div.
On 3rd X Day: 1 Inf Div
On 4th X Day: 1 Inf Div
On 5th X Day: 2 Inf Divs from 7th day on 1 Inf Div and one light Div.

8th Army: - FREIBURG - 4 Inf Divs. The following is the timetable for arrival:
On 2nd X Day: two-thirds of one Inf Div
On 3rd X Day: one-third of one Inf Div
On 4th and 5th X-Day: One Inf Div each day.
4th Army Corps - Herrenhub, 2 Inf Divs of which one will arrive on the 1st day, the other on the 3rd day.

10th Army:- SCHNANDORF - 3 Inf Div's, 1 Armd Div, 1 Light Div, 3 Mot Inf Divs. They will arrive as follows:
On 1st X Day: 1 Inf Div and 1 Armd Div. 1 Light Div, 3 Mot Inf Divs.
On 2nd X Day: 1 Inf Div., 1 Mot Inf Div.
On 4th X Day: 1 Inf Div.

12th Army:- PASSAU -- 7 Inf Div's, 1 Mountain Div, 1 Inf Div on trucks, Regt. They arrive as follows:
On 1st X Day: 1 Inf Div, 1 Mountain Div.
On 2nd X-Day: 2 Inf Div, 1 Inf Div on trucks
On 4th X Day: 2 Inf Div's.
On 7th X Day: 1 Inf Div.
On 8th X Day: 1 Inf Div.

14th Army: - VIENNA - 1 Inf Div, 2 Mountain Div's, 1 Armd Div, 1 Light Div, 1 Mot Inf Div. N N Mot (?) They will arrive as follows:
On 1st X Day: one-third of one Inf Div, 1 Armd Div, 1 Mot. Div.
On 2nd X Day: 2/3 of one Inf Div, 1 Light Div.
On 3rd X Day: 2 Mountain Divs.

END

Reich War Ministry / Naval Communication Service

MOST SECRET 18.9

Renewed attention is called to strictest observance of secrecy regarding following message. Noted. Message begins -
(There follows a repetition of the above telegram in its exact form.)

Any questions?



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H1166-0204



ITEM 27

Army Appointments Held

| | |
|---|---|
| Army Group Command: | C-in-C: Gen. of Inf Adam<br>CofS : Gen. of Inf Wietersheim<br>G-3 : Lt. Co. Muller |
| 1st Army HQ: | C-in-C: Ge. of Arty Beck<br>CofS : Maj. Gen. v. Apell<br>G-3 : Col. v. Greiffenberg |
| 2nd Army HQ: | C-in-C: Gen. v. Rundstedt<br>CofS : BrigGen v. Salmuth<br>G-3 : Lt.Col.Hasse |
| 3rd Army HQ: | C-in-C: Ge.Arty v. Kuechler<br>CofS : Brig.Gen.Hollidt<br>G-3 : Lt.Col.Wagner |
| 4th Army HQ: | C-in-C: Gen. (for special duties) v. Hamerstein<br>CofS : Maj.Gen. Viebahn<br>G-3 : Lieut.Col. Metz |
| 6th Army HQ: | C-in-C: Gen. of Inf Liebmann<br>CofS : Brig. Gen. v. Sodenstern<br>G-3 : Col. Duvert |
| 7th Army HQ: | C-in-C: Gen. of Inf (for special duties) Baron Zeutter v. Lotzen<br>CofS : Brig. Gen. Modl<br>G-3 : Col. v. Witzleben |
| 8th Army HQ: | C-in-C: Gen. v. Bock<br>CofS : Brig. Gen. Felber<br>G-3 : Col. Hauffe |
| 10th Army HQ: | C-in-C: Gen. of Arty v. Reichenau<br>CofS : Brig. Gen. Bernard<br>G-3 : Col. Dostler |
| 12th Army HQ: | C-in-C: Gen. Ritter (for special duties) v. Leeb<br>CofS : Maj Gen. v. Lewinsky, known as v. Manstein<br>G-3 : Lt. Col. Blumentritt |
| 14th Army HQ: | C-in-C: Gen. of Inf List<br>CofS : Maj Gen. Ruoff<br>G-3 : Col. Wohler |



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H1166-0205



ITEM 29

Chief, OKW

Berlin, 21 Sept 1938

If the Czech Government accepts terms:

a. Cession of Sudeten German territory

b. Plebiscite in Czech-German territories,

The following military measures are to be considered:

1. The withdrawal by the Czechs from this territory of troops, police and Gendarmerie and other military units.
2. The immediate surrender of arms in these territories.
3. The immediate surrender of all fortifications in the areas with all arms and equipment.
4. The immediate evacuation of fortifications by the military outside the above territories.
5. The withdrawal of all military power behind a security line, which will include the fortifications under (4).
6. The right of the German Wehrmacht to use all public transportation and communications, especially the railroads, for military purposes.
7. The right to fly over the above territories and to maintain Air security up to the security line.
8. The occupation of territories to be ceded including the adjoining railroad junctions, communications installations, towns, airfields, etc. inland beyond the last fortification line.
9. Pacification and security of the Plebiscite Areas by:
   a. German Police (originally)
   b. International Police (later for plebiscite)
10. Demobilization of the entire Czech armed forces in the remaining area of the country, discharge of all reserves, etc.
11. Immediate discharge of all Sudeten-Germans in the armed forces from the whole of Czechoslovakia to be sent home into Sudeten-Germany.
12. Closing down of entire armament industry until after the end of all negotiations.



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H1166-0206



ITEM 29

13. a. Prohibition of any new fortifications and field fortifications opposite the security line.

b. Destruction of all existing fortifications which are situated beyond the future German borders.

14. Demand further cession of territory on military grounds, namely the Pressburg bridgehead, the area northwest of Pilsen, the Eger sector west of the Elbe to Laun.

15. Security line must be 25 km from the territory being ceded to Germany or the territory being put to the vote. (See number 5).

16. Cessation, immediately, of all military Intelligence work against Germany. Violation will be considered breach of neutrality.

17. Immediate pardon and release of all Germans and Sudeten-Germans, convicted of espionage.

18. Transfer of all Czech Air Force personnel to their peace time garrisons and prohibiting of all military flying operations.

19. Prohibition of destruction or sabotage of any military installations, including ground installations of the Air Force, in the territories to be ceded.

20. The closing down and handing over to the German armed forces of all radio transmitters of a military, official or private nature in the areas to be ceded.

21. The handing over of all Railroad networks including rolling stock, undamaged.

22. The handing over of all Public Utilities (power houses, gas works, etc.) undamaged.

23. No materials of any kind to be transferred (such as raw materials, provisions, livestock, etc.)

24. Prohibition of import of war equipment of any kind.

25. Demobilization of Danube patrol and security vessels.



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H1166-0207



ITEM 30

Bayreuth 134

Pencil Note: Written by Schmundt: Not sent off. Sehm

HEADQUARTERS OF THE SUDETEN-GERMAN FREE CORPS

Herr Benesch has dissolved the Sudeten-German Party and believes that he will thus be able to destroy the unity of the Sudeten-German radical group and to deal the death blow to the Sudeten-Germans. Konrad Henlein knew the answer to this. He issued a call on 17.9.38 for the formation of a Sudeten-German Free Corps. Within a few hours, thousands of Sudeten-Germans had already rallied to the colors all along the border. Thousands who were burning to fight for their tortured homeland were forced, to their great disappointment, to remain at their places of work, because it was impossible, in such a short period of time, to induct, equip and arm the masses of enthusiastic volunteers. For even in the first few hours after the appeal, (probably the first instance in the History of the Free Corps) shock troops of the Free Corps began, in extremely daring operations, to secure the escape of their countrymen who had been hounded out of their homeland by their torturers.

Since 19 Sept. - in more than 300 missions - the Free Corps has executed its task with an amazing spirit of attack (defense)* and with a willingness often reaching a degree of unqualified self-sacrifice. The result of the first phase of its activities; more than 1500 prisoners, 25 MG's and a large amount of other weapons and equipment, aside from serious losses in dead and wounded suffered by the enemy. (The Czech Terrorists)*

Thousands of members of the Sudeten-German Free Corps stand shoulder to shoulder on the frontiers of Germany. They are inspired by but one desire: The freedom of the homeland within Adolph Hitler's Greater Germany.

For Konrad Henlein

The Chief of Staff

*The superimposed corrections represent actual ink corrections on the original manuscript.



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H1166-0208

Adj to the Fuhrer

(Note in pencil)

28/7
Schm.

Item 31

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces — Berlin 27.9.1938

MOST SECRET — 1920 hours.

WFA/L No. 2305/38 Most Secret II — 45 copies
16th copy

The Fuhrer has approved the mobilization without warning of the five regular west divisions (26th, 34th, 36th, 32, and 35th). The Fuhrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has expressly reserved the right to issue the order for employment in the fortification zone and the evacuation of this zone by workers of the TODT organization.

It is left to the OKH -- to assemble as far as possible first of all the sections ready to march and subsequently the remaining sections of the divisions in marshalling areas behind the western fortifications.

CHIEF OF THE SUPREME COMMAND
OF THE ARMED FORCES.

Signed. Keitel

Distribution: II.

C 000473



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H1166-0209

Stamp:
Office of the Armed Forces
Adjutant attached
To the Führer and
Reich Chancellor
Recd. 3 Oct 1938
Reg. No. 259/38 Most Secret

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388 PS
cont.

pencil note: Adjutant to the Fuehrer

Item 32

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2288/38 Most Secret WFA/L II

Berlin 27 Sept 1938

Subject: Mobilization Measures;

Most Secret

To : The Deputy Führer via Administrative Offices (J)
The Reichsfuhrer SS and Chief of German Police Express
attn: S.S. Oberführer. 47 copies
18th copy

As a result of the political situation the Führer and Chancellor has ordered mobilization measures for the Armed Forces, without the political situation being aggravated by issuing the mobilization (X) order or corresponding code-words.

Within the framework of these mobilization measures it is necessary for the Armed Forces authorities to issue demands to the various Party authorities and their organisations, which are connected with the previous issuing of the Mobilization order, the advance measures or special code names.

The special situation makes it necessary, that these demands be met (even if the code word has not been previously issued) immediately and without being referred to higher authorities.

OKW requests that subordinate offices be given immediate instructions to this effect so that the mobilization of the Armed Forces can be carried out according to plan.

Following are several examples of cases where previous mobilization measures were delayed and a recurrence of which might seriously endanger the mobilization of the Armed Forces:

1) The SA in Wehrkreis XI refused to give up equipment requisitioned by the Armed Forces in accordance with mobilization regulations, because mobilization has not yet taken place.

2) Billets which were prepared for troops under mobilization regulations were not evacuated because mobilization has not taken place. (NSKK-School KREISCHWITZ - SILESIA).

3) Police authorities refused to give up Police Radio Stations for the A/C reporting network, although the A/C reporting service had already been called up.

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces further requests that all measures not provided for in the plans which are undertaken by Party Organisations or Police units as a result of the political situation, be reported <u>in every case</u> and <u>in plenty of time</u> to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Only then can it be guaranteed that these measures can be carried out in practice.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.

KEITEL

Further:
Distribution II



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H1166-0210



28.9.38

Item 33

MOST SECRET

MEMORANDUM

At 1300 September 27 the Fuhrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces ordered the movement of the assault units from their exercise areas to their jumping-off points.

The assault units (about 21 reinforced regiments, or 7 divisions,) must be ready to begin the action against "Grün" on September 30, the decision having been made one day previously by 1200 noon.

This order was conveyed to General Keitel at 1320 through Major Schmundt. (pencil note by Schmundt)



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H1166-0211



Stamp: Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant initialed Schm.
Attached to the Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor

Recd: 3 October 1938

Reg. No.: 261/38 Most Secret

Item 34

Adj. to the Führer

Berlin, 28 Sept 38

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
No. 2310/38 Most Secret L I a

45 copies
16th copy.

MOST SECRET

To define spheres of responsibility on the Cz-German frontier, the following orders are issued:

Through mobilization of the frontier guard (Grenzwacht) responsibility has shifted entirely onto the army, that is onto the competent general staff corps. All the units operating on the frontier are subordinate to them.

No new units of police, customs or party may be shifted into the immediate frontier area without the knowledge of the army headquarters concerned, nor may units already in the area be reinforced without such knowledge. In addition no one may cross the frontier without the knowledge of the army headquarters.

For the Henlein Free Corps and units subordinate to this the principle remains valid, that they receive instructions direct from the Fuhrer and that they carry out their operations only in conjunction with the competent general staff corps. The advance units of the Free Corps will have to report to the local commander of the frontier guard immediately before crossing the frontier.

Those units remaining forward of the frontier should -- in their own interests -- get into communication with the frontier guard as often as possible.

As soon as the army crosses the Cz border the Henlein Free Corps will be subordinate to the OKH. Thus it will be expedient to assign a sector to the Free Corps even now which can be fitted into the scheme of army boundaries later.

H1166-0212



The frontier guard has orders only to protect the German frontier, and not to take part in operations on the other side of the border. Any support to the Free Corps by the frontier guards anywhere over the frontier is prohibited.

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Keitel

Distribution II
plus:
Reich Minister of the Interior
Reich Finance Minister
Deputy of the Fuhrer
S.A. Hqs.
Reichsführer SS
Reich Labour Service

Volunteer Corps Henlein (Oberstlt Köchling)

(The following 2 pages are an exact duplicate: Copy 33



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H1166-0213



Stamp: Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant
Attached to the Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor

Recd: 3 October 1938 (pencil noted: Adjutant to the Fuehrer)

Reg. No: 262/38 Most Secret

Item 35 Berlin, Sept 28, 1938

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2315/38 Most Secret WFA/L II

MOST SECRET.

Re: Advance Measures Pertaining to Mobilization Plan (Army) Special Appendix 5

Following advance measures may be carried out:
On the Franco-German border (WEHRKREIS V and XII)

1. Special Group Siegfried, Kz9148 -- preparation of organization for the reception of refugees.

2. Special Group Siegfried, Kz9145 -- Preparation of employment of district offices and staffs of collecting areas for the discharging of reservists.

Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces

(Signed) Keitel

Distribution II



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H1166-0214

Stamp: Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant
Attached to the Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor

Recd: 3 Oct. 1938 pencil note: Adjutant to the Fuehrer

Reg. No: 260/38 Secret Schm.

Item 36

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Berlin, Sept 28, 1938
No. 2335/38 Most Secret WFA/L II

45 copies
16th copy

Subject: 4 SS-Totenkopf Batallions subordinate to the C in C Army.

To : Reichsfuhrer SS and Chief of the German Police. MOST SECRET
(SS Central Office) (36 copies)

By order of the Supreme Command of the armed forces the following Bn's of the SS Deaths Head organization will be under the command of the C in C Army with immediate effect.

II and III Bn. of the 2nd SS-Totenkopf Regiment Brandenburg at present in Brieg (Upper Silesia)

I and II Bn. of the 3rd SS-Totenkopf Regiment Thuringia at present in Radebeul and Kotzenbroda near Dresden.

C in C Army is requested to deploy these Bn's for the West, (Upper Rhine) according to the Fuhrer's instructions.

These SS-Totenkopf units now operating in the Asch promontory (I and II Bn of Oberbayern Regiment) will come under the C in C Army only when they return to German Reich territory, or when the Army crosses the German-Cz. frontier.

It is requested that all further arrangements be made between C in C Army and Reichsfuhrer-SS. (SS Central Office)

For the Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.

Jodl

Further:

Distribution II



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H1166-0215



L II b

Item 37

28.9.38.

MEMORANDUM

SA-General Herzog answers question of Adjutant's Office, Chief of Staff of the SA, 1600:

Reichsfuhrer SS, on the 26th of Sept., issued order to Chief of Staff of Sudeten German Free Corps Ref. Diary 38/Most Secret according to which the Volunteer Corps would come under the command of the Reichsfuhrer SS in case of German invasion of the Sudeten German territory.

The order was signed by Berger, SS-Colonel.

J. (initialled by Jodl)



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H1166-0216

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388-PS
(Cont'd)

ITEM 38

Stamp = as usual
Recd 3 Oct 1938
Req No. 263/38 MOST SECRET

Adjutant to the Führer

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2385/38. Most Secret. L I a

Berlin 30.9.38
1600 hrs

12o Copies
16th copy

MOST SECRET

Subject: Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces No. 2371/38 Most Secret. OKW/WFA L I a dated 30.9.38

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 2 TO DIRECTIVE NO I.

1. Attachment of Henlein Free Corps:

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has just ordered that the Henlein Free Corps in its present composition be placed under command of Reichsführer-SS and the Chief of German Police.

It is therefore at the immediate disposal of OKH as field unit for the invasion, but is to be later drawn in like the rest of the police forces for police duties in agreement with the Reichsführer SS.

The instructions OKW No. 2310/38 Most Secret of the 28th Sept (last paragraph but one) and OKW No. 2371/38 Most Secret of Sept 30 are amended accordingly.

2. Rate of Exchange for the Cz.Krone:

The following rate of exchange will apply for all translations and payments: 100 Cz.Kronen = 10.00 Marks (1 Cz.Krone = 10 Rpfg)

THE CHIEF OF THE SUPREME COMMAND
OF THE ARMED FORCES

Distribution III
and Special Distribution
(including Henlein Volunteer Corps and Reichsführer SS through OKW/L II )

Keitel



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H1166-0217



ITEM 39

Stamp:
Recd 3 Oct 1938
Req No 265/38 Most Secret

Adj. to the Fuhrer

Berlin, 30 Sept 1938

The fuhrer and Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces

OKW No. 2367/38 Most Secret
WFA/L I A

Most Secret
60 copies
16th copy

DIRECTIVE #1

Subject: Occupation of territory separated from Czechoslovakia.

1. The sectors separated from Cz will be occupied by the Armed Forces as follows:

The sector marked I to be occupied on the 1st and 2nd of Oct, the sector marked II on Oct 2 and 3rd, the sector marked III on Oct. 3, 4 and 5, the sector marked IV on Oct. 6 and 7th. The remaining area up to Oct 10.

The extent of the area I-IV is shown on the attached map. The extent of the remaining areas will be announced later.

2. The Armed Forces will have the following tasks:

The present degree of mobilized preparedness is to be maintained completely, for the present also in the West, Order for the rescinding of measures taken is held over.
The entry is to be planned in such a way that it can easily be converted into operation "Grun".
The depth of the territories to be occupied daily depends on the details of the evacuation, which are being settled by the international committee.

a. Army: First of all the following units are available for the invasion:
Training Bn's.
Motorized and Armoured Units
Adolf Hitler 35 Bodyguard Regiment
I and II Bn's of SS Deaths Head Regiment (Oberbayen)
Henlein Free Corps
All combat action on the part of the Volunteer Corps must cease as from 1st October.

b. Air Force:
Those ground installations (including supply and signal installations) situated in the separated areas are to be occupied immediately and prepared for the use of our own units. Flying units can be transferred if this becomes necessary for the air defense of the territory yielded or for the possible switch to "Fall Grun", in accordance with fig. 2. Flights over territory not yet cleared for occupation by German troops must be avoided at all costs. Flak must be assigned to those objectives which cannot be protected by Flak under the command of the Army.

ITEM 39

3. Those units of the Armed Forces intended for the occupation of sector I must cross the former Czech-German frontier by 1200 noon Oct 1st.

4. Armed resistance in the area cleared for occupation must be broken. Czech soldiers and other armed personnel found within the sector are to be disarmed and taken prisoner. The boundary of the sector against the Czechs is not to be crossed under any circumstances. Hostile action against the Czechs on or beyond this boundary is to be avoided.

5. The conduct of the field units must be based on the realization that they are occupying a territory whose population, after being harrassed for years, looks upon the German Armed Forces as Liberators.

6. The German frontier guard will remain on the former German-Czech frontier, as before.

7. The securing of the boundaries of the sectors against the area still in Czech hands is sole responsibility of the army.

For the Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

KEITEL

Distribution: III



H1166-0218

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H1166-0219

IT● 40

Stamp:
Recd 3 Oct 1938
Req No 264/38 Most Secret

Adj. to the Fuhrer

Berlin, 30 Sept 1938

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
OKW No. 2371/38, Most Secret, WFA/L I a

Most Secret

Special Orders No. 1 to Directive No. 1

Subject: Occupation of territory ceded by Cz.

1. Operational Area of the Army:

The area to be newly occupied will be at first an operational area of the Army. In it the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces will have full powers and authority to delegate these powers to the C-in-C's of the armies. The Commanders exercising these full powers can publish laws, institute special courts and issue directives to offices valid for the operational area with the exception of the highest Reich authorities, the highest offices of the State of Prussia, and the executive board of the NSDAP. This authority to issue regulations has priority over regulations issued by other Superior authorities.

2. Units under Command of Army:

a. The units of the military SS and SS Totenkopf Regiment intended for the occupation of the sector remain under OKH control.

b. The Sudeten German Volunteer Corps comes under the control of OKH. The bn's of the Volunteer Corps are to be employed in the direction of their native territory wherever possible. They retain their present armament. Provisioning to be guaranteed through the army Hqs. Members of the Free Corps do not come under the military penal code. The Hqs of the Free Corps after occupation of territory III, is to be transferred from Bayreuth to Eger.

c. The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, in cooperation with Reichsfuhrer SS and at the request of Army Hqs will direct Police Forces and Gestapo forces for the support of Secret Field Police forces in the occupied areas. As required for Military Police duties, the Special Police (SdP) will be drawn in as much as possible.

3. Taking over of Military Accommodation and RR Installations:

a. All military installations, barracks and property will be turned over in the occupied Sudeten German territories by OKH in so far as they were up to now the property of the Cz. army. By OKL if they were property of the Cz. Air Force (including civil aviation.)

b. The Chief of Transport System will make arrangements with the Reich RR's regarding the taking over of rail installations.

4. Signal Communications:

a. The Army will be at liberty to use the postal communication facilities within the area to be occupied. Requirements of the Luftwaffe are to be assured through the Field Signal Units under the command of the OKH attached to the Army Hqs. Depending on the situation, the most important communication installations are to be put into operation as soon as possible, secured and screened against Cz.

H1166-0220

ITEM 40

Special emphasis must be laid on the effective silencing and confiscation of all transmitting installations. Official, private and permanent radio installations of the Cz army are to be secured through OKH, those of the Cz Air Force through OKL.

5. Customs Frontier Guard

After the crossing of the Reich frontier by the troops, the securing of the old frontier is the responsibility of the Customs Frontier Guard (Zollgrenzschutz); the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces will put the necessary personnel from the Frontier Guard at their disposal.

The customs regulation of the forward line of the area to be occupied, will be determined by the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces in conjunction with the Inspector General of Customs. Liaison officials are still at the disposal of Corps Headquarters acc. to #13 of the regulations governing the VGAD. Shipments to Wehrmacht offices as well as members of the Wehrmacht are not subject to customs regulations.

H1166-0221



6. Application of Laws:

a. Compensation laws are to be employed on both sides of the border. Public buildings are to be used mainly for billets. Requisitioned articles do not become the property of the armed forces. Compensation for services rendered in cash (German currency)

b. Special regulations will be issued with regard to the introduction of the German Penal Code in the occupied areas.

7. Mobilization Measures among Civilian Population:

Mobilization measures will not be taken among civilian personnel. But all authorities have been asked to carry out quickly demands made by armed force authorities.

The following measures are especially requested in order to guarantee the tasks of the armed forces.

a. Reichs Postal Ministry

Securing of direct tele-communications in the areas BRESLAU, DRESDEN, WÜRZBURG, NURNBERG, MUNCHEN, VIENNA, BERLIN. Establishing of Special Emergency networks. Furnishing of items to the armed forces to whatever degree they may be required. (Compare, Mobilization Book (Z) Section IX No. 3501, 3503, 3532). Fulfilling staff requirements as regards the restoring of signal networks in occupied areas.

b. Ministry of Propoganda:

Dispatch of commissioners to the chiefs of civil administration in the operational area. Prohibition of the publication of military news of any kind in the press (compare Mobilization Book (Z) Part V No. 1758 - and 1600)

8. Organisations of the Party:

The Fuhrer's Deputy has been asked to inform the party organisations that OKH must furnish permission if party units are to be brought into the Sudeten area.

9. Economic Directives:

Any confiscation of values or balances at credit institutions (Kredit instituten) in the Sudeten German area is prohibited. Requisitioning is also prohibited. Suppling of the armed forces with food, forage and fuel is to be carried out from the Reich. The following rate of exchange applies for all transactions and payments: 100 cz. krones=9,00 RM (1 Cz. Kr = 9 Rpfg) (the underlined crossed out!)

(pencil note: will be published this afternoon)

10. Payment of the armed forces

For the parts of the armed forces operating, pay as applicable in accordance with the peacetime regulations for large-scale maneuvers will go into effect after leaving garrisons or assembly areas. All additional costs arising through the operation are to be deleted under chapter VIII E 20 (OKW Treasury)

11. Administrative Directives:

The army hqs will administer the occupied areas on their own responsibility. The C D Z with their special staffs are at their disposal in an advisory capacity (compare H. Dv. 90. No. 20 etc.)

H1166-0222



Item 40

12. Supply Installations:

For the maintenance and putting into operation of supply installations OKW Admin.Staff will attach the following to the Army/H.Q.'s

| Army H.Q. | Tech Hq | To | App | Time of Arrival |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12 | 13 | LANDAU/ISAR | 10.1 | 2000 |
| 10 | 4 | PLAUEN | 10.2 | 2000 |
| 8 | 3 | GORLITZ | 10.1 | 2000 |
| 2 | 8 | LAMSDORF(SW/OPPELN) | 10.5 | 2000 |

13. Propaganda Companies:

Propaganda companies are to be used. Amendments as regards attachment made necessary through the peaceful entry will be conveyed verbally.

Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces

KEITEL

DISTRIBUTION: III
and Special Distribution

H1166-0223



Stamp: Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuhrer and Reichs Chancellor

pencil note: Adjutant to the Fuhrer

Recd: 3 Oct. 1938

Req.No: 266/38 Most Secret

Item 41

Berlin 30.9.38

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
WFA/L No. 2150/38 Most Secret IV a.

200 copies
153rd copy

MOST SECRET

Subject: OCCUPATION OF SUDETEN-GERMAN TERRITORY

1. The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor has ordered that Sections of the Armed Forces march into the Sudeten-German territory, beginning 1 October, 1938. There will be no general mobilization of the Armed Forces (OR case "X"). Units already mobilized, will, for the timebeing, remain at their present posts.

2. Coincident with the crossing of the Reich frontier, the Commander in Chief of the Army will assume full powers in the territory to be occupied together with authority to transfer this power to the C's in C of the Armies.

The Commander in Chief can, exercise these powers, and pass laws, install special courts, and give directives to the appropriate departments and offices functioning in the area of operations, valid for the operational area with the exception of the highest Reich authorities or officers of the State of Prussia and the Executive Board of the NSDAP. In all other cases, the right of issuing directives has priority over directives from higher superior authorities. The area of operations will be extended forward according to the area to be occupied. The shifting of the rear frontier of the operational area will be ordered separately.

3. Mobilization measures will not be enforced in the civil sphere. However, all authorities are requested to carry out immediately the demands of the armed force authorities. To guarantee completion of the tasks of the armed forces the following measures are especially desired:

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H1166-0224



Item 41

a. Reich Postal Ministry

Securing of direct tele-communications in the districts of the Communications Hqs, Breslau, Dresden, Wuerzburg, Nuernberg, Muenchen, Vienna and Berlin.

Establishing of Special Communications networks. Furnishing of equipment to armed forces in whatever degree may be required (see Mob. Book (Z) Part IX, No. 3501-03-32).

Furthermore it is requested that staff requirements as regards restoring communication networks in the occupied area, be met.

b. Propaganda Ministry:

Dispatch of commissioners to the Chiefs of Civil on the administration operational area. Prohibition of the publication of military news of any kind in the press. (Compare Mob Book (Z) part V, 1758 & 1600)

c. Reichsbank:

Issue of Mobilization money supplies without fiduciary monetary tender is authorized. (Compare Mob Book (Z) part XVIII, Nr 8031)

4. Application of Laws:

a. There will be a special directive as to the introduction of the German Criminal Code into the occupied territory.

b. The Army Compensation Law (Wehrleistungsgesetz) will be in force on both sides of the frontier. Public buildings will be used as billets primarily. Requisitioned articles will not become property of the armed forces. Payment for services rendered will be made in cash (German currency)

5. Economic Directives:

Any confiscation of valuables or balances at Credit Institutions (Kredit Instituten) is prohibited in the Sudeten-German area. Requisitioning is also prohibited. Supplies of food, forage and fuel for the armed forces will be drawn from the Reich. The following rate of exchange is effective for all transactions and payments:

100 Czech kronen - 10.00 RM (1 Czech krone -- 10 Pfg)

H1166-0225

Item [redacted]

6. Payment of the Armed Forces:

For parts of the armed forces operating, pay as applicable in accordance with the peace-time regulations for large-scale maneuvers, effective from time of dparture from areas or garrisons.

7. Customs Frontier Guard:

After the crossing of the Reich Frontier by the troops, the security of the old frontier will be taken over by the Customs-Frontier Guard at whose disposal the supreme commander of the armed forces will put the necessary personnel.

The supreme command of the armed forces will arrange the guarding of the front lines of the area to be occupied (as to collection of duties) with the Inspector General of Customs. The Liaison officials according to Nr. 15 of the regulations pertaining to the VGAD will continue to be at the disposal of the Corps Hqs.

Shipments to armed forces authorities as well as members of the armed forces are not subject to customs inspection.

8. Administrative Directives:

The armed Hqs will administer the occupied areas on their own responsibilities. The OdZ with their staff of experts are at their disposal in an advisory capacity (see H. Dv 90, Nr. 20 etc.). In all matters of a police nature, the Reichsfuehrer SS is to be consulted.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces

(signed) Keitel

Distribution: Overleaf

H1166-0226



ITEM 41

DISTRIBUTION

| | |
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H1166-0227

IT[redacted] 41

| | |
|---|---|
| Reich Labour Minister<br>for the attention of Min. Rat. Schroeder | 21st copy |
| Directorate of the Reichsbank<br>for the attention of the Reichsbank dir.<br>Dr. Müller | 22nd copy |
| Reich Conservator of Forests<br>for the attention of Oberlandforstmeister<br>Hausmann | 23rd copy |
| Reich Office for long range regional planning<br>(Raunoreburg) for the attention of Reg. Rat.<br>Dr. Schepers | 24th copy |
| President of the Secret Cabinet Council<br>Reich Minister Freiherr von Neurath | 25th copy |
| Reich Minister Frank<br>for the attention of Oberstaatsanwalt Dr. Bühler | 26th copy |
| Head of Reich Labour Service<br>for the attention of Oberarbeitsfuhrer Richter | 27th copy |
| OKH (2nd Div. Army General Staff) (80X) | 28th - 107th copy |
| Reich Minister for Air and C.-in-C Air Force<br>(2nd Div. Air Force General Staff) (30X) | 108th - 137th copy |
| OKM (A II) (15 x | 138th - 152nd copy |
| Adjutant to the Führer | 153rd copy |
| OKW: Chief of OKW | 154th copy |
| WZ | 155th copy |
| Ansl/Abwehr<br>(with NA for Foreign Abwehr I, II & III) (5 X) | 156th - 160th copy |
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| Armed Forces Communications (WNV) (2X) | 169th - 170th copy |
| L<br>(Chief, Ia, Ib, Ic, II, IVa, IVb, IVc, IVd, K) | 171st - 180th copy |
| WH | 181st copy |
| WR | 182nd copy |
| Special Staff W | 183rd copy |
| Stock kept at LIV | 184th - 200th copy |



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H1166-0228

TRANSLATION OF DOC. NO. 388 PS
cont.

Item 42

200 copies
153rd copy

Berlin, 30.9.38

(STAMP-)
Office of the Armed Forces
Adjutant attached to the
Führer & Reich Chancellor
Rec. 3 Oct 1938

Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces
L. No. 2385/38 Most Secret IVA

Enclosures: Reg.No. 267138
Dispatched -
Clerk

Subject: Occupation of the
Sudeten-German area.

1. By order of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, the occupation of the Sudeten-German areas by the Armed Forces will be executed in a manner which will allow a changeover to military operations at any time.

   For the advance of the troops to coincide with the withdrawal of the Czechs, particularly in the fortified zones, and on account of the possibility of local resistance, it is necessary for the march in to be arranged in a way suited to the conduct of military operations.

2. The military occupation also necessitates the settling of economic conditions in the Sudeten-German area. Assimilation can only be brought about gradually. For this transition period the rate of exchange has been fixed at 100 Czech crowns to 10.00 RM. so as to enable the retail trade to function. It is a pre-condition of this temporary settlement, however, that, until a final settlement is made with regard to economics and currency, and in order to avoid placing the Sudeten-German population at a disadvantage, only those things are bought in the open market which come in the category of goods which fill the immediate needs of life. Any exploitation of the present economic situation is a serious offense.

3. For the above stated reasons, travel into the Sudetenland from the old Reich will be confined to those officials and authorities who have been given specific tasks in the Sudeten-German area. It is requested that all civil authorities and all organizations of the Party be instructed without delay that it is essential to obtain the previous approval of the military authorities charged with the exercise of executive power (C-in-C of the Army, Army HQ) for the transfer of departments and units of any kind into the Sudeten-German area which is under military authorities.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces

Keitel

(Distribution for Item 42 identical to that of Item 41)

Item 43 is handwritten notes too illegible to translate.



223

TRANSLATION OF DOC. NO. 388 PS
cont.

Item 44

Berlin, 1st October 1938

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2400/38 Most Secret LIa

150 copies
18th copy

H1166-0229

Top Secret

(Stamp-)

Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Führer & Reich Chancellor.
Rec. Oct.3rd 1938, Encl.2-30
Reg.No. 268338 Secret
Dispatched -
Check -

MOST SECRET

SPECIAL ORDERS NO.3 to DIRECTIVE No.1

Parts of the Army Employed.

In addition to the Sections of the Army whose employment has been approved (See Directive 1, Section 2a), the following units will also be used for the occupation:

Command (Generalkommando) III

10th Inf Regiment (4th Inf Div)

The Chief of Supreme Command of the Arm
By direction
Jodl

Distribution: III
and special distribution

Item 45

Army Teleprint Network

| | Received from | HDZG | Pass to | Date | Time | Re.No. | by |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Teleprint Office Notes | | 9.10 | Dept Klimisch (?) | 9 10 | | | Schm.(?) |

by Joe (?)

Delay notes:

Telegram HBZG 12 9110 1304 Priority notes:
Tel.No. of Sender:

TO LT. COL. SCHMUNDT * FUHRER'S TRAIN * (FUHRERZUG)

1. IF THE OCCUPATION OF ZONE 5 IS CARRIED OUT TODAY ACCORDING TO PLAN AND WITHOUT INCIDENT OKW INTENDS TO DISSOLVE V.G.A.D. IN THE WEST AS FROM 10.10 AND TO BRING THE 5 SERVING DIVISIONS BACK TO THEIR HOME STATIONS...

2. ACCORDING TO TELEGRAM RECEIVED HERE POPULATION OF IGLAU VERY WORRIED AND EXCITED. COMMUNISTS THERE ARE ARMED. FOREIGN OFFICE HAS BEEN INFORMED. OKW SUGGESTS EMPLOYMENT OF ENGLISH LEGION, IF IT IS BROUGHT UP IN THIS AREA , FOR PROTECTION OF THE GERMANS FUHRER'S CONSENT REQUESTED FOR 1 AND 2 ....

signed KEITEL

(Ink Notes:-) Telephoned this from Opera House in Saarbrucken at 2100 10.9 to Capt. Deyle. Fuhrer agreed to points 1 and 2. In connection with 2: if the lives of Germans threatened, troops to march in after short warning.

SCHMUNDT
Lt.Col.



224

H1166-0230

Item 46

TRANSLATION OF DOC. 388 PS cont.

The C-in-C of the Army

Berlin W 35 October 10th, 38

Tirpitzufer 72-76
Tel.

11.10.38

1800 hours Schm.

My Fuhrer!

I have to report that the troops will reach the demarcation line as ordered, by this evening. In so far as further military operations are not required, the order for the occupation of the country which was given to me will thus have been fulfilled. The guarding of the new frontier line will be taken over by the reinforced frontier supervision service (Grenzaufsichtsdienst) in the next few days.

It is thus no longer a military necessity to combine the administration of the Sudetenland with the command of the troops of the army under the control of one person.

I therefore ask you, my Fuhrer, to relieve me with effect from October 15, 1938, of the charge assigned to me - that of exercising executive powers in Sudeten German territory.

Heil my Fuhrer,

VON BRAUCHITSCH

(Handwritten Note:) Submitted to Fuhrer 11 Nov. Agreed.

H1166-0231



Remarks of teleprint office

Army Telegraph Network

| Pass to | Date | Time | R.No. | by |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Received from HQLe 10.10 1930 | Schmundt's Dept. | 10.10 | 1940 | Schm. |

Delay notes

Item 47

Note of Priority
Tel.No. of Sender

Telegram SECRET
HBZG No. 17 1915 Schm.

TELEGRAM TO FUHRER'S TRAIN, LT.COL. SCHMUNDT

IF EVENING REPORT SHOWS THAT OCCUPATION OF ZONE FIVE HAS BEEN COMPLETED WITHOUT INCIDENT OKW INTENDS TO ORDER FURTHER DEMOBILIZATION

PRINCIPLE: 1) To SUSPEND OPERATION "GRUN" BUT MAINTAIN A SUFFICIENT STATE OF PREPAREDNESS ON PART OF ARMY AND LUFTWAFFE TO MAKE INTERVENTION POSSIBLE IF NECESSARY.

2) ALL UNITS NOT NEEDED TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE OCCUPIED AREA AND REDUCED TO PEACETIME STATUS, AS POPULATION OF OCCUPIED AREA IS HEAVILY BURDENED BY THE MASSING OF TROOPS.

3) TO DISSOLVE TRUCK REGIMENTS AS A MATTER OF URGENCY, IN THE INTERESTS OF ECONOMY.

4) IN THE WEST - GRADUAL REVERSAL OF ALL MOBILIZATION MEASURES WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE WORK ON THE LINES.

5) INTENTION OF THE C-IN-C OF THE ARMY TO RELINQUISH HIS EXECUTIVE POWERS ON 10.15

FUHRER'S CONSENT REQUESTED

OKW

Item 47

Fuhrer's decision:

1---Agreed
2--Suggestion to be made on the 13th Oct in Essen by Gen Keitel. Decision will then be reached.
3---Agreed
4---Agreed
5---Agreed

NB. Notice of 5 to be sent by 6th Division

Relayed to Lt. Colonel Leitzler at 2300, 10.11

SCHMUNDT

Lt.Col.
(in Schmundt's writing)

(Next page contains illegible notes)

H1166-0232



Item 47

10.10.38
What is in the Zone?

5 1 (motorized)
1 (light)
1 armoured
1 mountain
1 div.

For special duties 1 mountain
3 div
1 truck transport regt.

4 3 motorized div
1 light
1 armoured
2 div
Liebstandarte

3. 4 div
Germania

1 1 armoured
3 div

13 div
4 div (motorized)
3 armoured
2 mountain
2 light

24 divisions

(notes in Schmundt's writing

H1166-0233

TRANSLATION OF DOC. 388 PS cont.

Army Telegraph Network

| Notes of Telegraph Office | Received | Pass to | Date | Time | R.No. | by |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | from HOZG 11.10.10.45 | Lt.Col. Schmundt | 11.10 | | | Schm. |

by -chm.
Note of delay

Item 47

HBLG 008 1040 Note of Priority
Tel.No. of Sender

TO THE ARMED FORCES ADJUTANT ATTACHED TO THE FUHRER AND SUPREME COMMANDER OF ARMED FORCES. THE C-IN-C THE ARMY REGARDS HIS DUTIES AS POSSESSOR OF EXECUTIVE POWERS IN THE SUDETEN GERMAN AREA AS FINISHED AS FROM 10.15. AND SUGGESTS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION BE TAKEN OVER ON THAT DATE BY REICH COMMISSAR HENLEIN, PROVIDING THAT FURTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS ARE NO LONGER NECESSARY. PERSONAL LETTER OF THE C-IN-C TO THE FUHRER HAS BEEN DESPATCHED.

OKH 8th Div. (Five)

General Staff of the German Army

11.37/38

H1166-0234



Item 48

(Ink note)

1. If advance orders, times can be shortened. Regrouping of armies.

2. If Hungary, small degree of preparedness. 2 brigades between Pressburg and Budapest. 1 brigade east of Friedl.

(Rest of note impossible to decipher completely)

H1166-0235

TRANSLATION OF DOC. NO. 388 PS
cont.

Notes of the telegraph office

Army Telegraph Network

Received from HBLG 11.10.1955.

Pass to Lt.Col. Schmundt

Date 11.10

Time 2030

R.No. by Joe

1)4 Mot. Div. 1 B'n ready to march 1 Arm'd Brig.

(?)

by Schm.

Notes re delay

24
15
29 (Unciphorable note)

Note of priority:
Tel. No. of Sender

Item 48

TOP SECRET

HBLG 13 1930.11.10
Lt. Col. Schmundt

Question 1: WHAT REINFORCEMENTS ARE NECESSARY IN THE PRESENT SITUATION TO BREAK ALL CZECH RESISTANCE IN BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA?

Answer: ARMY SUGGESTS: ARMY GROUP 5: Nothing

ARMY GROUP FOR SPECIAL DUTIES: 1 Arm'd Brig., 2 Mob. Div.

ARMY GROUP 4: Nothing
ARMY GROUP 3: 1 Mobile Division
ARMY GROUP A: 1 Division ready to march and 1 Mobile Division

B) LUFTWAFFE: EMPLOYMENT NECESSARY OF ALL FORCES PROVIDED TO DATE OKW BELIEVES THAT IT COULD BE POSSIBLE TO COMMENCE OPERATIONS WITHOUT THESE REINFORCEMENTS IN VIEW OF THE PRESENT SIGNS OF WEAKNESS IN CZECH RESISTANCE.

Question 2: HOW MUCH TIME IS REQUIRED FOR THE REGROUPING OR MOVING UP OF NEW FORCES?

Answer: A) Army: FOR REGROUPING: 2 days. FOR MOVING UP OF NEW FORCES FROM THE REICH 4 to 5 DAYS (INCLUDING MOBILIZATION)

B) Luftwaffe: OPERATIONAL DUTY POSSIBLE ANY TIME

Question 3: HOW MUCH TIME WILL BE REQUIRED FOR THE SAME PURPOSE IF IT IS EXECUTED AFTER THE INTENDED DEMOBILIZATION AND RETURN MEASURES?

Answer A) Army: IN THE SOUTHEAST ABOUT 10 to 11 DAYS.--IN THE EAST 9 to 10 DAYS.

B) Luftwaffe: AFTER RETURN OF FLYING UNITS TO PEACE TIME AIRFIELDS AND THEIR DEMOBILIZATION - THE AA GUNS WHICH ARE READY FOR ACTION AND THE GROUND ORGANIZATION BEING LEFT AS THEY ARE - LENGTH OF TIME IN SOUTHEASTERN AREA 12 HOURS IF WEATHER FAVORABLE. AFTER DEMOBILIZATION IS COMPLETE SEVERAL DAYS, IN ANY CASE LESS THAN IN THE CASE OF THE ARMY.



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H1166-0236

TRANSLATION OF DOC. NO. 888-PS
Continued

Question 4: HOW MUCH TIME WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE THE STATE OF READINESS OF OCT. 1st?

Answer: Army: 6 days. If the reserves are called up by radio, 3 days at least.

Luftwaffe: AIR DEFENSE WEST, BEFORE COMMENCEMENT OF REORGANIZATION, WILL BE READY FOR OPERATIONS IN 24 hours

(signed) KEITEL

H1166-0237

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388 PS
(Con'd)

Berlin, Oct 12th, 1938

Item 49
LI a

3 copies
1st copy

REFLECTIONS

Of the Supreme Command of the Army on the withdrawal of Forces from the Sudeten-German Area

PRESENT STRENGTH

| ARMY GROUP | NO. OF DIVS. | DIVISIONS EARMARKED FOR WITHDRAWAL | NO OF DIV TO BE WITHDRAWN | STRENGTH AFTER WITHDRAWAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Army Group Command 5 | 5 1/3 | 1/3 44, 2 Mtn, 3 Mtn, 29th Mot, 4 Light, 2nd Armoured | 3 | 2 1/3 |
| Army Group Command for Special Duties | 4 1/3 plus 1 SS Regt) | 1/3 5th, 7th, 9th, 45th, 1st Mtn. | 1 1/3 | 3 1 |
| Army Group Command 4 | 7 (plus 1 SS Regt) | 10th, 24th, 2nd (Mot), 13th (Mot), 20th (Mot), 1st Light, 1st Arm'd. | 2 | 4 2 |
| Army Group Command 3 | 3 (plus 1 SS Regt) | 4th, 3rd, 18th | 2 | 2 1 |
| Army Group Command | 4 | 8th, 28th, 30th, 3rd Arm'd. | 1 | 3 2 |
| TOTAL | 22 2/3 (Plus 3 SS Regts) | | 8 1/3 | 14 2/3 (Plus 3 SS Regts) |

| Namely: | Namely: | Namely: |
|---|---|---|
| 11 2/3 Inf Div | 3 1/3 Inf Divs | 8 2/3 Inf Div |
| 3 Mtn Divs | 2 Mtn Divs | 1 Mtn Div |
| 3 Mot Divs | 1 Mot Div | 2 Mot Divs |
| 3 Light Divs | 1 Light Div | 1 Light Div |
| 3 Armd Divs. | 1 Arm'd Div | 2 Arm'd Divs |
| | | 7 1/3 |

H1166-0238



ITEM 50

REICH WAR MINISTRY/NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

MOST SECRET

Received
on 17.10 from kg
at 1535 by (Indecipherable)
Notes re delay
MBZ 0 61
Telegram from MBZ 045 17/10 1525
Lt. Colonel Schmundt

Space for Receipt Stamp

OKW suggests that by 20 October about half of the Army forces still remaining in Sudeten-German Territory (14 1/3 Divs and 3 SS Regiments) should be moved out, as otherwise the orderly discharging of the old age group at the end of October - this is necessary for the building up of the Army - and the reassignment of the recruits will not be possible by 10/11. (Involved are the: 2nd Arm'd Div, 1st Mountain Div., 7th Div, 13th Motorized Div, 20th Motorized Div, 18th Div and 3rd Arm'd Div) Fuhrer's decision requested to-day.

Signed Keitel

(Note at bottom in Schmundt's handwriting:)

The Fuehrer has given his consent 17 Oct.

By telephone, 1905 hours, 17 Oct. to Capt. Vogel,

Section L, OKW.

Schmundt, Lt. Col.

ITEM 51

The Fuehrer and Supreme Comdr of the Armed Forces

Berchtesgaden, 18 Oct. 1938

Despatched 19 X 38 M

TO THE C-IN-C OF THE ARMY

GENERAL VON BRAUCHITSCH, BERLIN

The occupation of the Sudeten-German territory has been completed, the operation being carried out by sections of the Army, the Air Forces, the Police, the military SS (SS Verfugungstruppe), the SS and SA.

Placed under protection of the armed forces, 3½ millions of German compatriots have returned to the Reich once and for all.

The Civil Administration is taking over charge of them on 21 Oct 1938. Simultaneously I relieve you of your right to exercise executive power, while acknowledging the understanding cooperation of all departments.

Along with our Sudeten German compatriots, the entire German people express their gratitude to those who participated in the liberation of the Sudeten-Land.

(signed) Adolf Hitler

Berchtesgaden, 18 Oct 1938

(signed) Schmundt,

Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C.

The Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor.

After Delivery:

To the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

I request that publication in the press be initiated from there



H1166-0239

H1166-0240



Item 51.

1st Draft

To

The C - in - C of the Army

The occupation of the Sudeten - German territory had been completed according to plan, the operation being carried out by sections of the Army, Air Force, and police. Thus 3½ million German compatriots have returned to the Reich once and for all, and have been placed under the protection of the Armed Forces.

You have borne the responsibility for the occupation of the country and the care of the population from the day when the army marched in, and now I approve your proposal to release you from your authority to exercise executive power in the Sudeten-German area, date of expiry being October 20th 1938.

My thanks to all those who participated in the liberation of the Sudetenland, for the order and discipline, the social understanding and devoted readiness to help with which they have done their duty.

J.

(Handwritten note)

The military SS (SS VERFÜFUNGSTRUPPE), the SS and SA

- - - -

2nd Draft

(Exact repeat of Item 51 followed by handwritten note)

Signed Adolf Hitler (unknown hand)



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H1166-0241



ITEM 52

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2560/38 MOST SECRET L I a

Berlin, Oct. 18th, 1938

1300 hours

(Stamp)
Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant
attached to the Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor
Rdcd. 20 Oct. 1938
Req. No. 297/38 Most Secret
Despatch Clerk W.

60 copies
Copy

MOST SECRET

Directive No. 4

The Fuehrer has ordered:

1. That about half of the forces of the Army still remaining in Sudeten-German territory be shipped back to their peace time bases.
2. That those parts of the Luftwaffe which are under the command of the Army be shipped back and returned to the C-in-C of the Air Force.

The withdrawal of other parts of the Luftwaffe operating in Sudeten-Germany will be effected by the C-in-C of the Air Force.

Chief of the Supreme Command of
the Armed Forces

Keitel

Distribution: III



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ITEM 53

REICH WAR MINISTRY/NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

MOST SECRET

Received at 1040 by (Indecipherable) Initials Space for Receipt Stamp
Notes re Delay
NBZ 066
Telegram from NBZ 050 21/10 1030

LIEUTENANT COLONEL SCHMUNDT:

(SECRET) - OKW REQUESTS THE FUEHRER'S APPROVAL TO THE FOLLOWING DECREE:

ON THE 20TH OF OCTOBER THE REICH LABOUR SERVICE CEASES TO BE UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE RAD FORCES OPERATING IN THE AREA OF THE WESTERN FORTIFICATIONS. THE CHIEF OF THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES REGULATES THE CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT FOR THESE SECTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH MY DIRECTIVES, AND AGREEMENT WITH THE REICHS LABOUR LEADER. OKW NR 2690/38 Secret WFA/L two of 20 Oct 38 JODL

Handwritten: Consent given, 21 Oct 38.

Passed to Colonel Jodl's

Ante-Room at 1400

Sch 22/10



H1166-0242

237

H1166-0243



ITEM 54

MOST SECRET

TOP SECRET

Only through officer

Conference Notes

L I a

Berlin, 27.9.38

4 copies
1st copy

Time of Attack "Grun"?
(Z v. A Grun)

COORDINATED TIME OF ATTACK BY ARMY AND AIR FORCES ON X DAY

As a matter of principle, every effort should be made for a coordinated attack by Army and Air Forces on X Day.

The Army wishes to attack at dawn, i. e. about 0615, it also wishes to conduct some limited operations in the previous night, which however, would not alarm the entire Czech front.

Air Force's time of attack depends on weather conditions. These could change the time of attack and also limit the area of operations. The weather of the last few days, for instance, would have delayed the start until between 0800 and 1100 due to low ceiling in Bavaria.

If the Luftwaffe were to attack at the time desired by the Army no tactical surprise of the enemy's air force would be achieved and it would necessitate certain changes in the method of attack (height of flight level). Consequently, from the outset the Luftwaffe has desired a later hour of attack on the part of the Army. Even so, there would be no definite guarantee of a well-timed coordinated attack of both Forces, as bad weather conditions on the day of attack might postpone the commitment of the Air Force on X Day in part or altogether.

If an early hour of attack on the part of the Army is regarded as indispensable, a simultaneous attack by the Air Force, - desirable as it may be, may possibly have to be dispensed with.



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H1166-0244



ITEM 54

Thus it is Proposed:

Attack by the Army - independent of the attack by the air force - at the time desired by the Army (0615) and permission for limited operations to take place before then, however, only to an extent that will not alarm the entire Czech front.

The Luftwaffe will attack at a time most suitable to them.

(J)

H1166-0245

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO 440
PS
Office of U.S.Chief of Counsel

The Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces

OKW/WFA No. 213/39

Top Secret, only for General
Officers, Dept. L (I)

Berlin, November 20 1939

8 copies only

Pencil Marks.

---

Only for general officers
By officer courier only! (Stamped)

DIRECTIVE NO.8

FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

1) The state of alert must be maintained for the time being to continue at any time with the deployment which has been initiated. Only in this way is it possible to take immediate advantage of a favourable weather situation.

The parts of the armed forces will make preparations so that the attack can still be stopped, even if the order for stopping the attack should arrive at the higher command only at A-day minus one at 2300 hours. The code word

"Rhein" ? = carry out attack

or

"Elbe" (= stop attack)

will be transmitted to the higher commands not later than at the above-mentioned time.

The supreme command of the Army and the supreme command of the Airforce are requested to report immediately after the designation of attack day to the Supreme Command of the Armed forces, department Airforce the hour at which the beginning of the attack is planned by mutual agreement.

2) Contrary to previously issued instructions, all action intended against Holland may be carried out without a special order when the general attack will start.

The attitude of the Dutch armed forces cannot be anticipated ahead of time. Wherever there is no resistance, the entry should carry the character of a peaceful occupation.

3) The operations on land are to be conducted on the basis of the deployment order of October 29th. The following statement will apply:

a) All arrangements are to be made, in order to shift quickly to the main effort of the operations from Army group B to Army group A, in case faster and greater successes should develop at Army group A than Army group B, as one might well conclude from the present distribution of enemy forces.

b) At first the Dutch area, including the West-Frisian islands situated just off the coast, for the present without Texel, is to be occupied up to the Yrebbe-Haas line.

(11876)

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H1166-0246





4) Blockade measures against the Belgian and, contrary to earlier orders, also against the Dutch harbours and navigable waters are authorised for the navy, namely for submarines during the night before the attack and for surface fighting craft and airplanes from the time of the attack of the army. The span of time between the beginning of the blockade operations and the time of the attack on land, must however be kept as short as possible for the deployment of the submarines.

Battle actions against Dutch naval forces are authorized only, if they take a hostile attitude.

The navy will take over the artillery defence of the coast against attacks from the sea, in the coastal territories which are to be occupied. The preparations for that are to be made.

5) The missions of the airforce remain unchanged. They are supplemented by special orders, which the Fuhrer has given orally, about airborne landings and support of the Army in the seizure of the bridges West of Maestricht.

The 7th Airborne Division (7. Fl. Div) will be committed for the airborne operation only after the possession of bridges across the Albert-Canal has been assured. The quickest transmission of this message is to be assured between the supreme command of the Army and the supreme command of the airforce.

Localities, especially large open cities, and industries are not to be attacked without compelling military reasons, neither in the Dutch, nor in the Belgian - Luxembourgian area.

6) Shutting of the borders:

a) Until the beginning of the attack the traffic and news service across the border is to be maintained in its present size across the Dutch, Belgian, and Luxembourgian border, in order to assure the moment of surprise. Until the beginning of the attack, civil authorities are not to participate in the preparations for a border closing.

b) With the beginning of the attack, the Reich border against Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg is to be blocked for all non-military traffic and news service across the border. The supreme commander of the army gives the orders in that respect to the military and civil offices concerned. With the beginning of the attack, the supreme Reich authorities concerned will be informed by the Supreme Command of the armed forces that the measures for the closing of the border are ordered directly by the Supreme Commander of the Army - and that this also applies to the Dutch border not in the area of operations.

c) On the other Reich Borders opposite neutral countries, there will at first be no restrictions in traffic and news service across the border after the beginning of the attack. Further measures which have been prepared for the supervision of the traffic of persons and news service will be put into force, if necessary.

241

BY ORDER OF:
signed, Keitel
authenticated: (illegible signature)
Captain.

1877

H1166-0247



Distribution:

Supreme Command of the Army (OKH) - 1st copy
Supreme Command of the Navy (OKM) 2nd copy
Supreme Command of the Airforce - 3rd copy
(R.d.L.n. Ob. d. L.)
Supreme Command of the armed forces (OKW):

Chief Armed forces operations office
(Chef WFA) 4th Copy
(L) 5th - 8th Copy

Distribution:

Copies
K 1st Copy
IV 2nd copy (underlined in pencil)
II 2nd copy for acknowledgement

Acknowledged November 21st
(in pencil) (illegible initials)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 440-PS

I, 1st Lt. Seligson, A.U.S. Ord. O-1558904, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 440-PS

Seligson
1st Lt. A.U.S
O-1558904

1878)

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 444-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

TOP SECRET

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces

WFSt/Abt.L(I) No.33 356/40 g.K.Chefs

Only by officer

Fuehrer's Headquarters
12 November 40
27 408

10 copies
4th copy
55

Directive No. 18

The preparatory measures of Supreme HQ for the prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made along the following lines:-

1. Relations with France

The aim of my policy towards France is to cooperate with this country in the most effective way for the future prosecution of the war against England. For the time being France will have the role of a "non-belligerent power" :- she will have to tolerate German military measures on her territory, especially in the African colonies, and to give support, as far as possible, even by using her own means of defense. The most pressing task of the French is the defensive and offensive protection of their French possessions (West and Equatorial Africa) against England and the de Gaulle movement. From this initial task France's participation in the war against England can develop fully.

For the time being, the conversations with France resulting from my meeting with Marshal Petain are being carried on - apart from the current work of the Armistice Commission - entirely by the Foreign Office (Auswartiges Amt) in cooperation with the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW).

More detailed directives will follow at the close of these talks.

2. Spain and Portugal

Political steps to bring about an early Spanish entry into the war have been taken. The aim of German intervention in the Iberian peninsula (code name Felix) will be to drive the English out of the Western Mediterranean. For this purpose:

a) Gibraltar will be taken and the Straits closed.
b) The British will be prevented from gaining a foothold at another point of the Iberian Peninsula, or the Atlantic Islands.

The preparation and execution of this operation is intended as follows:

Section I

a) Reconnaissance troops (officers in civilian clothes) make the necessary preparations for the action against Gibraltar and for taking over aerodromes. As regards disguise and cooperation with the Spaniards they will comply with the security measures of the Chief of Foreign Intelligence.

b) Special units of the Foreign Intelligence Bureau are to take over the protection of the Gibraltar area, in secret cooperation with the Spaniards, against English attempts to widen the terrain in front and against premature discovery and frustration of our preparations.



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H1166-0249

c) The units intended for this operation will be kept in readiness away from the French Spanish border and information will be withheld from the troops, at this early stage. In order to start operations, a warning order will be given three weeks before the troops cross the Spanish-French border (but only after conclusion of the preparations regarding the Atlantic Islands).

With regard to the low capacity of the Spanish railways, the army will detail mainly motorized units for this operation, so that the railways are available for reinforcements.

Section II

a) Units of the Air Force, directed by observation at Algeciras, will, at a favourable moment, carry out an air attack from French soil on the units of the British fleet lying in the port of Gibraltar, and will force a landing on Spanish aerodromes after the attack.

b) Shortly after this the units intended for use in Spain will cross the Franco-Spanish frontier on land or in the air.

Section III

a) Attack for the seizure of Gibraltar by German troops.

b) Mobilization of troops to march into Portugal should the British gain a foothold there. The units intended for this will march into Spain immediately after the units intended for Gibraltar.

Section IV

Support by the Spanish in closing the Straits after the seizure of the Rock from the Spanish-Moroccan side as well, if required.

As for the strength of the units to be used for operation "Felix" the following will apply:

Army

The units intended for Gibraltar must be in sufficient strength to seize the Rock even without Spanish assistance.

Apart from this, a smaller group must be available to aid the Spaniards in the unlikely event of the British attempting to land at a different point on the coast. The units to be kept in readiness for a possible invasion of Portugal are to be predominantly of a mobile nature.

Air Force

Sufficient forces will be detailed for the air attack on Gibralter to guarantee substantial success.

For the subsequent operations against naval objectives and for the support of the attack on the Rock mainly dive-bomber units are to be transferred to Spain.

Sufficient anti-aircraft artillery is to be supplied to the army units, and is also to be used to engage ground targets.

Navy

Provision is to be made for U-boats to attack the British-Gibraltar-Squadron, particularly when they leave harbor, which they are expected to do after the air raid.

To support the Spaniards in the closing of the Straits, preparations are to be made in cooperation with the army for the transfer of single coastal batteries.

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An Italian participation is not envisaged.

As a result of operation "Gibraltar", the Atlantic Islands (in particular the Canaries and Cape Verde Islands) will gain increased importance for the British conduct of the war at sea, as well as for our own. The commanders in chief of the Navy and Air Force are examining how the Spanish defense of the Canaries can be supported and how the Cape Verde Islands can be occupied.

I also request that the question of an occupation of Madeira and the Azores be examined and also the advantages and disadvantages that would arise from this for the conduct of the war at sea and in the air. The results of this examination are to be given to me as soon as possible.

3) Italian Offensive against Egypt

If at all, the use of German forces only comes into consideration after the Italians have reached Mersa Metruh. Even then the use of German air forces will be considered mainly if the Italians put at our disposal the air bases necessary for this.

The preparations of the branches of the armed forces for use in this or any other North African theatre of war are to be carried on as follows:-

Army

Holding an armoured division ready for use in North Africa (composition as previously provided for).

Navy

Fitting out of such German ships lying in Italian ports as are suitable as transports for the transfer of the strongest possible forces either to Libya or to North West Africa.

Air Force

Preparations for attacks on Alexandria and on the Suez Canal, so as to deny the British Command the use of the latter.

4) Balkans

The commanders-in-chief of the Army will make preparations for occupying the Greek mainland north of the Aegean Sea in case of need, entering through Bulgaria, and thus make possible the use of German air force units against targets in the Eastern Mediterranean, in particular against those English air bases which are threatening the Roumanian oil area.

In order to be able to face all eventualities and to keep Turkey in check, the use of an army group of an approximate strength of ten divisions is to be the basis for the planning and the calculations of deployment. It will not be possible to count on the railway, leading through Yugoslavia, for moving these forces into position.

So as to shorten the time needed for the deployment, preparations will be made for an early increase in the German Army mission in Roumania, the extent of which must be submitted to me.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force will make preparations for the use of German Air Force units in the South East Balkans and for aerial reconnaissance on the southern border of Bulgaria, in accordance with the intended ground operations.

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The German Air Force mission in Roumania will be increased to the extent proposed to me.

Bulgarian requests to equip their army (supply of weapons, ammunition) are to be given favourable treatment.

5) Russia

Political discussions have been initiated with the aim of clarifying Russia's attitude for the time being. Irrespective of the results of these discussions, all preparations for the East which have already been verbally ordered will be continued.

Instructions on this will follow, as soon as the general outline of the army's operational plans has been submitted to, and approved by, me.

6) Landing in England

Due to a change in the general situation it may yet be possible or necessary to start operation "SeelÖwe" in the spring of 1941. The three services of the armed forces must therefore earnestly endeavour to improve conditions for such an operation in every respect.

7) I shall expect the commanders-in-chief to express their opinions of the measures anticipated in this directive. I shall then give orders regarding the methods of execution and synchronization of the individual actions. In order to assure secrecy, only a restricted staff will work on these plans. This applies particularly to the operations in Spain and for the plans concerning the Atlantic Isles.

signed: ADOLF HITLER

initialled: Jodl

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 444-PS

15 October 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt. Inf., O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 444-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt. Inf.
O-1335567

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PS-446.

Translated from the German.

TOP SECRET.
FOR ARMY CHIEFS - To be dealt with by officers only.

F. H. Q. 18. 12. 1940.

The Führer and
Supreme Commander of the
Wehrmacht.

---

Instruction No.21

Case BARBAROSSA.

The German Wehrmacht must be prepared, before the war with England is terminated, to overthrow Soviet Russia in a single rapidly conducted campaign (Case BARBAROSSA).

The Army, with this object in view, will employ every available unit after allowing, however, for due protection of the occupied territory against surprise.

The essential object for the Luftwaffe will be to set free for the Eastern campaign in support of the field army, sufficient strength to allow of our anticipating the conclusion of ground operations within a short period of time and to reduce the damage inflicted upon Eastern Germany by hostile attacks from the air to the smallest possible dimensions. The formation of this point of gravity in the East is conditional upon the affording of adequate protection to the whole of the fighting and armament area under our control against air attacks and the maintenance of offensive operations against England and especially against her import trade.

The main effort of the Navy, even during the Eastern campaign, will be directed against England.

I shall give orders for development against Soviet Russia to take place, if necessary, 8 weeks before the planned commencement of operations.

Preparations requiring more time must - if this has not already been done - be at once started and completed by 15. 5. 41.

The prevention of any discovery of our intention to attack is, however, of essential importance.

The preparations of the Supreme Command will be based upon the following principles:-

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1. General intention.

The main body of the Russian army concentrated in Western Russia must be annihilated in a series of bold operations in the course of which arrow-head formations of tanks will push far ahead and prevent the withdrawal of such bodies of troops as are still capable of fighting, into far distant Russian territory.

A line must be reached, by means of a rapid pursuit from beyond which the Russian Air Force cannot attack on home territory. The final object of our operations must be to protect ourselves against Asiatic Russia along a line running roughly from the Volga to Archangel. If necessary, Russia's last remaining industrial area, in the Urals will be levelled to the ground by the Luftwaffe.

In the course of these operations the Russian Baltic Fleet will soon lose its bases and thereby be put out of action.

Effective intervention by the Russian Air Force must be prevented at the outset of operations by a series of rigorous blows.

II Probable allies and their duties.

(i) The active intervention on our side on both wings of our armies by Roumania and Finland may be anticipated. The manner in and the extent to which the forces of these two countries will be under our orders, when they attack, will be agreed upon and determined by the Wehrmacht in due season.

(ii) Roumania's task will be, by means of the forces deployed by them, to hold the enemy engaging them and, in addition, to perform auxiliary duties on the lines of communication.

(iii) It will be the duty of Finland to cover the development of the German northern group landed from aircraft and coming from Norway (part of Group III). She will, furthermore, have to neutralise Hango.

(iv) It may be anticipated as possible that Swedish railway lines and roads will be available for the deployment of the German northern group, at the beginning of operations at any rate.

III Conduct of operations.

The Army (In approval of the reports submitted to me).

As regards the theatre of operations which is divided by the Pripet

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Marshes into a northern and southern half, the point of main effort will be formed in the northern part of this area. Two army groups must be provided here.

To the southern of these two army groups - centre of the entire front - faces the task of advancing with specially strong tank and motorized units into the area round and to the north of ORSHA (?) to rout the enemy strength in White Russia. Thus a basis must be made for turning strong parts of the enemy forces to the north in order, with the co-operation of the Northern Army Group from East Prussia operating in the general direction of Leningrad, to annihilate the enemy strength fighting in the Baltic area. Only after priority has been given to this most urgent task, which must be followed by the occupation of Leningrad and Kronstadt, are the offensive operations to be continued for the capture of the important communications and armaments centre, Moscow.

Only an unforeseen swift and sudden collapse of the Russian powers of resistance could justify any attempt to strive simultaneously for both objectives.

The chief duty of Group II remains as before to guard Norway during the operations in the East. Forces over and above those required for this task are to be employed in the North (Alpine Corps), first of all to guard the Potsamo area and its ore mines and the Polar Sea Road and afterwards, in conjunction with the Finnish forces, to attack the Murmansk railway line and prevent supplies from reaching the Murmansk area by the land route.

Whether an operation of this kind can be carried out by a strongish German force (2 - 3 Divisions) from the area of Rovaniemi and to the south of it depends upon the willingness of Sweden to place her railways at our disposal for a deployment of this kind.

It will be the task of the main Finnish army to conform its movements to those of the advancing German north wing and to hold by attack as large a Russian force as possible to the west and on both sides of the Lake and thus obtain possession of Hango.

The Army Group engaged to the south of the Pripet Marshes should direct its main activities against the area of Lublin, and generally speaking, the country in the direction of Kiev with a view to penetrating with

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strong motorized forces rapidly into the deep flank and in the rear of the Russian forces and eventually "rolling them up" along the Dnieper.

The German Roumanian group on the right flank will have the task of:

(a) protecting the territory of Roumania and incidentally this flank of the entire operation.

(b) While the offensive of the northern wing of the army group is in progress, of paralysing the opposing hostile forces and as it further develops, of pursuing them in conjunction with the Luftwaffe and preventing their orderly retreat across the Dniester.

In the north, Moscow must be reached rapidly. The capture of this town will be a success of decisive political and economic significance and will, in addition, neutralise the most important railway junction.

B. The Luftwaffe.

The Luftwaffe will have the task of paralysing and eliminating, as far as is feasible, the action of the Russian Air Force and of supporting the main operations of the army, especially those of the central army group and the decisive operations of the southern Army Group. Such Russian railways as are of operational importance will be cut or alternatively the most important neighbouring objectives (such as railway bridges over rivers) will be captured by parachutists and glider troops.

In order to ensure the employment of our utmost strength against the hostile Air Force and to afford immediate support to the Army the armament industries will not be attacked while the main operations are taking place. It will not be till after the conclusion of operations in the field that any idea of attacks of this nature, principally upon the Ural area can be entertained.

C. The Navy.

It will be the task of the Navy during the war against Soviet Russia, while ensuring the safety of our own coast, to prevent hostile naval forces from breaking out of the Baltic. As the capture of Leningrad will mean the loss of the last remaining base of the Russian fleet, which will then be in a hopeless predicament, operations on any considerable scale, should, in the meantime, be avoided.

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As soon as the Russian fleet is neutralised the essential task of the Navy will consist in keeping the Baltic open to maritime traffic to the fullest extent and also in ensuring the arrival by sea of reinforcements for the northern wing of the army (Mine clearing).

IV. Any dispositions to be made by commanders of troops in conformity with these instructions must bear unmistakable evidence of being precautionary measures to be taken in case Russia should change the attitude she has hitherto observed towards us. The number of officers to be detailed at the outset to carry out preliminary work must be restricted to a minimum and the assignment of future assistants be deferred to as late a date as possible; the latter, moreover, must only be taken into our confidence so far as is essential in view of their activities. Otherwise there is a risk of knowledge of preparations, the date of execution of which is not yet settled, being noised abroad and entailing both from the political and military points of view the most serious inconvenience.

V. I look forward to receiving reports from Commanding Generals as to their further intentions, having regard to these instructions.

The preparations contemplated by all branches of the Wehrmacht and the rate of progress of the same are to be reported to HQ of the Wehrmacht.

(Signed) : ADOLF HITLER

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 447-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

H1166-0257

TOP SECRET

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Only thru officer

OKW
Armed Forces Operational Staff
Section L (IV/Qu)
44125/41 Top Secret

Fuehrer Hq, 13 March 1941
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Subject: Armed Forces Operational Staff/Section L(I) #33408/40. Top Secret. 18 December 1940

Directives for Special Areas

To Order #21

(Case Barbarossa)

I. Area of Operations and executive power

1) The authorization to issue orders and the regulations regarding supply for an area of operations within the armed forces shall be set up by the High Command of the Armed Forces in East Prussia and in the General Gouvernement at the latest four weeks before operations are started. The proposal by the High Command of the Army (OKH) is being made in time, after an agreement with the Commander of the Luftwaffe (Ob.d.L.) has been reached.

It is not contemplated to declare East Prussia and the General Gouvernement an area of operations. However, in accordance with the unpublished Fuehrer orders from 19 and 21 October 1939, the Supreme Commander of the Army shall be authorized to take all measures necessary for the execution of his military aim and for the safeguarding of the troops. He may transfer his authority onto the Supreme Commander of the Army Groups and Armies. Orders of that kind have priority over all orders issued by civilian agencies.

2) The Russian territory which is to be occupied shall be divided up into individual states with governments of their own, according to special orders, as soon as military operations are concluded. From this the following is inferred:

a) The area of operations, created through the advance of the Army beyond the frontiers of the Reich and the neighboring countries is to be limited in depth as far as possible. The Supreme Commander of the Army has the right to exercise the executive power in this area, and may transfer his authority onto the Supreme Commanders of the Army Groups and Armies.

b) In the area of operations, the Reichsfuehrer SS is, on behalf of the Fuehrer, entrusted with special tasks for the preparation of the political administration, tasks which result from the struggle which has to be carried out between two opposing political systems. Within the realm of these tasks, the Reichsfuehrer SS shall act independently and under his own responsibility. The executive power invested in the Supreme Commander of the Army (OKH) and in agencies determined by him shall not be affected by this. It is the responsibility of the Reichsfuehrer SS that through the execution of his tasks military operations shall not be disturbed. Details shall be arranged directly through the OKH with the Reichsfuehrer SS.

c) As soon as th area of operations has reached sufficient depth, it is to be limited in the rear. The newly occupied territory in the rear of the area of operations is to be given its own political administration. For the present, it is to be divided, according to its genealogic basis and to the positions of the Army Groups, into North (Baltic countries), Center (White Russia) and South (Ukraine). In these territories the political administration is taken care of by Commissioners of the Reich who receive their orders from the Fuehrer.

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3) For the execution of all military tasks within the areas under the political administration in the rear of the area of operations, commanding officers who are responsible to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (OKW) shall be in command.

The commanding officer is the supreme representative of the Armed Forces in the respective areas and the bearer of the military sovereign rights. He has the tasks of a Territorial Commander and the rights of a supreme Army Commander or a Commanding General. In this capacity he is responsible primarily for the following tasks.

a) Close cooperation with the Commissioner of the Reich in order to support him in his political task.
b) Exploitation of the country and securing its economic values for use by German industry (see par. 4)
c) Exploitation of the country for the supply of the troops according to the needs of the OKH.
d) Military security of the whole area, mainly airports, routes of supply and supply-dumps against revolt, sabotage and enemy paratroops.
e) Traffic regulations.
f) Billeting for armed forces, police and organizations, and for PW's inasmuch as they remain in the administrative areas.

The commanding officer has the right, as opposed to the civilian agencies, to issue orders which are necessary for the execution of the military tasks. His orders supersede all others, also those of the commissioners of the Reich.

Service directives, mobilization orders and directives on the distribution of the necessary forces shall be issued separately.

The time for the assumption of command by the commanding officers will be ordered as soon as the military situation shall allow a change in the command without disrupting military operations. Until such time, the agencies set up by the OKH remain in office, operating according to the principles valid for the commanding officers.

4) The Fuehrer has entrusted the uniform direction of the administration of economy in the area of operations and in the territories of political administration to the Reich Marshal who has delegated the Chief of the "Wi Rü Amt" with the execution of the task. Special orders on that will come from the OKW/WiRüAmt.

5) The majority of the Police Forces shall be under the jurisdiction of the Commissioners of the Reich. Requests for the employment of police forces in the area of operations on the part of the OKH are to be made as early as possible to the OKW /Armed Forces Operational Staff/ Section Defense.

6) The behavior of the troops towards the population and the tasks of the military courts shall be separately regulated, and commanded.

II. Personnel, Supply and Communication Traffic:

7) Special orders shall be issued by the OKW Armed Forces Operational Staff for the measures necessary before the beginning of operations for the restriction of travel, delivery of goods and communications to Russia.

8) As soon as operations begin, the German-Soviet Russian frontier and at a later stage the border at the rear of the area of operations will be closed by the OKH for any and all non-military traffic with the exception of the police organizations to be deployed by the Reichsfuehrer SS on the Fuehrer's orders. Billeting and feeding of these organizations will be taken care of by the OKH-Gen. Qu. who may for this purpose request from the Reichsfuehrer SS the assignment of liaison officers.

The border shall remain closed also for leading personalities of the highest government agencies and agencies of the Party. The OKW/Armed Forces Operational Staff shall inform the highest government and Party agencies of this fact. The Supreme Commander of the Army and the agencies under him

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shall decide on exceptions.

Except for the special regulations applying to the police organizations of the Reichsfuehrer SS, applications for entrance-permits must be submitted to the Supreme Commander of the Army exclusively.

III. Regulations regarding Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary and Finland.

9) The necessary arrangements with these countries shall be made by the OKW, together with the Foreign Office, and according to the wishes of the respective high commands. In case it should become necessary during the course of the operations to grant special rights, applications for this purpose are to be submitted to the OKW.

10) Police measures for the protection of the troops are permitted, independently from the granting of special rights.

Further orders in this shall be issued later.

11) Special orders shall be issued at a later date for the territories of these countries, on the following subjects:

Procurement of food and feed.
Housing and machinery.
Purchase and the shipment of merchandise.
Procurement of funds and wage-control.
Salaries.
Request for indemnity-payments.
Postal and telegraph services.
Traffic.
Jurisdiction.

Requests of units of the Armed Forces and agencies of the OKW from the respective governments regarding these subjects, are to be submitted to the OKW/Armed Forces Operational Staff/Section Defense not later than 27 March 1941.

IV. Directives regarding Sweden.

12) Since Sweden can only become a transient-area for troops, no special authority is to be granted the commander of the German troops. However, he is entitled and compelled to secure the immediate protection of RR-transports against sabotage and attacks.

The Chief of the High Command of the
Armed Forces
signed: KEITEL

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(Translator's note: Armed Forces Operational Staff/Section Defense = Wehrmacht Fuehrungs Stab/Abt. Landesverteidigung)

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 447-PS

16 October 1945

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt (jg) USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 447-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt (jg) USNR
391590

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H1166-0260

GB 118

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 448-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Fuehrer and Supreme of the Armed Forces.
OWK/WFST/Abt. L Nr. 44018/41 g. K. Chiefs

F. H. Q. 11th Jan
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Order No. 22

Participation of German Forces in the Fighting in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations.

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The situation in the Mediterranean Theater of Operation demands for strategical, political and psychological reasons German assistance, due to employment of superior forces by England against our allies.

Tripolitania must be held and the danger of a collapse of the Albanian front must be removed. Beyond that, the Army group Cavallero, in connection with later operations of the 12th Army, shall be enabled to start an attack also from Albania.

I order therefore, the following:

1. A blocking unit is to be recruited by the High Command of the Army which will be in a position to render valuable services to our Allies in the defense of Tripolitania especially against the English armored divisions. The principles for its composition will be given separately. The preparations for the transfer of the unit will be made in time to follow immediately the present transport of an Italian armored division and a motorized division to Tripoli. (starting approximately 20 February)

2. The X Air Corps will retain Sicily as basis for operations. Its most important assignment will be the fight against the English Naval forces and their communications between the western and eastern Mediterranian. Besides that, provisions are also to be made, with the help of temporary landing fields, to attack the English unloading harbors and supply bases on the coast of Western Egypt and Cryenaica and thus give immediate support to the Army groupof Graziani.

The Italian Government has been asked to declare the territory between Sicily and the North African coast a "restricted area" (Sperrgebiet) in order to facilitate the operations of the X Air Corps and to avoid incidents against neutral ships.

3. For transfer to Albania, German units in the approximate strength of one corps, among them the 1st Mountain Division and Armored forces, are to be provided and held in readiness. The transport of the 1st Mountain Division is to commence, as soon as the approval of the Italians is received by the High Command of the Armed forces. In the meantime, it must be examined and determined with the Italian High Command in Albania whether and how many more forces for operational attacks could be employed to good advantage and could also be supplied besides the Italian Divisions.

The duty of the German forces will be:

(a) To serve in Albania for the time being as a reserve for an emergency case, should new crises arise there;

(b) To ease the burden of the Italian Army group when later attacking with the aim:

To tear open the Greek defense front on a decisive point for a far-reaching operation,

To open up the straits west of Saloniki from the back in order to support thereby the frontal attack of List's Army.

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DOCUMENT NO. 448-PS

4. The directives for the questions of authority over the German troops to be employed in North Arican and Albania and the restrictions which are to be made with reference to their employment, will be settled by the High Command of the Armed Forces and the Italian Armed Forces staff.

5. The suitable transports available in the Mediterranean only as far as they are not already used for transportations to Tripoli, to be provided for the transfer of the Albania-bound troops. For transports of personnel, the transportation group Ju 52 stationed in Foggia is to be utilized.

Every effort should be made to complete the transfer of the bulk of the German forces to Albania before the transfer of the blocking unit to Lybia starts. (Sec 1) and the use of all German boats becomes necessary for this purpose.

(Signed) Adolf Hitler

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F. H. Q. 29th Jan 41

High Command of the Armed Forces
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OKW/WFST/Abt. L(L) Nr. 44018/41 gk Chefs. V.
11th Jan 41.

The measures ordered in Order 22 are to be given the following code names:

Operation Tripoli: "Sonnenblume"
Operation Albania: "Alpenveilchen"

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces.

By Order
(Signed) Warlimont.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 448-PS.

17 November 1945

I, WOLFGANG E. THORMANN, M/Sgt, 33779426, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 448-PS.

WOLFGANG E. THORMANN
M/Sgt. 33779426.



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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 503-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Top Secret

High Command of the Armed Forces.
No 55 1781/42 g. K. CHefs. W F St/Qu

F.H. Qu.,19 October 1942

Top Secret
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Added to the decree concerning the destruction of terror and sabotage troops (OKW/Wst No. 003830/42 top secret of 18 October 1942) a supplementary order of the Fuehrer is enclosed.

This order is intended for commanders only and must not under any circumstances fall into enemy hands.

The further distribution is to be limited accordingly by the receiving bureaus.

The bureaus named in the distribution list are held responsible, for the return and destruction of all distributed pieces of the order and copies made thereof.

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces

By order of
Jodl

1 enclosure
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Top Secret
By officer only

The Fuehrer
and Commander in Chief
of the Armed Forces

18 K

I have been compelled to issue strict orders for the destruction of enemy sabotage troops and to declare non-compliance with these orders severely punishable. I deem it necessary to announce to the competent commanding officers and commanders the reasons for this decree.

As in no previous war, a method of destruction of communications behind the front, intimidation of the populace working for Germany, as well as the destruction of war-important industrial plants in territories occupied by us has been developed in this war.

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territories occupied by us has been developed in this war.

In the east, this type of combat in the form of partisan warfare as early as last winter led to severe encroachment upon our fighting strength and cost the lives of numerous German soldiers, railroad workers, members of the labor corps (Organisation Todt), the labor service, etc. It severely interfered with and sometimes delayed for days the performance of transportation necessary for the maintenance of the fighting strength of the troops. By a successful continuation or perhaps even intensification of this form of war, a grave crisis in one or another place at the front might develop. Many measures against these horrible as well as wily sabotage activities have failed, simply because the German officer and his soldiers were not aware of the great danger confronting them and therefore in individual cases did not act against these enemy groups as would have been necessary in order to help the forward echelons of the front and thereby the entire conduct of the war.

It was therefore in part necessary in the East to organise special units who mastered this danger or to assign this task to special SS formations.

Only where the fight against this partisan disgrace was begun and executed with ruthless brutality were results achieved which eased the position of the fighting front.

In all eastern territories the war against the partisans is therefore a struggle of absolute annihilation of one or the other part.

As soon as the realization of this fact becomes the common knowledge of troops, they will regularly be able to cope with these occurrences in short order; otherwise their efforts achieve no decisive results and become purposeless.

Even though under a different name, England and America have decided upon a similar kind of warfare, while the Russian attempts to put partisan troops behind our front by land and only in exceptional cases uses air transportation to land men and to drop supplies, England and America use this method of warfare primarily by landing sabotage troops from submarines or pneumatic boats or by means of parachute agents. Essentially, however, this form of warfare does not differ from the activites of the Russian partisans. For it is the task of these troops:

1) to build up a general espionage service with the assistance of willing natives,
2) to organize troops of terrorists and supply them with the necessary weapons and explosives,
3) to undertake sabotage activites which by destruction of traffic installations, not only continuously disrupt our communications, but also, when things become serious, make troop movements absolutely impossible and eliminate our communications system.

Finally, these troops are to make attacks on war-important installations, in which, according to a scientifically worked out program, they destroy key works by dynamiting, thereby forcing whole industries into idleness.

The consequences of these activites are of extraordinary weight. I do not know whether each commander and officer is cognizant of the fact that the destruction of one single electric power plant, for instance, can deprive the Luftwaffe of many thousand tons of aluminum, thereby eliminating the construction of countless aircraft that will be missed in the fight at the front and so contribute to serious damage of the Homeland as well as bloody losses of the fighting soldiers.

Yet this form of war is completely without danger for the adversary. Since he lands his sabotage troops in uniform but at the same time supplies them with civilian clothes, they can, according to need, appear as soldiers or civilians. While they themselves have orders to ruthlessly remove any German soldiers or even natives who get in their way, they run no danger of suffering really serious losses in their operations, since at the worst, if they are caught, they can immediately surrender and thus believe

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that they will theoretically fall under the provisions of the Geneva Convention. There is no doubt, however, that this is a misuse in the worst form of the Geneva agreements, especially since part of these elements are even criminals, liberated from prisons, who can rehabilitate themselves through these activites.

England and America will therefore always be able to find volunteers for this kind of warfare, as long as they can truthfully assure them that there is no danger of loss of life for them. At worst, all they have to do is to successfully commit their attacks on people, traffic installations, or other installations, and upon being encountered by the enemy, to capitulate.

If the German conduct of war is not to suffer grievous damage through these incidents, it must be made clear to the adversary that all sabotage troops will be exterminated, without exception, to the last man.

This means that their chance of escaping with their lives is nil. Under no circumstances can it be permitted, therefore, that a dynamite, sabotage, or terrorist unit simply allows itself to be captured, expecting to be treated according to rules of the Geneva Convention. It must under all circumstances be ruthlessly exterminated.

The report on this subject appearing in the Armed Forces communique will briefly and laconically state that a sabotage, terror, or destruction unit has been encountered and exterminated to the last man.

I therefore expect the commanding officers of armies subordinated to them as well as individual commanders not only to realize the necessity of taking such measures, but to carry out this order with all energy. Officers and non-commissioned officers who fail through some weakness are to be reported without fail, or under circumstances-when there is danger in delay-to be at once made strictly accountable. The Homeland as well as the fighting soldier at the front has the right to expect that behind their back the essentials of nourishment as well as the supply of war-important weapons and ammunition remains secure.

These are the reasons for the issuance of this decree.

If it should become necessary, for reasons of interrogation, to initially spare one man or two, then they are to be shot immediately after interrogation.

(signed:) A. Hitler

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 503-PS

26 November 1945

I, ARNE OLSEN, 2nd Lt., AUS, O-2015976, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 503-PS.

ARNE OLSEN
2nd Lt., AUS
O-2015976

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 789-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

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Pencilled note: Duplicate

Nov. 23, 1939, 1:00 hours. Conference with the Fuehrer, to which all Supreme Commanders are ordered. The Fuehrer gives the following speech:

The purpose of this conference it to give you an idea of the world of my thoughts, which takes charge of me, in the face of future events, and to tell you my decisions. The building up of our armed forces was only possible in connection with the ideological (weltanschaulich) education of the German people by the Party. When I started my political task in 1919, my strong belief in final success was based on a thorough observation of the events of the day and the study of the reasons for their occurrence. Therefore, I never lost my belief in the midst of set-backs which were not spared me during my period of struggle. Providence has had the last word and brought me success. On top of that, I had a clear recognition of the probably course of historical events, and the firm will to make brutal decisions. The first decision was in 1919 when I after long internal conflict became a politician and took up the struggle against my enemies. That was the hardest of all decisions. I had, however, the firm belief that I would arrive at my goal. First of all, I desired a new system of selection. I wanted to educate a minority which would take over the leadership. After 15 years, I arrived at my goal, after strenuous struggles and many set-backs. When I came to power in 1933, a period of the most difficult struggle lay behind me. Everything existing before that had collapsed. I had to reorganize everything beginning with the mass of the people and extending it to the armed forces. First reorganization of the interior, abolishment of appearances of decay and defeatist ideas, education to heroism. While re-organizing the interior, I undertook the second task: to release Germany from its international ties. Two particular characteristics are to be pointed out: secession from the League of Nations and denunciation of the disarmament conference. It was a hard decision. The number of prophets who predicted that it would lead to the occupation of the Rhineland was large, the number of believers was very small. I was supported by the nation, which stood firmly behind me, when I carried out my intentions. After that the order for rearmament. Here again there were numerous prophets who predicted misfortunes, and only a few believers. In 1935 the introduction of compulsory armed service. After that militarization of the Rhineland, again a process believed to be impossible at that time. The number of people who put trust in me, was very small. Then the beginning of the fortification of the whole country especially in the west.

One year later, Austria came, this step also was considered doubtful. It brought about a considerable reinforcement of the Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia and Poland. This step also was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of all, the western fortification had to be finished. It was not possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to me from the first moment that I could not be satisfied with the Sudeten-German territory. That was only a partial solution. The decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the erection of the Protectorate and with that the basis for the action against Poland was laid, but I wasn't quite clear at that time whether I should start first against the east and then in the west or vice-versa. Moltke often made the same calculations in his time. Under pressure the decision came to fight with Poland first. One might accuse me of wanting to fight and fight again. In struggle I see the fate of all beings. Nobody can avoid a struggle if he does not want to lose out. The increasing number of people requires a larger living space (Lebensraum). My goal was to create a logical relation between the number of people and the space for them to live in. The struggle must start here. No people can get away from the solution of this task or else it must yield and gradually die out. That is taught by history. First migration of peoples to the southwest, then adaptation of the number of people to the small space by emigration. In the last years, adaptation of the people to insufficient space, by reducing the number of births. This would lead to the death and weakening of the blood of the people. If a people chooses that course all their weaknesses are mobilized. One yields to the force of the outside and uses this force against one's self by killing of the child. This means the greatest cowardice, decimation of the number, and loss of value. I decided a different way: adaptation of the living space to the number of people. One acknowledgement is important. The state has a meaning only if it supports the maintenance of its population potential. In our case 82 millions of people were concerned. That means the

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greatest responsibility. He who does not want to assume this responsibility is not worthy of belonging to the mass of the people. That gave me the strength to fight. It is one eternal problem to bring the number of Germans to a proper relationship to the available space. Security of the needed space. No calculated cleverness is of any help, solution only with the sword. A people unable to produce the strength for fight, must withdraw. Struggles are different than those of 100 years ago. Today we can speak of a racial fight. Today we fight for oilfields, rubber, treasures of the earth, etc. After the peace of Westphalia Germany disintegrated. Disintegration, impotence of the German Reich was determined by decree. This German impotence was removed by the creation of the Reich when Prussia realized her task. Then the opposition between France and England began. Since 1870 England has been against us. Bismarck and Moltke were certain that there would have to be one more action. The danger at that time was of a two-front war. Moltke was at times in favor of a preventive war. To take advantage of the slow progress of the Russian mobilization. German armed might was not fully employed. Insufficient sternness of the leading personalities. The basic thought of Moltke was the offensive. He never thought of the defense. Many opportunities were missed after Moltke's death. The solution was only possible by attacking a country at a favorable moment. Political and military leadership always declared that it was not yet ready. In 1914 there came the war on several fronts. It did not bring the solution of these problems. Today the second act of this drama is being written. For the first time in 67 years it must be made clear that we do not have a two-front war to wage. That which has been desired since 1870 and considered as impossible of achievement has come to pass. For the first time in history we have to fight on only one front, the other front is at present free. But no one can know how long that will remain so. I have doubted for a long time whether I should strike in the east and then in the west. Basically I did not organize the armed forces in order not to strike. The decision to strike was always in me. Earlier or later I wanted to solve the problem. Under pressure it was decided that the east was to be attacked first. If the Polish war was won so quickly, it was due to the superiority of our armed forces. The most glorious appearance in history. Unexpectedly small expenditures of men and materiel. Now the eastern front is held by only a few divisions. It is a situation which we viewed previously as unachievable. Now the situation is as follows: The opponent in the west lies behind his fortifications. There is no possibility of coming to grips with him. The decisive question is: how long can we endure this situation? Russia is at present not dangerous. It is weakened by many incidents today. Moreover, we have a pact with Russia. Pacts, however, are only held as long as they serve the purpose. Russia will hold herself to it only so long as Russia considers it to be to her benefit. Even Bismarck thought so. Let one think of the pact to assure our back. Now Russia has far reaching goals, above all the strengthening of her position in the Baltic. We can oppose Russia only when we are free in the West. Further Russia is striving to increase her influence on the Balkans and is striving toward the Persian Gulf. That is also the goal of our foreign policy. Russia will do that which she considers to benefit her. At the present moment it has retired from internationalism. In case she renounces this, she will proceed to Pan-Slavism. It is difficult to see into the future. It is a fact that at the present time the Russian army is of little worth. For the next one or two years the present situation will remain.

Much depends on Italy, above all on Mussolini, whose death could alter everything. Italy has a great goal for the consolidation of her empire. Those who carry this idea are fascism and the Duce, personally. The court is opposed to that. As long as the Duce lives, then it can be calculated that Italy will seize every opportunity to reach her imperialistic goal. However, it is too much to ask of Italy, that it should join in the battle before Germany has seized the offensive in the west: Just so Russia did not attack until we had marched into Poland. Otherwise Italy will think that France has only to deal with Italy, since Germany is sitting behind its West Wall. Italy will not attack until Germany has taken the offensive against France. Just as the death of Stalin, so the death of the Duce can bring danger to us. Just how easily the death of a statesman can come I myself have experienced recently. The time must be used to the full, otherwise one will suddenly find himself faced with a new situation. As long as Italy maintains this position then no danger from Jugoslavia is to be feared. Just so is the neutrality of Rumania achieved by the position of Russia. Scandinavia is hostile to us because of Marxistic influences, but is neutral now. America is still not dangerous to us because of its neutrality laws. The strengthening of our opponents by America

is still not important. The position of Japan is still uncertain, it is not yet certain whether she will join against England.

Everything is determined by the fact that the moment is favorable now, in 6 months it might not be so anymore.

As the last factor I must name my own person in all modesty: irreplaceable. Neither a military nor a civil person could replace me. Assassination attempts may be repeated. I am convinced of the powers of my intellect and of decision. Wars are always ended only by the destruction of the opponent. Everyone who believes differently is irresponsible. Time is working for our adversary. Now there is a relationship of forces which can never be more propitious, but can only deteriorate for us. The enemy will not make peace when the relationship of forces is unfavorable for us. No compromise. Sternness against ourselves. I shall strike and not capitulate. The fate of the Reich depends only on me. I shall deal accordingly. Today we have a superiority such as we have never had before. After 1914 our opponents disarmed themselves of their own accord. England disregarded the construction of her fleet. The fleet is no longer sufficiently large to safeguard the shipping lanes. Only two modern new constructions: Rodney and Nelson. Now construction activity only in the cruisers of the Washington class, which were, however, an unsatisfactory type. The new measures can become effective only in 1941. In the Abyssinian war England did not have enough strength to occupy the Tana See. At Malta, Gibraltar and London little anti-aircraft protection. Since 1937 a renewal of rearmament. At present however, only a small number of divisions, which must form the nucleus of new divisions. Material for the army being gathered together from all over the world. Not before next summer is a positive action to be expected. The British army has only a symbolic meaning. Rearmament in the air is proceeding. The first phase will end in the spring of 1940. Anti-aircraft has only guns from the last war. A German flyer is safe from English anti-aircraft fire at 6000 meters altitude. The navy will not be fully rearmed before one to two years (1 - 2 Jahren). I have the greatest experience in rearmament and I know the difficulties which must be overcome therein.

After 1914 France reduced the length of service. After 1914 decrease of military might. Only in some special branches are we inferior. Only the French Navy was modernized. In the time after the war the French army deteriorated. There were no changes until Germany rearmed and announced her demands.

In summary:

1) The number of active organizations in Germany is greatest.
2) Superiority of the Luftwaffe.
3) Anti-aircraft beyond all competition.
4) Tank corps
5) Large number of anti-tank guns, five times as many as 1914 machine guns.
6) German artillery has great superiority because of the 10.5 gun.
7) French superiority in howitzers and mortars does not exist.

Numerical superiority, but also the value of the individual soldier is greater than for the others. I am most deeply pained when I hear the opinion that the German army is not individually as valuable as it should be. The infantry in Poland did not accomplish what one should have expected from it. Lax discipline. I believe that the soldiers must be judged in their relative value in comparison with the opponent. There is no doubt that our armed forces are the best. Every German infantryman is better than the French. Not the exhilaration of patriotism but tough determination. I am told that the troops will only advance if the officers lead the way. In 1914 that was also the case. I am told that we were better trained then. In reality we were only better trained on the drill field, but not for the war. I must pay the present leadership the compliment that it is better than it was in 1914. Mention of the collapse while storming Liege. There was nothing like this in the campaign in Poland.

Five million Germans have been called to the colors. Of what importance if a few of them collapse. Daring in the army, navy and Luftwaffe. I can not bear it when one says the army is not in good shape. Everything lies

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in the hands of the military leader. I can do anything with the German soldier if he is well led. We have succeeded with our small navy in clearing the North Sea of the British. Recognition of the small navy, especially the High Command of the Navy.

We have a Luftwaffe which has succeeded in safeguarding the entire living space of the Germans.

The land army achieved outstanding things in Poland. Even in the West it was not shown that the German soldier is inferior to the French.

Revolution from within is impossible. We are superior to the enemy numerically in the West. Behind the Army stands the strongest armaments industry of the world.

I am disturbed by the stronger and stronger appearance of the English. The English are a tough enemy. Above all on defence. There is no doubt that England will be very much represented in France at the latest in six to eight months.

We have an Achilles heel: The Ruhr. The progress of the war depends on the possession of the Ruhr. If England and France push through Belgium and Holland into the Ruhr, we shall be in the greatest danger. That could lead to the paralizing of the German power of resistance. Every hope of compromise is childish: Victory or defeat! The question is not the fate of a national-socialistic Germany, but who is to dominate Europe in the future. The question is worthy of the greatest efforts. Certainly England and France will assume the offensive against Germany when they are armed. England and France have means of pressure to bring Belgium and Holland to request English and French help. In Belgium and Holland the sympathies are all for France and England. Mention of the incident at Venlo: The man who was shot was not an Englishman, but a Dutch General Staff officer. This was kept silent in the press. The Dutch government asked that the body of the Dutch officer be given up. This is one of their greatest stupidities. The Dutch press does not even mention the incident anymore. At a given time I shall use that to motivate my action. If the French army marches into Belgium in order to attack us, it will be too late for us. We must anticipate them. One more thing. U-boat. Mines, and Luftwaffe (also for Mines) can strike England effectively, if we have a better starting point. Now a flight to England demands so much fuel that sufficient bomb loads cannot be carried. The invention of a new type mine is of greatest importance for the Navy. Aircraft will be the chief mine layers now. We shall sow the English coast with mines which cannot be cleared. This mine warfare with the Luftwaffe demands a different starting point. England cannot live without its imports. We can feed ourselves. The permanent sowing of mines on the English coasts will bring England to her knees. However, this can only occur if we have occupied Belgium and Holland. It is a difficult decision for me. None has ever achieved what I have achieved. My life is of no importance in all this. I have led the German people to a great height, even if the world does hate us now. I am setting this work on a gamble. I have to choose between victory or destruction. I choose victory. Greatest historical choice, to be compared with the decision of Friedrich the Great before the first Silesian war. Prussia owes its rise to the heroism of one man. Even there the closest advisers were disposed to capitulation. Everything depended on Friedrich the Great. Even the decisions of Bismarck in 1866 and 1870 were no less great. My decision is unchangeable. I shall attack France and England at the most favorable and quickest moment. Breach of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaningless. No one will question that when we have won. We shall not bring about the breach of neutrality as idiotically as it was in 1914. If we do not break the neutrality, then England and France will. Without attack the war is not to be ended victoriously. I consider it as possible to end the war only by means of an attack. The question as to whether the attack will be successful no one can answer. Everything depends upon the favorable instant. The military conditions are favorable. A prerequisite however, is that the leadership must give an example of fanatical unity from above. There would not be any failures if the leaders always had the courage a rifleman must have.

Individual acknowledgements: The enemy must be beaten only by attack. Chances are different today than during the offensive of 1918. Numerically we can use more than 100 divisions. With respect to men, reserves can be supplied. The material situation is good. Moreover that which is not

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 789-PS
(cont.)

ready today must be ready tomorrow. The whole thing means the end of the World War, not just of a single action. It concerns not just a single question but the existence or non-existence of the nation.

I ask you to pass on the spirit of determination to the lower echelons

1) The decision is irrevocable.
2) The only prospect for success, if the whole armed forces are determined.

The spirit of the great men of our history must hearten us all. Fate demands from us no more than from the great men of German history. As long as I live I shall think only of the victory of my people. I shall shrink from nothing and shall destroy everyone who is opposed to me. I have decided to live my life so that I can stand unshamed if I have to die. I want to destroy the enemy. Behind me stands the German people, whose morale can only grow worse. Only he who struggles with destiny can have a good intuition. In the last years I have experienced many examples of intuition. Even in the present development I see the prophecy.

If we come through this struggle victoriously - and we shall come through victoriously - our time will enter into the history of our people. I shall stand or fall in this struggle. I shall never survive the defeat of my people. No capitulation to the outside forces, no revolution from the interior forces.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 789-PS

3 October 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of document 789-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 798-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

The Führer's speech to the Commanders in Chief on 22 August 1939.

I have called you together to give you a picture of the political situation, in order that you may have insight into the individual elements on which I have based my decision to act and in order to strengthen your confidence.

After this we will discuss military details.

It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come sooner or later. I had already made this decision in spring, but I thought that I would first turn against the West in a few years, and only afterwards against the East. But the sequence cannot be fixed. One cannot close one's eyes even before a threatening situation. I wanted to establish an acceptable relationship with Poland in order to fight first against the West. But this plan, which was agreeable to me, could not be executed, since essential points have changed. It became clear to me, that Poland would attack us in case of a conflict with the West. Poland wants access to the sea. The further development became obvious after the occupation of the Memel region, and it became clear to me that under circumstances a conflict with Poland could arise at an inopportune moment. I enumerate as reasons for this reflection:

1) First of all two personal constitutions:
My own personality and that of Mussolini.
Essentially it depends on me, my existence, because of my political activities. Furthermore the fact that probably no one will ever again have the confidence of the whole German people as I do. There will probably never again be a man in the future with more authority than I have. My existence is therefore a factor of great value. But I can be eliminated at any time by a criminal or an idiot.

The second personal factor is the Duce. His existence is also decisive. If something happens to him, Italy's loyality to the alliance will no longer be certain. The basic attitude of the Italian court is against the Duce. Above all, the court sees in the expansion of the empire a burden. The Duce is the man with the strongest nerves in Italy.

The third factor favourable for us is France. We can ask only benevolent neutrality from Spain. But this depends on France's personality. He guarantees a certain uniformity and steadiness of the present system in Spain. We must take into account the fact that Spain does not as yet have a Fascist party of our internal unity.

On the other side a negative picture as far as decisive personalities are concerned. There is no outstanding personality in England or France.

For us it is easy to make decision. We have nothing to lose; we can only gain. Our economic situation is such, because of our restrictions, that we cannot hold out more than a few years. Goering can confirm this. We have no other choice, we must act. Our opponents risk much and can gain only a little. England's stake in a war is unimaginably great. Our enemies have men who are below average. No personalities. No masters, no men of action.

Besides the personal factor, the political situation is favourable for us; in the Mediterranean rivalry among Italy, France, and England, in the Orient tension, which leads to the alarming of the Mohammedan world.

The English empire did not emerge from the last war strengthened. From a maritime point of view, nothing was achieved. Conflict between England and Ireland. The South African Union became more independent. Concessions had to be made to India. England is in great danger. Unhealthy industries. A British statesman can look into the future only with concern.

France's position has also deteriorated particularly in the Mediterranean.

Further favourable factors for us are these:

Since Albania there is an equilibrium of power in the Balkans. Yugoslawia carries the germ of collapse because of her internal situation.

Rumania did not grow stronger. She is liable to attack and vulnerable She is threatened by Hungary and Bulgaria. Since Kemal's death, Turkey has been ruled by small minds, unsteady, weak men.



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these fortunate circumstances will no longer prevail in 2 to 3 years. No one knows how long I shall live. Therefore conflict better now.

The creation of Greater Germany was a great achievement politically, but militarily it was questionable, since it was achieved through a bluff of the political leaders. It is necessary to test the military. If at all possible, not by general settlement, but by solving individual tasks.

The relation to Poland has become unbearable. My Polish policy hitherto was in contrast to the ideas of the people. My propositions to Poland (Danzig corridor) were distrubed by England's intervention. Poland changed her tone towards us. The initiative cannot be allowed to pass to the others. This moment is more favourable than in 2 to 3 years. An attempt on my life or Mussolini's could change the situation to our disadvantage. One cannot eternally stand opposite one another with cocked rifle. A suggested compromise would have demanded that we change our convictions and make agreeable gestures. They talked to us again in the language of Versailles. There was danger of losing prestige. Now the probability is still great that the West will not interfere. We must accept the risk with reckless resolution. A politician must accept a risk as much as a military leader. We are facing the alternative to strike or to be destroyed with certainty sooner or later.

Reference to previous risks.

I would have been stoned if I had not carried my point. The most dangerous step was the invasion of the neutral zone. Only a week before, I got a warning through France. I have always accepted a great risk in the conviction that it may succeed.

Now it is also a great risk. Iron nerves, iron resolution.

The following special reasons strengthen my idea. England and France are obligated, neither is in a position for it. There is no actual rearmament in England, just propaganda. It has done much damage that many reluctant Germans said and wrote to Englishmen after the solution of the Czech question; The Führer carried his point because you lost your nerve, because you capitulated too soon. This explains the present propaganda war. The English speak of a war of nerves. It is one element of this war of nerves to present the increase of armament. But how is British rearmament in actual fact. The construction programme of the Navy for 1938 has not yet been filled. Only mobilization of the reserve fleet. Purchase of fishing steamers. Considerable strengthening of the Navy, not before 1941 or 1942.

Little has been done on land. England will be able to send a maximum of 3 divisions to the continent. A little has been done for the air force, but it is only a beginning. AA defense is in its beginning stages. At the moment England has only 150 AA guns. The new AA gun has been ordered. It will take a long time until enough have been produced. Fire directors are lacking. England is still vulnerable from the air. This can change in 2 to 3 years. At the moment the English air force has only 130,000 men, France 72,000 men, Poland 15,000 men. England does not want the conflict to break out for two or three years.

The following is characteristic for England. Poland wanted a loan from England for rearmament. England, however, only gave credit in order to make sure that Poland buys in England, although England cannot deliver. This means that England does not really want to support Poland. She does not risk 8 million pounds in Poland, although she put half a billion into China. England's position in the world is very precarious. She will not accept any risks.

France lacks men (decline of the birth rate). Little has been done for rearmament. The artillery is antiquated. France did not want to enter on this adventure. The West has only two possibilities to fight against us:

1) Blockade: It will not be effective because of our antarchy and because we have sources of aid in the east.

2) Attack from the West from the Maginot line: I consider this impossible. Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgium, and Swiss neutrality. I have no doubts that all these states as well as Skandinavia will defend their neutrality by all available means. England and France will not violate the neutrality of these countries. Actually England cannot help Poland. There remains an attack on Italy. A military attack is out of the question. No one is counting on a long war. If Mr. von Brandutch had told me that I would need 4 years to conquer Poland I would have replied: then it



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cannot be done. It is nonsense to say that England wants to wage a long war.

We will hold our position in the West until we have conquered Poland. We must be conscious of our great production. It is much bigger than in 1914-1918.

The enemy had another hope, that Russia would become our enemy after the conquest of Poland. The enemy did not count on my great power of resolution. Our enemies are little worms. I saw them in Munich.

I was convinced that Stalin would never accept the England offer. Russia has no interest in maintaining Poland and Stalin knows that it is the end of his regime no matter whether his soldiers come out of a war victorious or beaten. Litvinow's replacement was decisive. I brought about the change toward Russia gradually. In connection with the commercial treaty we got into political conversation. Proposal of a non-aggression pact. Then came a general proposal from Russia. Four days ago I took a special step, which brought it about that Russia answered yesterday that she is ready to sign. The personal contract with Stalin isestablished. The day after tomorrow von Ribbentrop will conclude the treaty. Now Poland is in the position in which I wanted her.

We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us with grain, cattle, coal, lead and zinc. It is a big arm, which demands great efforts. I am only afraid that at the last minute some Schweinehund will make a proposal for mediation.

The political arm is set farther. A beginning has been made for the destruction of England's hegemony. The way is open for the soldier, after I have made the political preparations.

Today's publication of the non-aggression pact with Russia hit like a shell. The consequences cannot be overlooked. Stalin also said that this course will be of benefit to both countries. The effect on Poland will be tremendous.

Goering answers with thanks to the Führer and the assurance that the armed forces will do their duty.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 798-PS

15 Nov. 1945.

I, Virginia von Schon, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 798-PS.

Virginia von Schon
046318

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1014-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

SECOND SPEECH BY THE FUEHRER ON 22 AUG '39.

It may also turn out differently regarding England and France. One cannot predict it with certainty. I figure on a trade-barrier, not on blocka and with severance of relations. Most iron determination on our side. Retreat before nothing. Everybody shall have to make a point of it that we were determined from the beginning to fight the Western powers. Struggle for life or death. Germany has won every war as long as she was united. Iron, unflinching attitude of all superiors, greatest confidence, faith in victory, overcoming of the past by getting used to heaviest strain. A long period of peace would not do us any good. Therefore it is necessary to expect everything. Manly bearing. It is not machines that fight each other, but men. We have the better quality of men. Mental factors are decisive. The opposite camp has weaker people. In 1918, the Nation fell down because the mental prerequisities were not sufficient. Frederic the Great secured final success only through his mental power.

Destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim is elimination of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line. Even if war should break out in the West, the destruction of Poland shall be the primary objective. Quick decision because of the season.

I shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the war, - never mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be asked later on, whether we told the truth or not. In starting and making a war, not the Right is what matters but Victory.

Have no pity, brutal attitude. 80 million people shall get what is their right. Their existence has to be secure . The strongest has the Right. Greatest severity.

Quick decision necessary. Unshakeable faith in the German soldier. A crisis may happen only if the nerves of the leaders give way.

First aim, advance to the Vistula and Narew. Our technical superiority will break the nerves of the Poles. Every newly created Polish force shall again be broken at once. Constant war of atrition.

New German frontier according to healthy principle. Possibly a protectorate as a buffer. Military operations shall not be influenced by these reflections. Complete destruction of Poland is the military aim. To be fast is the main thing. Pursuit until complete elimination.

Conviction that the German Wehrmacht is up to the requirements. The start shall be ordered, probably by Saturday morning.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1014-PS.

12 Oct. 1945.

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt. Inf 0-133 55 67, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true translation of Document No. 1014-PS.

'Sgd' FRED NIBERGALL

2nd Lt. Inf.
?-133 55 67.



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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1541-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Top Military Secret

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces High Command/armed forces.
Command Staff/ armed forces
Section L Nr. 33 406/40

Top Secret

Matter of Chief
Only through Officer

Fuehrer#9
13 December 1940

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Direction Number 20
Operation Marita

1.) The result of the battles in Albania is not yet decisive. Because of a dangerous situation in Albania it is double necessary that the British endeavor be foiled to create an bases under the protection of a Balkan front, which would be dangerous above all to Italy as well as to the Rumanian oil fields.

2.) My plan therefore is (a) to form a slowly increasing task force in Southern Rumania within the next months.
(b) After the setting in of favorable weather, probably in March, to send this task force for the occupation of the Aegean North coast by way of Bulgaria, and if necessary to occupy the entire Greek mainland (Operation Marita). The support of Bulgaria is to be expected.

3.) For the concentration of the task force in Rumania are necessary:
(a) The 16th Panzer Division which arrives in December on an army mission, and whose task remains unchanged.
(b) Following will be a task force of about seven divisions (final to be dispatched to Southern Rumania. Engineers in the required strength for the preparation of the Danube crossing can conveniently be attached for transport to the 16th Panzer Division (as instructional troops). The field commander of the army will await my decision for the proper moment for them to be employed on the Danube.
(c) Preparations are to be made for further transport to take in the calculated maximum for the operation Marita (total of 24 divisions).
(d) It is the mission of the Air Force to give air protection to the concentration, as well as preparing the necessary primary and reserve installations on Rumania soil.

4.) The Operation Marita itself is to be prepared on the following basis:

(a) The primary mission of the operation is the occupation of the Aegean coast, and the Bay of Saloniki. It may be necessary to continue the attack across Larissa and the Isthmus of Corinth.
(b) Flank protection against Turkey will be the task of the Bulgarian forces, although it is to be secured and strengthened through the alerting of German Forces.
(c) It is not certain whether the Bulgarian forces will take part in the attack. Likewise the Yugoslavs position cannot yet be clearly determined.
(d) It will be the mission of the Air Force to support the drive of the Army in all phases, to liquidate the opposing air force, and, as far as possible, to occupy British strongpoints on the Greek Islands through airborne landings.
(e) The question in which fashion the Operation Marita is to be supported by the Italian forces, and how coordination of the operations is to take place, awaits a later decision.

5.) The military preparations which will produce exceptional political results in the Balkans demands the exact control of all the necessary measures by the General Staff.
The transport through Hungary and the arrival in Rumania will be reported

step by step by the General Staff of the armed forces and are to be explained at first as a strengthening of the German Army mission in Rumania.

Consultations with the Rumanians or the Bulgarians which may point to our intentions as well as notification of the Italians are each subject to my consent also the sending of scouting missions and advanced parties.

6.) After the completion of the operation Marita it is contemplated to use the access of the forces use therein for a new undertaking.

7.) I anticipate reports of the Chiefs concerning their plans, which has already taken place as regards the Army. I want to be presented with exact timetable for the planned preparations, as well as for the necessary recallings from the armament industry, (reconstruction of Furlough Divisions).

Signed: Adolf Hitler.

Witnessed
(Signature unreadable)
Captain in the General Staff

Distribution

| | |
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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1541 PS

10 November

I, PFC ERNST W. COHN, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 1541 PS.

ERNST W. COHN,
PFC 33925738.



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Doc. 1760-PS

United Mexican States )
Mexico Federal District ) SS
Embassy of the United )
States of America )

GEORGE S. MESSERSMITH, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

During the period 1930 to the late spring of 1934, I was Consul General of the United States of America in Berlin. During that period and particularly during the years 1933 and until my departure for Austria in the late spring of 1934, the nature of my work brought me into frequent contact with German Government officials. As background for this statement it is pertinent to state that this contact with German Government officals in the highest categories was necessary by me as Consul General, and some of my principal associates, because of the circumstances of the period.

In the period immediately preceding the coming into power of the National Socialists it was necessary for me and some of my principal associates in the Consulate General to have contact with high officials of the German Government because of the unsettled state of affairs in Germany due to the uncertain political situation; this involved difficulties for American firms of various kinds which made the intervention of the Consulate General in the line of its regular duty necessary. In addition to this contact with the officials of the Government, as a matter of further duty, I had contact with individuals in all parties in Germany in order to keep myself and therefore our Government currently informed with regard to developments in the political picture in Germany. During that period, and before the National Socialists came into power, I therefore had contact of an informal character with persons in the National Socialist Party for the purpose of securing information as to their aims and objectives, but that contact was, before the access to power of that party, with secondary rather than with the first ranking members thereof.

Immediately after the access to power of the National Socialist Government in the beginning of 1933, all sorts of steps of an arbitrary character were taken by the new Government and by its various agencies and dependencies which affected the rights of American citizens and property and in the carrying through of my official duty as Consul General I had the primary responsibility for the protection of American citizens and property. In consequence of this responsibility I had to see frequently almost all of the high ranking members of the German Government with the exception of Hitler and a very large number of officials below the rank of Minister. The nature of my duties was such that a considerable portion of my days had to be spent in visits on such officials to discuss the protection of American interests and property. Some of these secondary officials I had known before the Party came to power, for information purposes.

It is difficult to explain adequately in a statement of this kind the circumstances under which these officials of the Nazi German Government frequently took occasion to talk to me most frankly about matters of general Nazi policy and to discuss frankly and freely the aims and purposes of the Nazi regime. Frequently our conversations were long and difficult because of the matters which I had to present and on which I had to take the firmest stand. Not infrequently at the end of such official conversations they spoke freely and without any reserve with regard to the aims of the regime.

It is the more important to bring this out in this preliminary section of my statement because I did not at any time conceal from any of these Nazi officials my complete lack of sympathy with the course which they were pursuing not did I hesitate to say to them what I considered was the danger of the course which they were pursuing not only for Germany but for Europe and the rest of the world. Their freedom of expression to me was all the more interesting in view of the fact that I never hesitated to assert in the strongest possible way the rights of the United States and of its citizens when they were violated. It requires a knowledge of the circumstances of the time, of the character and psychology of these high Nazi and secondary Nazi officials to be able to appreciate that the fact that I was forthright in my views and did not hesitate to express them and particularly that we stood out so strongly for the rights of our country and our citizens that led them to respect me and my associates and to reveal to me more than they very probably revealed to other

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foreign representatives. Whatever the reasons may have been, however, the Nazi Government officials, almost without exception from the highest to the lowest with whom I had contact, were on most occasions amazingly frank in their conversation and without any concealment of their aims.

(Omitted is a part of this affidavit in which Mr. Messersmith lists the names, and states his impressions of, the following:

1. Hermann Goering
2. General Milch
3. Hjalmar Schacht
4. Hans Frank
5. Wilhelm Frick
6. Count Schwerin von Krosigk
7. Joseph Goebbels
8. Richard Walther Darré
9. Robert Ley
10. Hans Heinrich Lammers
11. Otto Meissner
12. Franz von Papen
13. Walther Funk
14. General Wilhelm Keitel
15. Admiral Eric von Raeder
16. Admiral Karl Doenitz
17. Dr. Bohle
18. Dr. Stuckart
19. Dr. Krupp von Bohlen
20. Dr. Davidson)

In the late spring or early summer of 1934, I cannot recall the exact date, I left my post as Consul General at Berlin to go to Vienna where I remained until the late spring of 1937. During my stay in Austria, I had intimate official and personal contact with the highest officials of the Austrian Government as well as with many of the secondary and lower ranking officials. I had this intimate contact with these officials of the Austrian Government from the very outset due undoubtedly to the fact that when I came to Austria it was already well known that I was an outspoken opponent of all that the Nazi Government and leaders stood for. In consequence, even though I was the Minister of a country which was considered in Austria as having no immediate concern in Austria's foreign relations, I received much information from the many Austrian officials on developments in Austro-German relations and in their relations with other countries in Europe. Among those whom I saw frequently and from whom I obtained information were the following:

President Miklas
Chancellor Dollfuss
Chancellor Schuschnigg
Foreign Minister Berger-Waldenegg
Police President and Minister of
Security, Hofrat Skubl.

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In addition, I should add that there were both in Berlin and in Vienna a corps of correspondents, many of whom were of outstanding ability and with whom I was in frequent contact.

Finally, I should say that during my stay in Austria I made fairly frequent trips to Berlin and on many of these saw and talked with the same persons whom I had known during my residence there as Consul-General. Thus I maintained my German sources of information as well as acquiring new Austrian ones.

I feel fully qualified, therefore, to speak with authority on the matters which follow in this statement. The specific conversations and events which I recite are, of course, specific facts which I set forth here as facts. As to many of them, I have refreshed my recollection as to details from contemporaneous reports and letters which I wrote during this period. The opinions which I offer are, I believe, fully warranted by the sum total of information which I received from all sources.

From the very beginnings of the Nazi Government, I was told by both high and secondary Government officials in Germany that incorporation of Austria into Germany was a political and economic necessity and that this incorporation was going to be accomplished "by whatever means were necessary". Although I cannot assign definite times and places, I am sure that at various times and places every one of the German officials whom I have listed earlier in this statement told me this, with the exception of Schacht, von Krosigk and Krupp von Bohlen. I can assert that it was fully understood by everyone in Germany who had any knowledge whatever of what was going on that Hitler and the Nazi Government were irrevocably committed to this end and the only doubt which ever existed in conversations or statements to me was "how" and "when".

At the beginnings of the Nazi regime in 1933, Germany was, of course, far too weak to permit any open threats of force against any country, such as the threats which the Nazis made in 1938. Instead it was the avowed and declared policy of the Nazi Government to accomplish the same results which they later accomplished through force through the methods which had proved so successful for them in Germany - obtain a foothold in the Cabinet, particularly in the Ministry of the Interior which controlled the police, and then quickly eliminate the opposition elements. During my stay in Austria I was told on any number of occasions by Chancellor Dollfuss, Chancellor Schuschnigg, President Miklas and other high officials of the Austrian Government that the German Government kept up constant and unceasing pressure upon the Austrian Government to agree to the inclusion of a number of Ministers with Nazi orientation. The English and French Ministers in Vienna with whom I was in constant and close contact confirmed this information through statements which they made to me of conversations which they had with high Austrian officials.

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In order to compel the Austrian Government to accept their terms the Nazis resorted to almost every conceivable measure, including economic pressure, propaganda, and most important of all, terroristic acts. My information concerning these terroristic outrages came partly from official communiques of the Austrian Government, partly from responsible news sources, and to a very considerable extent from Skubl, the Police President and later Minister of Public Security, whom I saw frequently and knew well. The Austrian secret police under the direction of Skubl, it should be noted, was one of the most efficient in all of Europe.

The outrages were an almost constant occurrence, but there were three distinct periods during which they rose to a peak. During the first two of these periods -- in mid-1933, and in early 1934--I was still in Berlin. However, during that period I was told by high Nazi officials in conversation with them that these waves of terror were being instigated and directed by them. I found no concealment in my conversations with high Nazi officials of the fact that they were responsible for these activities in Austria. These admissions were entirely consistent with the Nazi thesis that terror is necessary and must be used to impose the will of the Party not only in Germany but in other countries. I recall specifically that General Milch was one of those who spoke frankly that these outrages in Austria were being directed by the Nazi Party and expressed his concern with respect thereto and his disagreement with this definite policy of the Party.

During the wave of terroristic acts in May and June 1934, I had already assumed my duties as American Minister in Vienna. The bomb outrages during this period were directly primarily at railways, tourist centers, and the Catholic Church, which latter, in the eyes of the Nazis, was one of the strongest organizations opposing them. I recall, however, that these outrages diminished markedly for a few days during the meeting of Hitler and Mussolini in Venice in mid-June 1934. At that time Mussolini was strongly supporting the Austrian Government and was strongly and deeply interested in maintaining Austrian independence and sovereignty and in keeping down Nazi influence and activity in Austria. At that time also Hitler could not afford an open break with Mussolini and undoubtedly agreed to the short cessation of these bomb outrages on the insistence of Mussolini because he, Hitler, wished to achieve as favorable an atmosphere for the meeting between him and Mussolini as possible. The cessation of the bomb outrages during the Hitler-Mussolini conversations was considered by me and by the Austrian authorities and by all observers at that time as an open admission on the part of Hitler and the German Government that the outrages were systematically and completely instigated and controlled from Germany.

While I cannot recall at this time the details of the terroristic acts, they were fully reported in the Legation despatches of the period. These reports were based upon intimate and frequent contact with high Austrian officials and many of the details I received from the then head of the Austrian Police, Dr. Skubl. While there was no doubt whatever that these outrages had been conducted and directed by Germany, there was ample evidence as to the origin of the outrages from the fact that fragments of the bombs collected by the Austrian police showed that they were of German manufacture and had been introduced from Germany into Austria. While I do not recall having seen any of these bomb fragments myself, I recall specifically having been told by high Austrian authorities that they had seen them and that there was no doubt as to the origin of the bombs. A further proof that these outrages were directed from Germany, although in most cases the bombs were actually planted by Austrian Nazis, is found in the fact that the records of the Vienna Police and Courts at the time will show that when some of those Nazis were arrested they declared proudly that they had committed these acts.

At various times I or A. W. Kliefoth, Counselor of the Legation, reported on these outrages because of their significance. Quotations from some of these despatches are as follows:

"Trunks containing inflammable material were placed in the three leading railway stations of Vienna and timed to explode simultaneously on the evening of May 6. The damage was very slight. The police charged the Nazis with the Crime.

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"An official communique, dated May 10, announced that on the previous evening a bomb was exploded near the Philadelphia Bridge in Vienna, wounding two persons. The same evening a bomb was exploded in one of the local beer gardens, at which a picnic of the Heimwehr was being held, slightly wounding a woman".

Official despatch from Vienna dated May 15, 1934.

"During the past week the continuation of the Nazi terrorist activities in bombing public places and railway lines, with the object of damaging the Austrian tourist trade, some of which are described below, was the source of serious concern to the authorities. This terrorism was carried out according to a well organized plan, undoubtedly conducted by Nazi agents in Germany. The explosives used by the Nazis during the past week, according to the Foreign Office, were all manufactured in Germany and smuggled into Austria."

"In a communique dated May 24, the authorities also admitted a number of other bomb outrages at Braunau, Bad Ischl and Dorf an der Pram. While the damage to both life and property was small - no lives were lost - the Government admitted its inability to cope with the situation with the existing measures of security . . . .

"The authorities further confirmed officially, on May 25, a bomb explosion on May 23 in the residence of the Archbishop of Salzburg, which caused considerable damage. At Morzg, near Salzburg, on May 23, a bomb explosion wrecked a flower-kiosk, causing damages amounting to 10,000 schillings. A nine year old child was severely injured in Anlaiten, near Ried."

Official Despatch from Vienna dated May 29, 1934.

"The Nazi terrorist outrages continued during the past week in spite of the Government's notification regarding the application throughout Austria of martial law for crimes of public violence. These crimes, now punishable by death, include malicious acts against public order, and damage to the railway, telegraph, telephone and wireless services of the State.

"The new development in the recent outrages was that many of the acts were directed against the property of the Roman Catholic Church, which in the eyes of the Nazis was the strongest organization opposing the Nazi regime.

"In addition to the attempted bombing of the Archbishop's palace in Salzburg, a few days previously, a bomb was exploded on May 20 in an annex to the Archbishop's palace in Feldkirch, which caused minor damages. The police charged Nazis with the outrages and arrested a number of suspects. During the night of May 27, a bomb explosion broke windows in the churches and vicarage of St. Paul in Carinthia.

"In Linz, on May 26, a bomb exploded before the entrance of one of the schools, breaking 44 windows. The school was empty at the time the outrage was committed. During the same night, an attempt was made to blow up the electric works at Braunau, causing a temporary suspension of the electric service.

"Other outrages, not reported by the press, included an attempt to blow up one of the bridges over the Danube in Vienna on May 30, a bomb explosion in one of the popular cafes, and numerous bombings of telephone and newspaper kiosks."

Official Despatch from Vienna dated June 4, 1934.

"The National Socialist terrorism in Austria, which started slowly and cautiously several weeks ago, culminated in a heavy and rather serious outbreak on June 8 to June 11, threatening not only the peace



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and security of the country, but the foreign tourist trade, an exceedingly important item in Austria's economic life. The attempts to wreck the railway lines near Vienna and in other parts of Austria, as well as terrorist outrages in the principal tourist centers, occupied the attention of the Government above all other matters. After a number of important cabinet sessions, new measures were adopted to counteract the terrorism, and the matter was also the subject of diplomatic conversations between Austria and Germany."

Official Despatch from Vienna dated June 13, 1934.

"The outrages in Austria during the week ending June 23, while almost as numerous as in the week preceding, were less violent in character. The attacks were directed, as heretofore, against the quarters of anti-Nazi associations and persons, public utilities, but less against the railway communications. Additional stores of expolsive materials were uncovered in Vienna and elsewhere."

. . . . . .

"A recent terrorist explosion in the Vienna School of Agronomy caused damages amounting to about 40,000 schillings. As a result of the Nazi outrages, the school has been closed for one week.

"In an attempted bomb attack on the post office in Bregenz, the capital of the Province of Vorarlberg, the police seized a supply of explosives bearing labels of "Sprengstoffwerke Kloster Lechfeld, G.m.b.H.", "Dynamit A.G. Hamburg, Alfred Nobel & Co.", and "Fabrik Wurzendorf", explosive factories domiciled in Germany.

Official Despatch from Vienna dated June 25, 1934.

"During the week ending June 30 there were less terrorist outrages of major importance, but the number of small outrages, bomb explosions, attacks on electric, water, and railway establishments had not decreased. The principal attacks were directed against Catholic institutions, ex-National Socialists, and the city of Salzburg. The purpose in the latter case was to frighten foreign tourists away from the Summer Music Festivals at Salzburg.

"A bomb which exploded in the Roman Catholic vicarage in Kapfenberg, in the Province of Styria, on June 24, resulted in the death of the Chaplain, Reverend Franz Eibel. Several other persons were slightly injured. The death was one of terrorism, although there were several cases of attacks. Likewise there were attacks on other Church institutions in different parts of the country.

"A series of outrages were reported on June 28 from Salzburg and adjoining tourist centers. Bombs were exploded in the market place and elsewhere, and attempts were made to blow up the electric and railway communications. The outrages were particularly directed at Salzburg at this time in view of the forthcoming Summer Festivals, which ordinarily attract thousands of non-German tourists. Similar attacks were made the same day in the Provinces of Vorarlberg and Tyrol."

Official Despatch from Vienna dated July 3, 1934.

"A series of lesser outrages were reported from all parts of Austria on Sunday, July 15. A large amount of explosives were stolen from a shop in Gloggnitz; the director of the institution was fined 600 schillings and sentenced to two weeks imprisonment for negligence in guarding the supplies. In Unterkirchen, on July 17, a bomb explosion damaged the local vicarage and the electric works. On July 18 a bomb explosion in Innsbruck injured one person, whereas in St. Kathrein a house was damaged. In Vienna on July 18 a public telephone was damaged, and set on fire. The perpetrator, a National Socialist, was immediately apprehended by the Police. At Edlach, a summer resort about 100 kilometers from Vienna, an attempt was made to bomb the railway. A similar attempt was made in a Tyrolian mountain railway station."



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. Official Despatch from Vienna dated July 26, 1934.

In addition to these outrages, the Nazis attempted to bring pressure upon Austria by means of the "Austrian Legion". This organization, a para-military force of several thousand men, was stationed near the Austrian border in Germany as a constant and direct threat of violent action against Austria. It was without any question sanctioned by the Nazi Government of Germany as it could otherwise not have existed, and it was armed by them. It was made up of Austrian Nazis who had fled from Austria after committing various crimes in Austria and by Austrians in Germany who were attracted by the idle life and pay given by the German authorities.

After the July Putsch, in August 1934, in Vienna I was told by the British Military Attache in Vienna of a conversation which he had had with the German Military Attache in Vienna, General Muff. It may be observed here that to my knowledge General Muff was a rather influential person in Germany and one who played a preponderant role in the German Legation in Vienna. General Muff told the British Military Attache that he had just been in Germany and had spent three days with Hitler at Berchtesgaden, during which time he had had several conversations with Hitler. He said then - in August 1934 - that the Austrian Legion had not yet been dissolved and that Hitler had talked at length with him about the Legion. General Muff did not deem it worth while to conceal to the British Military Attache the fact that the Austrian Legion had been armed and that the Nazis had armed it. I saw General Muff later myself and received the same impression as to these facts although he was not as frank and direct in his statements with me as he had been with the British Military Attache.

The events of the Putsch of July 25, 1934, are too well known for me to repeat them in this statement. I need say here only that there can be no doubt that the Putsch was ordered and organized by the Nazi officials from Germany through their organization in Austria made up of German Nazis and Austrian Nazis. Dr. Rieth, the German Minister in Vienna, was fully familiar with all that was going to happen and that was being planned. The German Legation was located directly across the street from the British Legation and the Austrian secret police kept close watch on the persons who entered the German Legation. The British had their own secret service in Vienna at the time and they also kept a discreet surveillance over people entering the German Legation. I was told by both British and Austrian officials that a number of the men who were later found guilty by the Austrian Courts of having been implicated in the Putsch had frequented the German Legation. In addition, I personally followed very closely the activities of Dr. Rieth and I never doubted on the basis of all my information that Dr. Rieth was in close touch and constant touch with the Nazi agents in Austria; these agents being both German and Austrian. Dr. Rieth could not have been unfamiliar with the Putsch and the details in connection therewith. I recall too very definitely from my conversations with the highest officials of the Austrian Government after the Putsch, their informing me that Dr. Rieth had been in touch with von Rintelen, who it had been planned by the Nazis was to succeed Chancellor Dollfuss had the Putsch been successful.

It may be that Dr. Rieth was himself not personally sympathetic with the plans for the Putsch but there is no question that he was fully familiar with all these plans and must have given his assent thereto and connived therein.

As this Putsch was so important and was a definite attempt to overthrow the Austrian Government and resulted in the murder of the Chancellor of Austria, I took occasion to verify at the time for myself various other items of evidence indicating that the Putsch was not only made with the knowledge of the German Government but engineered by it. I found and verified that almost a month before the Putsch, Goebbels told Signor Cerruti, the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, that there would be a Nazi Government in Vienna in a month. On the evening before the Putsch, a pamphlet appeared in the streets of Berlin from which it appeared that the



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Nazi Government had full knowledge of what was planned the next day in Vienna. An attempt was made by the German authorities in Berlin to suppress this pamphlet and this effort was partly successful but copies of it were available at the time and I recall an officer of our Embassy in Berlin, whose name I cannot specifically recall at this time, informing me that he had seen a copy thereof. Articles also appeared in some of the German papers of July 25, indicating that they had information as to the time that the Putsch was to take place. I will not go into detail as to the character of the evidence but there is no question from the historical record and the facts as known to me from direct knowledge at the time that the Putsch was engineered and directed by the German Government from Berlin and Munich.

For two years following the failure of the July 25 Putsch, the Nazis remained relatively quiet in Austria. Very few terroristic acts occurred during the remainder of 1934 and as I recall in 1935 and most of 1936; this inactivity was in accordance with directives from Berlin as direct evidence to that effect, which came to my knowledge at that time, proved. Early in January, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, furnished me a document which I considered accurate in all respects and which stated:

"The German Minister here, von Papen, on the occasion of his last visit to Berlin, was received three times by Chancellor Hitler for fairly long conversations, and he also took this opportunity to call on Schacht and von Neurath. In these conversations the following instructions were given to him:

"During the next two years nothing can be undertaken which will give Germany external political difficulties. On this ground, everything must be avoided which could awaken the appearance of Germany interfering in the internal affairs of Austria. Chancellor Hitler will, therefore, also for this reason not endeavor to intervene in the present prevailing difficult crisis in the National Socialist Party in Austria, although he is convinced that order could be brought into the Party at once through a word from him. This word, however, he will, for foreign political reasons, give all the less, as he is convinced that the, for him, desirable ends may be reached also in another way. Naturally, Chancellor Hitler declared to the German Minister here, this does not indicate any disinterestedness in the idea of Austria's independence. Also, before everything, Germany cannot for the present withdraw Party members in Austria, and must, therefore, in spite of the very real exchange difficulties, make every effort to bring help to the persecuted National Socialist sufferers in Austria. As a result, Minister of Commerce Schacht finally gave the authorization that from then on 200,000 marks a month were to be set aside for this end (support of National Socialists in Austria). The control and the supervision of this monthly sum was to be entrusted to Engineer Reinthaler, who, through the fact that he alone had control over the money, would have a definite influence on the Party followers. In this way it would be possible to end most quickly and most easily the prevailing difficulties and division in the Austrian National Socialist Party.

"The hope was also expressed to Herr von Papen that the recently authorized foundation of German 'Ortsgruppen' of the National Socialist Party in Austria (made up of German citizens in Austria) would be so arranged as not to give the appearance that Germany is planning to interfere in Austrian internal affairs.

"He was also informed that an effort would be made through the easing of the Auslandesperre, particularly with reference to the more westerly Austrian Alps sections, so that to the German-Austrian Alpenverein (Alps Association) a particular role was to be given. The easing of the Auslandesperre was naturally only to be accorded to those who obligated themselves to visit the more westerly Austrian Alps sections and to go to fixed towns and live in specified hotels or inns."



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This policy of the Nazis was dictated solely by considerations of expediency. The basic aim of achieving Anschluss remained wholly unchanged. The brutal murder of Dollfuss, the Austrian Chancellor, and the unquestioned direct attack on Austrian sovereignty through the Putsch, directed by the German Government from Germany, had so shocked public opinion in Austria and in Europe that the Nazis could not afford for the time being to take open action.

That the policy of Anschluss remained wholly unchanged was confirmed to me by Franz von Papen when he arrived in Vienna as German Minister. It will be recalled that he accepted this assignment as German Minister even though he knew that he had been marked for execution in the St. Barthlomew's massacre on June 30, 1934. When, in accordance with protocol, he paid me a visit shortly after his arrival in Vienna, I determined that during this call there would be no reference to anything of importance and I limited the conversation strictly to platitudes which I was able to do as he was calling on me in my office. I deemed it expedient to delay my return call for several weeks in order to make it clear to von Papen that I had no sympathy with and on the other hand was familiar with the objectives of his mission in Austria. When I did call on von Papen in the German Legation, he greeted me with "Now you are in my Legation and I can control the conversation". In the baldest and most cynical manner he then proceeded to tell me that all of Southeastern Europe, to the borders of Turkey, was Germany's natural hinterland, and that he had been charged with the mission of facilitating German economic and political control over all this region for Germany. He blandly and directly said that getting control of Austria was to be the first step. He definitely stated that he was in Austria to undermine and weaken the Austrian Government and from Vienna to work towards the weakening of the Governments in the other states to the South and South East. He said that he intended to use his reputation as a good Catholic to gain influence with certain Austrians, such as Cardinal Innitzer, towards that end. He said that he was telling me this because the German Government was bound on this objective of getting this control of Southeastern Europe and there was nothing which could stop it and that our own policy and that of France and England was not realistic.

The circumstances were such, as I was calling on him in the German Legation, that I had to listen to what he had to say and of course I was prepared to hear what he had to say although I already knew what his instructions were. I was nevertheless shocked to have him speak so baldly to me and when he finished I got up and told him how shocked I was to hear the accredited representative of a supposedly friendly state to Austria admit that he was proposing to engage in activities to undermine and destroy that Government to which he was accredited. He merely smiled and said, of course this conversation was between us and that he would, of course, not be talking to others so clearly about his objectives. I have gone into this detail with regard to this conversation as it is characteristic of the absolute frankness and directness with which high Nazi officials spoke of their objectives.

Nazi activities, forced underground in this period, were by no means neglected. The Party was greatly weakened for a time as a result of the energetic measures taken against the Putsch and as a result of the public indignation. Reorganization work was soon begun. In October 1934 the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, furnished me the following memorandum, which he told me had been supplied to the Austrian Government by a person who participated in the meeting under reference.

"A meeting of the chiefs of the Austrian National Socialist Party was held on the 29th and 30th of September, 1934, at Bad Aibling in Bavaria.



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"The meeting occupied itself principally with the reorganization of the Austrian National Socialist Party and particularly with the measures to be taken to this end in the Tirol.

"Measures were decided upon as to the means to be used to create better contact between the party leadership and its members as well as with respect to new propaganda measures.

"One principal point on the agenda had reference to the preparatory measures to be taken for taking over the power in Austria. It was decided to give to all of the Party Headquarters in Austria instructions preparatory to new Terroristic acts. The necessary material, however, is nevertheless until new instructions are issued not to be transported from the German border into Austria, but shall be kept assembled at appropriate places on the German side of the entire Austro-German frontier.

"From a report received by the Party chiefs on the situation in Vienna and upper Styria, it is established that agreements have been concluded with the Communists and with the Socialists with respect to a uniform and common procedure.

"The agents of the Party Direction in Germany have received orders in every Austrian district to prepare lists of all those persons who are known to actively support the present Government and who are prepared closely to cooperate with it.

"When the next action against the Government takes place these persons are to be proceeded against just as brutally as against all those other persons, without distinction of party, who are known to be adversaries of National Socialism.

"In a report of the Party leaders for Austria the following principles have been emphasized:

"A. The taking over of the power in Austria remains the principal duty of the Austrian National Socialist Party. Austria has for the German Reich a much greater significance and value than the Saar. The Austrian problem is the problem. All combat methods are consecrated by the end which they are to serve.

"B. We must on every occasion which presents itself appear to be disposed to negotiate, but arm at the same time for the struggle. The new phase of the struggle will be particularly serious and there will be this time two centers of the terror, one along the German frontier and the other along the Yugoslav frontier."

The Austrian Legion was kept in readiness in Germany. Although it was taken back some miles further from the Austrian frontier, it remained undissolved in spite of the engagement which had been taken to dissolve it. The Austrian Government received positive information to this effect from time to time which it passed on to me and I had direct information to the same effect from reliable persons coming from Germany to Vienna who actually saw the Legion.

On the surface, however, German activities consisted principally of efforts to win the support of prominent and influential men through insidious efforts of all kinds, including the use of the German Diplomatic Mission in Vienna and its facilities and personnel.



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Von Papen as German Minister entertained frequently and on a lavish scale. He approached almost every member of the Austrian Cabinet, telling them, as several of them later informed me, that Germany was bound to prevail in the long run and that they should join the winning side if they wished to enjoy positions of power and influence under German control. Of course, openly and outwardly he gave solemn assurance that Germany would respect Austrian independence and that all that she wished to do was to get rid of elements in the Austrian Government like the Chancellor, Schuschnigg and Starhemberg as head of the Heimwehr and others, and replace them by a few "nationally-minded" Austrians, which of course meant Nazis. The whole basic effort of von Papen was to bring about Anschluss.

In early 1935, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, informed me that in the course of a conversation with von Papen, the latter had remarked "Yes, you have your French and English friends now and you can have your independence a little longer". The Foreign Minister, of course, told me this remark in German but the foregoing is an accurate translation. The Foreign Minister told me that he had replied to von Papen "I am glad to have from your own lips your own opinion which agrees with what your chief has just said in the Saar and which you have taken such pains to deny." Von Papen appeared to be terribly upset when he realized just what he had said and tried to cover his statements, but according to Berger-Waldenegg, kept constantly getting into deeper water.

Von Papen undoubtedly achieved some successes, particularly with men like Glaise-Horstenau and others who had long favored the "Grossdeutschum" idea, but who nevertheless had been greatly disturbed by the fate of the Catholic Church. Without conscience or scruple, von Papen exploited his reputation and that of his wife as ardent and devout Catholics to overcome the fears of these Austrians in this respect.

Developments in the fall of 1935 and the spring of 1936 gave Germany an opportunity to take more positive steps in the direction of the Nazification of Austria. Italy, which had given Austria assurance of support of the most definite character against external German aggression, and on one occasion, by mobolizing her forces, had undoubtedly stopped German aggressive action which had been planned against Austria, embarked on her Abyssinian adventure. This and the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 completely upset the balance in Europe. The French and the British Minister informed me that as early as August 1935, they had informed their Governments, on the basis of conversations with the Austrian Foreign Minister, that if there was to be any Danubian Pact, it would have to come into being rapidly for the Austrian Government would be forced to negotiate with Germany even though it would have no confidence that any such agreement arrived at would be respected.

The result of all these forces was the Austro-German accord of July 11, 1936, the public text is as follows:

> "Convinced that they are thereby rendering a valuable contribution toward the peaceful development of Europe, and believing that they are thereby doing the best service to the various common interests of the two German States, the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the Austrian Federal State have decided to restore normal and friendly mutual relations.
>
> "It is therefore declared:
>
> "(1) In the sense of the statement made by the Führer and Reich Chancellor on May 21, 1935 the German Government



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recognizes the full sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria:[1]

"(2) Each of these two Governments shall regard the internal political conditions of the other country, including the question of Austrian National-Socialism, as a domestic concern of that country, upon which it will exert neither direct nor indirect influence:

"(3) The Austrian Federal State Government's general policy and its policy toward Germany in particular shall be constantly guided by the Principle that Austria recognizes herself to be a German State. The Rome Protocol of 1934, together with its additional clauses of 1936, and the relations of Austria to Italy and Hungary, as partners in the said protocols are not hereby affected.

"Recognizing that the relaxation of tension desired by both parties can be brought about only if in addition certain preliminary conditions are established by the Governments of both countries, the Reich Government and the Austrian Federal Government shall in a series of detailed measures create these required preliminary conditions."

Even more important than the terms of the agreement published in the official communique, was the contemporaneous informal understanding, the most important provisions of which were, that Austria would (1) appoint a number of individuals enjoying the Chancellor's confidence but friendly to Germany to positions in the Cabinet; (2) would devise means to give the "national opposition" a role in the political life of Austria and within the framework of the Patriotic Front, and (3) would amnesty all Nazis save those convicted of the most serious offenses. This amnesty was duty announced by the Austrian Government and thousands of Nazis were released, and the first penetration of the Deutsche Nationaler into the Austrian Government was accomplished by the appointment of Dr. Guido Schmidt as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and of Dr. Edmund Glaise-Horstenau as Minister without portfolio.

The significance of these arrangements can best be explained by quoting from an official despatch which I wrote in October 1934 when concern was being expressed with regard to conversations which Chancellor Schuschnigg was reported as having with the "moderate Nazis", Reinthaller and Riehl. I then reported as follows:

"It is obvious, however, that in view of certain well known facts, these conversations will be followed with interest. A major consideration which will not be disregarded is the fact that Chancellor Hitler himself has

1. On May 1935, in a speech in the Reichstag, Hitler had stated with respect to Austria (I quote from Documents on International Affairs, Vol. I. 1935, published by the Royal Institute of National Affairs, (London, 1936) p. 171):

"Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria, or to conclude an "Anschluss". The German people and the German Government have, however, the very comprehensible desire, arising out of a simple feeling of solidarity due to a common national descent--namely, that the right to self-determination should be guaranteed, not only for foreign nations but to the German people everywhere. I myself believe that no regime which does not rest on public consent and is not supported by the people can continue permanently."



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always been in favor of indirect rather than direct action in bringing Austria into the German picture. It is his belief that the way to be followed is to get representatives of the National Socialist Party into the penetration. It is an indication of political astuteness, for it is quite certain, in the opinion of many objective observers, that if once a militant, even though small, National Socialist minority gets representation in the Cabinet, it will be the forerunner of absorption. To explain why this is so is rather difficult, as it requires a full appreciation of many factors at play in Germany and in Austria. Briefly, however, it may be epitomized in the terroristic policy which is one of the primary principles of National Socialism. Even before July 25, when the National Socialist Party was legally prohibited, it was very difficult to get proper police and judicial action against National Socialists who committed terroristic acts or who were plotting against the Government. This inaction came, not through sympathy with the movement or through lack of definite knowledge of overt acts, but through fear - through fear of reprisals when a National Socialist regime might come, and that if it did come, those who had proceeded, even though in the line of duty, against National Socialists, would be dealt with with the barbarity and intolerance with which National Socialism has treated its opponents in Germany. The determined attitude of the Government after July 25, strengthened the administration of justice and of the security forces, and this changed attitude came about as a result not only of the feeling within the country that National Socialism would not come now, but also as a result of the action of the powers in support of the independence of Austria. Should the conversations which the Government is having with the National Socialist groups reawaken this fear, or should there be any weakening of the attitude of the Government towards National Socialist be admitted even to indirect or subordinate participation in the Government, it would undoubtedly bring back this fear in an even more acute form and bring into what element of weakness.

"The fact that these conversations are taking place need therefore, not be considered as being intrinsically a disturbing factor in the internal and external situation of Austria, but should these National Socialist elements in the Government, there is reason for the gravest concern, not only so far as the internal situation in Austria is concerned, but this might become the focal point of disturbance without the country..."

The sequel of the agreement was the only one which could have been expected in view of all the facts and previous recorded happenings. Active Nazi operations in Austria were resumed under the leadership of a certain Captain Leopold, who it was known definitely was in frequent touch with Hitler. The Nazi program was now to form an organization through which the Nazi could carry on their operations openly and with legal sanction in Austria. There were formed in Austria several organizations which had a legal basis but which were simply a device by which the Nazis in Austria could organize, and later seek inclusion as a unit in the Patriotic Front. The most important of these was the Ostmarkischer Verein, the sponsor of which was the Minister of the Interior Glaise-Horstenau. Through the influence of Glaise-Horstenau and the pro-Nazi Neustadter-Sturmer, this organization was declared legal by the Courts. I made specific mention of the foregoing because it shows the degree to which the situation in Austria had disintegrated as a result of the underground and open Nazi activities directed from Germany.



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Even more open recognition of the Nazis was demanded. In January 1937, Captain Leopold submitted a memorandum of Nazi demands, which, though not formally received, were known to and considered by the Austrian Cabinet.

The Leopold memorandum is as follows:

For the Internal Pacification of Austria.

(In Mr. Messersmith's affidavit there appears at this point the body of Captain Leopold's lengthy memorandum. It includes Captain Leopold's statement of the existing situation in Austria. It includes the following demands: (1) An amnesty for all punishments or privations suffered for National Socialist or National activity or sympathy; (2) equal treatment for National Socialists, including freedom of political activity and cultural activity; abolition of laws and sanctions used by the Government against Nazi activity. The memorandum advocates cooperation on the basis of political principles including: A broadening of the Patriotic Front; changes in the Cabinet; an alliance with the Reich; common racial stock as a political aim, and the application of anti-Semitic measures; an early plebiscite on Anschluss.)

Later, a petition circulated by Leopold was submitted to the Austrian Government, demanding authorization to form a "nationalistic party", which was to be incorporated as a group in the Political Front. It was a Party which its sponsorship plainly marked as openly Nazi. Pressure for the acceptance of these demands was exercised by staging frequent demonstrations and circulating propaganda, all of which was financed in and from Germany. Even as soon after July 11 as July 29, 1936, when the Olympic Torch was carried through the streets of Vienna, there were violent Nazi disorders. From then on, and until Austrian sovereignty was destroyed, there were constant arrests and trials of persons accused of distributing illegal literature or staging illegal demonstrations, accompanied by numerous press comments of more or less violence.

The Austrian Government sought to counteract this pressure in some way by allowing activity in favor of a restoration of the Hapsburgs. On his visit to Vienna in late February 1937, von Neurath took occasion to register Germany's emphatic opposition to any such move. I remember von Neurath's visit very clearly. I had known him well and was on friendly terms with him while I was stationed in Berlin. At that time and after the Nazi came into power, he had told both Ambassador Dodd and me that he had remained as Foreign Minister when the Nazi came into power in order that he might exercise "a restraining influence" and render service to his country. This may have been the initial motive of von Neurath but he rapidly became one of the most complete and in some ways effective instruments of the Nazis. If he was not in accord with what they did, he was a perfect instrument in helping to carry it through.

Although I had known him well in Berlin and had on occasions been in his house in small gatherings, when he came to Vienna in 1937, there were a number of ceremonies and receptions given by the Austrian Government to which the Diplomatic Corps was invited. When he met me at these meetings he treated me with great coolness and even disdain. knowing my complete lack of sympathy with the program to which he had committed himself, and this manner of treating me with disdain and open disregard was probably his way of protecting himself and his own feelings of shame. Shortly after the visit of von Neurath, Chancellor Schuschnigg in my conversations with him told me that in his conversations with von Neurath, during the visit, Von Neurath had been just as bad as if Habicht or Frauenfeld had been talking when they had discussed the German demands for the inclusion of Nazis in the Austrian Cabinet.



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About the same time, Schuschnigg made some concessions to ease the pressure from the Nazis. In February, he appointed a so-called "Committee of Seven", consisting among others of Dr. Jury and a man named Tavs, to discuss "nationalistic ambitions" with him. In June, following the visit of Glaise-Horstenau and General Kraus and Leopold to Hitler in Berlin, and the increased Nazi activities following, Schuschnigg appointed Seyss-Inquart and Dr. Pembauer to devise a means whereby the "Nationalists" could be incorporated into the Patriotic Front.

Dr. Seyss-Inquart himself was a prominent Vienna Lawyer, who had long been an intimate personal friend of Chancellor Schuschnigg. The Chancellor himself told me on various occasions that Dr. Seyss-Inquart had frequently attempted to convince him that the admission of the Nazi into the Austrian Cabinet would be for the best interest of Austria, in that it would relieve the pressure on Austria by Germany, and that he (Seyss-Inquart) at all times professed a sincere desire to maintain the independence of Austria. I had little personal contact with Seyss-Inquart but I knew from various sources absolutely reliable that while Seyss-Inquart was making these protestations to the Chancellor with whom he had had this intimate friendship, and which the Chancellor repaid by his confidence, Seyss-Inquart was in fact completely insincere. He was known at the time, and I had knowledge of this, to be in frequent contact with many high officials of the German Government and that he had had contact with Hitler himself. My information on this point was obtained not only from sources in Austria but also from acquaintances in Germany. There is only one thing which can be said in favor of Seyss-Inquart at the time and that is that he perhaps did believe the German protestations made to him that Austria's independence would be respected. It is difficult, however, to conceive that a man who was known to have the legal ability and intelligence of Seyss-Inquart could have been completely taken in by these protestations. The probabilities are that at least from the outset he used his friendship with Chancellor Schuschnigg in order to help to destroy the independence of his country in order to make a place for himself.

I left Vienna on, July 11, 1937, in order to assume the post of Assistant Secretary of State in Washington. I, therefore, left Vienna before the final tragedy occurred. The final outcome, however, was then already foreseeable. From the tenor of the Italian Minister's conversations with me it was clear that Italy would not or could not any longer defend Austria militarily against German aggression. It was also clear that Austria could not resist the German pressures alone. Although France had given very definite assurances as to her interest in maintaining Austria's independence and England had expressed her interest therein, the Austrian Government was less and less able to be assured of real support. When the Austrian government could no longer expect the full military support of Italy, it knew that its fate was sealed. Hitler was, therefore, free to work his will in Austria. The only question remaining was when he would do it and when he considered it opportune. The work of disintegration, set forth in this statement, had had its effect. Early in 1938, apparently satisfied that England and France would not move and knowing that Italy could not and would not oppose him, Hitler struck the final blow at Austria's independence, bringing to a climax what must be recorded in history as one of the most insidious, dastardly, unjustified and altogether effective series of measures to undermine and bring about the end of a sovereign state, during the course of which machinations and operations the Nazi Government nevertheless consistently openly proclaimed its friendliness towards Austria and its intention of maintaining its respect for its sovereignty and independence.

(Signed) G. Messersmith

Subscribed and sworn to before me,
William L. Brewster, a Vice Consul of the
United States of America, duly commissioned
and qualified, in Mexico, D.F., Mexico, this
28th day of August, 1945.

William L. Brewster
Vice Consul of the United States
of America



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1807 -- PS

Extract from Jodl's Diary.

16.6.42.

The operational staff of the Navy (Skl), applied on the 29th May, for permission to attack the Brazilian sea and air forces. The Skl considers that a sudden blow against the Brazilian naval and merchant ships is expedient at this juncture (a) because defence measures are still incomplete (b) because there is the possibility of achieving surprise and (c) because Brazil is to all intents and purposes fighting Germany at sea.

4015.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1809-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Copy

Translations of General Jodl's Diary (Armed Forces Operational Staff) from 1 February to 26 May 1940

1 February 1940: The Fuehrer requests that Major Mieritz be sent from here in good time with special mission.
Col. Schmundt and Capt. Deyhle are back from the West.
Conclusion:
1) Morale and discipline - excellent
2) Tactical mobility is impossible because of the weather. One cannot withdraw more than 15 km. Army group B, on the contrary, deems weather excellent to overcome floods.
3) In all divisions, formerly committed in the East, the automotive position is very bad. Up to 40% are missing --each of these 40 divisions should be provided with up to 100 vehicles.

1700 hours General Jeschonnek.
1) Attitude of parachute units. In front of the Hague, they have to be strong enough to break in even forcibly. The 7th Div. intends to drop units near the town.
2) Political mission contrasts to some extent with violent action against the Dutch air force.
3) Walcheren Iceland will have to be occupied as soon as possible.
4) Immediate use requires some arrangements.
To be eliminated
Committment of K against Eben Emael
against bridge C
"Fieseler Stork" airplane in front of Army Group A.
The ground Forces already will take up position at dusk, if possible.
7th Fl. Division is to be in readiness, but will not take up position without further orders.
5) Question about general intentions? Time.
6) Is it not possible to tackle H alone; that would already be a tremendous improvement in conducting aerial warfare.
7) The Air Force wants permission to attack every kind of commercial shipping in the 30 mile-zone as well as everything anywhere making use of arms: French vessels, cargo boats.

2 February: Fuehrer is furious about presentation by Ordnance Bureau which needed 8 days to demonstrate to him-not by actual constructing but only theoretically-that the Czech 4.7 cm anti-tank gun is not useble with armored car 3.
Fuehrer decides as to Jeschonnek's questions of 1 February:
a) one has to employ in the Hague (d.H.) forces of such strength that they will be able to take over command there. In order to achieve that, a landing can be made in the center of the Hague.
Unlimited use of arms against airfields and antiaircraft guns is authorized.
Relative to an attack against all ships, found between the English East Coast and the English mine fields, as desired by air, the Foreign Office is still to be consulted.
and Admiral Chief Air Force, 1700 hours, states in that matter that al Schuster) he does not want any exception.
Italian and Japanese ships to be considered, which were sailing to Newcastle, until a short time ago.
(Translator's note: In German text, it is not clear if "Admiral Schuster" belongs to first or second phrase. My assumption is that the sentence should read as follows: "Admiral Schuster wants to bear in mind the Italian and Japanese ships, which were sailing to Newcastle, even a short time ago."-)
Important, that, though we signed an agreement about submarine warfare, we never signed one about manner of air war-

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fare.

Reported to the Fuehrer on 3 February

The Spanish have supplied a German submarine and convoyed a merchant ship from Bilbao to Santander.

Opinions of the newspapers: Spain is not ungrateful. Photos of Church Services, does Fuehrer agree with them?

The Foreign Office wants that within the 30 mile zone the Air Force shall not attack

a) Japanese and Italian ships
b) Danish Maltesian cross ships
c) all passenger boats which do not fire.

3 February: General Gerke: Railroads are unable to accomplish big tasks. No reaction to our transports. It seems possible that he got news about the reliefs. Opportune to keep movement going. Proposal to prepare again an A-movement to deceive the enemy. Empty rolling stock for 6 divisions available, organization transports are rolling. Will head of transportation service be able to release state of readiness, so that he can gather empty rolling stock for 4 days less. (Translator's note: Could be-that he can gather fewer rolling stock during 4 days). To consult Fuehrer. The chief of Transportation Corps West requires one week's time (225 trains). 70 trains are at the disposal of the armies.

315 trains are needed for second echelon. An order will be issued on this matter on D-day.

Afterwards remain 3rd, 4th, and 5th echelon.

Total 660 trains, including 80 for tanks and 70 for armies (among them 10,000 army cars).

Altogether 60 fewer trains ready than before.

Air raid protection

Ammunition train has no special protection. If machine gun car is added, the enemy flier will be aware of the fact, that this is an important train. The wave before the trains should attack the enemy plane with best results. Ammunition trains often remain for weeks, personnel for its protection become demoralized.

Ammunition trains, regulating stations and storage areas to be spread out and protected. Assembly stations are enlarged to assembly areas.

Maintenance units are kept in readiness in the most endangered areas between the Rhine and the line Kassel-Hanover.

Ruhr area has 15 different ways to give way.

Romania wants to get supply of rail track materiel (from Poland).

1340 locomotives and 40000 cars will be manufactured by the end of 1940 or maybe beginning of 1941. Stock 23000 locomotives, 8000 of which are heavy freight train locomotives for Armed Forces transports. This will only replace the loss.

4 February: Will the Court-Martial be re-activated?

Bodenschatz: Army Group C should not get out of hand (Keinen zauber machen) on minus-1 day.

Fuehrer gives his agreement that 225 trains in position of readiness may be used for other purposes by the chief of transportation corps until 12 February

Proposal to the Fuehrer about continuation of aerial warfare within the 30 mile zone. Fuehrer agrees with proposal and talks with the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the afternoon.

5 February; Special staff "Weser Exercise" meets and is welcomed by Chief of Armed Forces High Command, gets instructions.

Representative of Air Force is still missing.

6 February: Consumption of gasoline is not reduced. Stocks further diminshed by 30000 tons.

Deception even of Armed Forces High Command.

Office Reinicke and Thomas, that is to say Chief of Armed Forces High Command,

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W Pr that is to say Chief of Armed Forces Operational Office. Fuehrer leaves in the evening.

15:30 hours conference with General Jeschonnek, Col. v. Waldau and Col. Warlimont.

Air Force submits following questions:

Does X time remain unchanged? Yes. Deceptive action intolerable for Army Group C on A-1 day. Navy is not interested in Walcheren. Does not see any danger from the English side. New idea: carry out actions H and Weser Exercise only and guarantee Belgium's neutrality for the duration of the war.

Discussed once more affair Risberg with Chief of Armed Forces High Command.

8 February: Chief of Transportation Corps reports: Reich Railroads (Reichsbahn) now admit that they cannot handle any additional burden at this moment. They are not ready for war. Although they hardly got any military requests, they cannot supply the domestic economy right now.

It is only a question of engines, now, there are enough cars available everywhere.

Transportation 80% railroad
18% water transport
2% road transport

Transportation by water has to be brought to double of current capacity.

Radio receivers can be transformed into transmitters without particular difficulties.

Paris probably only by Gen. F....(Fermont?), rue de Louvre.

9 February: Chief of Armed Forces High Command received by Field Marshal Goering at 10 o'clock. Newspaper correspondents from the Protectorate may be sent to the West Wall (Fuehrer gave permission on 10 Febr.)

10 February: The difficult situation in Transportation is presented by me in written form to the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command.

13:00 hrs: Conference of Fuehrer with General Halder. Before that, inspection of 4.7 tank destroyer on tank I, chassis satisfying (befriedigt) (Translator's note: should perhaps be: befestigt--fixed).

Field Marshal has explained, that he is able to start at night anyhow. Flying into the area of .....from the sea.

During the world war, we have dropped 28000 tons. Thus, the Air Force does not want to anticipate, but prefers start at night. Planes shall not fly over Lüttich and Eben Emael in order to avoid any alarm there.

113000 trucks driving in the W.....

45,000 of them are suited for Armed Forces.

We are able to produce 4000 trucks.

Fuehrer states, all the iron has been taken away from Todt, even that put aside by him (he wanted to build 3000 additional ones).

<u>For the first time, the problems of transportation, motor vehicles and gasoline have been reported to the Fuehrer more impressively.</u>

Fuehrer agrees that the 225 trains for the first wave of Army High Command reserves may still be used further on by the Chief of the Transportation Corps.

11 February: First report from France about our troop movements and reinforcements in the west, which were terminated on 1 February already.

12 February: Fuehrer has a cold. No report.

13 February: The Army requested survey about the strength of the a armies and reserves, divided into batteries, battalions and tanks (Btn. Btlen u. Kampfwagen), induces the Fuehrer again to open the question of the center of gravity.

He says:

Most of the armed tanks (Geschützkampfwagen) have been directed to areas of secondary importance. Armored Divisions at 4th Army can do little in barricaded and fortified area.

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They will be stopped at the latest on the Maas river and must be withdrawn. The 16th or 12th Army will then miss them. One should lead them together in direction of Sedan. The enemy does not expect our main assault there. The documents of fliers, who landed, have convinced them (the enemy) still further in their opinion that our intention is only to take possession of the Dutch and Belgian channel coast.

A great number of tanks with 8th Tank Division does not seem necessary, a mechanized division in 3 or 4 parts with tanks assigned, should suffice. (It may be that this is a wish of the SSV division)

I hand over to the Fuehrer a summarized report, from which the great possibility for formation of a center of gravity south of the line Lüttich-Namur becomes obvious (at least 5 times the strength of the forces committed north of that line). I bring to his attention that the thrust against Sedan is a tactical secret path, where one can be surprised by the God of War. If the French attack from the south flank, we must veer to the south.

Fuehrer still thinks it possible, that the enemy will not engage the battle at all. Anyhow he will not do it automatically. After half a day the news from Holland and Belgium may be so threatening already that he will decide to stand still.

I don't believe it.

At 17:30 hours Col. v. Greifenberg and Lt. Col Heusniger are summoned to discuss these questions.

The Fuehrer disapproves of the wearing of regular army uniforms by persons who are not members of the army or the Fuehrer's Headquarters.

Recommends taking care of motor vehicles and fuel. Higher speeds result in doubled tire consumption.

Chief of Armed Forces High Command has a cold and will remain at home in the afternoon.

Have learned from Admiral Canaris that the echelon Reivel is to be put to use against the Caucasus with bulk from Bulgaria. The Air Force must explain with whom this false idea originated.

Inquiries made to the Chief of the Operational Division: whether there is a sufficient quantity of cloth for flags on hand? Change of position of the Army High Commands

Proper designation of own troops:

(a) front line: white
(b) in line of company CPs: swastika flag
(c) rear echelons: yellow rectangle.

Communicated Fuehrer's ideas to Col. Warlimont, von Greifenberg and to Lt.Col. Heusniger, at 17:30 hours. Instructions requested how we should proceed in future.

14 February: Ziegenberg plant cannot be completed before June due to technical difficulties. Emergency installation can be made ready for operation by the middle of March, but in that case the Air Force must be in Nauheim or on the train.

Colonel Sommandt must make a report on the distribution of personnel to WNV.

Copper advance from Wifo stocks now to WNV, later back to W Wifo.

Political action against the increase in frontier roadblocks (?) in Luxemburg.

Dr Dorpmüller telegraphed to the chief of the Transportation Corps: The condition of the Reich Railroads (Reichsbahn) requires that all non-essential transportation of the Armed Forces be postponed until warmer weather sets in.

15 February: The Fuehrer approves my article on the Finnish-Russian conflict. Is to be published in the Völkischer-Beobachter.

Backlog congestion of railroads increased by 200 trains.

Certainty that nothing will happen to W.

Instructions to the 18th Army.

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16 February: Corps on left flank of 16th and not 6th Army.
Landing at the Hague.....,
Capture Fort Hendrik
10 divisions of the 8th wave (must receive 3 batteries)
To the Chief of the Luftwaffe (taken care of) No off-standard types of vehicles must be permitted to be used at the front, as long as standard army models are still being used in industry, air raid protection.....
Speakers for troops, danger if commanders order the speeches themselves
Chief of the Armed Forces High Command.

WNV ) training of 300 to 400 men
) land postal clerks at Verst. (?)
)

from the Chief of the Air Force Not yet at present
6 new German consuls appointed in Scandinavia.
C. has given orders for large-scale preparations for offensive.
Fortress (Fest) drill of "Grafenwöln"
Special security by counter-intelligence co-ordination of press.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1809 PS
Continued

Brief reports in the provincial newspapers for enemy intelligence service. Request authorization to land at Lyden with a load of machines. Alternative preparations at C. should work in the same direction. Pr. Battleship "Repulse" in dock. Complete flop of this news report. Altmark in Bergen, British submarines expected. Burgedeyk subarine 48 Schulz unsuccessful (?) submarines.
Chief of Armed Forces High Command.
Press Conference at Foreign Office.
Chief of the Navy High Command wishes to talk the Halifax problem over once more and then speak to the Fuehrer. Now applications of mines only. Chief of Navy, High Command will takethis matter up again with the Fuehrer. L.ask what with report of General Staff officers.
17 February: Incident with tankship "Altmark", 6 dead, 4 seriously injured.
1700 hours: Newly promoted Commanding Generals and General Rommel at Fuehrer's table for dinner. (Geyr, Manstein, Schmidt, Reinhardt, Glumme). Complaints that guns in armored cars IV only . . . have not to 2000 m. After dinner Manstein reports his ideas about the operations of Army Group A. He says. the decisive blow will not fall west of the Maas, but it must be overcome between Sedan-Charleville. If the enemy crosses the river, we are able to beat him and cross the River Maas together with him. In the south therefore, we must have strong armor or none at all. That is in the rear cannot reach the battlefield in time.
18 February: On the basis of my discussion with Greifenberg on 13 February Chief of the Armed Forced High Command and General Halder reported to the Fuehrer the following intention:

1. To shift the demarcation line between Army Group A and B in line Luettich-Namur.

2. To employ stronger armored forces in front of the 12th and 16th army, weakening by the measure Army Group B (1st and 5th armored) and ground forces reserved (9th armored division)

3. Intention to go to the front any way with a very small staff one night preceeding A Day.

Fuehrer approves all three suggestions but insists that in distributing the heavy tanks III, III t and IV due consideration should be given to the tasks to be expected. That is to say not such a large number of heavy tanks as it is the case now with the 8th Armored and 6th Armored Division.
19.II Fuehrer displeased with behavior of Graf Spee crew on the Altmark. No resistance, no British losses.

Fuehrer presses energetically, preparations for the Weser Exercise Equip steamships. Put units in readiness. Will talk to staff.

In order to speed up preparations I advise to appoint one of newly promoted commanding generals with his staff as leader.

Fuehrer approves.

Chief of Army reports about problems of organization.
20 February Discussion and consideration how case "Weser Exercised" is to be carried through. Equipment is to be taken on board ships ahead of the troops. Designation of units depends on equipment on hand.
1500 hours discussion concerning that matter through Chief of Armed Forces High Command with General Fromm. Intention, to take two divisions with technical equipment as second wave.
21 February Fuehrer talks to General von Falkenhorst and charges him with preparation of the Weser Exercise. Falkenhorst accepts gladly. Instructions to each of the 3 branches of the armed forces.

Proposal from Fromm to use only units with German material. Therefore 7th Fl. Div., 22nd Division, one regiment of the 1st mountain division, Two divisions of the 7th wave, motorized brigade, (rifle brigade. 11 with armored car 1).

Fuehrer wishes that western connections of the "Spicherer Hoehen" be advanced and fortified with pillboxes.

Colonel v. Greifneberg transmits.
22 February: Fuehrer expresses his intention to go to Munich for Sunday.

At the beginning of operations he does not want to go to Ziegenberg but to the Eagle's Nest (Felsen Nest).

Colonel Juppe ordered:
a) to have a drawing made of the chain of command.
b) to consider, in what way the communications can be technically improved at the Eagle's Nest and vicinity.

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Commander Junge informed about proposed points in his report by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Important 3 points:
a) submarines into the Mediterranean
b) Esthonian submarines.
c) Discordance Navy - Airforce about the moment for the beginning of mine laying. Air force beginning 1 May with 3000, Navy with Heinckel 115 now, already 1845 hours Chief of the Armed Forces High Command informed.
Noon Todt reports to the Fuhrer concerning extension of railroad guages (?) (Schienenhoehen.) Fuhrer approves that extension (Anschluss) will be built according to schedule.
23 February: Navy High Command reports that during last night 2 destroyers were sunk by our own planes (Leberecht Maas and ..) Navy High Command stresses that this is the consequence of uncoordinated conduct of sea warfare, regardless whether it is conducted under, on or above the sea. One takes pains not to get excited; what would happen if there should be heavy losses. Fuhrer is furious. he is right. He says: "I would not say anything if the whole Navy were sunk in battle with the enemy, but it is inexcusable if that happens on account of lack of coordination!"
Gasoline reserve for motor vehicles.
24 February: Clear up, whether Navy is authorized to start already now with mine laying. Who will ask Duce, whether our own submarines have to enter the Mediterranean?
Engle informs about inquiry results Todt and Schmundt. The latter calls long distance from Munich. Fuhrer has ordered completion of Eagle's Nest for Armed Forces Operational Staff and Air Force. (Zug) (air group ?) Heinrich will have to stay east of the Rhine.
Army High Command as strongly as possible in forests. Officer from the General Staff and an officer from Intelligence Service are to go to Eagle's Nest 26 February. There to reconnoiter together with Todt.
1430 hours Orally transmitted to Chief of Operational Department and to Lieutenant Colonel Heusinger the matter. Chief of the High Command informed. Staff Falkenhorst arrives in Berlin and starts to function XXIst Corps.
25.II. Disturbing reports from Turkey. Communication apparently cut off.
Chief of Armed Forces High Command inform General Halder about Fuhrer's intention to have an Operational Staff of the Army High Command near the Eagle's Nest also.
26.II. Fuhrer raises the question, whether it is better to undertake the Weser Exercise before or after case "Yellow"
Chief of the Air Force charged with examining this problem. Fuhrer decides that Navy will have to wait with starting of mine laying by means of planes. until situation will permit large-scale employment of air force. (transmitted to Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.
Talked with Chief of Air Force and Chief of Staff about work on and about housing of Air Force near Eagle's Nest at the beginning. Air Force to Rodert or Muenstereifel or train nearby.
27 February 60 Tons of leaflets shall be dropped down in the near future. Fuhrer approves the schedule but will not issue proclamation to Armed Forces from here on A Day.
28 February I make the following proposition to the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command and after that to Fuhrer: Case "Yellow" and Weser Exercise have to be prepared in such a manner that they will become quite independent from another regarding time and strength. Fuhrer completely agrees with that proposition if there is any possibility for it.
1500 hours, staff Falkenhorst reports about preparations made so far. In this connection I explain to him the new basis of preparations.

Proposition for employment of forces

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| N | 4 airborne companies | 22 infantry divisions less |
| | 2 Mountain divisions | 2 division, 7th wave. |
| D | 1 corps headquarters | pol. (Police?) division |
| | | 1 div. 3rd wave |
| | | regional defense unit. |

It has yet to be decided, whether reinforcement 11th rifle brigade is to be directed first to group D and then to group N or to group N immediately
Proposition as regards combat planes too high.
29 February, 1500 hours Report of staff Falkenhorst with Kranke, Buschenhagen, Dnaus very satisfactory to Fuhrer. He approves the suggestions.
Fuhrer wishes also to have a strong group at Copenhagen and detailed elaboration in which way the individual coastal batteries are to be overpowered. Commander-in-Chief of Air Forces is instructed to make out immediately the order



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for Army, Navy, and Air Force, and Chief "HZ" order concerning increasing of the staff.

According to my proposal out fit transport ships immediately and with them bring horses over here from East Prussia.

1300 Hours, Order to Juppe to speed up construction of Eagle's Nest, 11 March according to interim solution (operational staff of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces in hunting lodge and at the same time permanent solution (Army High Command with operational department and parts of O.K.W. IV.

The same evening order concerning personal requirements of the staff and requisition to the branches of the armed forces.

1 March: Fury at Army High Command because transfers. Consultation with Chief of Armed Forces High Command. After my discussion with Jeschonnek scaling-down of requisitions.

2 March: Agreement with Army. Field Marshal rages and gets unfriendly towards Chief of Armed Forces High Command, goes to see Fuehrer at 1300 hours. During the afternoon new requisitions are put forward which are somewhat reduced after consulting with Army and Air Force.

1100 hours: Assistant Secretary of State Welles with the Fuehrer. The appointment of a new Minister for Ordnance is to be expected because Fuehrer is dissatisfied with production of equipment and munition.

Letter from the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command to the Field Marshall.

3 March: Fuehrer expresses his opinion about the necessity of prompt and strong action in Norway very sharply. No delay by branches of Armed Forces. Rapid acceleration is necessary.

Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force is against any proposition to subordinate Air Force units to XXI Corps.

Fuehrer decides to undertake Weser Exercise before case "Yellow", with several days interval.

4 March: Discussion with General Jeschonnek. All units of the Air Force are subordinated to X Fl. K. This receives its orders through High Command of the Air Forces, upon demand of the Staff of XXIst Corps

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1809-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(CONT'd)

JODL's DIARY

(Page 18 - 24)

Fuehrer orders that the Air Force shall provide the anti-aircraft battalion for the Weser exercise South.

3rd montain division to be in Berlin already on March 6th.

10.00 hours: Chief of the Air Force is informed.

13.00 hours: Chief WNV is charged with securing communications from Falkenhorst to us. The former has to go to Luebeck to the X Fl. K.

15.00 hours: Chief WNV is instructed to set up ... platoon company only after X-day. After that time, use expedients and send some men with the tactical troops.

17.00 hours: General Bodenschatz complains about exclusion of the Field Marshal from Weser exercise. He said that 110 officer of the Air Force had been consulted in advance. Such subordination (Unterstellung) is intolerable.
Mad at General K (Generaloberst K).
I certify this error.
Chief of the Armed Forces High Command is informed that General (Generaloberst) Rundstedt is supposed to feel sick. Intend to talk about it with Commander - in - Chief of the Army. If it is true, v.R. would have to be replaced by List in good time.

Himmler or Canaris are to provide personnel who are familiar with the Hague. These to Venninger and are grabbed there by Kiertz (werden dort von Kierutz gegriffen)
Proclamations: a) faked ones,
b) proclamations that everything is going well.

Student wants seperate proclamations for Holland.

March 5th:
15.00 hours: Big conference with the 3 Supreme Commanders about Weser exercise. Field Marshal vents his spleen, became he was not consulted beforehand. He dominates the discussion and tries to prove that all previous preparations are good for nothing.
Result: a) Stronger forces to Narvik,
b) Navy shall leave warships in the ports (Hipper or Luetzow in Trondheim),
c) Christiansand may be excluted, for the beginning,
d) 6 divisions should be figured with for Norway.
e) to get a foothold immediately in Copenhagen, too.

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After this, the following make a report: General von Kesselring, Student, Sp.... Richthofen, Captain Koch, 1st lieutenant Witzig about the case "Festung" (fortress" and actions by glider-borne troops against the bridges of Vroenhofen and Veldvezelt, furthermore against Fort Eben-Emael. Accusations are made that Army Group B is supposed to have said that is would take 3-4 days until forces of the army could attack the fort.

March 6th:

March 7th: Falkenhorst with Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. The preparations have now materialized. The Fuehrer signs a directive containing all changes subsequent to the conference of March 5th. Nothing is to be changed anymore now.

March 8th: Fuehrer wishes to have issued special orders for the Weser exercise in another form. They are to be divided into military orders which have to be made known to the tactical troops and into general instructions concerning actions of the Plenipotentiary of the Reich.

Fuehrer is outraged about report of the Field Marshal that the Army does not care for occupation of the area in front of the left wing of the Army led by Busch by airborne troops drapped from "Stork" planes, because divisions can get there only after several days. I object that it will naturally be better to employ these troops there, where armored divisions will arrive faster.

March 9th: Fuehrer is outraged when he learns that Prince Oskar is commanding officer of a regiment.
Schmidt was just about to suggest that he is should be given command of a division, but he managed not to mention it.
Buschenhagen reports to me about the preparation for W and submits the schedule.
Fuehrer does not appear at table.
In the evening of March 8th, I again bring seriousness of the gasoline situation to the attention of the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command. Nothing efficacious has been done to improve the situation. Industry regularly uses up 80.000 tons a month.
There is pressing need for the appointment of a Deputy-General for Fuel Economy (General von Schell).

March 10th: Fuehrer makes his wonderful speech in the arsenal on the occasion of Memorial day.
The news about the Finnish-Russian negotiations are very favorable, from a political point of view.

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The French Press rages about it because they consider it necessary to cut Germany off from the Swedish ore. In a military way, the situation is disturbing for us, because, if peace should be concluded soon, the motivation for the prepared action of the group Falkenhorst will be difficult.

March 11th: Fuehrer has objections against the iron cross in gold (color effect black-gold), as it means abandoning tradition. Rather create a new decoration.
On the other hand, he agrees with the Oak-Leaves for the Knight's Cross. The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command presents a list of the tanks at hand in the armed forces.

Fuehrer wants a basic ruling that only such people should be appointed in the Armed Forces and in Civil Service who lave no relatives abroad. The danger is too great that they will get into conflict with their own conscience. The schedule (for the Weser exercise) is presented to the Fuehrer. Also the special orders which the Fuehrer takes along.

March 12th: Fuehrer is very much satisfied with Ribbentrop's conference in Rome. Duce remains steadfast, wants to talk with Fuehrer personally next week on the Brenner. Conclusion of peace between Finland and Russia deprives England, but us, too, of any political basic to occupy Norway.
The preparations are ready to the extent that March 20th could be W-day. However, imfavorable ice-conditions compel postponement by 1-2 days.

March 13th: Fuehrer does not yet give order for "W". He is still looking for some justification.

March 14th: English keep vigil in the North-Sea with 15-16 submarines; the reason is doubtful, either to prevent a German action. Fuehrer has not yet decided, how to justify the Weser exercise. Wrong news report in the American newspapers.

Commander - in - Chief of the Navy is in doubt, whether it is still important to play at preventive war (?) in Norway. The question is, if it wouldn't be better to carry out case "Yellow" before the Weser exercise.
The danger in that case is that the English will immediately get a foothold in Narvik, because we would have started with neutrality violations

At noon, Colin Rosz visits the Fuehrer. Interesting explanations about Japan-China and Russia.

March 15th: Fuehrer wants the following material for the

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conference with the Duce on March 18th:
1.) Large-scale map of the distribution of our own forces (207 divisions).
2.) Maps about the distribution of enemy and neutral forces.
France, England, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Hungary.
3.) Terminal map of the Finnish-Russian conflict.
4.) Strength of our own Air Force.

13.30 hours: Lunch with Army Group A and with Chief of the General Staff.

15.00 hours: Reports of Army Group Commander and of Army Commanders, including Group Kleist; very satisfactory.

March 16th: Worries that the English will proceed against Norway, as overheard radio messages indicate.
As the English have retired 7 submarines, such an action does not seem probable any longer.
Army Group B reports about its evaluation of the situation and its intentions.
Detailed preparations are done very well. Displeasure about disconnection of the 4th army.
Mutual assistance is eliminated.
Lack of reinforcements, if the 6th army should be successful, after all. 6th army shifts its center of gravity to 4th Corps, and also draws 3 armored divisions of the 2nd echelon there.
10th and 9th Corps have no anti-aircraft protection.
Jeschonnek transmits that Army Bush needs another 25 "stork" plones.

March 17th: Fuehrer leaves at noon for conference with Duce on the Brenner.
News of the successful raid of the Air Force against Scapa Flow. Fuehrer is in high spirits.

March 18th: Nothing important.
Commander - in Chief of the Air Force (Chef L) is informed about the report of the commanders in the West.

March 19th: Fuehrer returns from the conference with the Duce becoming with joy and very much satisfied. Complete harmony, Duce is resolute; but he cannot fight a long war. Duce is highly impressed and agrees with the opinion of the Fuehrer's that the decision against France is being made. Whatever happens at the periphery in the meantime, is unimportant. At the end, Duce told Ciano: "My decision is made. Did you hear,Fuehrer?" Balkan should and must remain quiet. Complete understanding for Fuehrer's cooperation with Stalin.

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Fuehrer deeply moved by enthusiasm of the Tyrolians, England song ("We will sail against England ....."; translator's note).
Chief of Armed Forces High Command very much depressed because of Todt's appointment. I try to persuade him not to insist on the "agreement". It is much better, to separate the tasks clearly. The quests of the Armed Forces are laid down by the Fuehrer and transmitted to Dr. Todt by the the Armed Forces High Command. Dr. Todt has full powers to fulfil these requests.

March 20th: During the night, the English attack Sylt and Hoermann (?) No success.
At noon, the Fuehrer signs an order which appoints Todt as Minister for Ordnance.
Wédel is instructed by the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command to celebrate the 40th anniversary of service by the Commander - in Chief of the Army in a modest way only. The achievements of individual personalities can be appreciated only during or after the war.
In the evening, annihilating blow against an English convoy; 42000 tons of big boats (10-12000 tons) have been sunk.

March 21st: Objections of Group 21 (Grp. XXI) about the long interval between taking up readiness positions at 05,30 hours and finishing of the diplomatic action. Fuehrer rejects any earlier negotations, became otherwise calls for help will be offered, it has to be broken ruthlessly. The political plenipotentiaries will have to strougly emphasize the military measures taken, and will even have to exaggerate them.

March 22nd:

Reported to Fuehrer, how we want to proceed at the proposed discussions with the Italian General Staff. First, inquiry by attache in Rome, how they believe they can take some burden of us. Only then to proceed to possibility of an operation across the Upper Rhine. Discussion with General Staff only wonce our cards are on the table.

American newspaper correspondents inspect the small damage on Sylt.

March 24th - 25th:

Fuehrer at Obersalzberg.
No special events.
The English start to molest our merchantmen in the Danish and Norwegian territorial waters, or even fire at them.

March 26th :

The Fuehrer is back.

Discussion about deadlines for operations.
Fuehrer sticks to it: first Weser exercise, dark nights necessary for it. Thus about 4-5 days later. Commander-in-Chief of the Navy reports, urges to start laying minesswith planes, as 1270 mines will already be at hand by end of April. Fuehrer wants to think it over some more.

March 27th:

Our own submarine stranded near Lindesnais, one submarine and boat 37 come to help. Are to ask for permission to stay in Norwegian waters, if necessary, 230 Mi Discussion of the Fuehrer with Commander-in-Chief of the Army and of Army Group C. First and Seventh army.

Fuehrer explains his intentions with the Italians about to strike. Operational aim plateau of Imgres.

Deceptive actions of First Army in case of Yellow agreed to. Attacks proposed in case of 95th, 93rd, 75th, 268th, 215th, and 246th divisions. These have favorable effect, but deceptive measures of the 7th army will not take place, because of the preparation of case Brown (Ital.)

March 28th:

Duce attaches importance to General Staff talks, Graziani intends to send General Roatta to B. in April. The Norwegians are interning U 21, seemingly because of awkward statements of the commander, who did not claim engine trouble but mistaken navigation. But it may also be a mistake made in translation. Individual naval officers seem to be lukewarm concerning the Weser exercise and need stimulers. The three chiefs von Falkenhorst are also pondering matters, which are none of their business. Kranke sees more disadvantages than advantages.

In the evening, the Fuehrer steps into the map room and explains sharply that he will not be content with the Navy again quitting the Norwegian ports right away. Narvik, Trondheim, and Oslo will have to remain occupied by naval forces. Bad impression on ground forces.

March 29th:

Talk with Commander-inChief of the Navy, 1200 hours. Wants



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decision about commitment of air mines.

Fuehrer talks to him alone about retaining of ships. Admiral of the Fleet (Grossadmiral) rejects Narvik, but wants to examine, if Trondheim cannot be set up as a baseimmediately.

Commander-in-Chief of the Navy draws attention to the fact that they want fuel from him, because the army will run out of it by the end of Mai. This is the consequence of the wrong arrangements with Shell and not to buy in Mexico, like the Navy did it.

3 MM: Commander-in-Chief of the Force with the Fuehrer.

March 30th:

U-21 not set free yet by the Norwegians. Negotiations under way.

Fuehrer thinks about activation of another 10-12 new divisions. Where are the mortars committed?

L II ordered to present an outline of personnel and material, from which it could be determined, if and when new activations are possible.

March 31st:

Nothing of importance.

April 1st:

German fighters shoot 7 enemy fighters down. 1300 hours: Falkenhorst again gives general report about Weser exercise. 1300 hours: Breakfast, then discussion with all commanding officers primarily concerned.

Fuehrer has a very good impression about thoroughness of preparations.

April 2nd:

1530 hours: Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Commander- in-Chief of the Navy, and General von Falkenhorst with the Fuehrer. All confirm end of the preparations. Fuehrer orders carrying out of the Weser exercise for April 9th.

Protests of the commanding officer of the Air Force that some warships leave ports again right away, Fuehrer, too, disapproves of that, but does not want to intervene too much in anexclusive concern of naval warfare.

Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force agrees to plan to start aerial torpedo war (LM-Krieg) now.

Fuehrer wants that Luetzow shall be used for the transport of troops to Trondheim, in spite of tasks later on.

Find out, if it is not possible to land debarkation troops by fishing boat, in order to capture the bridge strong point of Vordingborg.

April 3rd:

Movements of the first 3 ships of the leading echelon (Ausfuhrstaffel) started at 0200 hours. Lt. Commdr. Junge reports at 1600 hours that the 3 ships have instructions how to act against Norwegians. I immediately instruct Councillor of Legation Hewel in order to inform the Foreign Minister what the situation is, in case one of the ships of the leading echelon should be examined by Norwegians. The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command also informs the Fuehrer at 1815 hours about it.

1830 hours Reich Foreign Minister informed by Fuehrer. Chief of Armed Forces High Command asked to join discussion.

April 4th:

Slight alarm, as some news from Norway indicate increased preparedness. Sweden has asked what preparations for troop shipments

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in Stettin are supposed to mean (boats under Reich Naval Ensign (Reichsdienstflagge).

Fuehrer drafts the proclamations. Piepenbrock, Chief of Counter-Intelligence service 1 , (Chef Abwehr 1) returns with good results of the talk with Quisling from Copenhagen.

News that 2 armored coastal vessels (Kuestenpanzer) are in Narvik and that 2 submarines are expected.

April 5th:

Weser exercise runs according to plan. Some alarm report from the source of a Belgian agent (V-Mann) appear unworthy of belief. The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command instructs General von Rintelen at 1930 hours.

April 6th:

Weser exercise runs according to plan. The high-pressure weather areee (Hochdruckwetterlage) over the Northern North-Sea, which was predicted yesterday, is not taking place and that favors the action of the navy. Fuehrer puts great imphasis on the fact that the families of all deserters will be checked carefully. Navy records long English radio massage, but is unable to decipher it.

1500 hours: General Gerke reports that his movements according to plan.

1600 hours: Talks in room of the Chief of the section for Foreign Countries (Chef Ausl) in presence of Chef L and Military Attache in Rome with General Marras.

1700 hours: Report that Luetzow is dropping out and can go to Oslo only, because ausciliary engines did not take part. Fuehrer agrees to this decision.

April 7th:

No disquiesting news. Hipper with destroyers seems to have been reported by an English submarine on Sunday morning, April 7th.

Prince Axel of Denmark has the intention to visit Field Marshal Goering on Monday.

April 8th:

Day of highest tension. The English put 3 mine fields in the Norwegian territorial waters and make that public.

Leading echelon is far off with several ships because of lack of pilots.

Only 1 ship near Narvik, everything else seems to be hardly beyond Bergen.

Boat Rio de Janeiro is terpedoed; since horses and men in uniform are landed, the impending project becomes known to the Norwegians.

Group Hipper gets into a battle with an English destroyer and her annihalates.

April 9th:

The surprise effect succeeds in Bergen, Trondheim, Narvik, and from the air in Stavanger, Not at Christiansand and in Oslo.

Bluecher sinks after a heriec fight, Commanding Admiral and Commander 103 (Kdr 103) of it, on deck up to the last moment, swim to land.

Luetzow has to take over lead and lower boats.

Heavy fighting for coastal fortifications. Fortress Christiansand fought to surrender by planes and Karlsruhe.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1809-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(cont.)

April 10th:

Chief of naval forces (Flottenchef) report 2 turrets gone, only 25 miles.

First breaking through of British destroyers in Narvik.

The Koenigsberg destroyed by enemy dive bombers. Bornholm occupied.

April 11th:

Luetzow on voyage home. Oslo hit by torpedo.

Norwegians warships are put into service.

Denmark does not belong any longer to jurisdiction of XXIst Corps. Railroads Oslo - Bergen and Oslo - Dronthein destroyed.

April 12th:

Still 6 destroyers left ready for use in Narvik, Freighter (Truckdampfer) Jon Wellan in N., otherwise no ship of the leading echelon. (Ausfuhrstaffel). Bulk of the submarines ordered outside the ports occupied by us.

Hundalen on the iron-ore railroad reached. Strong enemy air attack on Bergen.

April 13th:

..... Mountain battery flown to lake near Narvik with Ju 52 planes. Concentration of strong English naval forces near Harstadt in process.

Much booty in Oslo.

1650 hours naval battle in Narvik.

Battleships and Hipper arrived in home ports.

April 14th:

Dietl is not being attacked, but is seperated from Northern group. Terrible excitement. All details are to be ordered from here.

Steamship Baerenfelsis sunk in the course of attack on Bergen.

Another 3 air-force antiaircraft batteries on board ship torpedoed by submarine.

Fuehrer wants that Dietl tries to fight his way through to the South. I argue against this impossible idea.

April 15th:
April 16th:

Reproaches against the navy, especially

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because the battle was not engaged by battleships and because she does not succeed in speeding up the transports (Unjustified - I strongly argue against it).

April 17th:

During the night from the 16th to 17th Staff Officer from Admiralty arrives in Narvik and delivers written report by Dietl with call for help from Stavanger, since English naval forces are firing there. Air - Force notified. The Fuehrer again states in a temperamental way that the Gr. Dietl will have to march South or will have to be picked up. I advocate again in a very strong way that

a) a march South is impossible,
b) even a transport can evacuate only very small units, leads to the loss of many planes and breaks the moral backbone of the Dietl group..

They will continue to fight on the Swedish border for a long time. A thing should be considered lost only when it is actually lost.
1200 hours: Field Marshal with Jeschonnek. Has to be regrouped. Draws combat teams to Ralburg and transport groups back into Slesvig.
1530 hours: Admiral of the Fleet (Grossadmiral) with Admiralty Staff Officer from Narvik who reports verbally about his experiences in Narvik. The fight what order group Narvik is supposed to receive starts again. Each piece of bad news leads to the worst fears. Chief of Air-Force and of L IH (Army Air-Forces?) presents an evaluation of the situation I fully agree to.
I present to the Fuehrer this and the proof that we do not have enough longrange planes to pick up troops from Narvik, anyhow. Furthermore, an order which is delivered by courier and composed in our sense. To fight and tie down forces and not to give up.
Even a professor who knows Norway is fetched from Innsbruck and asked whether mountain troops can get from Narvik to Fauske is impossible judging from my mountain experience.
In the evening, the Fuehrer signs the order to Dietl which I had prepared, to hold out as long as possible.

April 18th:
Fuehrer is again calm. He gives orders to Captain von Sternburg in a way conforming entirely with our point of view. It might even be possible to change last night's order even more towards a sense of holding out and tying down forces.
The situation, too, looks better. The strong shipping losses of the English give them something to think about.
Quiet day which does our somewhat strained nerves good.
Sternburg leaves by plane with additional verbal orders.
1600 hours: General Jeschonnek shares the opinion we should to Bardufoss I refuse that. The troops cannot hold out.
Important is..... of the forces on hand, most important the thorough destruction of the railroad.
2) He expresses doubts whether the landing of the 22nd division which takes several days still runs satisfactorily in view of the preparations in Holland. I emphasize that we have to open for ourselves at least the entry into the Southern front of the fortress Holland and that we have to keep it open.
April 19th:
Renewed crisis.
Political action has failed. Envoy Braner is recalled; since Norway is at war with us, the task of the Foreign Offices is finished. According to the Fuehrer's opinion, force has to be used. Gauleiter Terboven is supposed to be put in charge.

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Field Marshal works in the same direction; he critizises that the behavior against the civilian population is not energetic enough, that is was possible to occupy the electrical plant, that not enough troops are brought up by the navy. The Air-Force cannot do everything.
Chief of the Armed Forces High Command leaves room, leadership chaos is again threatening, because even details are being overruled from above, and all orderly work of the competent military leadership(Navy High Command and Gr. XXI) is in vain.
In the evening, Terboven arrives; after supper, the Fuehrer instructs him alone.
It is doubtful, if it will be possible to limit him to the activity of a Civilian Commissar (Zivilkommissar), as I suggest it; we will have to talk to him personnally.

April 20th:

Fuehrer's birthday. Chief of the Armed Forces High Command and the Supreme Commanders congratulate. All the tempests has quieted down.
The movements to Oslo and Narvik make progress. No English landings.
Fuehrer has a discussion with the Field-Marshal, with Himmler, Terboven, Reichsleiter Bormann.
Before that, the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command has told the Fuehrer about all possible points of friction between an independent head of the government and the Military Commander in Norway. It seems that reports of the Air Force have induced the Fuehrer to form the opinion that the Norwegians are already conducting guerilla warfare and sabotage on a large scale.
Already on the 19th I contradicted such an opinion. We must not lead the Norwegians to passive or even active resistance, because that is precisely the aim of the English, after all.

April 21st:

Reports about landings on a larger scale near Andalsnes and Namsos become more tangible.
On the evening of April 20th, the General (Generaloberst) leads a long fight in order to word the text of the order to Therboven in such a way that the military necessities are taken into account.
Fuehrer would like to bring big vessel with personnel and materiel to Trondheim.
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy considers that to be impossible, especially now.

April 22nd:

Fuehrer is increasingly worried about the English landings and the consequent impossibility to set up ground communications with Trondheim. Without success, I compare the difficult situation of the English, who have no usable port and no airdrome attheir disposal.
The Field-Marshal somewhat quieter, in view of the good weather forcasts for the Air Force today.

April 23rd:

The excitement grows, because the 163rd and 196th divisions are making small progress towards the North and new bridge demolitions are being reported.
Fuehrer orders that no more motorized units. (11th rifle brigade) are to be sent to Stavanger, but immediately 2 mountain divisions instead. 3rd is to be brought up to full strenght again. 4 ships of the Iller class, in addition a 5000t steamer, later 2 larger East Asia boats are to be brought to Bergen convoyed by capital ships, in order to make the troops there mobile and ready for battle.
Forces in Narvik to be reorganized right away, in order to make the 3rd mountain division again steadfast for battle (kampffest).
No heavy artillery is to go to Norway for ground combat. The heavy battalion of the 2nd mountain division remains in the West, those of the 3rd mountain and 69th divisions are at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1809-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
cont'd

Fuehrer talks to Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.
a) Anti-aircraft reinforcements for Stavanger.
b) Bombers for ground fighting in Oslo,
Fighters " " " "
In the evening Lieutenant-Colonel von Lossberg returns from Oslo. He reports the favorable situation in a somewhat schoolmasterly way, but does not know any details. He brings along an English battalion order.
April 24th:
The situation looks much more favorable, a fast advance on the right flank is to be expected with mechanized Battalion Goering.
Lieutenant-Colonel Boehme confirms that picture after his return from the front. He brings collected orders of the captured English brigade detachment (Brigadekdo) along. Very great political success to be anticipated with that.
1130 hours: Field-Marshal reports, especially the situation in Trondheim. Lieutenant-Colonel Boehme, back from the battle field, reports favorably, rapid progress. Fuehrer regrets the halting of the 11th rifle brigade. I refuse to send them again now.
2300 hours: Schmundt back, even more favorable news. Boehme brings English orders for the entire project of Norway's occupation by the English. Complaint about lack of clear orders in the Air Force.
April 25th:
Optimistic mood continues. Fuehrer very happy about Schmundt's report and about exact orientation. Talks adversely about Lossberg to Bodenschatz; Lossberg's somewhat braggard report has created displeasure, although he did not know any details. Preparation of an action on the basis of the orders found on captured Englishmen.
Order to Kraatzer W Pr and Counter Intelligence Bureau for foreign countries (Amt Abwehr/Ausland).
Report by Sternberg about his task in Narvik.
Order by me to Chief L to give out a strong directive that nobody but Armed Forces High Command will give orders to Gr. Narvik. All men there are subordinated General Dietl exclusively.
The Belgian government resigned.
April 26th:
Suggestion to the Fuehrer to omit naval transport to Bergen with battleships and to bring these mobile parts of the 69th division back to Oslo.
Italian ambassador Attolico is recalled, because he does not take a clear pro-German attitude.

At 1500 hours the Commander = in = Chief of the navy reports.

Führer drops request for transporting troops to Bergen convoyed by heavy naval forces.

Commander = in = Chief of the Navy reports that everything which could be possibly thought of has been done for the safeguarding of ....., the Westwall will be extended ..... Sp ..... solidified.

Major Soltman reports about the interrogation of the Englishmen, and delivers additional important documents, among them the secret chain of command (Rangliste). At noon, the first prisoners arrived in Ber=lin.They are being interrogated in the Alexander Barracks (Alexander=Kaserne) and confirm the authenticity of the orders.All material is handed over to the Foreign Office.

Until 0330 in the Reich Chancellery, where Führer formulates the go=vernment statement together with Foreign Minister.It will be publi=shed on the 27th April :

Führer voices intention to start with case "Yellow" between 1 th and 7 th May. I point out that the Air Force and the Transportation Chief have to be initially notified 3 days ahead of time.

Motor column (Mot.Kol.) Fischer gets stuck 100 miles (Km ?) south of Drontheim in front of many destroyed bridges.

Group (Gr) XXI is crying for engineers and cross=Country motor ve=hicles.They will have to get along with their own engineers.After all, there are 19 engineer companies.Order to get all engineers up to the front.

April 28 th :
Advance movement direction Drontheim is halting. Nevertheless the E English are retiring far, according to their communiques.

April 29 th :
Führer decides:
Air Force can commit another 2 groups (now) in Norway on Tuesday and Wednesday, but must be ready for Yellow on Sunday.

Commander = in = Chief of the Navy commits heaviest flat ..... ..... for the safeguarding of ..... .... (?)

Emden still to be left in Baltic (O). Employ 2 East Asia steamboats for Oslo=transport.

Falkenhorst wants his motorized and mountain battalion with engi=neer platoon and battalion brought to Drontheim by air.

Commander = in = Chief of the Army has to be compelled first to set up the missing regiment for the 3rd mountain division so rapid=ly than it can roll immediately behind the 2nd mountain division.

Führer is worried about Drontheim and is not quite to be dissuaded yet from readying heavy artillery and also the 1st mountain divi=sion for Norway.



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April 30 th :
At 13.35 hours I am able to report to the Führer that line of communi=cation on land between Oslo and Drontheim has been established.Führer is happy with joy. At noon, I have to sit next to him.

The special communique is released right away. It remains to be decided now, whetherto keep in readiness the 1st mountain division (no) and heavy artillery (no). At 18.30 hours the report comes in that Dombaas has been reached , too, and that the enemy is retiring.Opdal on the railbroad Dronthaim = Dombaas also has been occupied. Führer releases order of the day to the soldiers in Norway.

May 1 st :
More big successes in Norway on land and in the air.

Führer orders that starting Saturday, May 4th, everything must be in readiness to start operations for case Yellow the following day, when ordered.

May 2nd :
Victory report from Norway. Pursuit direction Andalsnes. The English flee to the boats.Norwegians give up the Commander of Möron = , Romsdal, Gen, Hang, offers capitulation.

Field Marshal with Kesselring, Jeschonek, Student, Sponek again re=port about case "Festung" (fortress). It will be carried out.Landing on super=highway possible.

Difficulty is the strong echelonment in depth (Tiefenstaffelung) of the bridge position near Moerdyk and North of it.

Air Force is to get order on the 3rd at noon, whether to guide in (einweisen) or not to guide in, that whether means to use or not to use parachutists and airborne units.

May 3rd :
After evaluation of weather, Führer decides that X = day will not be before Monday, 6 May,

Air Force notified by code word "Do not guide in !" ("Nicht einweisen")

Field Marshal protests against draft of the comprehensive description of operations in Norway, where Armed Forces High Command is mentioned and where the name Pellengahr appears, but not Milch.

Führer rejects request of the Air Force to set up a listening post (Horchstelle) in the Causasus.

Prepared White Book concerning unneutral actions of Holland and Bel=gium does not seem to satisfy the Foreign Office completely.To my mind the material is more than sufficient.

A new order goes out to group XXI, especially as several foreign news reports say that Namsos, too, will be evacuated.

Dr. Todt transmits exact details.

May 4 th :
Reports about evacuation of Namsos by the English.Great successes of the Air Force against the English fleet. Battleship, heavy cruiser and de=stroyer, in addition 12000 ton transport sunk.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO.1809=PS
CONT'D.

Führer himself wants to make comprehensive report about the compaign in Norway.He is furious about it that people other than himself meddle with this reporting. He stated that the Armed Forces High Command is his staff. Führer designates Tuesday , May 7th as X=day.

The flanks of Gr. Dietl are being pressed hard in Narvik. I am afraid he remains too long in front.

May 5 th :
Field Marshal reports that an English 1500 ton submarine minelayer (1500 t =U=Minenboot) was sighted on the Swedish coast.He makes an onslaught aimed at subordinating all Naval Air units under the Commander=in=Chief of the Air Force.

Führer has finished justification (Begründung) for case "Yellow". Wednesday, May 8th, is designated as A=day.

May 6 th :
Detailed orders for May 8th for A=day are issued, and for transmission of the codewords Augsburg and Danzig.

May 7 th :
Führer railroadtrain was scheduled to leave Finkenkrug at 16.38 hours.

But weather remains uncertain and therefore, the order valid up to this time is rescinded. Next decision May 8th until 12.00 hours.
11.00 hours: The Field Marshal with Bodenschatz and Jeschonek at the Führer's.
15.00 hours: Admiral of the Fleet (Grossadmiral) Raeder.

Mine damage of the Gneisenau only very insignificant. One destroyer may be recalled from Drontheim, as a second one is still ready for sailing.

Führer very much agitated about new postponement, as there is danger of treachery particularly in brown leaflets (in braunen Blättern). Talk of the Belgian Envoy to the Vatican to Brussels permits the deduction that treason has been committed by a German personality who left Berlin for Rome on April 29 th.

Führer again emphasizes that the greatest achievement of endurance (Dauerleistung) is that of the foot=slogging combatsoldier (Erdkämpfer).

May 8 th :
Alarming news from Holland, Cancelling of furloughs, evacuations, road=blocks, other mobilization measures; according to reports of the counter=intelligence service (Abwehrmeldungen) the British have asked for permission to march in, but the Dutch have refused.

According to reports the measures of the Dutch are partly directed against the coast and partly against us. It is not possible to obtain a clear picture, whether the Dutch don't work hand in hand with the English or whether they actually want to defend their neutrality against the first attacker. Evaluation of the weather shows slow improvement of the whole situation, but developement fog in the next days still have to be taken into consideration.

Führer does not want to wait any longer.
Field Marshal wants postponement until the 10th, at least.

Chief of the Armed Forces High Command presses for early action.Führer is very agitated; then he consents to postponement until May 10th , which is against his intuition, as he says. But not one day longer.

[illegible] 371 [illegible]

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Departure of Envoy Kiewitz, who was scheduled to leave at 12.57 hours is stopped at the last minute.Is not supposed to leave until May 9th.

In the evening, I arrange the different telegrams with him.

May 9 th :
Führer decides to fall in on May 10 th for sure.Departure with Führer train at 17.00 hours.from Finkenkrug.

After report Jeschonnek that weather situation will be favourable on the 10 th, the code word Danzig is given at 21.00 hours.

The same to Commander=in=Chief of the Air Force.

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May 10th:

Morning arrival in Enskirchen still during darkness.
At 0530 hours in the Eagle's nest.

May 11th - 13th:

The operations take a course favorable beyond expectation. The Dutch offer desperate resistance. Bridges at Maastricht, and all bridges north of it, are blown up. Only the railroad bridge at Gennep falls into our hands undamaged. Fort Eben Emael is taken and the bridges in Nordeyk south of Dortrecht as well as the important ones over the Albert Canal west of Maastricht are taken over by parachutists and glider-borne personnel and are held by them. Airborne operation of the Sponek Division is met by heaviest resistance and is badly mauled. However, the different units hold out. On the M., the junction of the 9th armored division with them is effected. The citadel of Luettich is being broken into.

May 14th:

Order number 11 issued, which orders the concentration of all armored and mechanized units in front of the 4th army.
Holland capitulates.

May 16th:

Fuehrer insists very much on transfer of all armored and mechanized units from Army Group B to A, and on speediest bringing up of strong reserves behind the 4th and 12th army. OKH gives orders to pull these units out from B and to add them via F.....
to the fifteenth corps as new Armored Group Hoepner. According to report Reichau, there are indications that the enemy is giving up the Dyle Prosition or its Southern part, at least.
Therefore, Army High Command receives the option to carry out the junction of Armored Group Hoepner also in front, of Wanner, which the enemy seems to be evacuating.
Engel reports after visit at 4th army that that army has reached the French-Belgian border near Beauchmont, after a heavy tank battle.

1600-1830 hours: Field Marshal Goering with the Fuehrer, talk with Jeschonnek about forthcoming tasks of the Air Force and intentions concerning Narvik, utilizing the new airdrome near ...

May 17th:

May 18th:

Day of great tension. The commanders-in-chief of the Army has not carried out the intention of building up, as quickly as possible, a new flanking position to the South. Instead of turning march to the west. For this reason the 10th Armored Division and the 2nd and 29th Motorized Divisions are still entrenched in defensiue flanking positions.
The commander-in-chief of the Army and General Holdes are called immediately and ordered peremptorily to adopt, the necessary measures immediately. (see note in the files)
Chief of the Armed Forces High Command is Flying immediately by plane to General Rundstedt at Bastogne.

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I further give an order supplementing the previous directive. It veers the 1st Mountain Division and the rear echelons of the 4th Army, to the South and South-West for an attack.

19th May:
20th May:

Break-through becomes more and more clearly outlined. True, Army Group "B", respectively Chief are very vexed because their Armored Corps was taken away from them, but it was the right thing to do. On the 20th, we already have all armored and mechanized divisions, except the 9th one, in the middle of the break-through wedge. While we were still afraid on the 19th that the bulk of the French-English army might have escaped to the South, it becomes increasingly evident on the 20th that more than 20 divisions are still north of the Somme.

(cont.)

Now everything depends on sealing off the abbeville gap and the Army Corps Kleist reaches it in the evening of the 28th. In the forenoon of the 20th, at the Army High Commands conference, the FUEHRER declares the new directive for continuation of operations against the French Army.

I. Anihilation of the enemy north of the Somme and gaining of the sea coast,
2. Sudden thrust forward between Oise and sea, until SEINE river is reached,
3. Pricipal Attack on both sides of REIMS in SOUTH-WESTERLY direction, accompanied on the right flank east of PARIS by Heavy forces,
4. For secondary reasons penetration of the Maginot line by lighter forces between St. Avold and Sarreguemines indirection of Nancy-Luneville.

General von STUELPNAGEL is ordered, not to follow up anymore former intention, to attack the PLATEAU OF LANGRES with 20 Italien Divisions crossing the UPPER RHINE, The Italiens rather should attack the French Alpine Front and pin down French forces on the Upper Rhine. This they can prepare already now, without having commenced hostilities.

FUEHRER is besides himself with joy. Talkes in words of highest appreciation of the German Army and its leadership. Is working on the Peace treaty, which shall express the tenor only: Return of territory sobbed over the past 400 years from the German people, and of other values.

First negotations in the forrest of Compiegne like in 1918.

Britishers can get a separate peace any time after restitution of the colonies.

A special memorandum of the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command containing the emotion - chocked words of the FUEHRER when receiving the telephone report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army about the capture of Abbeville, is in the files.

21 May: Commander in Chief of the Army together with Halder reports at 09.45 about situations and later intentions. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army wants to operate by-passing Paris on the West with the entire Armored and mechanized units under Reichmann's Command, and in addition to this to attack with he wants to attack the Upper Rhine with 18 divisions. This would change the intentions of the Fuehrer, expressed by him on the 20th. FUEHRER declares his agreement for the time being.




Plan of Commander in Chief of the Army

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In the afternoon the FUEHRER explaines to Chief of the Armed Forces High Commadn and to me, that he had changed his mind. He believes, that it is wrong to employ all Armed and Mechanized Divisions West of Paris, that it would be better to direct the main thrast, also with the balk of Armored forces, to by-pass Paris in the east, (transmitted by me to Greifenberg in the evening).

Report of Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to Fuehrer at I200hours. In the afternoon Field Marshal and Jeschonnek.

The Fuehrer is a little nervous in the evening about the fact, that Infantry Divisons are not pushed forward fast enough. Possibly they are being held back in order to obtain improvements of position of the VIth and VIIthe Corps. If possible, one must employ transport groups.

Fuehrer stays in map room until 0130 hours.
22.May: Chief of the Armed Forces High Commadd decides after that to fly to Army Group A in Charleville early on the 22nd. Brings back a report much more pleasant than the situation map indicates. It becomes apparent that Headquarters of 4th Armym has ordered General Kluge to commit the Ist Army Corps south of the SOMBRE, so that it will be infront rather than in the rear of the French Border fortifications.

The FUEHRER approves at I300hours directive, submitted by me, concerning sparing of human lives of the IOth Army by disengagement from the Maginot line, cessation of unneccessary attacks, bringing up of all Divisions and mobile CHQ troops to the rear of 4th Army.

Sharp pressure of Army Group B towards the West. The Fuehrer furthermore approves commitment of an airborne Battalion already in readiness and of 2 companies Mountain troops, with short training, in Narvik.

Army High Commad draws a very optimistic picture of the situation at I700hours and intenden to continue at I200 hours on left wing West of Arras towards North.

But JESCHONNEK reports at I900 hours, that French tanks reached point 3 kilometer in front of Arras and were stopped only there by dive bombers, pursuit planes and Anti AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY.

24.May: The FUEHRER flies together with me and SCHMUNDT to ARMY GROUP A to CHARLEVILLE.

He is very happy about the measures of the Army Group, which correspond entirely with his ideas. He learns to his surprise that the Army High Command, without informing the Fuehrer and the High Command of the Armed Forces, has subordinated the 4th Army and a number of Divisions to its rear, to Army Group B. Fuehrer is very much displeased and thinks this regulation is a mistake not only in Military respect but also psychologically wrong. Commander-in-Chief of the Army is ordered to report, and shifting of dividisy-line is rescinded. New crisis of confidence, especially since Field Marshal reports earlier that an order of the Army High Command in no way pushes the Army Group B onward, but even invits it to make available reserves that can be spared.

For that reason a new order is issued in the evening
a) not to advance beyond the line Sandez-St.Omer-Graveline towards the East. Besides that each change regarding the Chain of command among the Armies is subject to approval of the Fuehrer.

The Fuehrer signs Order # 13 regarding continnation of operations.

He prohibits the proposed talk by General von MELSCH in the Foreign Office to foreign journalists about the warsituation, if necessary this shall be done by W PR ( Armed Forces Propaganda ?)

Very favorable report of the Commander in Chief of the Air Force and the Commander in Chief of the Army about the situation.

It becomes obvious, that the surrounded enemy is no longer capable of concerted action.

Situation in the East becomes threatening because of Russian concentration of forces against Bessarabia.

25. May: In the morning the Commander-in-Chief of the Army arrives and asks permission armored mechanized divisions to push forward from the High terrain Vimi-St.Omer-Graveline towards the West into the level terrain. Fuehrer is against it, leaves decision to Army Group A. They decline for the time being because tank, shall rest a while, to be ready for tasks in the South.

At noon, Commander of 22 Divisions (Parachute Divisions) Count Sponek, reports about his experiences between the Hague and Rotterdam. He had heavy losses, but accomplished the incredible.

Air Force reports great successes near Narvik.

The unlimited expansion plan of the SS causes general apprehension. Lutze protests in a letter to the General (Generaloberst) against mentioning of the Armed-SS (Waffen-SS) in Armed Forces High Command communiques. But this came from the Fuehrer in a proclamation to the troops in the Dutch theater of operations. General Dietl has received parachuted mountain troops in Narvik after a course of training lasting only 10 days, no losses.

26.May: In the morning the Fuehrer sends for Commander-in-Chief of the Army and agrees because 18th and 6th Army advance slowly and because resistance in the South in front of the 2nd Army Corps has stiffened, that tank units and infantry divisions push forward in direction of Tournai, Cassel and Dunkerque from the West, especially because the enemy on their part do not advance against the mountain positions but dig themselves in defensive positions and improve them. In conjanction their with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army reports about his intentions



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for further conduct of the operations (All sketch). Of the 12 Divisions, committed for the first push northwest of Paris, 6 shall join Army Group B (9th and 4th Army). First push possible around 31 May. 2nd push 6 to 8 days later (Main attack A and B), 3rd push at C will be in readiness starting 15 June.

The problem Paris is to be considered, not only from a military, but also from a political point of view.




If Paris is surrendered or if revolutionary features come to the fore, then Paris must be occupied at once. If Paris is defended, we will strongly disengage ourselves for the time being.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 1809-PS

November, 23, 1945

I PAUL M. FREEDMAN, S/SGT., 33199122 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1809-PS.

PAUL M. FREEDMAN
S/SGT.
33199122.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1877-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

(Page 46760 to Page 46761, Line 18)

Report RAM 19/41

REPORT ON THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (RAM) AND THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA IN BERLIN ON 29 MARCH 1941.

---

The RAM resumed the preceding conversation with MATSUOKA about the latter's impending talks with the Russians in Moscow, where they had left off. He expressed the opinion, that it would probably be best, in view of the whole situation, not to carry the discussions with the Russians too far. He did not know how the situation would develop. One thing, however, was certain, namely that Germany would strike immediately, should Russia ever attack Japan. He was ready to give MATSUOKA this positive assurance, so that Japan could push forward to the South on SINGAPORE, without fear of possible complications with Russia. The largest part of the German army was anyway on the Eastern frontiers of the Reich, and fully prepared to open the attack at any time. He (the RAM) however believed, that Russia would try to avoid developments leading to war. Should Germany however enter into a conflict with Russia, the USSR would be finished off within a few months. In this case, Japan had of course even less reason to be afraid than ever, if it wants to advance on Singapore. Consequently, it need not refrain from such an undertaking because of possible fears of Russia.

He could not know of course, just how things with Russia would develop. It was uncertain, whether or not STALIN would intensify his present unfriendly policy against Germany. He (the RAM) wanted to point out to MATSUOKA in any case, that a conflict with Russia was anyhow within the realm of possibility. In any case, MATSUOKA could not report to the Japanese Emperor upon his return, that a conflict between Russia and Germany was impossible. On the contrary, the situation was such, that such a conflict, even if it were not probable, would have to be considered possible.

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(Page 46767 to Page 46769, Line 18)

Next, the RAM turned again to the Singapore question. In view of the fears, expressed by the Japanese of possible attacks by submarines, based on the PHILLIPPINES and of the intervention of the British Mediterranean and Home fleets, he had again discussed the situation with GENERAL-ADMIRAL RAEDER. The latter had stated, that the British Navy during this year would have its hands so full in the English home waters and in the Mediterranean, that it would not be able to send even a single ship to the Far East. General-Admiral RAEDER had described the U.S. submarines as so bad, that Japan need not bother about them at all.

MATSUOKA replied immediately, that the Japanese Navy had a very low estimate of the threat from the British Navy; it also held the view, that in case of a clash with the American Navy, it would be able to smash the latter without trouble. However it was afraid, that the Americans would not take up the battle with their fleet; thus the conflict with the United States might perhaps be dragged out to five



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years. This possibility caused considerable worry in Japan.

The RAM replied, that America could not do anything against Japan in the case of the capture of Singapore. Perhaps for this reason alone, ROOSEVELT would think twice before deciding on active measures against Japan. For while on one hand he could not achieve anything against Japan, on the other hand there was the probability of losing the Philippines to Japan; for the American president, of course, this would mean a considerable loss of prestige, and because of the inadequate rearmament, he would have nothing to offset such a loss.

In this connection, MATSUOKA pointed out, that he was doing everything to reassure the English about Singapore. He acted as if Japan had no intention at all regarding this key position of England in the EAST. Therefore it might be possible, that his attitude toward the British would appear to be friendly in words and in acts. However Germany should not be deceived by that. He assumed this attitude not only in order to reassure the British, but also in order to feel the pro-British and pro-American elements so long, until one day he would suddenly open the attack on Singapore.

In this connection, MATSUOKA stated, that his tactics were based on the certain assumption, that the sudden attack against Singapore would unite the entire Japanese nation with one blow. ("Nothing succeeds like success," the RAM remarked.) He followed here the example of the words of a famous Japanese statesman, addressed to the Japanese Navy at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war: "You open fire, then the nation will be united". The Japanese need to be shaken up to awaken. After all, as an oriental, he believed in the fate, which would come, whether you wanted it or not.

X X X X X X X X

Page 46775, Line 18, to page 46777, Line 20)

MATSUOKA then introduced the subject of German assistance in the blow against Singapore, a subject, which had been breached to him frequently, and mentioned the proposal of a German written promise of assistance.

The RAM replied, that he had already discussed these questions with Ambassador OSHIMA. He had asked him to procure maps of Singapore in order that the FUHRER - who probably must be considered the greatest expert on military questions at the present time - could advise Japan on the best method of attack against Singapore. German experts on aerial warfare, too, would be at her disposal; they could draw up a report, based on their European experiences, for the Japanese on the use of dive-bombers from airfields in the vicinity against the British fleet in Singapore. Thus the British fleet would be forced to disappear from Singapore immediately.

MATSUOKA remarked, that Japan was less concerned with the British fleet, than with the capture of the fortifications.

The RAM replied, that here too, the FUHRER had developed new methods for the German attacks on strongly fortified positions, such as the Maginot Line and Fort Eben Emael, which he could make available to the Japanese.

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MATSUOKA replied in this connection, that some of the younger, expert Japanese Naval officers, who were close friends of his, were of the opinion, that the Japanese naval forces would need three months until they could capture Singapore. As a cautious foreign minister, he had doubled this estimate. He believed, he could stave off any danger which threatened from American, for six months. If, however, the capture of Singapore required still more time and if the operations would perhaps even drag out for a year, the situation with America would become extremely critical and he did not know as yet how to meet it.

If at all avoidable, he would not touch the Netherland East Indies, since he was afraid that in case of a Japanese attack on this area, the oilfields would be set afire. They could be brought into operation again only after 1 or 2 years.

The RAM added, that Japan would gain decisive influence over the Netherland East Indies simultaneously with the capture of Singapore.

X X X X X X X X X

Berlin, the 31st of March 1941.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1877-PS

I, MARTIN L. LOWENTHAL, T/5, 33378374, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1877-PS

MARTIN L. LOWENTHAL,
T/5, 33378374

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H1166-0327

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. PS-2261
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

C O P Y.

The Reichs Minister of War and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
No. 1820/35 Top Secret L. II a

Berlin, 24 June 1935
TOP SECRET

To
The Supreme Commander of the Army
The Supreme Commander of the Navy
The Supreme Commander of the Air Forces

In the appendix I transmit one copy each of the law for the defense of the Reich of the 21 May 1935 and of a decision of the Reichs Cabinet of 21 May 1935 concerning the Reichs defense council. The publication of the Reich defense law is temporarily suspended by order of the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor.

The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor has nominated the President of the directorate of the Reichsbank Dr. Schacht to be "plenipotentiary-general for war economy".

I request that the copies of the Reich's defense law needed within the units of the armed forces be ordered before 1 July 1935 at armed forces office (L) where it is to be established with the request that the law should only be distributed down to Corps Headquarters outside of the Reichsministry of war.

I point out the necessity of strictest secrecy once more.

(Signed) von Blomberg.

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No. 1820/35 L Top Secret II a

Berlin, 3 Sept 1935

To
Defense-Economic Group G-3
Copy

transmitted

(signed) Jodl



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H1166-0328



COPY.

Reichs' Defense Law
of 21 May 1935

The Reichs Cabinet has enacted the following law that is hereby made public:

Part I State of Defense

ARTICLE 1.

The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor can declare a state of defense for the area of the Reich in case danger of war threatens.

ARTICLE 2.

(1) With the declaration of a state of defense the entire power of execution devolves upon the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor. The Reichsminister of war exercises it by his orders.

(2) The Reichsminister is empowered in the carrying out of the power of execution to issue legal regulations which may deviate fro existing laws. He can, in order to enforce his regulation, threaten punishments and set up special courts.

ARTICLE 3.

(1) The Reichsministers are to observe the instructions of the Reichsminister of war. They remain the highest Reich authorities within their realm of activity.

(2) The Reichsminister will in case of a state of defense effect the necessary measures and is empowered to issue legal regulations which may deviate from existing laws.

Part II Mobilization

ARTICLE 4.

(1) If conflict with an external enemy becomes unavoidable, the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor can order mobilization.

(2) The ordering of mobilization includes in itself the declaration of a state of defense according to Part I, in case the latter is not already proclaimed, without prejudice to the directive of Article Six.

(3) With the ordering of mobilization a state of war in the definition of this law begins.

ARTICLE 5.

The Reichsministers will effect the neccessary measures in case of mobilization and are empowered to issue legal regulations which may deviate from existing laws.



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ARTICLE 6.

(1) The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor will appoint a plenipotentiary General for war economy to direct the entire war economy.

(2) It is the task of the plenipotentiary-general for war economy to put all economic forces in the service of carrying on the war and to secure the life of the German people economically.

(3) Subordinate to him are:

The Reichsminister for economy
The Reichsminister for food and agriculture
The Reichs labor minister
The Reichs forest master and all Reichs' agencies immediately subordinate to the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor.

Furthermore the financing of the war effort, (in the province of the Reichs finance ministry and of the Reichsbank) will be carried on under his responsibility.

(4) The plenipotentiary-general for war economy is authorized, within his realm of responsibility, to issue legal regulations, which may deviate from the existing laws.

Part III Setting of penalties and Conclusion

ARTICLE 7.

Whoever purposely or carelessly acts in violation of a decree issued by authority of this law will be, insofar as a severer punishment is not stipulated according to other directives, punished wit jail and with fine or with one of these penalties.

ARTICLE 8.

The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor will issue the necessary legal and administrative directives for carrying out of this law.

Berlin, 21 May 1935

The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor
(signed) ADOLF HITLER
The Reichsminister of war
(signed) VON BLOMBERG
The Reichsminister of the Interior
(signed) FRICK

Note
on the law for the defense of the Reich
of 21 May 1935

The publication of the law for the defense of the Reich of 21 May 1935 will be suspended. The law became effective 21 May 1935.

The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor
(signed) ADOLF HITLER



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COPY.

Decision of the Reichscabinet of 21 May 1935
on the Council for the defense of the Reich.

Supplementing the decision of the Reichscabinet of 4 April 1933 and 13 Dec.34 on formation of a council for defense of the Reich the Reichscabinet has made the following decision:

I.) The plenipotentiary-general for war economy appointed by the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor will begin his work already in peacetime. At the suggestion of the chairman of the Council for the defense of the Reich, he will direct the economic preparations for war, insofar as they do not, in reference to the armament industry fall into the province of the Reichs'Ministry of war. In case of mobilization the following are subordinated to him:

Reichsministry of economic affairs
Reichsministry for food and agriculture
Reichsministry of Labor
Reichs forest-master and all Reichsoffices immediately subordinate to the Fuehrer.

In case of mobilization he will direct and be responsible for the financing of the war effort (in the province of the finance Ministry and the Reichsbank).

These ministries and the Reich's authorities are bound already in time of peace to observe his recommodations for the preparation of a war economy and the financing of the war-effort.

II.) The Reichsminister of war and the plenipotentiary for war economy will effect the preparations for mobilization in closest cooperation on both sides.

III.) The plenipotentiary-general for war-economy will be a permanent member of the Reich Defense Council (Reichsverteidigungsrat). Within the working committee he represents through his leadership staff the interests of war economy. The department heads (Referenten) for the defense of the Reich of the Ministries mentioned in Point I are bound by the recommendation of this leadership staff.

Foundation:

The State of War, an institution of the old law, as it was established in the old Reichsconstitution of 1871, the Prussian law on the state of siege of 4 June 1861 and the Bavarian law on the state of war of 5 Nov. 1912, have been only incompletely replaced in Article 48 of the Reichsconstitution of 11 August 1919. Moreover, the provisions of Article 48 no longer correspond to the actual legal conditions.

The new law for the defense of the Reich should create clear legal bases for the transfer of the whole machinery of state from a state of peace to one of war. In this connection it was to be noted that a state of war can begin unexpectedly or from a state of foreign political tension. Since the time of such tension must be utilized as far as foreign political relations will allow in order to create a readiness for war in time, the law for the defense of the Reich provides two steps for the transfer from state of peace to state of war:

H1166-0331



1. The state of defense
2. The mobilization

For both steps of war preparation, the law gives the legal basis, upon which the individual measures of the Reichsdepartments can be built up as the council for the defense of the Reich instructs.

It is to be mentioned in regard to the provisions of the law in detail:

To Article 2

The exercise of the power of execution by the Reichsminister of war under the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor should emphasize the pressing necessity of all demands of the immediate conduct of the war and should guarantee their fulfillment.

To Article 4, Section 3

In numerous laws special provisions for war are contained. It is therefore necessary, to establish the time of the commencement of a state of war, so as to create clear conditions for the administration of justice etc. Since, however, in a future war official declarations of war are not to be expected, as a result of which Article 42 Section 2 of the Reichsconstitution also is obsolete, the beginning of a state of war is to be considered as being at the same time as the beginning of the mobilization.

To Article 6

The experiences of the great war have demonstrated the necessity of including during a war the entire economy and the financing of the conduct of the war under unified leadership. The plenipotentiary general for war-economy should according to the will of the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor take over the responsible leadership and stands thereby independently along side the Reichsminister of war, the possessor of the power of execution, and responsible for his realm of activity under the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor.

Certificate of Translation
Of Document 2261-PS 4.1.46

I, Fred Niebergall, 2nd Lt. Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; adn that the above is a correct and true translation of Document NO.PS-2261.

Fred Niebergall
2nd Lt. Inf
O-1335567

H1166-0332



TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT EC-194
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

COPY

The Chief of the
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Fuehrer's Hq, 31 October 1941.

WFSt/Abt.L (II Org/IV qu
No. O 2588/41 Secret

Secret

Subject: Use of prisoners of war in the war industry.

The lack of workers is becoming an increasingly dangerous hindrance for the future German war and armament industry. The expected relief through discharges from the armed forces is uncertain as to extent and date, however, its possible extent will by no means correspond to expections and requirements in view of the great demand.

The Fuehrer has now ordered that even the working power of the Russian prisoners of war should be utilized to a large extent by large scale assignment for the requirements of the war industry. The prerequisite for production is adequate nourishment. Also very small wages are to be planned for the most modest supply with a few consumers' goods (Genussmittel) for every day's life, eventual rewards for production.

For the Arbeitseinsatz, following may be considered for example:

I. Armed Forces.

a.) Clearing and construction units of all kinds in the occupied Eastern territories.

b.) Work and construction battalions in the other occupied territories and in Germany.

c.) Closed units of all kinds to relieve soldiers in labor service.

II. Construction and Armament Industry.

a.) Work units for constructions of all kind, particularly for the fortification of coastal defenses (concrete workers, unloading units for essential war plants).

b.) Suitable armament factories which have to be selected in such a way that their personnel should consist in the majority of prisoners of war under guidance and supervision (eventually after withdrawal and other employment of the German workers.)

III. Other War Industries.

a.) Mining as under II b.

b.) Railroad construction units for building tracks, etc.

c.) Agriculture and forestry in closed units.

The utilization of Russian prisoners of war is to be regulated on the basis of above examples by:

To I. The armed forces.
To II. The Reich Minister for Arms and Ammunition and the Inspector General for the German road system in agreement with the Reich Minister for Labor and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (Wi Rü Amt).

H1166-0333





Deputies of the Reich Minister for Arms and Ammunition are to be admitted to the prisoner of war camps to assist in the selection of skilled workers.

To III. The Reich Minister of Labor. Limitations are:

1.) The securing of guards to protect the German people from dangers.

2.) Housing in closed camps.

3.) Securing adequate nourishment.

The observance of the counter-intelligence regulations which apply for the use of prisoners of war will be supervised by military counter-intelligence agencies as until now.

OKW (AWA) will furnish the Reich Minister for Labor with blueprints based on professional selection for the appropriate use of labor and will also permanently provide workers for assignment to the Arbeitseinsatz.

Furthermore the Supreme Commander of the Army is asked to take the necessary measures for the recruiting of volunteer labor in the Eastern operational zone in cooperation with the Reich Minister of Labor.

(Signed) Keitel

Distribution:

Ob.d.H/Org. Abt.
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Reichsarbeitsministerium
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W H

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. EC-194

23 November 1945.

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt (jg), USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. EC-194.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE,
Lt (jg), USNR,
391590.

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H1166-0334

TC 31.

[English Translation]

~~Avskrift~~ Copy

GERMAN LEGATION

AIDEMÉMOIRE

The German Reich Government is determined, in view of the friendly relations which exist between Norway and Germany, under no circumstances to prejudice the inviolability and integrity of Norway and to respect the territory of the Norwegian State. In making this declaration the Reich Government naturally expects, on its side, that Norway will observe an unimpeachable neutrality towards the Reich and will not tolerate any breaches of Norwegian neutrality by any third party which might occur. Should the attitude of the Royal Norwegian Government differ from this so that any such breach of neutrality by a third party recurs, the Reich Government would then obviously be compelled to safeguard the interests of the Reich in such a way as the resulting situation might dictate.

OSLO, 2nd September 1939.

This is to certify that the above is a tryc copy of the Aide-Mémoire which was handed to the Norwegian Foreign Minister by the German Minister in Oslo on the 2nd of September 1939.

OSLO, 3rd October 1945.

(signed) TRYGVE LIE

Foreign Minister.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-194
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Reich Minister for War and
C in C of the Armed Forces.

Berlin W.35. 6 March 1936
Tirpitzufer 72-76
Telephone Bl Kurfürst 8191

WA No. 415/36 Most Secret.L.Ib.
S.O. only

Re: C in C Navy AI Op. Most Secret. dated 6 March 1936

Written by an Officer.

C in C Navy
B. Nr. AI op 16/36

To be shown to
C in C Navy
(Pencil note)

(illegible notations)

To:
C in C Navy

The Minister has decided the following after the meeting:

1) The inconspicuous air reconnaissance in the German Bay, not over the line Texel-Doggerbank, from midday on Z-day onward, has been approved. C in C Air Force will instruct Air Command VI from midday 7 March to hold in readiness single reconnaissance aircraft to be at the disposal of the C in C Fleet.

2) The Minister will for the present defer the decision to set up a U-boat reconnaissance zone, until the evening of 7 March. The immediate transfer of U-boats from Kiel to Wilhelmshaven has been approved.

3) The proposed advance measures for the most part exceed Degree of Emergency A and therefore are out of the question as the first counter-measures to be taken against military preparations of neighbouring states. It is far more essential to examine the advance measures included in Degree of Emergency A, to see whether one or other of the especially conspicuous measures could not be omitted.

By order
Sgd. KEITEL

- - - - - - - - -

Most Secret

Top Military Secret

Berlin 6.3.36

C in C Navy
A.1. op. 100 Most Secret.
S.O. only

Written by an Officer.

(illegible notations)

Special Order.

1) This order will be forwarded by an authorized officer who has been instructed at the same time to pass on verbally procedures pertaining to this order.

2) Until special orders are issued, no measures showing military preparations are to be taken except those instituted by me personally.

3) MEASURE "LUDOLF"

Inconspicuous air reconnaissance in German Bay,



H1166-0335

carried out under S.O. Naval Air Forces in accordance with the instructions given by Fleet Command. Not over the line from Texel to Doggerbank and out of sight of land.

C.in C Air Force will issue instructions to Air Command VI and to S.O. Naval Air Forces, who will carry out the duties allotted by the Fleet.

MEASURE "URIAN"

Setting up a U-boat reconnaissance line F.O. U-boats in accordance with the instructions given by Fleet Command. Out of sight of land and not further west than Hook of Holland - Lowestoft. The measure is to be carried out unseen.

4) After the entry has been made, (7 March - Z day 1200) the following measures are to be taken:

a) There must be a staff-officer continually on watch at all higher staffs. The C.O.'s must be available at all times.

b) Military leaders as far as and including Flotilla-leaders are to be informed verbally and in detail, and the importance is to be stressed of keeping to the regulations issued by me in this order.

c) As far as this is possible by inconspicuous measures such taking over fuel, remaining in port instead of putting out to sea etc, the state of readiness may be increased.

d) Until further orders are issued, no measures except possible safety measures considered to required, must be taken which could show outwardly any military preparations in case a conflict should arise, i.e. recall from leave, strengthening the watches, cessation of dockyard work, conspicuous movement of troops.

5) After the entry has been made the attention of the troops is to be drawn to the significance of the day by means of the Führer's speech and the official publications. Troops are to be informed that I expect the Navy responsibly conscious of the leader's decision, not to give a false picture to foreign nations of the Führer's intentions and thereby render peaceful action more difficult, by celebrating and making a show of their war enthusiasm.

The rtroops are to be instructed by their immediately superior officer. No special concentrations under higher ranking Commanding Officers are to take place.

6) As soon as specific advance measures are necessitated by the fact that neighbouring countries have become aware that military measures are being taken, special instructions will be issued. They will presumably be limited at first to the following measures, which can be prepared in great secrecy by the staffs:

a) Increasing the state of readiness of the Fleet (fuel, provisions, materials, personnel).

b) Concentraion in assembly ports,(focal point the North Sea as nothing can be expected at first from Russia owing to the ice).

Equipping with "DE" for warfare in the Atlantic.

c) Equipping of U-boats for duties in distant sea-areas (focal point Channel, possibly single boats in the Eastern Baltic).



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H1166-0337



d) Strengthening the air defense by manning the most important batteries with active personnel, drawing on the local reserve personnel.

e) Preparation of important auxiliary ships (mine-layers, etc).

f) Increased measures for guarding (Reinforced Frontier Guard Control Service (costal) etc).

g) Preparation of protective barrages (keeping ready materials, preparing orders). Cessation of dockyard work and/or speeded- up completion of ships lying in the dockyard.

h) Assignment of reconnaissance staffels of the operational Air Force. Confidential instruction to shipping companies to delay German ships putting out to presumably enemy countries, until the situation permits a clear ruling being made.

7) Queries from shipping concerns, regarding the attitude to be assumed, can be answered as follows until new orders of 7 March. 1200 are issued:

At present, there is no cause to take special precautionary measures or to alter sailing plans.

C-in-C Navy

(illegible notations)

Distributions

| | |
|---|---|
| Flotilla leader | Copy No. 1 |
| Admiral Commanding in the Baltic | Copy No. 2 |
| " " " " North Sea | " " 3. |

- - - - -- - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-194

12 November 1945

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No C-194.

ERNST M. COHN
Pfc. 33925738

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

H-1166

File Copy
Used May 13, 1946

BRITISH DOCUMENT BOOK

ERICH RAEDER

No. 10 A (ENGLISH)

H1166-0338